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ABSTRACT
Chapter 121B of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
enacted in 1961, created a program of state aid for urban industrial land devel-
opment projects which were ineligible for federal urban renewal grants. Pursuant
to the provisions of 121B, the Bureau of Urban Renewal in the Department of
Conmunity Affairs (DCA) has provided local redevelopment authorities with the fol-
lowing tools for undertaking industrial land development projects: (1) eminent
domain powers, (2) advances for up to 75% of the costs of planning, and (3) grants
for up to 50% of the difference between the costs of assembling and preparing land
for industrial use and the proceeds from property disposition.
This thesis was comissioned by DCA to investigate the history, status, and
impacts of state-aided industrial projects and provide direction for the future
operation of the program. The study focuses primarily on the design and management
of the program and offers specific recommuendations on the operation of the 121B
program, the organization of DCA, and the management of economic development efforts
by the State.
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I defines a normative management
- framework for programing public economic development activities that includes sec-
tions on management control, strategic planning, project management, organization
development, and the characteristics of nonprofit organizations. The framework is
intended to have general applicability to public development programs and attenpts
to identify and respond to the unique management demands of government organizations
and project oriented programs. The normative framework is applied to an analysis of
the 121B program to yield the series of findings and reconmendations in Part II.
Part III consists of detailed case accounts of the fifteen industrial park projects
which entered into execution.
Increasingly, all levels of government are being called upon to play more ac-
tive roles in developing the economies of older, declining urban centers. However,
the literature on public economic developnent programs deals primarily with develop-
ment tools and neglects discussions of the requirenents for designing and managing
programs. This thesis attenpts to address this deficiency in a number of ways.
First, the normative management framework and findings and recommendations offer
guidelines for managing 'output' oriented economic development programs. In partic-
ular, the analysis focuses on the need for project management techniques and formal
lateral form of organization, such as project managers and teams. Second, the pro-
ject cases describe models of urban industrial development projects. Third, the
economic rationale and measures of effectiveness for an urban industrial development
program are outlined. Fourth, the components of an action oriented project plan are
described in detail. Fifth, the requirements for a reporting system are specified.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Kent Colton
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PREFACE
This report on the Chapter 121B urban industrial development
program was prepared for the Bureau of Urban Renewal in the Mass-
achusetts Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as one part of a
larger study of the state's sixteen year old subsidy program for
urban renewal projects not receiving federal aid. A separate re-
view of the use of the Chapter 121B program for industrial pro-
jects was initiated in order to examine and document the history,
impacts, and status of individual industrial projects, assess the
economic rationale for and effectiveness of 121B as a tool for
urban industrial development, and analyze the weaknesses of the
design and management of the program.
Although the original conception of the program review in-
cluded an evaluation of the economic and fiscal benefits to munic-
ipalities and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from individual
projects and the program as a whole, DCA's lack of essential in-
formation on the impacts of projects, and a weak response from
redevelopment authorities to a questionnaire seeking complete and
reliable information, precluded precise quantitative assessments
of net project and program impacts. As progress on this study
revealed that the absence of basic information was symptomatic
of DCA's failure to view and operate the industrial development
program as an economic development program directed toward the
achievement of valued economic objectives, study efforts increas-
ingly concentrated on the program design and management practices
which define the program. The broad range of design and manage-
ment issues that arose called for a comprehensive and systematic
treatment of all aspects of program and project management. How-
ever, a review of the management literature failed to produce a
conceptual framework which directly addressed the particular de-
mands of managing public sector economic development programs.
As a result, program review activities included the development
of a normative management framework for public sector economic
development programs. That framework was then applied to a re-
view of the Chapter 121B urban industrial development program to
yield a comprehensive assessment of the design and management of
the program.
The larger study of "solely state-aided" urban renewal, of
which this report is a part, proceeded under the direction of
John P. Sawyer, Jr., director of the Bureau of Urban Renewal,
between September 1976 and May 1977. Mr. Sawyer had recently
assumed his post and lacked any experienced staff or written
evaluation to provide information on the status of the forty-one
projects in execution and past problems with the program. A
team of students and faculty from the Department of Urban Studies
and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
Center for Community Renewal Studies at the University of Massachu-
setts (Amherst) surveyed all "solely state aided" industrial, res-
idential, and commercial urban renewal projects. Information was
gathered by team members from file reviews, questionnaires to local
redevelopment authority boards and staff, site visits, and inter-
views. Project summaries prepared on industrial projects were used
for this report. A final study report entitled "The Economic Devel-
opment Potential of 121B" presents summary information on all of the
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projects and offers conclusions and recommendations on the entire
Chapter 121B program.
This examination of the use of Chapter 121B for urban indus-
trial development relied on numerous sources of information in addi-
tion to the study team. Interviews were conducted with present and
former members of the DCA urban renewal staff, DCA management staff,
personnel working for various local economic development organiza-
tions, state personnel in the Office of State Planning and Depart-
ments of Commerce and Development and Manpower Development, redevel-
opment authority staff, and federal personnel with the Economic
Development Administration. A "Chapter 121B Industrial Park Survey
Questionnaire", a copy of which is included in the appendix to this
report, was prepared and sent to local personnel to obtain the
information on all fifteen industrial park projects needed for .
assessing the economic impacts of projects and identifying the key
factors influencing project outcomes. Theoretical and research
literature on urban economic development was studied to investi-
gate the economic basis for an urban industrial development program
and the assumptions underlying such ~a public effort. Various re-
ports and policy papers from units of Massachusetts state government
were examined. The writings on the management of public and private
sector organizations identified in the notes to PART I of this re-
port were utilized to develop the normative framework for managing
public economic development programs. The notes to PART III of this
report list the sources of information relied upon for preparing the
individual project cases.
INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pursuant to Chapter 121B,
Sections 45-57, of the General Laws, as amended in 1969, has pro-
vided monies to municipalities for planning and subsidizing state
approved industrial, commercial, and residential urban renewal pro-
jects which have not received federal Title 1 urban renewal aid.
The Bureau of Urban Renewal in the Department of Community Affairs
(DCA) has been responsible for approving projects, processing ad-
vances to local redevelopment authorities for planning projects,
and approving state grants to partially subsidize the difference
between the costs of assembling and preparing land for a project
and the funds received from disposition of the property. Of the
twenty-five projects which have entered the execution stage since
Chapter 121B was enacted in 1961, fifteen projects have been in-
dustrial developments. Thus, DCA has been operating a 'solely
state-aided' (i.e. no federal urban renewal assistance) urban in-
dustrial development program for well over a decade.
The report contained in the pages that follow this introduc-
tion attempts to accomplish six primary purposes:
(1) present a comprehensive normative management framework
which can be utilized as a basis for programming public
.sector economic development programs;
(2) employ this management framework as a standard for eval-
uating the design and management of the Chapter 121B
urban industrial development program and proposing de-
tailed changes in the content and operation of the pro-
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gram to transform the program from an "urban renewal"
into an economic development program;
(3) document and analyze in a detailed manner the experiences
of the fifteen Chapter 121B urban industrial park projects
which entered into execution;
(4) outline the economic rationale and define measures of
effectiveness for the state urban industrial development
program;
(5) study the character of economic development tasks and the
management context of government organizations in order to
identify the organizational development strategies and
project management techniques needed for effective and
efficient performance; and
(6) describe the needs and opportunities for inter-agency
coordination to achieve development objectives.
This study was commissioned by the director of the Bureau of
Urban Renewal to investigate the history, present status, and impacts
of individual industrial projects and provide direction for the
future design and management of the urban industrial development
program. Consequently, the program review reflects the perspective
of the program manager by focusing in a detailed manner on management
proceedures and the program rules and regulations as well as address-
ing broader policy questions and issues of program design. By con-
centrating on the needs of the program manager, this report differs
from the common program evaluation which reflects the policy concerns
of top managers, policy makers, and legislators. However, inasmuch
as program managers in the public sector normally play a larger role
than their private sector counterparts, this report is also directed
at the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs, the state
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Development Cabinet, and the Governor. Many of the findings and
recommendations relate directly to the activities of units of state
government other than DCA, to the organization of DCA, and to the
management of economic development efforts by state government as a
whole.
The report is divided into three major sections. PART I estab-
lishes a normative management framework for programming public eco-
nomic development programs. The framework is drawn from literature
on the management of public and private sector organizations and
includes sections on management control, strategic planning, project
management, organization development, and the distinguishing charac-
teristics of nonprofit organizations. Thus, the broad scope of
management concerns treated by the framework provides a comprehensive
view of program management: every organization must decide on goals
and objectives (strategic planning), use resources efficiently and
effectively (management control), respond to the requirements for
managing unique, one time tasks (project management), and develop an
organization structure and promote individual behavior that contrib-
ute to effective and efficient performance (organization development).
The framework is intended to have general applicability to program-
ing in the public sector and attempts to identify and respond to the
unique management demands of government organizations and economic
and physical development programs. The framework is applied to a
review of the urban industrial development program.
PART II presents numerous sections of findings and recommenda-
tions which have resulted from employing the management framework in
a programming process. One section deals with the failings of the
basic design of the program - an "input" or physical development
orientation rather than a focus on economic development "outputs" -
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and offers various suggestions for redesigning the program with an
economic development orientation. Problems in coordinating project
tasks and opportunities for inter-agency coordination to improve per-
formance are described and analyzed and a series of recommendations
are presented for achieving integration through organization design
initiatives. Use of the Department of Commerce and Development's
Business Contact Program to assist in the marketing of industrial
projects is examined. The duties of an economic developinent special-
ist, who should be obtained to create an economic development pro-
gram, are considered in detail. The benefits to be achieved from
revising the municipal monograph series and transferring responsibil-
ity for its preparation to DCA are described. A thorough examination
of the present requirements for a project plan is presented along
with detailed recommendations for creating an output oriented plan.
A series of recommendations are proposed for developing a project
reporting system. The need for reporting to the legislature is
addressed. A few sections of findings and recommendations examine
the propriety and accuracy of state payments for projects and pol-
icies on the recapture of state funds. Suggestions for revising the
state audit reports are advanced. Financial record keeping and cost
accounting issues are treated in the final few sections. Although
time limitations have precluded a complete analysis of the urban
industrial development program as comprehensive as the scope of
management concerns encompassed by the normative management frame-
work, the presentation of the framework in PART I should enable DCA
personnel to identify and review in a systematic manner aspects of
the program not considered in PART II.
PART III consists of detailed case descriptions and analyses of
the fifteen industrial park projects which have entered the execution
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stage. The format used for the cases structures the information on
each project into sections which reflect many of the recommendations
found in PART II for viewing and managing projects as economic devel-
opment efforts directed toward the achievement of valued state and
municipal objectives. Basic descriptive data is provided and the
financial status of each project is indicated, including the costs
assumed by the state and municipality. Aspects of each project that
suggest a particular model of development are identified. Use of
the five development tools offered by the state urban industrial
development program and inputs at the municipal level are described.
The participants on projects are noted and accounts of the roles
played by the different actors are provided. The timing, status,
and problems of the implementation process are discussed. Fiscal
and employment need assessments are made of each municipality to
judge the appropriateness of projects in relation to state and munic-
ipal development objectives. The performance of each project is
judged through a number of measures of effectiveness: positive net
municipal fiscal flows, employment impacts, growth of the state econ-
omy, evidence of agglomeration economies, induced benefits, and
increased diversity of the local economy. The effectiveness of each
project in achieving these types of positive benefits is analyzed
in relation to the asessment of municipal fiscal and employment
needs. A narrative account is provided of aspects of each project
not covered in other parts of the case. Finally, a summary judgement
is advanced on each project which assesses whether the project was
justified, notes the status and impacts of the project, identifies
the key factors accounting for success or failure, and offers rec-
ommendations for future actions by DCA. The information presented
in the cases was drawn from a variety of sources and serves as much
16
of the data base for the findings and recommendations developed in
PART II.
To an increasing degree, the governments of older urban centers
are attempting to intervene in the market economy and affect the lo-
cation of economic activity in order to counteract economic decline
and respond to the human problems which are associated with the loss
of jobs. As a result, state governments and the federal government
are being called upon to establish urban development policies and
programs to assist in urban economic revitalization. In addition,
many states which are suffering from regional economic declines, such
as those in the Northeast and "Crescent" areas of the nation, are
seeking to identify specific measures which can aid in promoting
economic growth and address the problems of fiscal strain and un-
employment that accompany the loss of economic activity. The devel-
opment policy in some states, such as Massachusetts, has directly
linked the welfare of the state economy to the economic well-being
of the state's urban centers. Thus, demands are being placed on all
levels of government to play more active roles in directly shaping
the spatial economy.
The contents of this report should prove relevant to other urban
economic development efforts in a variety of ways. First, little
published material addresses the unique requirements for managing
public sector programs, especially economic development programs.
In the normative framework presented for programming public economic
development programs and the analysis of management problems offered
in the findings and recommendations on the Chapter 121B urban indus-
trial development program, guidelines for managing public economic
development programs are defined. In particular, the need for lateral
forms of organization and the project managment approach are estab-
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lished. Second, the project cases describe specific models of suc-
cessful development projects and the key inputs for effective perfor-
mance. Third, the findings and recommendations outline an economic
rationale and measures of effectiveness for an urban industrial devel-
opment program that can serve as a basis for designing and operating
such a program. The limited literature on public urban economic
development programs consists mostly of discussions of development
tools and policies rather than the requirements for designing and
managing programs.
The term "urban renewal" is generally associated with the dis-
credited and abandoned federal Title 1 program for subsidizing res-
idential and commercial projects. Although Chapter 121B is desig-
nated as an urban renewal program, this study has found that label
to be grossly misleading and damaging to the state's urban industrial
development efforts. The principal themes of the findings and
recommendations of this report include the following:
(1) despite problems with the design of the program and
severe management weaknesses, many projects have
demonstrated that the program can achieve urban econ-
omic development objectives;
(2) the major problems with the program have related to
program and project management rather than the devel-
opment tools offered by the program;
(3) the program has been designed and operated with a tra-
ditional urban renewal focus on physical development
rather than as an economic development program directed
toward the achievement of valued development objectives;
(4) the literature on urban economics and studies of the
Massachusetts economy suggest a basis for a well managed
state urban industrial development program utilizing
eminent domain powers, planning advances, state infra-
structure investment, development grants, and an active
unit of state government;
(5) the unique characteristics of public "project oriented"
economic development programs require the adoption of
18
lateral forms of organization and project management
techniques to achieve efficient and effective perfor-
mance; and
(6) the effectiveness of projects and the program depends
upon the coordination of activities among many units of
state government and the application of various state
resources in addition to Chapter 121B assistance.
19
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
Chapter 121B of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts was enacted by the General Court in 1961. The stat-
ute established the terms for state-aid to federally subsidized
commercial and residential urban renewal projects and created a
'solely state-aided' urban renewal program for industrial projects
which were not eligible for federal Title 1 assistance. Pursuant to
the provisions of Chapter 121B for assisting projects not receiving
federal aid, the commonwealth, through DCA, provides local redevel-
opment authorities or other local development organizations desig-
nated by municipalities with the following tools for developing
industrial projects: (1) the public powers of eminent domain; (2)
funding advances for up to 75% of the costs of project planning;
and (3) reimbursement grants for up to 50% of the "net project
cost" of an industrial project. The "net project cost" is equal to
the difference between the costs of assembling and preparing project
land and the proceeds from disposition of the property. The state
execution subsidy is paid in twenty equal annual installments. Thus,
a municipality must advance the total funds for developing a project
and assume all costs until the disposition of property and the re-
ceipt of annual state subsidy payments. The legislation authorizes
a maximum of $20 million in total state grants for projects not re-
ceiving federal urban renewal assistance and a $1 million per year
limit on state payments.
From the time of the passage of the act in 1961 until 1966,
only two projects, industrial parks in Lawrence and New Bedford,
20
were approved for state assistance pursuant to the industrial devel-
opment provisions of Chapter 121B. However, neither of these pro-
jects received planning advances and both projects were funded retro-
actively after completion. The Bureau of Urban Renewal was very
active in processing almost ninety federally-aided urban renewal
projects in the state during the decade of the '60s and into the
early '70s and little staff attention was devoted to industrial pro-
jects. The first planning advance was extended in 1967. Chapter
121B was amended in 1969 to expand eligibility for the "solely state-
aided" program to include residential and commercial projects.
Beginning in 1969, the number of projects approved to receive
only state assistance increased considerably due to a number of fac-
tors: an increased public concern over the loss of industry from
older cities; a boom in industrial park development activity spurred
by an increase in federal funding for research and development; the
extention of eligibility to residential and commercial projects; and
a reduction in federal urban renewal activity. Interest in indus-
trial projects subsided with the recession and federal cutbacks in
funds for research and development. Whereas fifteen out of the
twenty-five 'solely state-aided' projects which reached the execu-
tion stage have been industrial parks, only five out of twenty-two
projects which received survey and planning approval after 1970 were
industrial. Almost all of the $20 million authorization for state
execution subsidies for non-federally-aided projects has been com-
mitt ed.
PART 1
A NORMATIVE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAMMING
PUBLIC ECONOINTC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
* SOME DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS
OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
* MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
* STRATEGIC PLANNING
* PROJECT MANAGEMENT
* ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
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Some Distinguishing Characteristics
of Nonprofit Organizations
The Profit-Nonprofit Distinction
For the purpose of distinguishing the requirements for management
systems -- strategic planning, management control, project management,
and organization development--profit and nonprofit organizations
can be differentiated on the basis of organizational purpose. Although
any classification of.organizations into profit and nonprofit
categories cannot be exact, profit oriented organizations are
motivated primarily to earn profits,and success is measured primarily
by the amount of profits earned, whereas nonprofit organizations
exist primarily to render services,and success is measured primarily
by the amount and quality of service delivered. As used in this
context, the term services refers to the "public goods" and "merit
goods" provided by government as well as to personal services such
as health care and education. Inasmuch as many profit motivated
organizations provide services and many nonprofit organizations
receive revenues for services rendered, the differences between the
two are not exact. Nevertheless, the crucial distinction for purposes
of management relates to whether or not the success of the organization
is defined in terms of profit maximization. Borderline cases
such as public authorities (ex. local airport, bridge, tunnel, and
port authorities, the Tennessee Valley Authority, etc.), government
or quasi-government corporations (ex. Amtrack), and municipal power
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plants, although managed in many ways as businesses, should not
operate so as to maximize profits but should attempt to maximize
public welfare subject to some minimum notion of profitability.
A useful way to distinguish profit and nonprofit organizations
for considering management differences, which strikes at the essence
of the matter, is to regard organizations which have difficulty
defining and measuring the quantity and quality of outputs and
establishing the relationships between inputs and outputs, and outputs
and objectives, as nonprofit while organizations with easily defined
and measured outputs and established relationships between inputs
and outputs, and outputs and objectives, are profit organizations. Thus,
the well developed decision approach of the profit organization
which consists of comparing costs and benefits is complicated in
nonprofit organizations because the causal relationship between costs
and benefits is difficult to establish and both are difficult to
measure.
Distinguishing Nonprofit Organizations
For the purpose of further refinement of management differences
in organizations, nonprofit organizations can be distinguished
between client-oriented -- those that render services to identifiable
individuals and exact a fee for the service -- and public-oriented
organizations -- those that provide services to the public at largg
2
or to particular segments of the public without demanding a fee.
Client-oriented organizations, such as hospitals, universities, and
24
public transportation organizations, can employ some of the tools
of profit making firms because output can be measured by counting
clients or by totalling revenues. Public-oriented organizations,
such as police and fire departments, the U.S.. Department of Defense,
or the Massachusetts Department of Community Affairs, usually provide
more purely public goods -- i.e. nonexclusive consumption -- and they
cannot readily measure the emount and quality of service rendered.
As with other organization distinctions, this is a matter of degree.
Anthony and Herzlinger identify four characteristics which
are useful for distinguishing nonprofit organizations along a
continuum with respect to the degree of management control difficulty
encountered.
(1) The extent to which the organization charges clients
for services at approximately the cost of provision.
(2) The importance of program decisions and the frequency with
which program decisions are made and, therefore, organization
functions and objectives changed.
(3) The relative importance of social and political criteria
as opposed to purely economic criteria in decision making.
(4) The extent to which other organizations perform comparable
functions so that comparative data exists.
Characteristics Which Affect Management
A number of features typical of nonprofit organizations in
general, and government organizations in particular, influence the
requirements for management of government economic development programs
(a few additional features which do not particularly affect economic
25
4development programs have been omitted).
1) Absence of the profit measure:
Nonprofit organizations lack the advantages which the profit
measure provides to businesses. The absence of an equivalent to
the profit measure is the single most serious management control
problem in a nonprofit organization.
a) No Single Criterion: Since nonprofit organizations have
multiple objectives,and these objectives cannot be easily
measured quantitatively, they lack a single performance
criterion, such as profit, which can be agreed upon by all
decision makers. The different actors participating in or
impacted by a government program may, and usually will, have
differing criteria for success.
b) No Relation Between Costs and Benefits: Lacking the profit
measure, which is synonymous with the difference between
costs and benefits for the firm, nonprofit organizations find
it difficult measuring the relationship between costs and
benefits and determining causal connections between expendi-
tures and the achievement of objectives.
c) Difficulty of Measuring Performance: Whereas the profitability
of the firm incorporates both efficiency and effectiveness
performance measures by definition, nonprofit organizations
must search for unique devices for measuring effectiveness
and standards by which efficiency can be judged. For the
nonprofit organization, performance with respect to the amount
and quality of service delivered is not reflected by the
numbers on a financial statement.
d) Limited Comparability Among Units: Whereas the profit measure
allows for organization comparisons across all functional
types, units in nonprofit organizations can only be compared with
units serving the same function because performance measures
are function specific (ex. fire department units can only be
compared with other fire department units and performance
measures must be specifically devised for fire department units).
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2) Outputs are services: 5
Organizations providing services lack the management advantages of
goods producing organizations.
a) Since goods can be stored, production can be maintained at a
level pace while the fluctuations of consumer demand are met. In-
asmuch as services cannot be stored, fluctuations in demand result
in periods of underutilization and over extention of resources and
it is difficult to plan for a level of services which meets demand.
b) Machine dominated production activity is easier to monitor
than labor intensive services because activities are fixed.
c) The quantity and quality of services rendered are more
difficult to measure than the quantity and quality of goods
produced (i.e., the task does not consist of measuring the
number of patients seen by a doctor but the amount and
quality of medical care provided).
d) The quality of service cannot be inspected in advance of
the client exchange.
63) Less responsiveness to market forces:
Although far ffom the ideal corrective mechanism suggested by some
economists and businessmen, market forces dictate performance
parameters because products and prices must be accepted by consumers
and competition will ruin a poorly performing organization. The
absence of market signals to many nonprofit organizations leaves the
program manager without an automatic device for checking on performance
or redirecting activities. In the case of the Chapter 121B industrial
park program which is dependent on the location decisions of private
firms, competition does exist and there are market signals which
indicate that performance is inadequate. However, inasmuch as one of
the objectives of the program is to induce firms to locate in areas
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that they otherwise would not choose as locations (i.e. depressed
urban centers), the interpretation of market signals is equivocal;
i.e. the response should not be simply to build parks in areas which
firms currently find attractive because this runs counter to the
objectives of the program (although a conclusion that firms cannot
be induced to move to publicly desired locations may be valid after
all other explanations have been considered, such as the adequacy
of public support or marketing efforts). In addition, whereas market
signals of poor performance may doom a business, in the case of the
state assisted industrial park program, poor performance does not
directly threaten the continuance of the program,which is a
political decision (the program will be threatened over the long
run), or the jobs of state employees who are protected by civil
service. On the contrary, local personnel working for Redevelopment
Authorities may find themselves employed only as long as projects
remain unfinished. lany nonprofit organizations share this latter
incentive problem when successful performance leads to the elimination
of the job: welfare, manpower training programs, etc.
4) Weakness of the vertical authority structure:7
Although .the shareholders who own major corporations do not actively
control the operations of the firm, they retain ultimate authority
and vest management responsibilities to a Board of Directors which
in turn delegates full powers of managemeht to a chief executive
office. In government organizations the corresponding line of responsibility
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and authority is less clear and substantial diffusion of power
is common.
a) Staff and program management personnel are often insulated
from top management authority by virtue of civil service
job security and rules. In addition, since civil servants
know that they will outlast the terms of the chief executive
and top managers (where frequent turnover is common), they
may be unresponsive to policy and program directions from
higher levels in the organization either because they do not
agree with the substance of changes or the new directions
upset comfortable ways.
b) Agencies, departments, divisions, or program units may have
independent sources of power, such as through special interest
groups with political influence, which are strong enough to
set the unit off from the control of higher line managers.
c) There may be fragmentation of responsibility by level of
government for programs bearing on the same problem or for
components of a single program. Thus, the development of a
Chapter 121B state assisted industrial park may require the
independent actions of the U.S. government (EDA public
facilities grant), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (DCA:
plan review and approval, execution subsidy, technical
assistance, etc. and DPW: highway and bridge construction),
municipal governments (project approval, expenditure of funds,
etc.), and semi-independent organizations created by the state
and the municipality (Redevelopment Authorities: preparation
and submission of project applications, management of development
activities, etc.). This fragmentation within a program is
often part of the design of government programs which consist
of one level of government providing incentives for the actions
of other levels. The fragmentation by level of government
usually reflects an attempt to devise an appropriate division
of resource commitments and execution responsibilities based
on the principles of fiscal federalism and local control and
preferences. The additional common problem of horizontal
divisions of authority within government organizations is not
unique to nonprofit organizations.
d) The division of government authority among the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches results in conflicting
judgements on objectives and the means for attaining them.
e) Government personnel systems afford managers little ability
to reward employees for superior performance.
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f) The frequent turnover of executives and program managers
in government organizations leads to a management focus on
short term objectives and reduces staff responsiveness to
management directives. In addition, the necessary on-the-job
training for new managers and changes in policy and operations
which accompany new managers result in delays, inaction, and
confusion.
g) Salaries and other compensation for managers in the public
sector tend to be low given the pressures encountered and
the skills required for good performance.
The above factors which weaken vertical authority relations in
government organizations result in a need for management systems
which do not assume the vertical responsiveness of the private firm.
8
5) Politics:
Important consequences of the political nature of government
organizations for management tasks include the following:
a) Concern for Re-election: Conflicting pressures are often
brought to bear on government organizations by elected representa-
tives who are eager to demonstrate gains to their own constituencies
rather than concern themselves with the best interests of the
public at large. The chief executive may engage in "logrolling"
with individual legislators by directing program expenditures
to their districts in return for support of his own measures
before the legislature. The chief executive's re-election
related need for a visible display of program success commonly
leads top managers to adopt a short term view of program and
policy management. In such instances, premature or unwise
project approvals may be ordered in order to demonstrate
executive leadership and deliver valued resources to particular
constituencies.
However, the most serious management problems arise from the
general tendency on the part of newly elected and newly
appointed top managers to "re-invent the wheel" with programs
of their own making rather than manage potentially worthwhile
programs which are. identified with a previous administration -or
lack glamour and high visibility.
b) Public Scrutiny: In a democratic society the public's
right to know what government does is fundamental. However,
the understandable tendency of the public and the press to
suspect legitimate mistakes as willful wrongdoing leads many
managers to avoid the collection of information essential for
effective management for fear that some information might
unfairly be used against them at a latter time. This concern
reinforces a more general feeling among civil servants that
one is rewarded for avoiding mistakes rather than for effective
and efficient performance which stems partly from the politically
motivated risk averse behavior of top managers and partly
from the lack of performance incentives in the civil service
system.
The vertical authority structure in government organizations
is undermined by the access of lower level employees to the
press.
c) Inadequate External Pressures for Good Performance: Whereas
multiple external pressures frequently lead to ill-considered
and negative program decisions in government, comparable outside
pressures demanding efficient and effective performance are
usually absent.
c) Legislative Restrictions: Statutes enacted by the legislative
branch often bind public managers much more.severely than private
sector managers are limited by corporate charters and by-laws.
In addition, legislators normally exact a price from the
executive branch for changes in statutory language.
e) Weak Top level Management Skills: Voters rarely have the
opportunity to elect officials on the basis of management
expertise. Similarly, agency heads and other top managers
are likely to be appointed because of political connections
and/or the broad policy orientations of these individuals
rather than on the basis of a capability for program imple-
mentation. As a result, program level managers often have a
good deal of authority in government organizations, but they
must act as program advocates within the political setting.
The common tendency on the part of top managers to concern
themselves with new policy and programs rather than the details
of program management is a basic weakness of government
organizations. Inasmuch as the vast majority of top managers
will remain in particular government jobs for less than three
years and are concerned about the political futures of their
friends and themselves, they seek to initiate new programs
which will be identified with their administration.
6) Tradition of a Neglect of Management in Government:
For a variety of reasons, some of which have been indicated above,
little attention has been focused on the special needs of the
public sector in fostering efficient and effective management.
Perhaps the primary reasons for this tradition of management
neglect are that most of the key actors have little incentive to
improve management capability and the principal beneficiaries of
improved management, the citizenry, lack a viable mechanism for
signaling their dissatisfaction. Other important explantions
for this tradition include a belief that business management practices
are not applicable to the public sector, an unwillingness on the
part of legislatures to provide the executive with adequate control
powers and relinquish the politically valued line item budget
format, and a -trepidation felt by civil servants who fear that a
good management control system will reduce their power.
The characteristics common to government organizations discussed
above suggest that efforts to improve public sector management should
focus on the following three concerns: first, the difficulty of
measuring outputs and the relationship between inputs and outputs
demands that considerable attention be devoted to defining objectives
and devising methods for measuring output' second, attention should
be devoted to the behavioral and structural factors which impede
good management for without proper understanding of employee and
organizational relationships, which encourage and limit sound
32
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management, technical improvements are not possible; and, third, the
weakness of the vertical authority .structure in government organizations
suggests that special measures are needed to increase vertical
control (ex. improved information systems) and formal horizontal
structures (ex. team management) may offer significant potential
for improving performance.
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Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations
Management Control In General
In all organizations... there is-a process called
management control. It has been defined as the
process by which managers assure that resources are
obtained and used effectively and efficiently in
the accomplishment of an organization's objectives.
This rather broad depiction of management control suggests
that such processes have existed for as long as organizations have
existed. However, the subject has received systematic study only
2
over the past forty years. That which is now known as the management
control process consists of evolved principles and techniques
which are purported to be helpful in designing control systems
and in carrying out management control tasks. As is the case
with all management subjects, the principles of management control
are not adequately founded on deductive or inductive bases and do
not form a complete and definitive account of the management control
process. Rather, one finds an assortment of principles, techniques,
tools, and concepts which seem to work in a number of actual
organizations. From the diverse evidence of experience, a tentative
normative framework for the management control process emerges.
Although most studies of the management control process have dealt
with business organizations, Anthony and Herzlinger base their
seminal text, Manaqement Control in Nonprofit Organizations, on the
hypothesis that the same basic concepts are valid for both profit
34
and nonprofit organizations. They argue, however, that the
application of these -concepts to nonprofit (including government)
organizations must be altered to suit the special circumstances of
nonprofits.5 Thus, different techniques and strategies may be called
upon in profit and nonprofit organizations to effect the same
principles.
A good management control system is supposed to provide an
organization with two basic types of benefits:
(1) Better Planning: programs and activities are planned
with reference to organization objectives and choices are made
on the basis of the relative benefits and costs of alternatives;
and
(2) Better Control: a greater ability to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of organization operations.
The following terms are basic to the management control
conceptual framework:
6
Responsibility Centers: According to the normative management
control conceptual framework, every organization is composed of
responsibility center units which are groups of pople headed by
a manager who is responsible for what the unit does. In large
organizations, such as the government of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, a complicated hierarchy of such responsibility
centers exists: i.e. units, sections, departments, divisions,
agencies, branches, etc. Therefore, responsibility centers,
except for the smallest units, consist of aggregations of smaller
centers and the organization itself is a single all encompassing
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center. The management control function of managers,
whether at the top, middle, or program level, is to plan,
coordinate, and control the work of these component responsibility
centers.
7Responsibility Center Objectives: Responsibility centers
exist for the puspose of accomplishing one or more objectives.
These objectives should form part of the overall objectives of
the organization. Decisions on the objectives of responsibility
centers are usually made during a conceptually and operationally
distinct strategic planning process which occurs in a sequence
prior to the management control process.
8
Responsibility Center Activities: A responsibility center
"works" with inputs of labor, materials, and services to produce
outputs of goods and services. In a well managed organization,
these outputs are related to the objectives of the unit. However,
conceptually, the outputs of a responsibility center are equal to
its activities. The goods and services produced by a responsibility
center may be furnished to another responsibility center or to the
outside world or combined with the outputs of other units to
compose the outputs of the organization. In a control system the
amount of labor, materials, and services used by the responsibility
center is translated from physical quantities into the common
denominator of money so that inputs can be combined and divided.
Cost is the monetary amount which measures resources used by a
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responsibility center. Outputs of responsibility centers in
nonprofit organizations may or may not be measurable.
9Efficiency and Effectiveness: The performance of a responsibility
center is most commonly measured by the two comparative criteria
of efficiency and effectiveness.
Efficiency is defined as the ratio of outputs to inputs.
Thus, the amount of output per unit of input represents an
efficiency measure. One organization unit is more efficient than
another if either (1) it uses less resources than the other unit
but has the same or greater output, or (2) it uses the same
resources but has a greater output. When precise quantification
of outputs is impossible because of data limitations or the
intrinsic difficulty of measurement, efficiency judgments
of the first type can be advanced if outputs can be judged
equal and, of the second type, if outputs can be ranked. In
some situations, efficiency can be judged by relating actual costs
to some standard costs.
Effectiveness is defined as the relationship between a
responsibility center's outputs and its objectives. Inasmuch
as the quantification of outputs and objectives .in nonprofit
organizations is often exceedingly difficult, effectiveness
measures must sometimes be sought in qualitative judgements or
measurable surrogates must be devised. In addition, when quanti-
fication is feasible, one must be careful not to exclude remaining
nonquantifiable outputs or objectives from an effectiveness judgement.
The management control process accepts the role and objectives of
the organization as given by the strategic planning process and
concentrates on how improvements in the control process can help
the organization to perform functions more efficiently and effectively.
Management control does not relate to the formulation of the
organization's objectives, the building and structuring of the
organization, or the selection of organization personnel.
Much of the management control process occurs informally through
such means as memoranda, meetings, lunch time conversations, and
10
social activities. The formal management control system consists
of an information system and the four sequential phases of programming,
budgeting, operating, and reporting and analyzing performance
which occur in cyclical fashion. The basic information system in a
formal system collects (1) planned and (2) actual information on
11(a) inputs and (b) outputs. Thus, according to the "accounting"
view of management control put forth by Anthony and Herzlinger,
the four phases of the management control cycle operate so that
"prior to actual operations, decisions and estimates are made as to
what outputs and inputs are to be; during actual operations, records
are maintained as to what outputs and inputs actually are; and
subsequent to operations, reports are prepared that compare actual
outputs and inputs to planned outputs and inputs, and action is
taken on the basis of these reports." 1 2
The following features of the management control process help
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to define its character: 3
(1) A formal management control process, no matter how
sophisticated, should be a total system in the sense that
all of the organization's operations are included. This total
system orientation attempts to provide managers with information
on all parts of the organization in order to assure that all
parts are consistent with one another.
(2) Management control systems should strive to operate so that
the actions taken by managers pursuing their own self-interest
are also in the best interest of the organization.
(3) A financial structure forms the core of the management
control system so that resources used and outputs attained can
be expressed in monetary terms which allow for combination and
corparison. However, the collection of non-monetary information
may serve a more important function for a management control
system.
(4) A management control system should be an integrated system
in the sense that data collected and organized by programs is
coordinated with data collected and organized by responsibility
centers. Information collected for different purposes and by
different sources should be reconciled by program and responsibility
center.
(5) Line and program managers are the critical management control
actors because they are the people who make operating decisions,
influence people, and are evaluated for performance.
(6) For a management control system to be effective, the flow of
funding authority within an organization should generally follow
the vertical organization hierarchy. It is difficult to improve
top management decision making if funding for operations does not
flow from the top down through the organization. If funding for
a program is received from several sources, performance measure-
rent is difficult because each funding source tends to focus on
its own aspect of operations and no one may consider operations
-as a whole. Management control systems respond to such a situation
through a program accounting framework and an ongoing programming
process.
39
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The Control Structure
Any system can be described in -terms of its structure and its
14processes. For the management control system of an organization,
the structure of the information system defines the structure of
the organization. A control structure includes a method of
classifying information and rules governing the content of
information collected (an additional aspect, the processing of
information, is the same for all organizations and so will not
15be considered here). After describing the structure of a
management control system in this section, the management control
processes of programming, budgeting, operating, and reporting
and analyzing performance will be considered in the following sections.
Information Categories: The Accounts
"An account is a device for collecting homogeneous data about
some phenomenon... Accounts contain data on inputs and outputs.
Data can :be collected on what has happened or on what is planned. 17
In the management control framework, the word account is used
in a broad sense to include monetary as well as non-monetary information.
Two interrelated account structures -- a program structure and a
responsibility structure -- define the structure of the management
18
control system.
The Program Structure: 19
Information on programs undertaken or planned by an organization
is collected in a program structure. In a business, company
40
products or product lines correspond to programs. A program
structure is useful for three basic purposes:
(1) To decide upon the amount and kind of resources to be
devoted to each program;
(2) To allow for comparisons between programs in terms of
costs and benefits; and
(3) To provide an accounting of all the resources devoted
to a program directed toward achieving particular objectives.
A separate program structure is needed, and becomes a problem,
only in organizations in which programs cut across vertical lines of
authority; for otherwise the program and responsibility structures
20
coincide. The program structure should provide information which
allows top and middle management personnel to make resource
21
allocations between and within programs. Therefore, in order to
be useful for decision making, the structure should be based on
the outputs or objectives of the organization rather than on the
inputs or sources of funds for programs. The designation of program,
sub-program, and program element categories which form the structure
on the basis of objectives also serves to clarify and communicate
organizational purpose to employees and suggest improvements to
the structure of the organization. In any particular case, various
ways to categorize the program structure will have merit. Choices
on the program structure should be based on the usefulness of the
categories for facilitating the most important decision making.
Program structures are built up from program elements which are
22
the smallest units in which program information is collected. A
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program element should represent some definable activity carried
on by an organization which is directly or indirectly related to
accomplishing the organization's objectives. A program element should be
the responsibility of a single person so that management decisions
can be enforced, program performance can be related to the
individuals responsible, and personal identification with programs
is fostered. In addition, program elements should be defined in
relation to a measurable output so that benefit/cost analysis is
facilitated.2 3
Inasmuch as program structures will cut across line agencies,
the categories should be consistent throughout the organization.
. The number of years for which program information is recorded --
past and future -- should also be based on the needs of decision
24
makers.
The Responsibility Structure:
'he responsibility account structure should correspond to the
organization of responsibility centers that carry out programs. The
principle purposes of this structure are: (1) planning responsibility
center activities; (2) coordinating work among responsibility centers;
25
and (3) controlling the responsibility center manager. Responsibility
centers can be classified as (1) expense or (2) revenue centers and
as (a) mission or (b) service (existing primarily to provide services
26
to mission centers) centers.
27Relation of the Program and Responsibility Structures:
Both a program and a responsibility structure are required to
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keep account of the inputs and outputs of responsibility centers by
programs. A responsibility center may deal with more than one
program and a program will often involve more than one center.
The closer the match is between the program and responsibility
structures the better is the system because responsibility center
heads can be held accountable for a program or part of a program.
Although both structures will rarely match, some person should
have identifiable responsibility for each program category, sub-
category, and element.
Purposes -of Information Collection:
Anthony and Herzlinger list four basic questions which the
account structure of a management control system should provide
28information to answer:
Before the event:
(1) What activities should the organization undertake? (i.e.
planned outputs)
(2) What resources should it use? (i.e. planned inputs)
After the event:
(3) How effectively did the organization do its jcb? (i.e.
actual outputs related to the organization's objectives)
(4) How efficiently did the organization use resources? (i.e.
actual inputs related to actual outputs)
All four questions should be answered in terms of both programs
and responsibility centers.
In addition to information on planned inputs and outputs,
the management control system should provide two other types of
43
information on the future: (1) estimates of what will happen
in the future-- forecasts; and (2) estimates of what should happen
over a period of the near future -- budgets. 9
30Cost Accounts:
Every organization needs information on the costs of various
functions or activities. When such information is too detailed
to be of interest to anyone but the program manager or the program
and responsibility structure does not isolate such information, a
subsidiary cost account which is "tied" to the general accounts
should be established.
Information Content: Inputs and Outputs
31
Input Information:
Input information consists basically of costs, although non-
monetary input data may also be collected. The full cost of a cost
objective (i.e. any unit for which costs are collected) is the sum
of its direct costs plus an equitable share of indirect costs
which are shared by several cost objectives. The full cost of a
program (a cost objective) is the total amount of resources that
are inputs to that program. The following additional cost categories
are sometimes relevant for an 'account structure:
(1) Differential costs are alternative costs which vary with
the conditions of a project or program (costs are estimated
to analyze choices among alternative courses of action).
(2) Responsibility costs are those incurred by a responsibility
center as resources are consumed over a period of time.
(3) Controllable costs are sometimes distinguished from
noncontrollable costs to clarify where management can exercise
influence.
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(4) Variable costs which change proportionally with the
volume- of activity are often distinguished from fixed costs
which do not vary with volume in order to more easily
identify the composition of- total costs.
(5) Opportunity costs which measure the foregone productive
opportunities from the use of resources rather than monetary
outlays are sometimes estimated to assess "economic" costs.
(6) Capital costs should be distinguished from operating
costs because operating costs benefit the current period
whereas capital costs give rise to long lived assets which
provide benefits over a long period of time.
32
Output Information:
Output information is needed to-measure efficiency and
effectiveness. The degree to which outputs can be measured
quantitatively varies considerably with heterogeneous, multiple,
and intangible outputs presenting special difficulties.
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Goals: A goal is the broadest statement of intended output of
an organization and should be neither quantified nor related to
a specific time period. A statement of goals indicates the aims
and relative priorities of an organization and serves to guide
organizational strategies. Management efforts devoted to
thinking about and expressing goals may facilitate later steps
of the management control process but goals are not specific
enough themselves to help in the measurement, of organization
performanc4
Objectives. An objective is a specific result, usually stated
in quanititative terms, to be achieved within a specific time
period. In cases where objectives cannot be stated in quantifiable
terms, objectives should be expressed with sufficient clarity
so that some judgements can be made with respect to effectiveness.
In light of the usefulness of output measures for both
planning.and control purposes considerable effort in finding
and developing output measures is normally worthwhile. On the
other hand, output measures which do not serve a specific purpose
should not be collected. Although almost any output measure can
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be challenged, qualified data (if qualifications are stated) is
usually better than no data at all. The development of quantity
and quality measures is especially important for government
organizations due to the variety of points of view on objectives
and the intrinsic problems in measuring services.
The types of output measures that are appropriate for use in
a given organization tend to be arranged along a continuum. At
one end are social indicators that closely relate to organization
goals but are not directly related to organization activities and
are affected by exogenous forces. At the other end are precise
"process" measures that are well related to the activities but
remotely related to the goals of the organization. Between
the two poles are "results' measures which relate directly to
the goals and activities of the organization.
Results Measure 5A results measure is a measure of output
expressed in terms that are directly related to an organization's
objectives. However, when objectives cannot be directly stated
in measurable terms, proxy or surrogate results measures may
have to be substituted. Inasmuch as surrogates by definition do not
correspond exactly to an objective, caution is called for with
their use.
Process Measure. 6 Process measures relate to the activities of
organizations undertaken in pursuit of objectives. Process
measures are "means" oriented -- i.e. measures of activities --
whereas results measures are "ends" oriented -- i.e. direct measures
of the achievement of objectives. Inasmuch as process measures
imply a causal relationship between organization activities and the
achievement of objectives which may not be valid, they are not as
useful as results measures. However, the close causal connection
between inputs and process measures (ex. the timely completion of
the construction of site improvements in an industrial park project
implies efficient effort by the Redevelopment Authority) makes
them useful for measuring short term efficiency, for budget purposes,
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for controlling responsibility centers, and for setting activity
milestones for projects and programs with long execution periods.
Social Indicators: A social indicator is a broad measure of
the achievement of objectives but it does not relate exclusively
to the activities of the organization.
Different types of output measures may be useful for managers
in the various levels of the organization hierarchy 8 Whereas
process measures are most useful for the program manager concerned
with activity performance, managers higher in the organization will
be more interested in results measures which are useful for
policy and resource allocation decisions and for reporting to
the press and citizenry. Thus, a variety of measures should be
employed to satisfy different needs. When possible, output
measures should be related to program elements, sub-categories,
and categories in order to facilitate control.
39Accrual Accounting:
Two key accounting innovations serve to distinguish the
management control accounting framework from the traditional
"fiduciary" notion of accounting; i.e. keeping track of and ensuring
the honest use of funds. The first, accrual accounting, will be
discussed in this section and the second, program budgeting, will
be presented below. Both accrual accounting and program
budgeting have become mainstays of private business while their
acceptance by the public sector has been slow and begrudging.
The accrual concept of accounting is a fundamental technique
which the other planning and control activities depend and follow
47
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upon. According to accrual accounting, costs are recorded when
resources are consumed rather than, as with other methods, when
liabilities are incurred (expenditures) or resources are purchased
(obligations). Costs are recorded by responsibility center and/or
by program elements. The recording of costs following accrual
accounting differs from obligation accounting with respect to
both time and place. Whereas under obligation accounting a
cost is recorded when an order is placed (a contract to acquire
resources) and is recorded for the unit that places the order,
costs are recorded under accrual accounting at the time resources
are consumed and for the unit that uses the resources. Efforts
to change government accounting systems from obligation to
accrual formats are usually resisted by legislatures because
obligation accounting directly controls agencies from contracting
for more goods and services than allowed for by appropriation
whereas accrual accounting does not. However, a system which
40
combines both obligation and accrual accounting can be devised.
An accrual accounting system is necessary to provide the responsibility
center and program information needed for management control.
41
Information Needs of Different Actors
!he diverse information needs of various actors should be
addressed in the design of an information system:
( Top managers need information for making policy decisions with
respect to resource allocations among programs and for monitoring
the performance of organization units. They may also need
nondetailed data on individual projects for political purposes and
for reporting to the citizenry. Therefore, aggregated effectiveness
48
and efficiency data should be reported by responsibility
center, program, and project to these individuals.
(2) Planners and program analysts need information which will
enable them to estimate the costs and benefits of programs,
monitor programs for conformance with. comprehensive and
localized strategic planning, formulate changes to strategic
planning on the basis of experience, and facilitate coordina-
tion with "outside" programs and actors. To the extent
planners consider organizational development issues, they
will need information by responsibility center as well as
by program, sub-program, and program element.
(3) Program managers need information classified by responsibility
center in order to ensure that expenditures are within
authorized limits and by program structure in order to
examine whether program responsibilities have been met by
the responsibility center and other units coordinating with
the center on programs. Thus, operating managers require
detailed information by program element and project on
process and results measures of performance.
(4) Outside agencies and the public should be provided with
information for a variety of purposes: compliance with access
to information laws, reporting to outside funding sources,
reporting between agencies engaged in "team management" of
a project; reporting to the press to stir citizen interest; etc.
The type and level of detail of information reported will
vary to suit the circumstances.
Every information system must strike a balance between one user's
need for information and the cost of collecting and processing the
42information.
Now that a normative view of the structure of public sector
management control has been described, attention turns to the
processes which characterize the management control process.
Programming
This section on the management control framework deals with the
nature of an identifiable "programming process" as described by
49
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Anthony and Herzlinger as one of the four cyclical phases of
the management control process. Although other authors may offer
variations on this basic conception, the Anthony and Herzlinger
textbook rendition of programming is here viewed as representative
of general thought. However, inasmuch as one purpose of this
evaluation effort is to present a somewhat distinctive view of
the programming process, which differs from the standard version
in several respects but nevertheless is based on most of the
accepted notions, the account presented here will serve as the
foundation for developing and contrasting a different conception
of the programming process and as part of the framework for
examining Massachusetts' Chapter 121B urban industrial land
development program.
A well managed organization plans in terms of programs.
Programming is the process of deciding on the programs to be
undertaken by the organization to achieve its goals and the amount
of resources to be devoted to each program. These decisions are
based on objectives and strategies previously decided upon or they
44
.represent changes in strategy. In the later case, program decisions
are usually made during a strategic planning process separate from
and prior to the management control process. Thus, the strategic
planning and management control processes tend to merge during
45
programming.
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A program has been distinguished from a policy as follows: 6
whereas a program is directed to a specific situation with the
purpose of maintaining or changing that situation in some fashion
and has a particular place within the government structure, a policy
seeks to be global and comprehensive by encouraging the largest
possible range of phenomena and the systematic interrelationships
between them.
Programs may be presented in the form of long range plans
showing inputs and outputs over a number of years or reports
which highlight facets of programs and indicate expenditures
and strategies. The information needed to prepare such plans
and reports tends to be program,. rather than responsibility, data.
To the extent possible decisions on programs are based on estimates
48,
of revenues or benefits corpared with costs. However, decisions are
also made on the basis of the persuasive abilities of advocates
within and outside of the organization and political and personal
considerations.
The programming process consists of two distinct types of
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activities: (1) the preparation and analysis of individual program
proposals and decision making with respect to these proposals; and
(2) a formal system for the generation, flow, and coordination
of separate program proposals. Many organizations are more effective
at one of these activities than the other. Of the two, good
individual program analysis is the more important for good
51-
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organization management. In addition, a useful distinction
should be drawn between new programs and ongoing programs. 5 0
The programming process receives varying amounts of attention
by different types of nonprofit organizations. Public-oriented
organizations, particularly government, normally devote considerable
time to formulating, analyzing, and deciding- on program- proposals
because activities tend to change frequently in response to
changes in perceived and real needs, opportunities, and program
funding sources.
51Organizational Relationships With Respect to Programming:
The following four actors normally play the key roles in
the programming process:
(1) Top managers make program decisions concerning the entire
organization under their authority.
(2) A staff unit referred to as a planning staff, program office,
systems analysis office, operations research office, or
similar title provides information, analyzes proposals
submitted by others and originates proposals of its own.
The role of the unit is usually stronger if it initiates
proposals. The programming staff should report to top
management or the controller. Locating the programming staff
unit within the controller's office provides the advantages
of easy access to data, minimizing the number of units
reporting to top management, and gaining the leverage
of the budget process, but the short term nature of
budgeting may subvert the long range view of programming.
(3) The controller's office should be responsible for designing an
information system and collecting program and responsibility
center information because all information should flow through
a single office. Experience indicates that when the planning
staff assumes the function of collecting program information
problems, such as duplication, data inconsistencies, and a
lack of coordination across activities, often arise.
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(4) Although members of the operating staff may originate program
ideas, the programming staff is normally given responsibility
for developing these ideas because operating units lack the
staff time and expertise to prepare full program proposals.
52Benefit/Cost Analysis :
The basic technique for analyzing programs is benefit/cost or
systems analysis which consists essentially of measuring whether
program benefits exceed estimated program costs. Although in many
cases most, and in all cases all, program factors cannot be
expressed numerically, benefit/cost analysis can be a useful tool
for estimating outcomes in quantitative terms and taking a systematic
look at the key issues, basic assumptions, factual bases, knowable
consequences, risks, inputs, and outputs which are the basis for
program decisions. The ability to quantify some factors can
reduce, but not eliminate, the need for judgement. Systematic
benefit/cost thinking can serve to sharpen the basis for program
decision debate. Merely the effort to clarify the goals and objectives
of programs can help to point out inconsistencies or unfeasible
programs and goal definition frequently suggests appropriate programmatic
courses of action.
The two basic decision rules in benefit/cost analysis are: 5 3
(1) a program should not be adopted unless benefits exceed costs;
and (2) the program with the greatest excess of benefits over costs
is to be preferred among competing proposals. Therefore, even if
benefits cannot be precisely quantified, one can choose between
two proposals which meet the same objective if one is less costly
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than the other Similarly, if competing proposals cost the same and
a ranking of benefits is possible, the program offering the most
55benefits is usually preferre d. However, benefit/cost analysis is
not useful for comparing programs intended to accomplish different
objectives and is weakened to the degree a causal connection
56between costs and benefits has not been established. Nevertheless,
the inability to apply benefit/cost analysis to proposals in whcih
causal connections between inputs and outputs have not been
demonstrated should not be a basis for rejecting programs.
Such a policy would tend to rule out innovative programs and
57lead to a conservative bias. The benefits of economic development
programs often consist of difficult to measure externality, spillover,
or social benefits and program decision criteria include political
and distributional, as well as, aggregate economic considerations.
Inasmuch as most proposals are advanced by advocates and the
accompanying analysis and justification tends, as a result, to
be biased, top managers need methods for compensating for these
prejudices. Commonly, managers rely on staff to make careful
reviews of proposals or attempt to foster an adversary relationship
with regard to a proposal in which natural opponents debate the
.58
merits of a proposed program.
59Ongoing Programs:
For most organiztions, activities are relatively unchanged from
one year to the next. All too frequently, however, top managers do
54
not devote attention to an examination of current operations
because new programs are perceived as more "glamorous" and
politically rewarding than ongoing operations. Inasmuch as new.
activities constitute a relatively small proportion of the work in
a typical organization, the well managed organization engages in
periodic, systematic examination of ongoing programs. A review of
current program operations should ascertain whether program
benefits exceed costs and whether improvements in efficiency and
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effectiveness are possible. Ongoing programs may continue
indefinitely if such a review does not take place. The recent wave
of "sunset" legislation being proposed and enacted at all levels
of government represents an effort to require that ongoing programs
be subject to periodic examination. On the other hand, a need
also exists to review programs that are lapsing from management
neglect and little public attention but which provide benefits
not commonly perceived. In any case, the systematic review of
ongoing programs is warranted because opportunities for improved
performance exist in every organization.
Whereas new programs have advocates, operating managers are
less likely to advocate improvements in existing programs because
a review may draw their own performance into question or call for
a cutback in funding of their program. In most cases, a staff
unit responsible to top management or the controller should have
the function of examining ongoing programs. Outside consultants may
55
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perform program reviews, but they are better suited to occasional
reviews of specific programs than to an ongoing examination role
which may be sabotaged by operating staff who resent the presence
of outsiders. On the other hand, consultants chosen or approved
by operating managers may establish better working relationships
with program staffs than in-agency progranming staffs which are
often perceived as threatening. Blue ribbon type commissions or
task forces of well-known citizens have, on occasion, proven
effective in reviewing current operations when they have received
top management support and have had the necessary staff expertise.
However, more often than not, reports from such groups lack the
operating staff participation necessary for the implementation
of recommendations.
Techniques for Analysis:
(1) One of the simplest and most effective techniques for
reviewing program operations is to question why operations
are performed in their current manner. This technique
may uncover proceedures which serve no useful purpose and,
more importantly, assist the operating unit staff in thinking
about the program along with the analyst so that the reasoning
to support changes is understood and the commitment of staff
is obtained for implementing needed changes.
(2) Another technique consists of comparing the costs and/or
output measures of activities with those of similar organizations.
(3) Work measurements of the time needed to accomplish tasks
can be used to assess the efficiency of staff.
(4) Models can be developed that approximate input and output
relationships. Models can be used to assess the impacts of
various changes in circumstances and indicate the conditions
under which greater efficiency and effectiveness are
achievable. Models can be based on empirical or theoretical
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relationships. Sophisticated mathematics is not necessary
for a model to be useful for conceptualizing more clearly
what a program does or can do.
62Zero-Base Review:
The process of reviewing all of the ongoing programs in an
organization on a periodic basis is referred to as "Zero-Base Review"
programming. As the term suggests, such a review involves the
examination of each function in its entirety by requiring the
justification of every activity expenditure starting with a base
of zero. The review process starts by questioning the need for
having the activity at all. In contrast, the more familiar
budgetary review process operates by taking the current level of
spending as the starting point and requiring only the justification
of additional expenditures. Although this programming review
process is sometimes referred to as "zero-base budgeting," the
"Zero-Base Review" approach requires more time than is available
during the one to two year budgeting process. Inasmuch as a
zero-base review is a time consuming and often traumatic experience
for managers, such a review is undertaken every four or five years
and managers often attempt to subvert or delay the process.
A zero-base review will raise basic questions about a program,
63
such as: (1) Should the function be performed at all? Is it
needed? Is the program appropriate to meet the need? Is it
adequate to meet the need? (2) What should the quality level and
activity mix be? (3) Should the program be performed as it is
presently and with the current organization structure?
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(4) How much should the program cost? (5) What size should the
program be? (6) Do less expensive or more effective alternatives
exist? If possible, the basic systems analysis methodology
should be employed: (1) determination of need; (2) definition
of the objectives; (3) identification of capabilities and
constraints; (4) generation of alternatives (with the current
program viewed as one alternative); (5) analysis and selection of
alternative; (6) development and pilot implementation; (7) evaluation;
and (8) feedback and midification (feedback loops exist for each
step). The possibility that certain functions might be performed
more efficiently and/or effectively by the private sector is
usually explored (known as privatization).
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Formal Ongoing Programming Systems:
Some organizations establish a formal system for the ongoing
programming process. The components of such a system commonly
include: (1) proceedures prescribing the preparation and analysis
of individual program proposals and the flow of proposals through
the organization to the decision makers; and (2) a "program
summary" document that summarizes the costs and outputs of a
program over a number of future years. A formal programming
system is an expensive effort which demands considerable time and
energy from program Dnd top managers. However, if the process is
understood and accepted by operating managers, top managers
are in a position to judge the relative priorities among programs
and the process provides for a long run point of view on operations,
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fosters clear thinking about the relationship between activities and
objectives, and encourages consideration of the interrelationships
between the program activities of responsibility centers and the
related activities of other responsibility centers. Once the
substantial job of creating the initial data base, documents,
and program descriptions has been accomplished, the task of
"running" the system is much less demanding.
Anthony and Herzlinger list several features which characterize
organizations which find it worthwhile to consider programs -
together in a formal process rather than one at a time:6 5
(a) a number of program decisions are made each year;
(b) interrelationships among the parts of the organization
are complicated;
(c) implementation of program decisions requires a relatively
long lead time;
(d) a complex scheduling of program elements is necessary
to ensure that activities and capital investments are in
proper sequence; and
(e) resources are scarce and the number of desirable programs
is large.
The first step in the formal system is the dissemination of
guidelines to operating managers throughout the organization which
specify, at a minimum, the constraints within which program proposals
are to be prepared (financial and non-financial), a definition of what
is considered a program, and instructions on the format and content
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of the program memoranda. Working from the guidelines, operating
managers prepare program memoranda which describe proposed programs
59
over a period of several years: a statement of the problem; a
definition of program objectives; a description of the specific
activities proposed for accomplishing these objectives; and an
accounting of the resources required by the responsibility
center and other responsibility centers to carry on these
activities. An attempt should be made in the program memorandum to
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distinguish two aspects of the problem: (1) the "population"
(whether persons, acres, towns, etc.) that needs or can use the
program; and (2) the "demand" that will actually be served by
the program. Numbers should be used to describe the problem
components and trends but the quality of the numerical information
should be indicated. If possible, the proposal should be in the
form of a benefit/cost analysis. Although program managers propose
programs, much of the data analysis and writing should be done
by programming staff. These memoranda are then analyzed by a
staff unit and discussed with program and top managers. The approved
programs which emerge are subject to refinement and modification during
the budgeting process. Initially, programs are likely to be defined
in terms of the individual responsibility centers that initiate the
ideas. With greater refinement of the system, programs will cut
across organization units.
A program summary differs from a budget by not focusing on all
of the activities of responsibility centers, by presenting less
detail, by covering more than one future year, and by representing
an estimate of the future rather than a bilateral commitment on
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resources and activities. The programming process is not contained
by the one year time horizon which defines and limits the
budgeting process.
68Budgeting
Conceptually and sequentially, the budget process follows the
programming process. The budget is usually a one-year plan expressed
in monetary and other quantitative terms. In the budgeting process,
the previously approved programs are refined by specifying the amounts
to be spent on program components and the program activities to be
undertaken by individual responsibility centers. In practice, no
plean separation exists between the programming and budgeting phases
and the budgeting process may call for revisions to previously approved
programs. Nevertheless, an organization that does not maintian a
separate programming process may, as a result, lack creativity,
responsiveness to new opportunities or changing conditions, a
comprehensive view of program activities, and a grasp of the
interrelationships among programs. The budget presents an annual
operating plan with careful estimates of costs and benefits against
which responsibility center performance can be checked.
Budgeting is a more important component of the management
control process in nonprofit organizations than in profit oriented
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organizations for the following reasons.
First, whereas costs are "engineered" by labor and production
requirements in many businesses, a large fraction of costs are
discretionary in most nonprofit organizations;
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Second, whereas the level and mix of business activity will
change frequently during a year in response to changes in
demand, a government agency usually is responsible for
executing a certain authorized program; and
Third, whereas operating managers in business are given latitude
to modify plans in pursuit of the maximization of profits,
operating mangers in nonprofit organizations must adhere
closely to budget figures.
The final budget is arrived at through a process of negotiation
between the managers of responsibility centers and their superiors.
The budget process begins with an estimate of the amount of revenue
expected during the budget year and expenses are budgeted to equal
that figure. The format and content of the budget documents should
be designed to facilitate analysis and the comparison of actual with
planned performance. The budget should include a quantitative
statement of planned objectives (the inclusion of objectives as
part of the budget is commonly referred to as "Management By
Objectives") as well as statements of the outputs expected and the re-
sources that are to be used to achieve these outputs. Whenever possible,
dollar amounts should be broken down into physical quantities and
unit costs, measures of output should be indicated, and data for
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the previous year(s) should be included for comparison. In addition,
the budget should distinguish between revenues that are "hard" and,
thus, can be counted upon, and "soft" revenues about which there is
some uncertainty, and program commitments should be based on the
certainty of funding.
Due to severe time constraints on analyzing budget proposals,
the level of current spending is usually taken as the starting
point for negotiations between program managers and their superiors.
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The final budget which results from negotiations should represent
a bilateral commitment: responsibility center managers commit
themselves to achieving the planned objectives with spending limited
to the specified amounts and their supetiors commit themselves to
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accepting such performance as satisfactory.
Program Budgeting:
Limitations of the "fiduciary" approach to accounting were
noted above when the advantages of accrual accounting were described.
The "fiduciary" attitude is commonly evident in the budget formats
of government organizations which detail amounts that can be obligated
by agencies on a line by line basis for different object classifications
such as personnel, travel, and supplies. Without a program budget
format which emphasizes the programs undertaken within and across
responsibility centers, the budget cannot serve as a tool for
controlling the effectiveness and efficiency, in addition to the
expenses, of government organizations.
The slowness of government to adopt program budget formats
can be attributed to two primary reasons:
(1) legislatures are reluctant to change from familiar ways
and legislators frequently suspect that the executive is
gaining additional power at their expense; and
(2) managers often fear that a good information system will
provide for easy review of their activities by outside
authorities such as the legislature and the public.
Operating and Accounting
Program activities occur during the operating phase: resources
are used by the organization in working to achieve outputs. During
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this phase of the management control cycle, managers need information
of two types for control purposes: "environmental" information on
the outside world and the larger organization of which the operating
unit is a part; and "internal" information on the performance of the
manager's responsibility center.
Environmental information is essential for judging alternative
courses of action. However, because the volume of potentially useful
information is almost limitless, an information system should only
collect information on key variables which are likely to affect a
program. The challenge in designing an information system is to collect
enough, but not too much, relevant information in a format that serves
the different needs of various levels of management. The controller's
office should normally assume the role of collecting all information
for the organization and issuing reports to suit the needs of the
various managers. Gaining the cooperation of program managers is an
essential but often difficult task because knowledge provides power
in an organization and shared knowledge is perceived as a threat to
managers who control programs. In the public sector, the political
nature and short tenure of top management appointments and the absence
of incentives for effective and efficient performance contribute to
the distrust felt by program level managers toward demands for increased
reporting. Horizontal flows of information cut against the common
parochialism and protective attitudes of responsibility center managers.
Internal information is collected in order to compare budgeted
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costs and outputs with actual costs and outputs. The accounts should
be structured to collect costs and outputs by programs and by
responsibility centers. In this manner, top managers can ascertain
whether and by what magnitude actual and planned occurrences differ
and the source of any discrepancy. In addition to numerical information,
narrative accounts of performance which identify the causes for
discrepancies are needed by decision-makers before future courses
of action can be decided.
Internal auditing proceedures and an audit staff should exist in
order to insure that information is accurate, rules governing the
handling of funds are adhered to, and losses due to theft, fraud, or
defalcation are minimized. In addition, in order for an information
system to serve its purpose for management control, top management
must devote attention to the review of performance. In particular,
top managers should attempt to counter the natural tendency to spend
100 percent of the amounts authorized, whether needed or not, by
offering appropriate rewards to those managers and staff who are able
to reduce spending and still accomplish planned objectives.
75Reporting and Analyzing Performance
During the fourth and final phase of the management control
process, collected information is summarized, analyzed, and reported
to those who are responsible for knowing what is happening and
76
improving performance. Control reports prepared for managers
consist essentially of comparisons of planned with actual inputs
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and outputs.
All of the information contained in reports should serve a
specific and well understood purpose. The types and levels of detail
of data in reports should vary to suit the needs of the different
levels of management. For example, top managers need highly
aggregated output data which shows results by program categories,
whereas operating managers need detailed information on unit
efficiency and the status of individual projects. Display formats
for reports should be concise, visually unambiguous, and easily
comprehensible.
Control reports should provide the information necessary to
answer two basic questions:
(1) Has the unexpected happened, and, if so, what should be
done about it?; and
(2) Are activities proceeding as planned, and, if not, what
should be done?
The environmental information and some of the internal information
address the first question and most of the internal information
responds directly to the second question. A "variance analysis" that
identifies the specific categories in which planned and actual
performance differ can help to pinpoint the targets. for corrective action.
Variances may be attributable to changes in the volume of activity,
78prices, the mix of activities, efficiency, or external Conditions.
operational Auditing:
In recent years, the audit function in the private sector has
begun to mirror prior changes in accounting by expanding from a
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traditional "fiduciary" or "compliance" orientation, which
encompasses only considerations of the accu'racy of information and
the legality of the use of funds, to an "operational" auditing
approach which also deals with questions of.effectiveness and
efficiency. When following the operational audit orientation in
reviewing organization efficiency, the auditor considers items
such as whether the entity is managing its resources in an economical
and efficient manner and whether inadequacies exist in information
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systems, proceedures, and organizational structure.
80System Design and Installation
A new or revised management control system is difficult to
install. A new system changes the way in which plans are made and
performance is measured and judged (and may mark the first effort
at measuring performance) and establishes new relationships among
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managers at various levels. Managers may feel threatened by a new infor-
mation system untiL they understand its limitations. Studies undertaken
to develop the system may lead to changes in organization structure
which upset comfortable patterns. Installation of a system in the
public sector is especially difficult because employees are familiar
with incentives for mistake avoidance rather than for superior performance
and public organizations usually lack the private sector climate
of management control. Operating managers may resist any move to a
new system because of uncertainty about the possible loss of power
as top managers gain centralized authority. Questions similar to
the following arise: Who benefits from and is hurt by the system?
How will the informal structure of the organization be affected?
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Will outside agencies obtain control over unit activities?
Will top managers be helped at the expense of operating managers?
Operating managers may also resist the shift of information collection
responsibility from operating units to the controller. As the
rules and style of management are changed, current managers may be
threatened as individuals with greater technical skills are
recruited.
The literature on management control reveals a basic difference
of opinion on the issue of whether system installation requires the
support and participation of operating managers or can be
accomplished with the impetus from top management without lower
83level support. Anthony and Herzlinger opt for the latter view on
the basis of a feeling that lower level employees will inevitably
subvert the installation process. However, whereas the active involvement
of top managers is definitely a requisite for successful system
installation, this author believes that the participation of
opearting personnel in system design and installation is essential
in government organizations due to the weak vertical authority
structure of organizations in the public sector.
Anthony and Herzlinger identify four necessary conditions for a
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successful effort to improve management control: top management
support, acquiescence from outside agencies or authorities, a
competent system design team, and sufficient time for system
installation. Top managers should allocate a significant amount of
time to the system development effort in order to convince operating
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managers that the new system will be used, hold meetings with
subordinates to discuss how information can be utilized, and
clear roadblocks during design and installation.
System designers must have access to top managers and spend
considerable time educating and gaining the participation of
operating managers. In spite of the resistance of operating managers,
system designers must work with managers to define the information
needs of units by asking managers to identify their information needs
and, most importantly, assessing the information requirements of jobs
irrespective of what managers indicate as needs. Operating managers
can judge the feasibility of the information collection effort
suggested by system designers and assess the format and content of
proposed reports. In order to foster staff identification with and
commitment to the system change, in-house personnel rather than outside
consultants should be used for system design and installation if
possible. In order to overcome the resistance of operating managers,
system designers should devote time to educating operating managers
on how the system can help them to do a better job and convincing
them of the impending reality of the new system. System designers
must be careful, however, not to oversell the advantages of the
system if hardheaded managers are to become less skeptical.
The principal steps of the system design and installation process
are as follows: 8
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(1) Develop a plan for system design and installation, including
a timetable and a statement of responsbilities.
(2) Diagnose the objectives of the organization, the existing
control system, and the existing organization structure.
(3) Examine and catalogue the existing sources of information.
(4) Develop the control structure by starting with the program
structure.
(5) Develop proceedures.
(6) Test the proposed structure and proceedures.
(7) Develop and implement an education program.
(8) Run the new system concurrently with the old system and
phase out the old system.
Rather than attempting to install a new system in the entire organization,
it is often preferable to limit the initial effort to a single part
of the organization which can demonstrate the value of the changes,
work out difficulties on a smaller scale, and stimulate managerial
acceptance. In addition, a system should be installed in stages to
allow enough time for managers to become accustomed to changes.
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Strategic Planning
86Anthony and Herzlinger distinguish the strategic planning and
management control processes by stating that the former involves
decisions on the goals and strategies of the organization whereas
the latter accepts these goals and strategies as given and deals with
the work undertaken by the organization to achieve its objectives.
Strategic planning takes up fundamental questions not considered during
the management control process: Should the organization exist?; How
should it be organized?; What is the kind and extent of need to be
addressed by the organization?; What should be the missions of the
organization and its component parts?; Are current goals and objectives
good or bad? What activities are appropriate and adequate to meet goals?
In contrast, the programming activities of the management control
process involve the identification of programs that will effectively
and efficiently achieve the goals determined during the strategic
planning process. Nevertheless, the line between programming and
strategic planning is not finely drawn in practice. Studies which
are conducted as part of a programming effort frequently indicate the
desirability of changing goals and strategies and strategic planning
often considers specific programs. The essence of the distinction
concerns the scope of inquiry: whereas strategic planning explores
an unlimited range of needs for the direction of organization efforts,
programming is limited to an examination of previously identified needs;
T1
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whereas strategic planning considers the constraints and capabilities
of the organization in the broadest terms, programming encompasses an
assessment of capabilities and constraints only in relation to
specific programs or objectives; and whereas strategic planning
includes a study of alternative goals for the organization, programming
deals only with alternative programs to achieve previously decided
upon goals.
A primary purpose for distinguishing between the strategic planning
and programming conceptually and as distinct processes is that
programming tends to become routine whereas strategic planning should be
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creative, unsystematic, and informal. Although the management control
system collects information that is useful for strategic planning,
strategic decisions are normally occasional events and require
information in the form appropriate for the issue at hand.
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Project Management
'Project Management in General
A distinctive management approach and several specific tools and
techniques have been developed for the management and control of
projects. Whereas the general framework of management control focuses
on the work done by organizations over various periods of time, project
management and control is concerned with the accomplishment of a
project which is non-periodic. However, most of the basic control
principles are the same for both. Thus, project management is
distinguished from production or program management primarily by the
nonrepetitive or temporary nature of the work defined as a "project.'A
Although work similar to a project may have been done previously, the
activity is not being repeated in an identical fashion and on a regularized
production basis. Consequently, in order to efficiently implement
a project, the project manager or project team must rely on experience
with similar projects and judgements on the unique conditions of
2
individual projects to plan and schedule implementation.
In a broad sense, the term project management refers to a
collection of organization, planning, and control tools and strategies,
and information systems used to manage a complex, one-time task. From
a narrower perspective, project management consists of those techniques
that enable a manager to plan a sequence of activities and assign
responsibility for those tasks in order to accomplish a complex
mission and to monitor the allocation of resources so that those
73
activities are accomplished within time and cost targets. The
ingredients of the project management approach include the
following items:
* Gantt and Milestone charts for scheduling and monitoring
the progress of activities;
* CPM and PERT network diagram methods for planning the
sequence of activities and establishing the interrelation-
ships among activities and the most critical sequence of
activities for meeting time and cost targets;
* Project plans for a concise account of the rationale,
strategy, objectives, organization design, activities,
resource requirements, constraints, and measures of
performance for projects;
* Reporting systems or display devices for the conveyance
of project status and performance information;
* Computer-aided information processing and reporting; and
Organization development strategies for increasing
project effectiveness and efficiency, such as the lateral
organization forms of team management and matrix organization.
With the growing emphasis on temporary organizations in our
"temporary" or ever changing society, project management approaches
4
to one-time projects are increasingly in use. Project management
began and is widely employed in construction and defense-related
Research and Development enterprises, and is now frequently in use
in the fields of business and industry, government, health, and
5.
education.
Projects for which the project management approach has proven
valuable are defined by the following characteristics:
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(1) projects are one-time efforts with tight time schedules;
(2) definable goals are evident;
(3) activities are different from ongoing operations in
existing line or functional agencies;
(4) tasks are somewhat uncertain or stochastic;
(5) complex task interrelationships are necessary and the
relationship between activities and results is uncertain; and
(6) projects require the participation of many actors and the
coordination of separate functional operating units.
Inasmuch as Chapter 121B industrial park projects exhibit all of
the above characteristics, use of the project management approach for
these projects should prove to be worthwhile.
Network Techniques
The development of network diagram methods, such. as CPM
(Critical Path Method) and PERT (Program Evaluation and Review
Technique), has provided the basis for a more formal approach to an
emerging discipline of project management. Network methods consist
of a graphical portrayal of the interrelationships among project
activities and an arithmetic proceedure which indicates the relative
7importance or "criticality" of each activity in the over-all schedule.
A network graph diagrams a planned sequence of activities and shows
the precedence relationships - the dependency of activities on
prior activities - which lead to project completion. The
calculation of a "critical path" through a network enables a manager
to focus attention and resources on the subset of activities that form
T5
the longest path through the network and, therefore, the most
critical sequence of events for on-time project completion. The
amount of "slack" time by which other paths of activities through
the schedule fall short of the critical path and, thus, the degree
of sensitivity of the network to changes in activity times along the
critical path, are also revealed by this Critical Path Method.
PERT differs from CPM by including a statistical treatment of the
probabilities of uncertain activity performance times.
Although network diagram methods have become mathematically
sophisticated with computer applications, probability statistics,
time-cost tradeoff proceedures, resource allocation optimization
techniques, and cost control proceedures, the majority of applications
of network diagram methods are limited to the following basic steps:
preparation of a network diagram; estimation of the expected time
or time and cost to perform each activity; computation of the critical
path; and updating of the network. Experience with a broad range
8
of project types has shown that these basic steps can serve to:
* encourage a logical discipline in the planning, scheduling,
and control of projects;
* encourage more long-range and detailed planning of
projects;
* provide a standard method for documenting and communicating
project plans, schedules, and time and cost performance;
* identify the most critical elements in a plan and, thus,
focus the attention of managers on the 10 to 20 percent of a
project that is most constraining on the schedule; and
* illustrate the effects of technical and proceedural
changes on the over-all schedule.
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The basic network diagram and critical path computations also
encourage detailed consideration of project objectives and resource
9
needs and constraints.
From the above account of the benefits of network techniques,
some of the features of network diagram methods that suggest their
usefulness for the Chapter 121B industrial land development program
10
can be identified:
(1) Networks can be applied at several stages of project
management; the planning phase, when alternatives and resource
needs are being considered; the scheduling phase, when time
and resource schedules are established; and the operating phase,
when actual progress is compared with planned activities.
(2) Networks are easy to understand conceptually and can be
explained to persons without a background in network theory.
Calculations are not difficult or time consuming.
(3) The network graph displays in a simple, direct, and
comprehensive fashion all of the complex interrelationships
among project activities. Project actors can quickly
perceive how their portion of the project affects, and is
affected by, other portions.
(4) Critical path calculations direct the attention of managers
to the subset of activities in a project that are most
critical and, thereby, facilitate management by exception.
(5) As simulation tools, network diagrams enable managers to
project the effects of planned or unanticipated changes so
that appropriate actions can be taken.
However, the usefulness of network diagrams is limited to the.
degree that the following underlying assumptions of the methods are
not valid:
(a) A project can be divided into a set of predictable,
independent activities.
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(b) The precedence relationships of project activities can be
. completely represented by a noncyclical network graph in
which each activity connects directly into its immediate
successors. For example, network methods do not allow for
activity sequences which are conditional on the outcomes of
preceding activities.
(c) Activity times can be estimated -- either directly or
probabilistically -- and are independent of each other.
The Project Plan
The project plan is the basic tool for defining a project:
background rationale; objectives; measures of performance; strategy;
resource requirements; constraints; organization design; activities;
and schedule. From the project management perspective, a plan is not
a static picture of a desired future state of affairs but an action
document which answers the why, what, how and who questions related
to the achievement of project objectives. A plan is not an ideal
map on the basis of which task responsibilities are delegated by a
manager but a consensus strategy which emerges from a common
understanding and the individual commitments of participating actors.
The contents of a plan are based on a systems analysis methodology
12
and commonly include the following items:
(1) background introduction to the project or program setting
forth the problem, the key actors, and the historical
context of the undertaking;
(2) definition of objectives and effectiveness measures;
(3) rationale for the project strategy chosen;
(4) available resources and constraints on resources and
capability;
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(5) design of the organizational relationships which structure
tasks and responsibilities: external, parent, and client
environmental considerations and measures of success related
to strategic choices in organizational design are treated;
(6) a schedule for the implementation of activities using
networks based on time and cost estimates: precedence
relationships and task interrelationships are mapped; and
(7) milestone charts, which indicate task responsibilities and
scheduling, are prepared for the future monitoring of
implementation.
In addition to providing for progress monitoring through "process
measures" on milestone chart reports, a plan establishes the measures
of effectiveness, basic strategy, and data base which allow for the
preparation of a format for periodic reporting on the effectiveness
of the project in achieving its objectives.
As an action oriented tool, a good project plan is a working
document that is continually referred to and modified as rescheduling
and redirection are required. Periodic milestone reports are the
central focus for multi-actor or team management decision-making
with respect to the accomplishment of project tasks. Effectiveness
reporting systems supply information on the outcomes of projects. In
addition, exception reporting, which identifies only those tasks that
are behind schedule, is a useful technique for focusing the attention
of top managers on specific problems. Milestone and exception reporting
enable project participants to take collective actions and bring
resources to bear on problems.
Essentials of a Project Control System
The orientation of project control differs somewhat from management
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control in that project management deals with all of the resources
necessary for numerous actors to accomplish a given job whereas
management control also concentrates on all of the resources used
by units (responsibility centers) in working on a variety of projects
and programs. The essentials of a project control system are as
13follows:
(1) At the beginning of a project, the work to be done, resources
needed to do the work, and the anticipated time required to
complete activities are estimated. Activities are broken
down into work packages which are measurable increments of
work that can be related to a milestone or other "process
measure" of progress and are the responsibility of a single
organization unit.
(2) A work schedule and related budget are prepared from this
information that indicate: (a) the milestones to be used to
measure task progress; (b) the costs for each work package:
(c) the starting and completion times for each work
package; and (d) the unit responsible for each work package.
(3) Based on the project strategy and measures of effectiveness
in the project plan, a reporting format is prepared which indicates:
(a) projected outputs in total and on a per unit basis (ex.
jobs per firm or per acre); (b) actual direct outputs in total
and on a per unit basis; (c) planned and actual indirect or
induced outputs in total and on a per unit basis; and
(d) a narrative account of nonquantifiable social, political,
and economic outputs and a qualitative assessment of the
quantifiable outputs.
(4) Records are maintained of actual outputs and actual costs.
(5) Reports are prepared at regular intervals which indicate
performance over the interval and cumulative performance.
(6) Plans, budgets, activities, organizational relationships,
and programs are revised on the basis of these reports.
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Strategic Considerations for the Design of a Project
Management System 14
In addition to the above "tactical" aspects of project
management, such as the preparation of network diagrams and the
collection and reporting of information, experience indicates that
the successful use of the project management approach requires a
"strategic" conception of the design and management of the components
of a project within a specific context of people and organizations.
Sophisticated project management tools have proven ineffective when
environmental factors which define the setting of project management
activities have not been addressed: for example, when personnel refuse
to accept project management tools; when the commitment of all actors
on a project has not been obtained; or when the measure of project
success is political approval rather than effective performance.
Therefore, managers must consider the design of the project management
system itself in addition to the particular tools for managing operations.
Although the task orientation of project management, i.e., the focus
on discrete achievable objectives, is one of the strengths of the
approach for coordinating complex activities, a neglect of the
environmental variables which affect project management efforts has
weakened the usefulness of the other techniques. However, Lawrence
Bennigson, on the basis of his personal experience with project
management, has developed a conceptual framework for considering in
a systematic fashion relevant environmental factors for the design of
an effective project management system and measures for assessing
a project management system independent of the particular pro ject
at hand.
Bennigson has identified a number of environmental areas that he
believes should be addressed when a project management strategy is
formulated.
(1) Political, economic, and social conditions external to a
particular project are aspects of the general environment which affect
project management priorities. For example, if the discovery of offshore
oil presents competitive opportunities for the Commonwealth that
must be exploited quickly, a premium should be placed on time rather
than cost or effectiveness measures of project success. This may
call for a project management strategy which places a member of the
governor's staff as the project manager in order to obtain maximum
authority leverage over other actors and assure access to the chief
decision-maker. In a case in which the demand for industrial land is
very sensitive to price differentials,closer attention must be given
to cost than to time or effectiveness considerations.
(2) The environment presented by the parent organization poses
constraints for a project management system by the particulars of its
management systems and its financial, political, and social dimensions.
For example, the choice of a project manager must respond to inner
political and bureaucratic dynamics and lateral forms of organization
which cut across vertical lines of authority may fail if top line
managers refuse to delegate authority, along with responsibilities
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to lower level personnel.
(3) Political, social, and financial features of the customer
environment are also important considerations for the design of a
project management system. For example, if an industrial park project
is undertaken for the purpose of creating jobs for unemployed residents
of a depressed community, attention should focus on measures to insure
effectiveness more than on time or cost considerations in order to
guarantee that unemployed individuals are being placed and retained in
newly created jobs. In contrast; a municipality with limited bonding
capacity must devote primary attention to cost control efforts. In
another instance, a politically unstable environment would call for
timely project completion as the paramount concern.
The above discussion of environmental considerations suggests
that tradeoffs are necessary in the design of project management
systems for individual projects among the three most basic measures
of project success: time, cost, and effectiveness. Although all
three measures are always important, the strategic settings of projects
demand emphasis differences. Customer satisfaction is an additional
strategically important measure of project success identified by
Bennigson. Inasmuch as local citizens and/or politicians may be
dissatisfied even though a project is doing well in time, cost and
effectiveness terms (for-example, because of the long development time
required), the building of confidence among local citizens and local
political support are also measures of project management success.
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A fifth measure of project success relevant to industrial park programs
is the change effect which is an explicit objective of development
projects. With change as an objective of a project, the project
management strategy must address those people affected by as well as
those participating in the change effort. For example, the information
system should provide status information to both the project participants
and the impacted citizenry.
In addition to the above project measures of success which bear on
the design of a project management system, the characteristics of
project tasks, in particular, task importance, task complexity, and
task uncertainty, should affect system design. Different views on
the importance of a project by the participants will influence the
priorities which should be placed on the other success criteria.
The greater the complexity of a project the more need there is for
formal coordination mechanisms and information processing. The impact of
task uncertainty is similar to task complexity and will be examined
in a later section on Organization Development through a presentation
of the "information processing" view of organizations advanced by
Jay Galbraith. 5
Along with an account of environmental considerations and measures
of project success which should be analyzed in designing a project
management system, Bennigson identifies five criteria for evaluating
a project management system independently of the particular task at
hand: (1) obtaining multi-actor commitment; (2) achieving transition
84
or termination; (3) effecting integration; (4) providing visibility or
a clear view of the information on a project; and (5) satisfying the
job security needs of personnel.
(1) Inasmuch as work on a project is temporary, projects usually
represent only part-time activity for individuals in line agencies,
and line agency employees are frequently not rewarded for inter-agency
project performance, commitment to projects may be difficult to obtain
among state and local government employees. Various organization
design forms, such as lateral forms of organization, can be employed
to "projectize" the project management system in order to foster
personel commitment and integration among organization units. These
organization design strategies are reviewed in the later section on
Organization Development.
(2) Inasmuch as a project must end at some point, the management
system should address in an explicit fashion which of three ways
project termination will occur: (1) out-and-out termination;
(2) adoption into an ongoing permanent organization; or (3) becoming
a permanent entity. Experience indicates that project completion will
be delayed if dependent relationships are fosters and personnel rely
solely on temporary projects for their livelihood.- In order to
provide incentives or minimize disincentives for timely project
execution, choices with respect to-the design of the project
management system should address termination. For example, if an
industrial park project is viewed as a singular economic development
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effort by a municipality, responsibility for project execution
should, perhaps, be contracted to a local industrial development
commission that engages in other activities which will continue after
the completion of the project. (Having the board and staff of the
local Chamber of Commerce serve as the board and staff of the
Redevelopment Authority is a similar option for this situation.)
On the other hand, if a municipality is contemplating a long-term
and multi-faceted economic development effort, DCA should demand
evidence of planning and resource commitments for these other
activities in order to be assured that a dependency relationship
is not being established for the industrial park project. In a third
case, the termination strategy may call for responsibility for a project
to shift to the municipal community development agency or industrial
development commission at a specified point in time. Examples
of aspects of a project management system that affect a project's
ability to successfully terminate include the design of information
systems, selection of the organizational approach, establishment of
reporting proceedures, and distribution of authority for resource
allocation decisions.
(3) Integration is a third criteria for assessing a project
management strategy. The effective integration of activities on a
project involves the achievement of coordination among work groups,
responsibility centers, and entire organizations. Projects frequently
create unique and complex interrelationships among actors who normally
do not work together. A project management strategy should consider
what .the needs for coordination are, what kind of coordination is
required, how to achieve this coordination, and how coordination needs
may change. In a section below on Organization Design Strategies,
a framework for assessing and responding to integration needs is
examined in detail.
(4) Attention to project "visibility" through the information
system is especially critical in a temporary project situation because
actors are commonly unfamiliar with team approadhes to execution, tasks
are complex, a great amount and variety of types of information are
needed during different phases of a project, performance deadlines
must be met, and environmental needs must be satisfied. The project
management techniques used to meet information and visibility needs
have been discussed previously: network diagram methods; exception
reporting; process measures reporting; and effectiveness measures
reporting. The particular kinds of information collected and reported
are largely a function of the specific emphasis on success criteria
for a project.
(5) A project can pose a serious threat to the job security of
personnel because of the uncertainty of new tasks and relationships,
the change from vertical performance rewards to rewards for cooperating
in lateral forms of organization, and the temporary nature of
project activities. A fifth criterion for judging the adequacy of
a project management system is attention to the security needs of
personnel. A project management system can respond to this need by
providing for the continuation of project activities, selecting
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personnel not likely to feel threatened, providing incentives, or
maintaining line authority relationships.
Reasons for the Failure of Project Management
The above classification of environmental considerations and
measures of project success for the design of a project management
strategy and criteria for assessing project management strategies
independent of the task at hand were derived by Bennigson from
experiences of problems, failures, and successes with project management.
Ivars Avots identifies five additional reasons for the failure
16
of the project management approach: (1) the basis of the project is
not sound; (2) the wrong man is appointed project manager; (3) top-
management fails to supply enough support; (4) task definitions are
inadequate; and (5) management techniques are inappropriate.
The basis of a project is not sound if it merely represents the
transfer of an idea from another context without critical analysis or
if project participants are not given the proper authority and rewards
for working on the project. The individual selected for the position
of project manager must be capable of leadership and conflict resolution
as well as demonstrate technical competence. Support from top
management must include a delegation of authority to project managers
and organization changes, such as project or program accounting, needed
to facilitate project control. Avots claims that inadequate definitions
of the work content of activities, activity costs, schedules, technical
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requirements, and responsibility assignments are the most common
failings of project management. Techniques used for planning,
scheduling, and monitoring should be understood by managers and other
participants and tendencies toward over sophistication should be
resisted.
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Organization Development
Organization Development in General
Organization Development (OD), as commonly understood with
reference to a particular body of literature, consists of theories,
normative principles and models, methods, strategies, and techniques
concerned with ways to achieve desired changes in organization
structure and behavior and ways organizations can be better structured
to accomplish organization missions. Thus, OD focuses on aspects of
the management of organizations not directly treated by the strategic
planning, management control, or project management frameworks:
approaches to effecting behavioral change in organizations and
organization design options for improving performance.
Beginning with psychology and the sociology of organizations, OD
practitioners have aimed at developing an approach to organization
analysis and "planned change" that serves to better adapt the structure
of organizations to their environmental circumstances and alter
working relations within organizations to maximize human potentialities
1
and satisfactions. Thus, OD deals with both the behavior of individual
contributors to an organization and the organization which structures
that behavior. However, OD is not concerned with identifying ideal
types of organization structures and behavior patterns which are
invariant but with aiding organizations and people to respond to
changing environments. "Organization development," writes Warren
Bennis, "is a response to change, a complex educational strategy
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intended to change the beliefs, attitudes, values, and structure of
organizations so that they can better adapt to new technologies,
2
markets, and challenges, and the dizzying rate of change itself."
Thus, OD efforts are change interventions broadly concerned with the
dual objectives of mobilizing the resouces of an organization to
achieve performance objectives while satisfying the needs of indivi-
duals for self-worth, growth, and satisfaction. In order for organizations
to meet these needs, OD focuses on new forms of organization' structure,
the learning of more effective goal setting (individual, team, and organ-
ization wide) and planning processes, and the devotion of organization
time to improving the methods of working, decision-making, and
communicating within teams of interdependent people.
Private Sector Origins
As in the cases of strategic planning, management control, and
project management, OD techniques and theories have been developed in
the private sector. OD has evolved in the business world to deal with
the altered conditions and environments facing contemporary business
managers. Managers in business have moved from a pre-World War II
concern for "human engineering" to maximize the production of goods,
through subsequent attention to "human relations" issues of the work
environment and job security during the 1950s, to dealings with present
day problems related to the dynamic and more complex business setting.
The increasing pace of technological and communication changes has been
accompanied by basic changes in the firm: the internationalization
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of markets; shorter product life; the increasing significance of
marketing; more specialist staff relative to line personnel; and
production which requires the inputs of numerous line functions
4in ever more complex relationships. These contemporary environments,
in turn, require adaptive organization structures with characteristics
significantly different from the common bureaucratic models of the
past, such as a high degree of internal differentiation, overlapping
responsibilities, appropriate mechanisms of integration, temporary
organization boundary arrangements, a predominance of high-capacity
horizontal channels of communication, and innovation seeking
leadership roles.
An Experience Based Approach
In contrast to the traditional rationalist view of organization
behavior and decision-making which implicitly assumes that actions
follow in course from decisions, the organization development approach
regards implementation as inseparable from decision-making. Rather
than a rationalist method of adapting means to ends, OD presents an
5
experience based methodology focusing on organizational change.
Organization development is a process of planned change which attempts
io move an organization and the people who compose the organization
to find their own way toward greater effectiveness within the
particular context of environmental circumstances, capabilities, and
constraints. A "rationalist approach, in contrast, attempts to find
the invariant rules that will lead to best solutions.
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Defining Characteristics of Organization Development
Some of the principal characteristics of OD are as follows:6
(1) OD is an educational strategy adopted to bring about a
planned organizational change;
(2) the changes sought through OD efforts are coupled directly
with the exigency or demand the organization is trying to
cope with; that is, OD is always related to the organization's
mission;
(3) organization development relies on an educational strategy
which emphasizes experienced behavior;
(4) OD activities are action oriented; rather than either
educational activities devoted to increasing the skills of
personnel who will subsequently apply their expertise or
analyses of organization structure which are prepared for
top managers to implement, change efforts are developed and
implemented during the OD process;
(5) OD is usually a long-term affair;
(6) organization development implies a collaborative relation-
ship between change agents and the constituents of the client
system;
(7) OD focuses on changing attitudes and/or behavior;
(8) the aim of OD is to increase organization health and
effectiveness; the criteria for initiating OD activities
are whether the change will lead to either a better fit
between the organization and the demands of the environment
and/or to a better fit between the organization and the
needs of individual contributors;
(9) OD change efforts deal primarily with groups; individual
learning and personal change occur as a by-product of the
OD process;
(10) change agents share a set of normative goals, including:
improvement in interpersonal competence; a shift in values so
that human factors and feelings come to be considered
legitimate; development of increased understanding between
and within working groups in order to reduce tension;
development of more effective "team management," and development
of better methods of conflict resolution.
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Basic Concepts for Developing Organizations
Lawrence and Lorsch, two prominent OD practitioners and authors,
offer a definition of organization which is based on many of the
fundamental concepts of OD:
An organization is the coordination of different activities
of individual contributors to carry out planned transactions
with the environment. 7
The focus on "individual contributors" in this definition reflects
the view that an organization consists only of the activities of
individuals who participate within a group to accomplish specific
purposes. The expression "planned transactions with the environment"
adds to this view by indicating that people form organizations for
the purpose of finding better solutions ("planned") to the problems
they encounter in dealing with an external environment and that
activities involve exchanges with the environment. Together these
components of the definition imply that organizations exist
principally to engage in activities with the aim of achieving objectives
related to dealings with the environment and that an organization
must respond to external circumstances rather than simply impose the
collective will of its participants. In addition, the definition
implies that organizations exist only to satisfy the needs of their
individual contributors and do not have an independent purpose of
their own. Furthermore, the environmental nature of the objectives
of an organization and the relationship of exchange between contributors
and the environment suggest that organization activities should
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change in response to changes in the environment. The phrase
"different activities of individual contributors" in the definition
connotes the familiar notion of division of work. The term
coordination qualifies the division of labor requirement by noting that
work is not randomly distributed auong individual contributors but
is organized in a fashion to accomplish the objectives of the
collective. Thus, coordination implies the need for mechanisms
of communication and decision-making in order to organize for a
planned purpose. Finally, by stating that people contribute
activities to an organization rather than being themselves parts of
an organization, the definition suggests that individuals will
differ in their concern over the performance of the organization
and will seek differing degrees of personal satisfaction through
participation.
The above definition and definitional analysis of organization
suggest the four major problem areas or "interfaces" for OD change
efforts: organization-and-environment; group-to-group; individual-and-
8
organization; and person-to-peson. With respect to the organization-
environment interface, OD interventions strive to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of the "planned transactions" conducted by the
organization in attempting to achieve organization objectives. The
OD developmental task at this problem area encompasses both the
formulation of an organization strategy based on the mission of the
organization and the maintenance and adaptation of organization-
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environment transactions in the face of environmental changes. The
specific items for the focus of OD efforts at this interface
include the proper division of activities by the organization, the
efficiency of organizational and administrative practice, and the
consistency of the thought and behavior of individual contributors
to the organization with the requirements of environmental transactions.
OD efforts directed at the interface between groups or units
within the organization address the problem of achieving integration
or "coordination" among units which evolve distinctive task related
characteristics and different points of view. OD issues at the
individual-and-organization interface relate to the implicit and
explicit agreement entered into between individuals and organizations
which establishes the inducements to be provided to individuals in
exchange for specific individual contributions to the organization.
The fourth major area for OD attention, the person-to-person interface,
involves questions concerning interpersonal relations between individual
contributors and the development of effective face-to-face task
group behavior.
The above definition of organization also suggests a few basic
normative concepts of OD used to determine the desired direction of
organizational change. First, the environmental demands on an
organization establish the degree of differentiation that should exist
10
among the various individuals, groups, and units. In particular,
differentiation within an organization is dependent upon the similarity
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of the degree of certainty of the information on the different parts
of the environment dealt with by the units of an organization. Thus,
units which share a level of certainty with respect to information
they hold about the aspects of the environment they confront should
exhibit similar practices and personnel attitudes, whereas units which
differ concerning the certainty of environmental information require
differentiation with respect to ways of thinking and behaving.
Second, the task demands facing an organization also determine
the degree of integration necessary among units: (a) which units need
to work together and (b) the degree of interdependence required
11
among the units. However, the more differentiation which is required
among units, the greater is the level of difficulty in achieving
integration. As a consequence, when-the tasks faced by an organization
demand highly differentiated and tightly integrated units,
formal integrating mechanisms must be developed to supplement the
basic integrating device of a management hierarchy. Supplemental
integrating devices used include individual coordinators, cross-
cutting teams, and entire departments devoted to achieving integration
12
among other units. Thus, the concepts of differentiation and
integration can be employed to analyze the needs of organizations
in dealing effectively with other environments and to suggest
appropriate formal structural devices for achieving desired behavior.
Another key OD concept which follows from the notions of
13differentiation and integration is the management of intergroup conflict.
Conflicts inevitably arise in organizations as individuals strive to
97
fulfill the dual requirements of difference and unity. Therefore,
the ability of an organization to achieve integration is largely a
function of how effective it is at managing conflict. From empirical
study OD practitioners have concluded that conflict is successfully
managed when the pattern of influence or power for decision-making
with respect to conflicts resides at the level of the organization
14
hierarchy where the knowledge to reach decisions exists. In addition,
the groups, units, or individuals with the most critical knowledge
about the environment should have the most influence in resolving
15conflicts. Furthermore, OD practitioners have found that, regardless
of environmental conditions, effective conflict management occurs
when conflict is dealt with openly and solutions are reached in terms
of organization goals rather than when conflict is avoided or raw
power forces one party to accept a resolution. The OD literature
also indicates that individuals assigned to integrating roles are
effective on the basis of their perceived knowledge and competence
16
rather than their formal power position in the hierarchy.
In summary, the concepts of differentiation and integration
can be used to understand the problems of and prescribe solutions for
organizations attempting to deal effectively with their environments.
The demands of the environment on an organization determine the degree
of differentiation, the pattern and degree of integration, the
integrative mechanisms, and the appropriate conflict-resolving actions.
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Two additional concepts which are basic to the OD conceptual frame-
work are part of the general "systems" view of organizations which forms
18the basis for much of OD. The first of these notions holds that the
parts of an organization are interdependent such that a change in one
part impacts on the others. Therefore, although the conceptual
framework of OD addresses various problem areas and organization needs,
the practice of OD is directed at an organiztion as a whole. The
second idea derivative from the systems view is that organizations are
capable of self-modification. A cybernetic process occurs when members
of an organization find problem discrepancies in comparing desired
with actual results and initiate a search for causes and remedies.
This feedback mechanism provides organizations with the potential for
extending human control over the environment.
Characteristics of Healthy Organizations
The basic methodology for an OD change intervention consists of
a descriptive diagnosis of the present state of an organization and
a prescriptive analysis of the organizational characteristics that
would provide the best fit with organization task requirements and
individual needs. The normative goals which serve as the basis for
diagnosis and prescription are expressed in the OD literature by
the following list of qualities characteristic of a healthy and
effective organization:
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(1) The total organization and its component parts manage work
against goals and plans for the achievement of these goals.
(2) Form follows function; that is, the mission, the problem, the
task, or the project at hand determines how resources are
organized rather than fitting tasks into existing structures;
an organization should be flexible and responsive enough to
organize differently depending on the task.
(3) Decisions are made by and near the sources of relevant information
regardless of where these sources are located on the organization
chart. There is a norm of the authority of knowledge rather
than an absolute reliance on the authority of rule or rank.
(4) The reward system responds to managers for effectiveness,
the creation of viable working groups, and participation in
cross-agency team management.
(5) Lateral and vertical communication is relatively undistorted.
Personnel are generally open and confronting and share feelings
as well as facts.
(6) At all levels of the organization conflicts are treated as
problems subject to problem solving methods. Self-criticism
is welcomed. Less than healthy organizations expend energy
dysfunctionally trying to avoid conflicts which are inevitable.
(7) Conflicts center on tasks and projects rather than personalities.
There is a move toward high collaboration and low competition
between interdependent groups.
(8) The parts of the organization see themselves as interacting
with each other and a larger environment.
(9) Management tries to help each person and unit in the organiza-
tion maintain individual integrity because perceptions of threats
undermine communication, reduce flexibility and responsiveness,
and foster parochialism.
(10) Feedback mechanisms exist so that individuals and groups can
learn from their own experience.
Components of an OD Effort
The elements of the normative conceptual framework outlined above
are commonly employed in an OD change process composed of the following
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identifiable, but not completely separable stages: diagnosis; action-
20
planning; implementation; and evaluation. The initial diagnosis phase
is usually provoked by the perception of a discrepancy between expected
and actual outcomes. During this phase two different analyses are
21
undertaken. First, analyses of the environmental task demands confronting
the organization and/or the needs of members of the organization
lead to the formulation of a normative prescription of the organizational
characteristics that best satisfy task and individual needs. Second,
a descriptive diagnosis of the current state of the organization
considers issues such as the degree of differentiation, integration
problems, conflict management, and individual satisfaction and
dissatisfaction. In any particular situation, these two analyses
together point to the desired direction for organization change.
During this diagnostic phase data is collected on the variables of
the OD conceptual framework in order to identify the causes of problems
and the variables contributing most to the problems.
In the action-planning phase alternative plans for interventions
to move the organization in the desired direction are examined.
Typically, the OD "change agent" considers which individuals are
motivated to change, what leverage or influcence they have, and what
22
variables they can most readily affect. The answers to these questions
guide the choice of interventions from among several types:
(1) working on unit, group, or team development:
improving effectiveness; forming new units, groups, or
teams; altering tasks; modifying working relationships;
developing problem solving skills; reorganization; formulating
rules; changing communication patterns and methods;
modifying planning methods; etc.
(2) working on intergroup relationships;
(3) working on planning and goal setting and processes for
individuals, teams, and larger systems; and
(4) working on educational activities for upgrading the
knowledge, skills, and abilities of personnel or changing
the expectations, attitudes, or feelings of organization members.
During the subsequent implementation phase, the planned
interventions are carried out according to a specific sequence of
activities. The final evaluation phase consists, once again, of
comparing planned with actual results and diagnosing discrepancies
and their causes.
The OD Process
A fundamental operating principle of organization development
holds that any lasting change in process and structure must come from
within an organization. This self-transformation requirement may be
24
regarded as a process of learning. A critical assumption of the
"action-research" methodology of OD is that people affected by change
must actively participate and develop a sense of ownership in the
planning and conduct of change. OD practitioners serve as "change
agents" or catalysts guiding the organization learning process in
accord with its inner dynamic. It is the job of the change agent to
lead the members of an organization through a descriptive diagnosis
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of the current state of the organization and a normative prescriptive
analysis of organizational characteristics that would provide the best
fit with environmental task demands facing the organization.
The work of analysis and diagnosis serves to translate perceived
symptoms of organization problems into a coherent picture on the basis
of which action can be planned and carried out to achieve change
objectives. 5 Although diagnosis is usually triggered by some
discrepancy between desired and actual outcomes, it is also a way to
locate unanticipated opportunities. A set of OD concepts provide for
the selection and ordering of data so that a systematic view of an
issue is developed. As analysis and diagnosis sort out the multiple
causes of a problem, the variables which can be altered to move an
organization in a desired direction are identified. The types and
degree of quantification of data used in the diagnosis can vary widely
to suit the receptivity of the individual organization. However, no
matter how the analysis and diagnosis are accomplished, results in all
cases are brought back to the relevant actors. Relying on the
normative concepts of OD, the change agent shapes the data into a
conceptual framework and presents the findings to personnel in order
26
to accomplish two purposes: to obtain a reasonable consensus on the
facts and create a shared way of thinking and talking about the
facts. The generation of a shared analysis and diagnosis leads into
the subsequent "action-planning" phase.
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Action-planning involves alternative periods of exploring "what
is desirable" and examining "what is" and considering change methods
27for closing the gap between the two. This experience based approach
to planned change circumvents discussions concerning ideal organization
types or whether people or structures should be changed first.
From the OD perspective there is no one best way to organize because
the desired model is conditional on the tasks of the organization, the
28
environment, and the characteristics of the individual contributors.
Similarly, the planning stage overlaps with the implementation stage
because the key to successful implementation is the degree of commitment
to the proposed change felt by participants and the required degree
of understanding and commitment is generated during the diagnostic
29
and planning phases.
Conditions for OD Success
A list of conditions which have been identified in the OD literature
30
as necessary for successful OD efforts follows:
(1) The external or internal environment exerts pressure for change.
(2) OD is strongly supported by top management. Top managers must
have knowledge of and commitment to the goals of the OD effort
and actively support the methods used to achieve these goals.
(3) Someone in a strategic position feels the need for change:
the chief executive; a unit head; or a natural leader in the
organization.
(4) Some personnel in strategic positions are willing to pursue
a real diagnosis of the problem.
(5) Leadership is present.
(6) Operating staff and strategic personnel collaborate on problem
identification.
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(7) There is some willingness to take risks in trying new
organization forms or relationships.
(8) A long-term perspective is adopted.
(9) Data on the situation is used to analyze and change the
situation.
(10) People are rewarded for the effort at changing the organization.
(11) Tangible intermediate results are evident:
(a) an invention of some new solutions to problems which
produces some commitment to new courses of action;
(b) experimentation with new solutions which produces a
search for results with the experiments; or
(c) reinforcement in the system from positive results which
produces an acceptance of the new practices.
Building Lateral Forms of Organization
For the purpose of setting forth a particular conception of the
components of a public sector programming process related to
economic development programs, one aspect of the OD conceptual
framework, a normative view of the design of organizations, warrants
detailed exposition and elaboration. In the opinion of this author,
a focus on how planned change efforts can restructure organizations to
perform more effectively is more important for managing economic
development programs than OD interventions dealing with organization
processes such as problem solving or communications or the attitudes
and behavior of organization members. More specifically, an aialysis
of the management of public sector economic development programs
involving projects should include detailed considerations of the lateral
forms of organization needed for effective program performance.
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Jay Galbraith, in his book Designing Complex Organizations,
presents a framework for organization design decisions which
identifies the types of lateral decision processes or matrix forms
adopted by organizations and the conditions under which these
alternatives are appropriate. Galbraith succinctly states the
rationale for OD efforts aimed at establishing lateral forms of
organization:
The implicit assumption underlying the use of matrix
designs is that we cannot find authority structures in
the form of product divisions, regional departments, programs,
functions, etc., which will encompass all the activities
which require coordination... In addition... defects may
not be corrected by the informal organization which can
arise to work across lines of authority... the informal
processes do not always arise spontaneously out of the
needs of the task. I assume that if these lateraproCesses
do not arise spontaneously they can be designed.
Whereas much of the OD literature is concerned with planned
interventions directed at changing the structure of organizations,
Galbraith presents a normative framework for identifying what the
appropriate organization structures should be.
Following the OD conceptual framework, Galbraith states that his
approach is based on "contingency theory" which holds that (1) there
is no one best way to organize and (2) any way of organizing is not
equally effective for an organization. Thus, OD researchers have
found through empirical studies that effective organizations differ
widely in their forms of organization but the forms adopted by effective
organizations are contingent upon their particular organizational
and environmental circumstances. Relying on the differentiation-
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integration model presented by Lawrence and Lorsch and numerous empirical
studies which examined variations in organization structures, Galbraith
concludes that the best way to organize is contingent upon the
uncertainty and diversity of the basic task being performed by an
organization unit. However, Galbraith goes beyond the concepts of
differentiation and integration by presenting an "information processing
view of organizations" which :attempts to explain why task uncertainty
affects organization design and identifies the design policy variables
related to uncertainty.
Galbraith relates task uncertainty to organization design with
the proposition that the greater the uncertainty of the task, "the
greater the amount of information that must be processed among decision
makers during task execution in order to achieve a given level of
1I"performance. Thus, if one has considerable knowledge about a task
prior to its performance, the activity can be planned in advance.
On the other hand, if a task is not well understood prior to its
performance, more information must be processed during the execution
of the task in order to make necessary changes in allocations,
schedules, and priorities. Therefore, if the effect of uncertainty is
to limit the ability of an organization to preplan, Galbraith theorizes
that the observed variations in organizational forms represent
alternative strategies of organizations to " (1) increase their ability
Itopreplan, (2) increase their flexibility to adapt to their inability
to preplan, or (3) decrease the level of performance required for
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continued viability.' The choice of a strategy is dependent upon the
degree of uncertainty and the relative costs of the alternative
strategies. Therefore, the job of the organization 'analyst is to
define the uncertainty faced by an organization and the costs of
the alternative strategies for dealing with that uncertainty.
Galbraith defines task uncertainty in terms of both a specific
task and a specific organization: "Uncertainty is defined as the
difference between the amount of information required to perform the
35task and the amount of information already possessed by the organization."
He goes on to define the amount of information needed to perform a
task as a function of "(1) the diversity of the outputs provided as
measured by the number of different products, services, or clients,
(2) the number of different input resources utilized as measured by
the number of different technical specialists on a project, .. and
(3) the level of goal difficulty or performance as measured by some
,,6
efficiency criterion. Thus, the greater the diversity of
outputs and number of inputs and the more difficult the performance
goal, the more and greater the complexity of the factors that must be
considered by decision-makers. However, it is not uncertainty, per se,
that is critical for organization design, but rather, the amount and
diversity of information that must be processed by the organization
during the actual performance of the task that is the key to proper
organizational form. Uncertainty is inversely related to the amount of
information possessed by an organization.
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Galbraith starts with the basic bureaucratic model to describe
the structural changes that-occur as the organization adapts to
increasing task uncertainty and, consequently, greater amounts of
information processing during task execution. After defining the most
fundamental organization design problem as the creation of mechanisms
37for the integration of behavior across interdependent groups,
Galbraith presents the following additive sequence of strategies
which evolve to process an increasing amount of information in order
to maintain a level of performance or reduce the need for processing
38information and/or the level of performance:
(1) Rules, Programs, Proceedures:
The simplest methods for coordinating interdependent subtasks
and the most common consist of ways of specifying necessary
behaviors in advance of their execution. Rules provide
stability to organization operations and eliminate the need
for communication to guarantee coordinated action. However, this
strategy is limited to situations which can be anticipated in
advance.
(2) Hierarchy:
Managerial roles are created and arranged in a hierarchy to handle
information collection and problem solving with respect to
situations not routinely faced by an organization. A hierarchy
functions on an exception basis. As unanticipated events arise,
decision-making is referred upward in the hierarchy to the point
where a shared superior exists for all of the subunits dealing
with the new situations. The weakness of a hierarchy is the
finite capacity of each link for handling information. As a
hierarchy becomes overloaded with exceptions, delays develop
between the time of the upward referral of information and the
receipt of a response to the information by operating level units.
(3) Targeting or Goal Setting:
As the volume of exception information referred upward overloads
a hierarchy, it becomes more efficient to bring the points of
decision-making down to the points of action where information
originates. However, as the amount of discretion exercised at
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lower levels of the organization increases, an organization must
set goals or targets for units to insure that employees choose
the appropriate responses for achieving coordinated action.
However, the ability to set targets is a function of the degree
of task uncertainty. The violation of planned targets leads to
the upward referral of information for hierarchical decision
making and the volume of exceptions can overwhelm an organization.
(4) Organization Design Strategies:
In order to respond to greater information processing demands,
an, organization can adopt one or two organization design strategies
to reduce the amount of information processed and/or one or two
basic strategies to increase its capacity to process more
information. The effect of any of these organization design
changes is to reduce the number of exceptions referred upward
through the hierarchy.
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Organization Design Strategies
To Reduce the Need for To Increase the Capacity
Information Processing for Processing Information
Creation of Creation of Investment Creation of
Slack Resources Self-contained In Vertical Lateral
Tasks Information Relations
Systems *Direct Contact
*Liaison Role
*Task Force
*Team
*Integrator
*Linking Roles
*Matrix Form
Creation of Slack Resources: The number of exceptions referred up
through the hierarchy can be reduced by lowering the level of
performance with increased costs in time, man-hours, resources, etc.
Creation of Self-Contained Tasks: A second method for reducing the
amount of information processed is to change from a functional
organization design of differentiated subtask units to one in which
each unit contains all of the resources it needs to perform its task.
The self-containment strategy shifts the structure from one based on
input or skill functions to one based on output or geographical
categories. Information processing needs are reduced in two ways:
first, by reducing the amount of output diversity faced by a
collection of resources (for example, rather than having the Chapter
121B staff allocate time among CBD, residential, and industrial
projects, separate units could be established for each type of project);
and, second, by reducing the division of labor (for example, rather than
sharing an environmental impact specialist at the Executive Office of
Environmental Affairs with other state programs and projects, the EIR
could be reviewed by someone on the Chapter 121B staff).
The above two strategies reduce overloads on-the hierarchy by reducing
the number of exceptions that occur. In contrast, the following two
strategies accept the required level of information and attempt to
increase the capacity of the organization to process the information
during task execution.
Investment in Vertical Information Systems: This strategy consists of
mechanisms that enable more information to be- handled by managers
so that replanning can occur with the frequency of exceptions.
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Creation of Lateral Relations: The last strategy involves selecting
from various formal lateral forms of organization or decision processes
which cut across lines of authority. Lateral forms of organization
serve to lower the point of decision making in an organization to
where the relevant information exists. The number and types of
structures employed are a function of the degree of task uncertainty
confronted. The following lateral processes are presented in order of
responsiveness to greater task uncertainty: direct contact between
two people; a liaison role; task forces; teams; integrating role;
managerial linking roles; and matrix forms of organization.
An organization should choose from among the above strategies
the approach or combination of approaches which is least expensive.
According to Galbraith the list of strategies discussed is an
exhaustive set of alternatives for responding to greater degrees of
task uncertainty, such that at least one of the four organization
39design strategies must be adopted as uncertainty increases. Thus, in
the absence of an explicit effort to choose a strategy, the alternative
of reduced performance will occur automatically. The information
requirements for performing tasks and the capacity of an organization
to process information are necessarily equal. Not to decide is to
decide on slack resources. Accepting Galbraith's framework, one must
conclude that the design of the structure of an organization should
be given detailed consideration at the same time that decisions are
made with respect to organization programs and policies.
This focus on lateral forms of organization and the conditions
under which different forms are appropriate complements and augments
the concepts and techniques of strategic planning, management control,
and project management. Whereas the management control framework
implies that coordination can be achieved through vertical information
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systems such as program budgeting and accounting, experience suggests
that coordination is not a necessary by-product of management control
improvements. Thus, the analytical framework presented by Galbraith
serves to delimit the place and potential of management control.
However, the potential for the use of organization design mechanisms
for furthering the functions of management control suggests that
combinations of management control and organization design intitiatives
may reinforce each other and, thereby, improve the chances of success
for both efforts ( for example, team management and program budgeting).
Moreover, problems experienced with the installation of management
.control improvements may be sometimes attributable to a failure to
understand the design problems of an organization and may be
remedied by simultaneous attention to organization design changes.
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PROGRAM DESIGN: FAILURE TO DESIGN AND OPERATE CHAPTER 121B
AS AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Strategic Planning / Management Control: Programming
Findings:
All fifteen of the Chapter 121B industrial park projects which
have reached the execution stage have been complete successes. Al-
though this startling statement is accurate as it stands, an import-
ant qualification should be added to clarify the particular sense in
which it is true. All of the industrial park projects have success-
fully achieved the goals and objectives of Chapter 121B set forth in
the declaration of necessity in the statute and the rules and regula-
tions. Thus, if one wants to question and criticize the performance
of the program, and one should inasmuch as some projects have not
achieved positive net economic benefits, one should begin by question-
ing and criticizing the design of the program as elaborated in the
statute and regulations. The failures and inadequacies of the 121B
industrial land development program can be largely attributed to the
weaknesses of the strategic planning and programming processes which
defined the program in the statute,-regulations, and execution. The
Chapter 121B industrial land development program has been designed
and operated with an "input" or physical development orientation as
a program to develop "blighted" property in any communityrather than
with an "output" orientation as an economic development program
directed at the achievement of state and local economic development
objectives.
Input or Blighted Parcel Focus
The 121B statute is almost the only information resource for
answering the basic strategic planning questions with respect to the
program: Why should the program exist?; What is the need addressed?;
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What are the goals and objectives?; and How should the program be
organized? In addressing these questions, the statute defines the
program solely in terms of the physical development process. Thus,
the declaration of necessity in s.45 of c.121B states the goals of
the urban renewal program as the following:
(1) the elimination of decadent, substandard, or blighted
open areas which are dangerous to the inhabitants of
the Commonwealth;
(2) the redevelopment of land in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan to promote the sound growth of the commun-
ity; and
(3) the prevention of the spread of blight or its recur-
rence in an area.
The focus on the physical condition of the project property in the
program goals follows directly from the statute's definition of the
problem addressed by the program as various social maladies which are
caused by the deteriorated condition of property: "each (decadent,
substandard, and blighted area) constitutes a serious and growing
menace, injurious and inimical to the safety, health, morals and wel-
fare of the residents of the commonwealth;...contributes...to the
spread of disease and crime,...substantially impairs or arrests the
sound growth of cities and towns;...". In addition, the statute
affirms that the tool of redevelopment is appropriate and adequate to
meet the goals and address the needs identified for the program:
"the redevelopment of blighted open areas promotes the clearance of
decadent or substandard areas and prevents their creation and occur-
rence". Therefore, on the basis of the reasoning reflected in the
statute, one can declare without reservation that all of the Chapter
121B projects have achieved the goals of the program. The statute
makes no reference to the achievement of economic development ob-
jectives such as the provision of jobs to the unemployed, the addi-
tion of tax revenue to needy municipalities, or the construction of
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space for the expansion of local firms. Projects which have com-
pleted site clearance and preparation work but have not disposed of
any acreage are effective performers pursuant to the language of the
statute. The casual attitude of the statute toward the outputs of
redevelopment activities is expressed clearly by the following phrase:
"the disposition of the property for redevelopment incidental to the
foregoing" (emphasis added).
The "input" or physical development orientation of the design
of the Chapter 121B urban renewal program derives from the federal
Title 1 urban renewal program on which the state program is based.
The language of the 121B statute and rules and regulations was taken
largely from the statutue and regulations for the federal program.
The "parcel" orientation of Title 1 of the Federal Housing Act of
1949 reflected the concerns of the national program for slum condi-
tions and the view that physical deficiencies caused public problems
such as poverty, disease, and fire.
In a simple minded fashion which ignored the reuse of once
blighted land, the federal program held that the elimination of the
poor physical circumstances of people and cities would contribute
significantly toward a reduction of various social problems (accept-
ing the legislation at face value and disregarding any hiddden agen-
das of supporters of the bill). Consequently, urban renewal was
based on the view that the public powers of eminent domain would
solve the "prisoner's dilemma" and "monopoly rent" problems of
large area development which inhibited private market activity and
the market would determine the highest and best' commercial and/or
*optimal area development can be achieved through the unified action
of all property owners but each individual owner optimizes his
welfare by not acting because the participation of others is not
assured.
**an individual property owner can demand exorbitant payment from
someone attempting to complete assembly of a large property.
123 
_ __
residential use for the assembled property, subject only to disposi-
tion restrictions on the physical design of the project, or low and
moderate income housing would be built. Theoretically, the assembled
property should be worth more in the market than the cost of obtain-
ing the individual parcels, but a public "write-down" subsidy was
provided to cover the additional costs of public improvements, re-
location expenses, and administrative costs and to account for the
higher than market acquisition costs that result from court awards
in eminent domain takings. The federal program did not adequately
consider the multiple reasons for why people live in older, low rent
districts, such as poverty and consumption preferences, or the impact
on housing prices from the destruction of large numbers of low rent
units. In addition, the legal basis for the public use of eminent
domain powers had been tested with respect to the damaging consequen-
ces of physical blight. Although this legal foundation did not
preclude the design of an output oriented program for blighted
property, the tie between public purpose and the elimination of
blight contributed to the design of an "input" oriented program.
The faulty causal assumptions underlying the federal program ul-
timately led to its demise as the outputs of projects came under
challenge.
The logic of the federal program is even less applicable to the
redevelopment of blighted open areas for industrial development than
for residential and commercial redevelopment. The report of the
Special Commission on Audit of State Needs entitled "Massachusetts
Needs In Urban and Industrial Renewal", published in 1960 and co-
authored by Michael Dukakis, which was the impetus for the enactment
of the state-aided urban renewal program, cited the problems of
obsolete structures, inadequate amounts of urban land for construct-
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ing new industrial buildings, the negative reinforcing effects of
industrial flight on remaining businesses and residences (ex. in-
creased tax burdens, atmosphere), and the reduction in municipal
revenues from the loss of industry as the reasons for the legislation
to establish a state subsidized urban industrial land development
program. However, this report, which served as the sole strategic
planning document for preparation of the act, did not define objec-
tives for the program, analyze the economic causes for the decline
of manufacturing or the possibilities for industrial growth in urban
centers, establish a clear basis for the state and local roles in
the initiation and development of projects, attempt to estimate the
costs and benefits expected from projects and the program, or con-
sider the need for the use of other state resources in conjunction
with the 121B powers. Thus, although the contents of the report
implied a concern for the outputs of renewal -- additional jobs,
positive net municipal fiscal returns, the expansion of local firms,
etc. -- and a judgement about some of the causes of industrial de-
cline -- inadequate urban land for modern facilities at competitive
prices -- these goals and causes were not incorporated into the
design of the program. Although the solely state-aided renewal pro-
gram was enacted for the purpose of supporting urban industrial devel-
opment, which was an ineligible activity for federal aid, the contents
of the statute and rules and regulations were based on the federal
program for residential and commercial projects.
The basic physical development focus of the Chapter 121B pro-
gram and weaknesses of the strategic planning and programming pro-
cesses have resulted in a program which has not been perceived or
operated as an economic development program directed toward the
achievement of valued local and state development objectives. This
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major failing is reflected by the following design problems with the
program:
(1) Absence of Project Selection Criteria Related to Need and
Expected Outputs
The only conditions required by the statute and rules and reg-
ulations for project approval by DCA are the same six findings that
apply to federal and state-aided residential and commercial projects:
(a) the project area would not by private enterprise alone
and without either government subsidy or the exercise of
government powers be made available for urban renewal;
(b) the proposed land use and building requirements in the
project area will afford maximum opportunity to privately
financed urban renewal consistent with the sound needs
of the locality as a whole;
(c) the financial plan is sound;
(d) the project area is a decadent, substandard, or blighted
open area;
(e) the urban renewal plan is significantly complete;
(f) the relocation plan has been approved under c. 79A.
Finding (a) is usually made on the basis of title problems, owner-
ship patterns which appear to preclude easy assembly, a lack of
adequate infrastructure, or topographical conditions which require
costly site improvements. Due to the vagueness of finding (a), any
property that isn't being used will provide adequate evidence to
support the finding. The second finding is considered to be satis-
fied by receipt of a Land Utilization and Marketability study pre-
pared by a consultant that indicates a market exists for industrial
land in the area. The financial plan is accepted if the costs for
acquisition and site clearance and improvements appear to be reason-
able. The finding of financial coundness is not based on benefits
exceeding the costs of a project or a judgement that the municipality
can afford the necessary debt service. Finding (d) on the condition
of the land is based on the broad criteria set forth in the rules
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and regulations. The project plan does not call for a definition of
the problem to be addressed by the project, a justification for the
project in terms of a specific strategy and objectives, or evidence
that the project will achieve positive net benefits (see separate
findings and recommendations on project plan).
Although the report which led to the enactment of 121B described
the fiscal and economic problems faced by municipalites experiencing
the loss of industry and indicated that land was needed in -the older
urban centers for the retention and expansion of local firms, the
criteria for project approval do not include any assessment of
municipal need or economic development objectives. As a result of the
absence of approval criteria related to expected net benefits, project
plans do not analyze the unique opportunities and constraints of
individual municipalities. Due to the absence of need criteria for
project approval, projects have been developed in the relatively
prosperous and growing communities of Woburn, Wilmington, Methuen,
and Peabody. Moreover, firms have moved out of more needy communi-
ties in the state to locations in these projects. Thus, the state
has subsidized projects which have subverted state economic develop-
ment goals and the legislative goal of the development of depressed
urban centers. Despite the explicit focus of state development policy
on the economic revitalization of older urban centers and evidence
that indicates that 121B can address the industrial development needs
of these municipalities, the program has not been employed as a tool
for the development of depressed urban areas (however, the program
has been utilized with some degree of success in such needy urban
centers as New Bedford, Brockton, and Lawrence).
Due to the ease of qualifying for 121B assistance, projects
were accepted on a first come, first served basis and not a single
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project was ever rejected by DCA. According to the former director
of the program, the DCA approval process consisted of the following
steps: an assessment of the cost to acquire and prepare the project
property; a judgement that the municipality and DCA want to share
the net project cost assuming the property can be sold for 50% of
the cost of assembly and preparation; and a judgement that the site
was appropriate for an industrial park. Project feasibility was
determined on the basis of a feeling about the desirability of the
location. DCA operated on the assumption that local personnel would
take a harder look at the project because the municipality must ad-
vance the entire cash cost of the project. The period of the late
1960s and early '70s was a boom time for industrial park development
in the Commonwealth and DCA personnel regarded any project as market-
able. Land Utilization and Marketability studies were treated as
formalities by DCA and were not even read by staff.
(2) Inadequate Definition of Needs, Problems, and Rationale for
Program
As a consequence of the weaknesses of the strategic planning
and programming processes related to the design and operation of
121B, the program has suffered from an inadequate definition of the
problems to be addressed and, therefore, objectives to be achieved
through the program and assessment of the appropriateness and ad-
equacy of the tools provided to meet objectives and satisfy needs.
As noted above., the legislation defines the problem solely in terms
of dangerous physical conditions and the report which precipitated
passage of the act refers to the fiscal problems of municipalities
caused by the loss of industry due to the obsolescerice of buildings.
No analysis was undertaken which examined the causes or extent of
industrial decline, isolated the impacts of the loss of industry
from cities on people and municipalities, or considered the rationale
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for various public actions and the strategy proposed by the legisla-
tion.
The first and most important step in any programming process is
the definition of the problem or need to be addressed. The aid in
definition is not only to provide a general account of the problem --
what, where, how much, etc. -- but to break the problem down into
components which indicate how the program should be designed and
directed. The identification of activities to solve a problem fol-
lows directly from the definition of the problem. Thus, general
statements such as high urban unemployment or the loss of industry
do not serve as an adequate basis for programming. For example,
a high rate of urban unemployment may mean any one or combination of
the following problems which call for different programmatic respon-
ses: (a) a high-job turnover rate; (b) too many unemployed youth;
(c) a high labor participation rate; (d) a shift of the economy to
service employment; (e) high seasonality; (f) a cyclically sensitive
economy; (g) structural obstacles to job access; (h) high welfare or
unemployment benefits; (i) considerable immigration; (j) a dual labor
market; and/or (k) too few jobs.
From the definition of the problem, the goals and objectives of
a program can be established and the appropriateness and adequacy
of the tools of the program for achieving goals can be assessed.
The program analyst must rely on available research and theoretical
discussion to examine the program strategy. Although it may not be
possible to categorically establish the adequacy of the program,
the programming process should determine the assumptions underlying
a program and the combination of resources that should be applied to
address a problem.
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In addition to inadequate attention to defining the problems to
be addressed by and rationale for the program as a whole, project plans
have not defined the problems to be addressed by individual projects
or justified the particular development strategies proposed. Inasmuch
as each municipality has a unique economy with particular problems
and opportunities, the project plan should describe a particular
development strategy in relation to local conditions. The case of
Attleboro can be used to illustrate how the specific economic condi-
tions of the municipality should establish the basis for a project.
For a project in a community such as Attleboro, which does not suffer
from fiscal and unemployment needs,'to serve publicly valued objec-
tives, special efforts must be made to manage the project with
reference to specific objectives. Inasmuch as Attleboro's employment
problem is not a matter of high levels of unemployment but of a
concentration of low wage jobs, firm selection criteria and an employ-
ment program should have been established to insure that public
development objectives were met through the hiring of under- and un-
employed local residents in "primary labor market" quality jobs.
The project was initiated principally as an intra-community indus-
trial relocation project to serve the expansion needs of firms located
near Attleboro's congested central business district. Therefore,
objectives of the project included the retention of existing firms
and jobs within the city, the expansion of specific firms, and the
upgrading of the downtown area after the relocation of firms. The
concentration of the jewelry industry in Attleboro and nearby Rhode
Island communities strongly suggests the presence of agglomeration
economies. Thus, by providing modern space that was not otherwise
available in Attleboro, the project enabled jewelry and related firms
to locate, start-up, or expand where they can take advantage of
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unique economies not available at other locations and thereby con-
tributed to the growth of the state economy and strengthened the
state's agglomerations.
(3) Failure to Differentiate Program Components
Lacking an understanding of the needs, objectives, and rationale
for the program, DCA has failed to differentiate the components of
the Chapter 121B urban industrial development program and properly
identify the circumstances when the various components should be
used. Five distinct economic development tools should be isolated
as elements of the program: (1) eminent domain powers, (2) state
advances or subsidias for project planning, (3) partial state sub-
sidization of the net project cost, (4) state infrastructure invest-
ment, and (5) DCA's role as regulator, coordinator, and assistance
provider. The experience of the fifteen industrial park projects
which have reached execution suggests that each of these elements
be regarded as a separate program. However, DCA has not identified
the different circumstances under which these tools should be applied
or attempted to vary the emphasis on the use of these tools to add-
ress particular development problems.
The fifteen industrial park projects which have reached the
execution stage have differed widely in the use of the five develop-
ment tools. In the case of Attleboro, eminent domain powers and the
construction of 1-95 have been adequate to execute a project which
has yielded substantial local and state fiscal and economic benefits.
In Brockton, a state execution subsidy and the construction of Rt. 24
have contributed to the development of an industrial park, but the
failure of DCA to actively monitor and assist the project has limited
the positive net benefits from the project below the potential level
of such benefits. The Fitchburg and Gardner projects have utilized
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state planning and execution funds but have received inadequate
assistance from DCA and have not disposed of any property. Holyoke
has relied on state planning and execution funds and the construction
of a highway through the project area but the lack of assistance from
DCA will limit the chances for success. State execution aid was the
the only tool employed to complete a project in Lawrence which has
provided significant benefits but DCA's weaknesses at project manage-
ment reduced the benefits from the project. In Methuen and Wilmington,
eminent domain powers and state planning advances have been sufficient
to develop successful projects but DCA's weaknesses at project man-
agement have limited the public benefits achieved. State execution
subsidies and infrastructure investments have been employed to develop
the three projects in New Bedford, two of which'have resulted in
considerable net benefits, but DCA's failure to assist with the third
project has contributed to the lack of benefits to date. Northampton
and Palmer have utilized eminent domain powers and state planning and
execution funds, but DCA's limited assistance efforts have contributed
to a lack of progress. The project in Peabody has relied on all of
the program components but the project has not progressed far due in
part to DCA's weaknesses at project management. The Woburn project
has achieved substantial net benefits employing all of the state
components, but DCA's lack of assistance efforts have reduced the
level of benefits.
The program has suffered in the following ways from DCA's failure
to manage efforts in terms of the individual components of the pro-
gram:
(a) Failure to Appreciate the Importance of Infrastructure
Investments
DCA has not given proper recognition to the importance of state
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infrastructure investments for the success of projects and actively
coordinated activities with the Department of Public Works. As a
result, many projects have been slowed by delays in DPW activities,
DPW projects have been placed in locations disadvantageous to 121B
projects, and DCA has not utilized DP4 projects as tools to initiate
-worthwhile projects, such as those in depressed urban areas.
Although there is a general awareness in state government that
highways and bridges are elements of economic development efforts,
the absence of formal mechanisms to integrate infrastructure invest-
ments with economic development activities indicates a lack of appre-
ciation of the critical importance of highways and bridges as econ-
omic development tools. (see the separate section of findings and
recommendations on integration for an account of coordination prob-
lems with DPW) The Governor's Management Task Force noted in its
report that the state lacked an effective capital budgeting capability
and recommended that the Office of State Planning serve as the unit
responsible for examing capital expenditures in relation to state
policies and programs. This recommendation has not been implemented
and the state continues to lack an ability to evaluate the economic
impacts of infrastructure investments and assess investments in
relation to complementary state activities. The construction of a
highway by the Commonwealth to enable the Digital Equipment Corp.
to locate a major facility in the state is an isolated example of
targeted capital investments to promote economic development objec-
tives. Much of the literature on urban economic development in-
dicates that highway investments are essential for providing new
modern industrial parks in dense urban centers. Kinnard and Messner,
two industrial real estate experts, state in a report entitled
"Inner City Industrial Development" that selective highway invest-
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ment is an effective and essential tool for creating viable industrial
sites in inner city areas and they cite industrial projects in New
Haven and Hartford that were successfully developed as a result of
the construction of access roads to major highways.
(b) Neglect of Projects Not Receiving State Execution Subsidies
DCA has neglected to monitor and assist projects not receiving
state execution assistance and has failed to treat such projects which
receive planning advances and/or infrastructure investments and/or
utilize eminent domain powers as part of the 121B urban industrial
development program. Although DCA's adoption of a "hands-off" attitude
stems partly from the limited leverage DCA maintains over projects not
receiving annual state subsidy payments, no basis exists for regarding
the state execution subsidy as any more or less important than the
other components of the program. DCA retains responsibility for
assuring that all of the tools of the program are serving development
objectives. In addition, experience indicates that considerable
potential exists for the abuse of eminent domain, which is a power
of the state selectively granted to redevelopment authorities, because
of the large differences in financial gains that can result from public
as compared with private land assembly.
Moreover, DCA should actively monitor all projects to insure that
public goals are not being subverted by projects. For example, evi-
dence suggests that the projects in Methuen, Attleboro, Wilmington,
and Woburn have allowed for the flight of industry out of high priority
development areas to these more prosperous communities. If projects
were more dependent on DCA for assistance, which would be the case if
project approval was based on municipal need criteria, DCA would have
more leverage over projects not receiving annual state aid payments.
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(c) Inadequate Understanding of DCA's Role
DCA has treated the program as a local redevelopment program and
has failed to understand and fulfill its necessary role as regulator,
coordinator, and provider of assistance. Numerous references to DCA's
weaknesses in performing these functions are noted in the project
cases in this report. Inasmuch as the direct benefits which accrue
to the Commonwealth from projects consist mostly of increases in
employment and employment for the previously unemployed, whereas munic-
ipalities benefit directly mostly through increases in real estate tax
returns, the Commonwealth cannot expect redevelopment authorities to
manage projects to achieve state development objectives without DCA
playing an active role in project development. Nevertheless, DCA has
operated with a passive or "minimum compliance" orientation to the
program.
Although the passive role assumed by DCA can be partly attributed
to the contents of the statute which set forth the six criteria for
project approval, DCA has considerable latitude in preparing the rules
and regulations which define the respective roles of redevelopment
authorities and the Bureau of Urban Renewal and the requirments for
satisfying the findings specified by the statute. However, DCA has
not gone beyond the statute by detailing project selection criteria
based on the achievement of state and local economic development ob-
jectives. For example, whereas DCA merely reviews the reasonableness
of project costs to establish the soundness of the financial plan, the
following additional information should be required to satisfy the
finding: a definition of the problem, objectives, and rationale for
the project in economic development terms; an assessment of the net
economic benefits, net fiscal flows to the state, and net fiscal flows
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to the municipality expected from the project; and evidence of re-
source commitments from participating local, state, and federal actors.
In addition, the rules and regulations describe DCA's role in project
management after project approval as limited to .the following activ-
ities: plan change approvals, approval of land disposition prices,
approval of all expenditures of over $1,000, and periodic auditing
of redevelopment authority accounts. These regulatory functions
assigned to DCA are intended to assure compliance with the physical
plan, the responsible use of funds, and a disposition process which
is open and honest. However, inasmuch as DCA does not provide assist-
ance to redevelopment authorities, authority personnel commonly view
these requirements as onerous burdens and DCA as an obstacle to the
development process. As a result of these widely shared hostile
attitudes toward DCA, few authorities comply with the regulations and
DCA does not provide even the minimal monitoring necessary to protect
state participation and the public interest.
In addition to the above reasons, the need for .CA to play an
active role in project management is evident from the following:
(1) as Regulator/Monitor:
(a) DCA's neglect of its regulatory responsibilities has
allowed illegal and unethical activities to occur in
numerous cases, for example:
* Woburn: municipal and redevelopment authority
officials profited from land speculation, rezoning,
and road construction; the Mayor and the Chairman
of the redevelopment authority purchased land in
an area prior to the designation of the property
for a project and sold the land to the authority
at a much higher price than they had acquired it
for; DCA failed to approve any of the 19 contracts
for site improvements and only 3 of the 19 contracts
were opened up for public bidding as required by
.he regulations.
Methuen: the redeveloper of the entire project
property acquired the land for the cost to the
authority for property acquisition which suggests
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that the town was not adequately compensated for
the land and eminent domain powers were used for
private advantage; the eminent domain taking of the
property was initiated prior to DCA approval of the
project in violation of the regulations; DCA did
not review and approve of the disposition price
prior to the sale as required by the regulations.
(b) The absence of an adequate reporting system has de-
prived DCA of the information necessary to compare
actual with estimated costs and assess the impacts from
projects:
* The lack of comparisons of actual with budgeted
costs and revenues has resulted in some projects
receiving a state subsidy equal to more than one-
half of the net project cost and other projects
receiving less than one-half. Thus, the Common-
wealth is over paying some municipalities and under
paying others without regard for the accomplishment
of objectives. DCA may now lack adequate funds to
adjust state payments on the basis of one half of
the actual net project costs.
DCA and the Commonwealth lack the information needed
to assess the benefits and costs of projects and
the merits of the program as a whole. As a result,
legislators and personnel in state government have
formed negative opinions about the program based
on crises during the development of projects rather
than the economic outcomes of projects.
* The lack of detailed information on the impacts of
projects is especially unfortunate inasmuch as
a number of projects have achieved significant pos-
itive net economic development benefits.
(c) The failure of DCA to enforce design and construction
standards for projects has reduced the physical attrac-
tiveness of projects and, thereby, lowered the poten-
tial of some projects for attracting high quality
firms.
(d) State economic development goals have been subverted
as firms have moved from high priority development
areas-to state assisted projects in more prosperous
communities because DCA has not established a "non-
relocation" regulation comparable to the regulation
promulgated by EDA.
(2) as Coordinator:
(a) Some projects have suffered from poor highway access
(ex. Brockton, Wilmington) but DCA has not attempted
to secure state or federal funds to improve access.
(b) DCA has not attempted to obtain the assistance of the
Department of Manpower Development to establish employ-
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ment programs for projects (ex. by targeting CETA
training funds) in order to help projects achieve
valued state economic development objectives related
to the employment and training of the unemployed.
Most projects have failed to address the needs of
unemployed local residents.
(c) Despite the inherent difficulty of marketing land
which private developers had not attempted develop,
DCA has not sought the assistance of the Department
of Commerce and Development in marketing projects
through its business contact program and the target-
ing of public sources of business capital (MIMIA,
MBDC, SBA, etc.) to projects.
(d) Despite the participation of numerous local, regional,
state, and federal actors on every 121B industrial
park project, DCA has not attempted to use its leverage
as a state agency to coordinate the many activities
which are part of the implementation of projects.
In particular, although many redevelopment authorities
have experienced difficulty in dealing with the
Department of Public Works, DCA has not intervened
on their behalf.
(3) as Assistance Provider:
(a) The failure of DCA to assist authorities in formulat-
ing firm selection criteria based on the quality and
number of jobs provided by businesses locating in
parks, and review disposition agreements to insure
that reuse with respect to employment objectives is
specified has allowed for land sales to firms with
low labor intensity uses and poor employment quality
and for firms to substitute low labor intensity uses
for high intensity uses agreed to verbally.
(b) The employment benefits from projects have been reduced
considerably due to DCA's failure to require and assist
in formulating employment programs for the hiring of
unemployed persons by firms in projects.
(c) Every redevelopment authority has lacked adequate ex-
pertise for marketing its project-but DCA has not.
provided assistance in marketing despite the inves-t-
ment of substantial amounts of state funds in projects
with good potential for achieving valued state ecdnomic
development objectives.
(d) Failure to Identify the Circumstances which Require Only the
Use of Eminent Domain Powers
In the cases of Attleboro, Methuen, and Wilmington the public
powers of eminent domain were employed to assemble property and the
land was subsequently sold for a price equal to or greater than the
cost .of acquisition. Inasmuch as a large assembled parcel of land
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should be worth more than the cost of acquiring the individual par-
cels, these experiences are not surprising. However, DCA has not
considered the possibility that subsidies may not be necessary in
other cases or focused attention on the conditions under which.em-
inent domain powers are sufficient to execute a project. Rather than
seeking projects which require only the use of eminent domain powers
and planning advances for successful implementation, DCA has tended
to treat such projects as less than bona fide Chapter 121B state
assisted projects.
(4) Inadequate Attention to Mechanisms for Insuring the Achievement
of Project Objectives
As a result of DCA's general neglect of project and program
outputs, the following three mechanisms, which have been identified
from experience as necessary for insuring the achievement of objec-
tives, have not been adopted:
(a) A Non-Relocation Regulation:
A number of Chapter 121B industrial park projects have been
developed in relatively prosperous and growing communities: Attle-
boro, Methuen, Northampton, Peabody, Wilmington, and Woburn. In a
few of these cases, evidence indicates that firms locating in these
projects have moved from "depressed" urban centers in the state.
Inasmuch as the Commonwealth professes a development policy which
regards depressed older cities as high priority development areas
due to the concentration of fiscal and employment problems, the sub-
stantial state revenue loss from the further decline of such areas,
the existing investment of infrastructure, and the potential for the
state to receive considerable benefits from the economic revival of
these communities, some state assisted and aided industrial park
projects have served to subvert state economic development objectives.
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The federal Economic Development Administration requires, as
a condition of receiving a public facilities grant for an industrial
park project, that the public or non-profit developer of the park and
firms moving to the park execute and comply with a non-relocation
statement which prohibits the .movement .of firms from other localities
to the project. The non-relocation provision, which is required by
statute, is intended to insure that projects lead to economic growth
rather than the transfer of employment and plant piracy. The non-
relocation prohibition becomes a covenant on the title to property
in projects in perpetuity because the project must continue to pro-
vide public benefits over a long period of time in order to justify
the public subsidy to the project. As a result of the non-relocation
provision, the market for projects assisted with EDA funds is limited
to relocating and expanding local firms, business start-ups, and
branch plant expansions of out-of-area firms.
DCA's failure to establish a variant of EDA's non-relocation
regulation, and the absence of a requirement for such a provision in
the Chapter 121B statute, have allowed state assisted projects to
subvert state economic development goals by supporting the flight of
industry out of high priority development areas and have limited the
net growth benefits achieved by the state from the development of
industrial parks.
A number of state assisted projects have received or will re-
ceive EDA grants (Fitchburg, Gardner, New Bedford (2), Palmer, and
Peabody) and, therefore, are subject to EDA non-relocation prohibi-
tions in marketing these parks. However, inasmuch as all of these
communities, with the exception of Peabody, are experiencing eco-
nomic problems, the EDA restriction will further limit the already
weak markets for these projects whereas the projects in more pros-
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perous are not so restricted. In addition, Fitchburg, Gardner, and
Palmer are relatively small and isolated municipalities which lack
sufficient economic activity for filling parks with relocating and
expanding local firms and business start-ups. Moreover, the reloca-
tion of non-expanding local firms to parks within the same community
does not contribute to economic development objectives unless the
space vacated by such firms is filled by new economic activity or
the local firms would have closed or fled the community if modern
space was not provided.
Inasmuch as the Commonwealth has expressed a policy commitment
to depressed area development and such communities face weak markets,
DCA should establish a non-relocation regulation which only applies
to the movement of firms out of high priority development areas to
projects, rather than the relocation of any firm as is the case with
EDA provision. Furthermore, the relocation of firms contributes
to state economic growth when moves are made in order to take ad-
vantage of efficiency advantages, such as transportation services,
or economies, such as low wage labor or agglomeration economies,
at new locations. A non-relocation regulation should serve the
policy objective of depressed area development by prohibiting the
movement of firms out of such areas to state assisted projects but
should not preclude firm relocations from non-depressed areas.
(b) A Standard Land Disposition Agreement and Requirement
for Performance Clauses in Agreements
DCA has not prepared a standard land disposition agreement for
use by redevelopment authorities, despite the requirement in the
rules and regulations for DCA to approve all disposition agreements.
As a result, redevelopment authorities have relied on inexperienced
local attorneys, municipal counsels, and developers purchasing
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property to compose disposition agreements. Therefore, many agree-
ments have not adequately served the interests of the redevelopment
authority, the municipality, or the Commonwealth.
In addition, with the exception of the project in Palmer, land
disposition agreements have not incorporated provisions related to
the performance of firms and developers in meeting specific economic
development objectives, such as the number of unemployed persons
hired, the total number of persons employed, or uses permitted.
Thus, in Brockton, where economic reuses were not specified in dis-
position agreements, the Knapp Shoe Company located a low labor
intensive warehouse and retail facility in the project after indicat-
ing verbally that a manufacturing plant would be built. The absence
of performance clauses in agreements follows from the lack of spec-
ific objectives in the project plan. However, in the case of the
disposition agreement for the project in Palmer. (see case), the
disposition price and sale of property to a developer were made
contingent upon meeting a timetable for the creation of specific
numbers of jobs in the project.
(c) The Negotiation of Disposition Prices on the Basis of
Performance in Meeting Development Objectives
Contrary to the beliefs of many of the executive directors of
redevelopment authorities, the rules and regulations do not require
disposition of property at the highest price obtainable. The five
methods for offering project land to developers described in the
rules and regulations (see pp. 130-33) all allow for disposition
which maximizes project objectives rather than the disposition price.
Obviously, if redevelopment authorities have not identified detailed
objectives for projects, disposition negotiations cannot be based on
tradeoffs between price and performance. If dispositions are based
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on performance in achieving objectives, clauses can be added to dis-
position agreements which specify the performance conditions which
are the terms for the disposition price.
(5) Project Plan Does Not Serve as an Action Document Oriented
Toward the Achievement of Objectives
A separate section of findings and recommendations on the pro-
ject plan details the inadequacies of the present requirements for
a project plan and presents recommended modifications for a plan
with an output focus.
As noted above, project plans have not defined the problems
to be addressed by projects or justified the particular development
strategies proposed. Thus, project plans have not defined specific
economic development objectives for projects or measures for monitor-
ing the effectiveness of projects in reaching objectives. In addi-
tion, as noted above, DCA has not developed a system for reporting on
the impacts of projects or attempted to monitor the effectiveness of
projects. As a result, DCA does not know whether or not projects
have been successful or which types or models of projects are most
desirable. In addition, the Commonwealth cannot assess the merits
of the program or compare the program with other state economic devel-
opment efforts.
In addition to failing to define objectives for projects, pro-
ject plans lack accounts of all of the activities required for pro-
ject implementation and all of the actors participating on projects.
Thus, the project plan is not an action document which directs the
accomplishment of project tasks.
(6) Few Incentives Exist for Achieving State and Local Economic
Development Objectives and the Timely Completion of Project
Development Tasks
After DCA approves a project and executes a financial assistance
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agreement with a redevelopment authority for a state execution sub-
sidy, the Commonwealth makes 20 annual payments of the subsidy with-
out regard for the status of project implementation or the achieve-
ment of economic development objectives.. Inasmuch as redevelopment
authorities often undertake only a single project, authority staff
preserve their jobs by delaying the execution of project tasks. Al-
though municipal officials and residents may apply pressure on re-
development authority personnel to efficiently execute projects,
they usually lack the expertise and information needed to demand
efficient performance. In addition, as noted previously, municipal
objectives for industrial development projects consist principally
of increases in real estate tax revenues whereas the Commonwealth
primarily seeks to reduce unemployment. Inasmuch as the benefits
captured by the state and municipality differ, few incentives exist
for redevelopment authorities to focus on state economic development
objectives. Therefore, various options should be examined for link-
ing state subsidy payments to milestones in project execution and/or
the achievement of state development objectives.
(7) Failure to Consider Economic Constraints on the Program
DCA has operated the Chapter 121B industrial park development
program as if the appropriation limit on subsidy funds were the only
economic constraint on the program. Thus, DCA has not attempted to
assess the supply and demand for industrial space in specific areas
or the state as a whole when approving projects and, therefore, has
not considered whether the private market could absorb the land made
available in state assisted industrial parks. As a consequence of
this failing, projects have been developed in areas where private
industrial parks have absorbed much of the demand for industrial
land. In addition, DCA approved most of the projects during a boom
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period for industrial park development in the Commonwealth (the late
'60s and early '70s) without regard for possible changes in the state
or national economies. These projects have come on the market at a
time of a sharp decline in demand for industrial land in Massachusetts
as a result of the recession and the reduction in federal research
and development expenditures. Thus, DCA has failed to consider the
conditions of the state and national economies in operating the pro-
gram.
(8) Identification of the Program as "Urban Renewal" rather than
Urban Industrial Development and a Reliance on Redevelopment
Authorities rather than Economic Development Organizations as
the Vehicles for Development
Although the "solely state-aided" Chapter 121B urban development
program was established in 1961 for the purpose of developing indus-
trial projects which were not eligible for federal Title 1 funds
(the scope of the program was expanded to include residential and
commercial projects in 1969), the program was incorporated into the
121B legislation which set forth the requirements for state partici-
pation in federally subsidized residential and commercial projects
and tied to redevelopment authorities. As a result of the identi-
fication of the program with redevelopment authorities and federal
Title 1, persons within state government and at the local level have
tended to view the program as "urban renewal" and actors involved in
economic development efforts have been unaware of and/or unable to
utilize state subsidies for urban industrial development.
Redevelopment authorities have lacked the economic development
expertise to design and execute industrial development projects
(authorities formed from local economic development organizations
have proven more effective). Redevelopment authority personnel have,
for the most part, successfully executed the physical development
tasks which are traditional urban renewal functions while failing
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to address the economic development aspects of the design and ex-
ecution of projects.
RECOMMENDATION: THE STATE URBAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
SHOULD BE VIEWED AND OPERATED AS AN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
RECOMMENDATION: THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE LABELED AS THE STATE URBAN
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND USE OF THE TERM
"URBAN RENEWAL" WITH REFERENCE TO THE PROGRAM
SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED
The term "urban renewal" is associated in most people's minds with
the discredited and abandoned federal Title 1 program for residential
and commercial projects and fails to accurately describe the pur-
poses and activities of the state program for industrial development.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD DISTINGUISH CHAPTER 121B INDUSTRIAL PARK
PROJECTS FROM RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROJECTS
IN ALL COMMDUNICATIONS DESCRIBING THE PROGRAM
RECOMMENDATION: STAFF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROCESSING CHAPTER 121B
INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS SHOULD BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL PRO-
JECTS
The basic organization development design rule of "form follows
function" should be applied to the management of Chapter 121B.
Thus, the development tools created by the legislation should not
define an all inclusive "urban renewal" program, but should be used
in conjunction with other state development tools to establish a
state urban industrial development program, a state central business
district development program, and an urban housing development pro-
gram. Greater DCA staff expertise is needed in each of these func-
tional areas to effectively manage programs directed at development
objectives than for carrying out the tasks required in processing
Chapter 121B projects in general.
RECOMMENDATION: A NE STATUTE SHOULD BE WRITTEN AND ENACTED WHICH
DEALS EXCLUSIVELY WITH STATE ASSISTANCE FOR URBAN
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
A state program for assisting urban industrial development should
be designed and operated independently of state programs for aiding
residential and commercial development projects. The new legislation
for a state urban industrial development program should incorporate
the many recommendations advanced in this report. The act should
be composed with an "output" orientation to describe an economic
development program directed toward the achievement of valued state-
and local economic development objectives.
The declaration of necessity for the act should define in economic
terms the problems to be addressed by the program, the rationale
for the tools offered by the program, and the objectives sought
through the program. Although the statute should include an account
of the detrimental consequences of physical blight, the emphasis
of the language of the act should be on economic development problems
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and solutions. Thus, the legislative declarations should include
items such as the following:
whereas, conditions of substantial and persistent unemployment
and underemployment exist in many municipalities of the
commonwealth;
whereas, these conditions cause hardships to many individuals
and families, such as .1..
whereas, concentrations of unemployment and underemployment
in municipalities have been caused in part by industrial
companies moving from these municipalities;
whereas, industrial companies have moved from these munici-
palities and others have not started-up or relocated to sites
in these municipalities due in part to the availability of
only obsolete and inefficient facilities;
whereas, municipalities have experienced fiscal strain as a
consequence of the reduction of industrial companies and the
added service demands and revenue losses from unemployed and
underemployed persons;
whereas, the fiscal strain experienced by some municipalities
has led to increased taxes which have further reduced the
attractiveness of the commmunity for industrial companies;
whereas, the industrial sector of the economy generally pro-
vides desirable job opportunities for the inhabitants of
municipalities;
whereas, the economy of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
experienced a net loss of industrial jobs;
whereas, the concentrations of underemployed and unemployed
persons in municipalities have been caused in part by a
shift of the composition of the state economy to a greater
reliance on service jobs;
whereas, employment in the service sector as a whole provides
more unstable and lower paying jobs than in industry;
whereas, service jobs have been statistically linked to higher
public assistance b~irdens;
whereas, new service jobs have not been created in many munici-
palities in sufficient numbers to replace lost industrial jobs;
whereas, the new service jobs in the commonwealth are concen-
trated in a few of the largest cities and growing suburban
areas;
whereas, the residents of some municipalities lack access to
industrial and service jobs in suburban areas;
whereas, unique agglomeration economies exist in some munici-
palities which are threatened by the flight of industry as a
result of a lack of modern facilities;
whereas, evidence indicates that some industrial companies
find urban locations desirable if modern industrial space is
available with efficient transportation services;
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whereas, unaided private efforts cannot provide the necessary
industrial sites within urban centers due to the "monopoly
rent" problem of land assembly, the "prisoner's dilemma" prob-
lem of unified action, the absence of adequate public infra-
structure, the unavailability of sufficient private capital
for development, and the complications of dealing with munici-
pal government agencies and the residents of populated areas;
whereas, the location of firms in depressed urban areas which
hire unemployed persons provides benefits to the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts in the form of lower public assistance pay-
ments, higher income and sales tax revenues,...;
whereas, the location of firms in depressed urban areas pro-
vides benefits to municipalities in the form of increased
real estate tax revenues,...;
whereas, the federal government provides various forms of
financial assistance to localities for industrial land devel-
opment projects and the commonwealth can provide valuable
assistance in obtaining such funds.
RECOMMENDATION: THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE DESIGNED AND OPERATED ON
THE BASIS OF A RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVES DRAWN
FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
EXPERIENCE
Although the material available on urban economic development theory,
research, and program experiences does not categorically establish
the basis for an urban industrial development program, the following
justifications and objectives which have been extracted from such
sources indicate a possible foutdation for a program.
Need For A Program:
(1) The price for industrial land in urban centers is bid up by
competing uses so that land costs are too high relative to
suburban locations.
(2) Private developers are discouraged from assembling land parcels
large enough for modern industrial parks in dense urban areas
by a variety of factors: (a) the "monopoly rent" problem
(i.e. a single property owner can demand an exorbitant price
for a small amount of land needed to complete the assembly of
a large property), (b) the possible opposition of present
occupants of a site; (c) the difficulties in obtaining nece-
ssary permits from municipal agenices; (d) the reluctance
of sources of finance to invest in older urban areas; (e) the
physical unattractiveness of many older areas; (f) the scar-
city of land with suitable access to major highways; (f) the
problem of establishing clear title to land parcels; (g) the
large number of owners to negotiate with; and (h) the uncer-
tain futures for older areas.
(3) The residential segregation of unemployed and underemployed
persons in older urban centers deprives them of access to
jobs in suburban areas and leads to the creation of dual labor
markets (i.e. structural rigidities in the labor market which
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result in artificially high wages for an employed pool of
workers and chronic unemployment and low wages for an inner
city pool of persons).
(4) Experience indicates that some industrial firms find urban
locations desirable if modern industrial space is available
at sites offering good access to major highway networks.
(5) Unique agglomeration economies in some municipalities are
threatened by the flight of industry as a result of a lack
of modern facilities.
Responses To Frequently Voiced Economic Objections To A Program:
(1) Objection: The state should not attempt to influence the
location decisions of firms because the market
provides for the most efficient allocation of
resources.
Responses: (a) Private market decisions create negative
externalities or costs which are borne by
society, for example:
labor markets are segmented as one pool of
workers is relegated to a situation of low
wage, undesirable jobs and unemployment;
public infrastructure is underutilized in
older communities while new public costs
are incurred for new infrastructure in
growing communities;
* scarce open space is utilized for new
industrial facilities;
small marginal firms are deprived of urban
economies which are necessary for initial
viability and growth.
(2) Objection:
Responses:
The flight of industry from urban areas represents
an efficient transformation of urban economies from
industrial to service uses and the loss of industrial
jobs will be compensated for by new service jobs
as municipalities become regional service centers.
(a) A report prepared by Donald Stone for Harbridge
House on the Massachusetts' economy indicates
that state statistics on services are dominated
by the figures for Boston and smaller cities
are not gaining large numbers of service jobs.
(b) Service jobs are generally more unstable and-
lower paying and offer less advancement oppor-
tunities than industrial jobs.
(c) The lower capital to labor ratio for services
results in lower real estate taxes per employee
than irndustry.
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The Parent-tnvinehment s
(1) The revitalization of the older cities of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts is an avowed policy goal of the Dukakis adminis-
tration. State initiatives to support urban revitalization
have included creative strategies such as the Culture Park in
Lowell and the reuse of old buildings for housing in several
cities, but the commonwealth has not addressed the need for
industrial jobs in older cities.
(2) The Community Development Finance Corporation, a state financed
development financial institution for making equity investments
in business ventures sponsored by community-based development
corporations in depressed urban areas, was enacted on December
31, 1975 and will soon begin to seek ventures in depressed
urban areas of the state. In order for firms receiving CDFC
funds to operate competitively from depressed area locations,
a mechanism for developing modern industrial facilities may be
needed. In addition, policy papers on the recently established
Massachusetts Industrial Mortgage Insurance Agency, a state
financed vehicle for insuring industrial mortgages, have ex-
pressed an intent of focusing as much as possible on depressed
area development.
(3) The Office of State Planning has recently indicated support for
measures to foster industry in older urban centers through real
estate tax incentives. However, considerable economic liter-
ature suggests that real estate tax incentives are ineffective
measures for inducing firms to locate in urban areas. High
real estate taxes should not affect the location decision of
firms if taxes are capitalized into the price of land or the
consumers of a firm's products bear the incidence of taxes.
In addition, evidence suggests that a firm's decision to locate
in an older urban center is not based on marginal considerations
and the advantages for firms that want to locate in urban
centers (ex. proximity to markets) far outweigh real estate tax
differentials between city and suburb. Nevertheless, high
urban real estate taxes may have a psychological effect of
discouraging firms from locating in urban centers.
(4) The Governor's Employment and Training Plan prepared recently
by the State Manpower Services Council calls for expanded state
efforts to create jobs in depressed areas.
Examples Of Needs and Opportunities:
(1) The town of Greenfield is threatened with the loss of the
Millers Falls Company, a major employer in the entire area,
due to the unavailability of a suitable site for the reloca-
tion of the plant into a modern facility.
(2) Kassanoff's Bakery, a major employer in the Rcxbury area of
Boston, was forced to close due in part to an inability to
expand operations at a site in the area.
(3) The discovery of significant oil deposits in the Georges Bank
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area may provide coastal communities in the commonwealth,
especially New Bedford, with opportunities for industrial
development that must be quickly exploited through the pro-
vision of suitable land for development.
ProgramObjectives:
(1) the provision of jobs to underemployed and unemployed persons.
(2) the retention of expanding local firms by depressed communities.
(3) the strengthening of unique agglomerations in urban centers
by enabling expanding, relocating, and/or start-up firms to
locate in areas to take advantage of the economies present.
(4) "incubation facilities": the provision of modern lease space
for small marginal firms which lack sufficient capital for the
purchase of land and structures; the development of such pro-
jects contributes to growth by providing more efficient space
for small firms than is otherwise available in older buildings.
(5) growth of the state economy through the expansion of-local firms,
the start-up of businesses, and/or the movement of out-of-state
firms to locations in projects due to the advantages particular
to an industrial park (so as not to count activity that would
have occured anyway) and the achievement of fiscal and employment
objectives which reduces the fiscal demands on the commonwealth
(by reducing welfare expenses, etc.) and, thereby, the need for
taxes which impair the competitive position of the state for
all business.
(6) positive net fiscal flows to municipalities.
(7) positive net fiscal flows to the commonwealth.
(8) increasing the stability of municipal and regional economies.
(9) improve the quality of jobs available in municipalities with
concentrations of "secondary labor market" quality jobs.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD ESTABLISH MUNICIPAL NEED CRITERIA FOR
THE APPROVAL OF PROJECTS BASED ON THE OBJECTIVES
OF THE PROGRAM AND DEFINE A METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESS-
ING MUNICIPAL NEED
The need criteria and methodology should be consistent with those
applied to other state legislation dealing with depressed area
development, such as the Community Development Finance Corporation
and Urban Job Incentive tax incentive.
RECOMMENDATION: FIVE DISTINCT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS SHOULD BE
DISTINGUISHED AS SEPARATE ELEMENTS OF A STATE
URBAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: (1) EMINENT
DOMAIN POWERS, (2) STATE ADVANCES OR SUBSIDIES FOR
PROJECT PLANNING, (3) PARTIAL STATE SUBSIDIZATION
OF THE NET PROJECT COST, (4) STATE INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT, AND (5) DCA'S ROLE AS REGULATOR,
COORDINATOR, AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDER
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The program experience to date indicates that these five components
are applicable under differing circumstances. DCA should identify
the conditions under which each of these tools is appropriate and
vary the relative emphasis on the use of these tools as situations
require.
(1) EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS
The public powers of eminent domain are needed for a variety of sit-
uations but are not necessary for every project. The use of eminent
domain is required for dealing with the following land assembly
problems: to clear the uncertain status of the title to property;
to prevent property owners from demanding prohibitive prices for
land needed to complete assembly of parcels large enough for in-
dustrial purposes; and to acquire property from owners who refuse
to sell small amounts of land needed to complete the assembly of
property for industrial parks.
Inasmuch as older urban centers do not have suitably large areas
of vacant land strategically located with respect to highway access
and controlled by a few owners, eminent domain powers are essential
for any program of industrial development in urban centers. Older
urban areas are usually characterized by the following circumstances
which require the use of eminent domain powerst numerous owners
of small parcels of land; few sites with easy access to highway
networks; land parcels with uncertain titles; slow permit approval
processes; and mixes of residential and commercial uses which bid
up the price for land and create relocation problems. Land assembly
problems are frequently cited by private developers and firm ex-
ecutives as a primary reason for the flight of industry from urban
centers.
RECOMMENDATION: THE STATUTE AND RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CHAPTER
121B SHOULD BE AMENDED TO EXPLICITLY ALLOW FOR
PROJECTS WHICH REQUIRE THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
POWERS BUT NO EXECUTION SUBSIDY
The current language of the rules and regulations and statute assumes
that all projects utilizing eminent domain powers will also need
state execution aid. However, in many cases, projects which serve
state and local economic development objectives can be developed
employing the tool of eminent domain exclusively.
(2) STATE ADVANCES OR SUBSIDIES FOR PROJECT PLANNING
State planning advances act as catalysts for the development of
industrial projects by local organizations. Firms prefer to locate
in industrial park settings in order to take advantage of amenities
and avoid problems with residential areas. Multi-firm developments
are often necessary to justify public expenditures on infrastructure
improvements. Private real estate developers are reluctant to
undertake the planning and execution of industrial parks in older
urban areas for a variety of reasons: too slow of an absorption
rate to provide sufficiently high financial returns; the high risks
of untested areas; the uncertainties of dealing with a multitude of
actors; etc. In addition, the advance of state funds for park
planning can provide the commonwealth with some control to promote
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state economic development objectives in projects not requiring a
state execution subsidy.
RECOMMENDATION: THE STATUTE AND RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CHAPTER
121B SHOULD BE AMENDED TO EXPLICITLY ALLOW FOR
PROJECTS WHICH NEED PLANNING FUNDS BUT NO EXECUTION
SUBSIDY
The current language of the statute and rules and regulations assumes
that all projects receiving planning advances will also require
state execution aid. Inasmuch as the land for projects may some-
times be disposed of for more than the cost of assembly and devel-
opment, state execution aid is not always necessary.
The statute and rules and regulations should be revised to require
that DCA receive 50% of the excess of land disposition proceeds over
project costs until all of the planning advance is returned. In
this manner, DCA will contribute one half of the net project cost
to projects not receiving execution assistance and recoup advances
that can be used for other projects. In addition, an incentive re-
mains for redevelopment authorities to dispose of property for a
price greater than the costs of assembly and development.
(3) PARTIAL STATE SUBSIDIZATION OF THE NET PROJECT COST
State and local subsidization of industrial park projects is often
necessary to reduce the price of land sufficiently to attract firms
to locations in older cities. Cheap land is frequently a necessary
inducement for firms due to a number of circumstances: the competi-
tion for land in urban centers drives up the price of land; the
expenses for relocating existing residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial occupants of land; the additional business costs which
accompany locations in depressed urban areas (ex. higher insurance
costs, vandalism); and the general unattractiveness of inner city
sites. In addition, although property acquisitions through eminent
domain takings are supposed to occur at market prices, court awards
consistently favor owners with payments greater than market value.
Inasmuch as municipalities capture higher real estate tax revenues
as direct benefits from industrial projects and benefit to a lesser
degree from increases in jobs (which may go to non-residents) and
economic growth, whereas the state captures job and growth benefits
directly~ through higher income and sales tax revenues and reduced
expenditures for human services, the state should participate with
municipalities in subsidizing projects. Moreover, the municipalities
most in need of development are least able to afford the cost of
infrastructure improvements associated with a project.
RECOMMENDATION: AMEND THE LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING STATE SUBSIDY
PAYMENTS TO ALLOW FOR SUBSIDIZATION OF THE NET
PROJECT COST ONLY FOR PROJECTS IN DEPRESSED URBAN
COMMUNITIES, PROJECTS WHICH OFFER SIGNIFICANT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE STATE TO ACHIEVE VALUED
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES, OR PROJECTS IN
COMMUNITIES EXPERIENCING DISASTERS OR THE LOSS OF
A MAJOR EMPLOYER
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By limiting state subsidies to the types of projects indicated
above, the expected benefits from state subsidization will be more
clearly apparent. Projects in non-depressed communities are likely
to provide negligible "net benefits" because some development would
occur even without a project. In addition, the potential for abuse
of the program is greater in non-depressed areas. However, some
projects in non-depressed areas, such as the Peabody project, may
offer rare opportunities for achieving state economic development
objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: ON THE BASIS OF ANALYSES OF THE FISCAL AND ECONOMIC
BENEFITS TO MUNICIPALITIES AND THE COMMONWEALTH
FROM THE FIFTEEN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS WHICH HAVE
ENTERED THE EXECUTION STAGE, DCA SHOULD ASSESS THE
PROPRIETY OF THE ONE HALF OF NET PROJECT COST
STATE SUBSIDY
(4) STATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
The construction of highways and bridges is a traditional public
sector function because these infrastructure items are "nonrival
public goods" (i.e. A's consumption does not diminish B's consump-
tion, the marginal cost of use is zero and, therefore, no price
should be charged for use if maximum efficiency is to be obtained).
Thus, the expense of such major infrastructure items is too great
to be borne by individual firms.which do not maintain exclusive
consumption rights to these facilities.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE
HIGHWAY AND BRIDGE PROJECTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, ESPECIALLY
PROJECTS IN DEPRESSED URBAN CENTERS, AND ACTIVELY
COORDINATE ACTIVITIES WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS
As one measure to improve coordination with DPW, DCA should require
that a memorandum of understanding between DPW and the redevelopment
authority be included as part of the project plan for any project
with DPW participation. In addition, DCA should explore the poss-
ibility of initiating projects in depressed urban centers with local
organizations utilizing state infrastructure investments.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD PRESS THE DEVELOPMENT CABINET TO ADOPT
THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE GOVERNOR'S MANAGEMENT
TASK FORCE TO EXPAND THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF
STATE PLANNING TO INCLUDE CAPITAL BUDGETING
The state machinery for managing economic development activities
should include a capital budgeting capability to integrate infra-
structure investments with economic development activities, examine
capital expenditures in relation to state policies and programs,
evaluate the economic impacts of proposed highways and bridges, and
identify the need for coordination among activi.ties. Evidence
suggests that the success of state efforts to revitalize older
cities will demand the selective use of capital investments.
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(5) DCA'S ROLE AS REGULATOR, COORDINATOR, AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDER
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD NOT REGARD CHAPTER 121B URBAN INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AS EXCLUSIVELY THE RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES OF LOCAL PERSONNEL BUT SHOULD PLAY AN ACTIVE
ROLE AS REGULATOR, COORDINATOR, AND ASSISTANCE
PROVIDER FOR A STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
DIRECTED TOWARD ACHIEVING LOCAL AND STATE OBJECTIVES
DCA should view its functions as an essential component of an urban
industrial development program. Inasmuch as the state and local
benefits from projects are not identical, the commonwealth cannot
expect redevelopment authorities to execute projects to achieve
state development objectives without DCA playing an active role in
project management. DCA has considerable latitude in preparing the
rules and regulations which define the respective roles of redevelop-
ment authorities and DCA. Many of the findings and recommendations
in this report provide detailed accounts of the need for active
participation in project management by DCA.
RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION:
DCA SHOULD NOT TREAT THE STATE EXECUTION SUBSIDY AS
ANY MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE
PROGRAM AND SHOULD MONITOR AND ASSIST ALL PROJECTS
WHETHER OR NOT THEY INCLUDE ANNUAL STATE SUBSIDY
PAYMENTS
ESTABLISH A NON-RELOCATION REGULATION WHICH PRO-
HIBITS THE MOVEMENT OF FIRXS OUT OF PRIORITY
DEVELOPMENT AREAS TO SITES IN STATE ASSISTED IN-
DUSTRIAL PROJECTS
DCA should obtain a copy of the EDA non-relocation statement as a
guide for drafting a suitable regulation for the state industrial
development program. The DCA regulation should differ from the
EDA statement by only prohbiting the movement of firms out of
depressed communities.
RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION:
DCA SHOULD PREPARE A STANDARD LAND DISPOSITION
AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDES CLAUSES DEALING WITH THE
PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS AND DEVELOPERS IN MEETING
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
DCA SHOULD ENCOURAGE REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES TO
DISPOSE OF PROPERTY ON THE BASIS OF MAXIMIZING
DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN DISPOSITION
PRICES
In addition, DCA should require authorities to submit estimates of
the objectives expected through the disposition of property as a
condition for DCA's approval of disposition.
RECOMMENDATION: VARIOUS INCENTIVE OPTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR
LINKING STATE SUBSIDY PAYMENTS TO THE COMPLETION
OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT TASKS AND/OR THE ACHIEVEMENT
OF STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
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(1) DCA might make the provision of other state development resour-
ces, such as manpower training funds or bridge construction,
conditional on the performance of authorities in accomplishing
project tasks.
(2) Rather than automatic annual subsidy payments by the state,
the state subsidy could be paid in lump sums at the times
specific stages of the development process are completed. (This
would serve to increase the pressure from local officials and
citizens on redevelopment authority personnel for timely
performance because the municipality advances all of the project
expenditures.)
(3) The payment of the state subsidy could be proportional to the
accomplishment of project objectives, such as the percentage of
land disposed of or the percentage of estimated jobs created.
(4) The state could offer bonuses for achieving state development
objectives, as for example, attracting particular industries
which provide high multiplier effects for the state economy.
(5) Bonuses could be offered to redevelopment authority personnel
for efficiency and effectiveness.
RECOMMENDATION: THE STATE URBAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND
ALL LEGISLATION ESTABLISHING TOOLS FOR THIS PURPOSE
SHOULD NOT OPERATE PRIMARILY THROUGH REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITIES BUT SHOULD ALLOW FOR PROJECTS DEVELOPED
BY ANY NONPROFIT PUBLIC PURPOSE LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
Thus, DCA should accept applications from and assist organizations
such as community development corporations, local development organ-
izations, economic development and industrial corporations (Chapter
121C), and industrial development commissions. Many of these organ-
izations possess more expertise for economic development activities
than redevelopment authorities and offer greater potential for ful-
filling the purposes of the program.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN DATA ON THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND FOR INDUSTRIAL LAND AND SPACE IN THE
COMMONWEALTH
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COORDINATION/INTEGRATION
Project Management:- Strategic Considerations For The Design Of A
Project Management System / Organization
Development
Findings:
The failure to coordinate the activities of the numerous actors
who are involved, or should be involved, in the development of a
Chapter 121B industrial park project has been, perhaps, the most
damaging and difficult to remedy problem for the program. An eval-
uation of the need for integration for an effective industrial park
project management system reveals the critical importance of coordin-
ation among units of state government and among the numerous local,
state, and federal participants on projects.
Task Complexity
In order to implement an industrial park project, activities
must be coordinated among individuals, units, governments, independ-
ent organizations, departments, agencies, and offices. In the
fifteen project cases prepared for this report, the following differ-
ent actors have been identified as participants or as actors who
should have participated in some fashion:
UNITS OF STATE GOVERNMENT:
* DCA: Bureau of Urban Renewal
* Department of Public Works: Transportation Planning
* Department of Public Works: Highway and Bridge Construction
* Environmental Impact Review
* Department of Environmental Management (previously Dept. of
Natural Resources)
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
Water Commissioners
Department of Commerce and Development
Department of Commerce and Development: Business Contact Program
Department of Commerce and Development: Training Assistance
Program
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*.,Department of Commerce and Development: Planning, Research,
and Statistics
* Department of Manpower Development
* Department of Manpower Development: Balance of CETA Prime Sponsor
* Department of Employment Security
* Lt. Governor's Office: Office of Federal-State Relations
* Energy Facilities Siting Council (Note: no case on this project
in report: Stoughton)
* Energy Policy Office
* Office of State Planning
* Executive Office of Environmental Affairs: (Note: no case on this
project in report: Watertown)
SEMI-AUTONOMOUS STATE AGENCIES:
* Metropolitan District Commission (Note: no case on this project
in report: Watertown)
* Massachusetts Business Development Corporation
* Massachusetts Industrial Mortgage Insurance Agency
* Community Development Finance Corporation
LOCAL ACTORS:
* Redevelopment Authority: B-oard
Redevelopment Authority: Staff
* Community Development Agency
Harbor Development Commission
* Municipal Department of Public Works
* City/Town Counsel
* Planning Department
* City Council/Board of Selectmen
* Mayor/Town Meeting
* Local Planning Board
* Conservation Commission
* Chamber of Commerce
* Industrial Development Commission
Economic Development and Industrial Corporation
Industrial Development Finance Authority
SBA 502 Local Development Corporation
* Consultants: planning, LUM study, appraisals, relocation plan,
geological, and legal
* Contractors: demolition, site preparation, rehabilitation, and
construction
* Developers of Speculative Buildings
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* Redevelopers of Entire Project Area
* Businesses
* Relocatees
* Citizens
REGIONAL ACTORS:
* Regional Planning Commission
* Regional CETA Prime Sponsor/Sub-grantee
* other: ex. Essex County Economic Development Corporation
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACTORS:
* Economic Development Administration
* Small Business Administration
* Army Corps of Engineers
Federal Highway Administration
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (Note: no case on this project in
report: Watertown)
Although all of the above actors have never participated together on
any one project, and the vast majority of the activities for project
implementation involve only a small portion of these participants,
the above list of actors accurately depicts the scope of coordination
required for the effective operation of the Chapter 121B industrial
land development program. The importance of integration for efficient
and effective performance is a major finding of this report.
Extensive multi-actor participation appears to be a necessary
characteristic of public industrial land development projects. Three
levels of government must be involved for the following reasons:
(a) public industrial land development must be a "local initiative"
program (i.e. project conceptualizatin, ihitiation, and execution
at the local level) due to the strong tradition of local autonomy
and control in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; (b) state part-
icipation is required because the state has legal authority over the
use of eminent domain powers, municipalities usually lack sufficient
resources to fund projects in full, state participation serves as
both a stimulus and a control, resource expenditures of the Common-
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wealth frequently establish the opportunity for projects (ex. high-
way construction) and enable projects to achieve economic develop-
ment objectives (ex. manpower training funds), and state regulatory
powers apply to all development projects; and (c) federal funds are
made available to serve national development and regional redistri-
bution objectives, and municipalities and the Commonwealth are en-
couraged to make use of these monies. The participation of numerous
actors at each level of government, especially the local and state
levels, also appears to be a requisite property of public economic
development projects due to the variety of functional tasks necessary
to execute a project. However, the acceptance of project complexity
does not imply resignation with respect to the problems of managing
project implementation. Various mechanisms for managing complex,
one-time projects should be investigated along with the possibilities
for redesigning the roles and organization of the actors at the three
levels of government.
Although integration problems are evident within and between
the three levels of government, the most severe difficulties involve
the coordination of activities within state government and between
state and local actors. The principal areas of integration weaknesses
which have been identified are the following: (1) weak inter-actor
information flows; (2) weak program conceptualization and joint
decision making across state agencies; (3) absence of the creative
combination of development resources; and (4) inadequate management
of project tasks.
Before reviewing the experience in the above problem areas, the
management context of state government will be considered. Despite
the complex interdependencies among actors involved on projects,
formal integrating devices have not been introduced within state
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government. In addition, DCA has assumed a passive monitoring role
which has not encompassed the most fundamental components of project
management. The need for the adoption of project management tech-
niques is discussed in sections of this report dealing with reporting
requirements and the project plan.
The Parent Environment
At present, the Development Cabinet is the only formal mechan-
ism within the structure of state government, other than the Governor,
for achieving information flows, decision making, and program and
project coordination across line functional agencies. Table 1 pre-
sents a detailed view of the organization of economic development
actors in the executive branch of state government in Massachusetts.
The table indicates that the only formal lateral form of organiza-
tion is the Development Cabinet. The Development Cabinet was formed
by Governor Dukakis in January of 1976 for the purpose of increasing
coordination among line agencies involved in economic development re-
lated activities.
The cabinet device is a team approach to lateral integration.
The mechanism lowers decision making one step from the Governor by
creating a new level of organization where shared information exists
and, thereby, reduces the information and decision overload on the
chief executive and allows him to focus on "exceptions" which cannot
be handled by the Cabinet. However, although the Director of the
Office of State Planning serves as the Chairperson of the Cabinet,
he does not direct the activities of the group in a project, program,
or team management sense. For example, no information system has
* The two year old "Inter-agency Economic Development Project Coor-
dinating Committee" is an attempt to establish a formal lateral
structure at the level of policy staff but it does not deal with
Chapter 121B projects and has floundered without a formal role
and explicit powers.
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Table . Dr anization Of Economic Development Actors In The Executive Branch
Of Massachusetts Government
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been established to report regularly on the activities of the sec-
retariats and the interrelationships among activities. The only
periodic reporting consists of exception or project status reports
from the individual agencies to the Governor's staff. Although such
exception reporting to the Governor serves to reduce the information
flow to the chief executive as intended by the introduction of the
cabinet mechanism, the added responsibility for sharing information
at the Cabinet level has not been pursued. As a result, a gap exists
in inter-agency information processing and decision making which
has led to implementation delays, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness.
Irnformal direct inter-agency contacts at the staff level may fill
some, but not all, of this gap.
According to interviews with several persons familiar with the
operation of the Development Cabinet, the Cabinet acts as a forum for
the airing of individual agency policies and announcing agency programs,
and as a vehicle for responding to problems with high priority pro-
jects, but does not serve as a mechanism for coordinating program
operations and policy formulation. Rather than providing for pro-
ject and program management across agencies, the exchange of informa-
tion through the Cabinet has fostered the compatability of "policies"
among agencies and the spread of thematic guides and goals for overall
state activities. For example, the theme of mill renovation in old
urban centers. The "management by policy and excepti-on" approach
practiced by the Cabinet leads to informal lateral coordination
across line functions but fails to deal with cross-cutting program
operations and program decision making in a comprehensive and
systematic fashion. For example, the Cabinet lacks its own staff
for preparing options papers, program analyses, and proposals for
management changes to achieve coordination across agencies. In order
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to strengthen the Governor's role in administering state agencies and
"bring the Cabinet Secretaries into the decision process" the report
of the Governor's Management Task Force recommended that "a program-
oriented individual ... be added to the Cabinet Coordination Unit to
prepare necessary program and policy analyses and proposals". The
Task Force report pointed to a weakness in the "management concept
and structure for the Governor and the Cabinet" which has resulted
in a failure to effect governmental decisions, formulate programs,
monitor implementation, and measure progress in achieving objectives.
However, the recommended program analyst has not been hired. In
addition, the recommendation of the Task Force to establish an
information system at the Cabinet level has not been acted upon.
Furthermore, although the secretaries have ultimate responsibility
for coordinating the programs under their jurisdiction, a body
composed of the top managers is an inappropriate mechanism for deal-
ing with the daily activities of program operations.
The policy reports prepared by the Office of State Planning
are the only mechanisms for encouraging the coordination and creative
combination of line programs and resources to achieve state develop-
ment goals and establishing state development priorities which per-
tain to all departments; ex. State Economic Development Program,
State Growth Policy Report. However, these policy documents are
limited to the strategic planning functions of identifying general
needs, articulating goals, and assessing resources and program di-
rections. They do not address the operating needs for the coordina-
tion of line agency activities. Although one such report is entitled
"Economic Development Program For Massachusetts", the document merely
identifies goals and lists projects, programs, and government activ-
ities related to those goals rather than presenting dollar commit-
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ments, a timetable of actions, the tasks of individual actors,
detailed objectives, and organizational relationships to achieve the
goals.
The weakness of the vertical authority structure in Massachusetts
government is an additional reason for the limited usefulness of
strategic planning documents and the Development Cabinet for effect-
ing coordination. Most secretaries lack direct authority over the
budgets and programs of the agencies and departments under their
jurisdiction (the Secretary of the Executive Office of Communities
and Development is also the Commissioner of the Department of
Community Affairs and, therefore, exercizes budget control). Agency
and department budgets are submitted individually to the legislature
rather than as components of an overall secretariat budget and the
secretaries' authority is limited to recommending changes in agency
requests to the General Court. Some agencies completely circumvent
the secretaries and the Governor by dealing directly with the legis-
lature on budget requests, and the independence exercised by many
agencies leaves the secretaries without means for implementing
executive and Cabinet programs and policies. Recognizing this fail-
ing of the present system, the Governor's Management Task Force
concluded:
"If the benefits of a cabinet system are to be
realized, the Commonwealth must take the second
step and make the Secretariats meaningful elements
in the Commonwealth's management structure. The
major factor will be the ability of all executive
offices to exercise line and budget authority over
the agencies under their jurisdictions."
However, the Governor has decided not to file legislation to
effectuate this recommendation.
In addition to lacking budget authority- over agencies within
secretariats, the form of the current budget limits the vertical
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authority of the secretaries. The present budget includes an ex-
cessive number of appropriation accounts (approx. 700), which vary
considerably in the scope of activities coveredand specify dollar
amounts for subsidiary accounts and numbers of personnel. Thus,
secretaries and department heads have little flexibility for shifting
resources to meet needs and delays often result from the inevitable
attempts to redirect resources. In addition, inasmuch as the collec-
tion and summarizing of expenditure data are not tied to operating
units, top managers are unable to hold lower level program managers
accountable. The attempt by legislatures to control spending through
"obligation accounting" which details appropriations for various
"object classifications", serves to weaken executive authority, add to
administrative work, and divert the attention of managers away from
program outputs.
The civil service system, which is more cumbersome in Massachu-
setts than in most states, is another major obstacle to the exercise
of vertical authority by secretaries. The rigid job classification
scheme provides top managers with little ability to place the proper
people in positions. The absence of incentives for performance and
the existance of inviolable job security contribute to an atmosphere
of unresponsiveness to top managers.
The above features of Massachusetts' government add to more
general characteristics of public sector organizations which result
in a weak vertical authority structure: frequent manager turnover,
division of authority into three branches, fragmentation of programs
by level of government, etc.
The weakness of vertical control by the secretaries limits the
effectiveness of the Development Cabinet as an integration mechanism.
Whereas team approaches to management in the private sector frequently
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suffer from a failure of top level managers to delegate authority
to lower level personnel on teams, the Development Cabinet suffers
from a failure to gain authority over lower echelon units. This
suggests that the need for,and constraints onintegration differ in
the public and private sectors. However, state government shares
the private sector problem of inadequate delegation of authority
to program managers in preparing budget requests.
The present form of the state budget, in addition to weakening
the vertical authority structure of government, does .not enable the
budget-to fulfill its potential as a vehicle for coordinating pro-
grams. The appropriation account structure is not organized by
responsibility centers or by program categories. No centralized
budget planning mechanism exists to communicate policy and program
priorities to personnel preparing budget requests. Inasmuch as the
budget is structured in terms of expenditures rather than program
activities, objectives, and goals, the budget cannot serve as a
mechanism for coordinating the activities of different agencies
which bear on the same goals or for monitoring program performance
with respect to objectives. The budget preparation process does not
call for the quantification of objectives, the calculation of benefit/
cost analyses, or the identification of activity milestones. In
addition, although the Governor's Management Task Force noted that
the state lacked a mechanism for coordinating and analyzing capital
budget items, and recommended that the Office of State Planning
review capital requests for conformance with program priorities and
objectives, the recommendation has not been adopted and no method
exists for ensuring that capital expenditures are coordinated with
the activities of other units of state government.
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Inter-Actor Information Flows
Examples of the negative consequences of the absence of adequate
inter-agency information flows within state government are plentiful.
The lack of formal channels of communi-cation between the Department
of Community Affairs (DCA) and the Department of Public Works (DPW)
has been the source of the greatest number of coordination problems.
Although ten of the fifteen Chapter 121B industrial park projects
have been directly dependent upon, effected by, or developed as a
consequence of DPW highway and bridge projects (see cases), no
mechanisms exist for the regular exchange of information between the
two agencies. Despite the frequent interdependence between the
activities of the two agencies and their ostensible sharing of
economic development goals (however, some people may view DPW's
purpose as building highways and not as economic development), DCA and
DPW personnel have rarely been in contact during the planning or
execution phases of Chapter 121B industrial park projects. Moreover,
problems with DPW projects have often been major obstacles to the
timely and effective execution of state-assisted industrial parks.
Although the Secretary of Transportation and Construction and
DPW Commissioner can make resource allocation decisions on the basis
of the guidelines and policies expressed in the strategic planning
documents prepared by the Office of State Planning, no information
flows exist to enable the decision maker to match DPW funding with
industrial park projects supported by the Commonwealth to promote
state economic development objectives. In addition, although the
construction of highways by DPW often creates the possibility for
development of industrial parksand DCA approved projects are often
dependent on DPW highway and bridge construction, DPW does not trans-
mit information to DCA on a regular basis on planned projects, fund-
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ing priorities, and construction timetables.
These problems cannot be solved simply by supplying DPW with
a list of Chapter 121B projects and DCA with a list of highway and
bridge projects (however, this would be a useful first step), but
require the creation of a project pldnning and execution 'machinery
among DCA, DPW, and other state agencies. For coordinating activities
during the planning of projects, DPW should review proposed Chapter
121B industrial park projects which involve DPW participation with
DCA in order to assess whether the costs and benefits of the projects
warrant DPW expenditures, and agree on the timing of DPW construction
and DPW should inform DCA of planned highway- and bridge projects and
the availability of funding for new projects so that DCA can assess
whether developments will affect 121B projects and identify oppor-
tunities for new projects (which could require the replanning of
proposed DPW highway routes). For coordinating project execution
activities, DPW and DCA should establish the timetable and respon-
sibility for project tasks and meet on a regular basis to review the
status of projects.
As a result of the absence of adequate information flows be-
tween DCA and DPW, projects suffered from DCA's failure to take
account of the following factors critical to project implementations
(a) the planned construction of a major state highway: the
121B project in Fitchburg (approved in 2/75) is located
at the opposite end of the city from where DPW plans to
construct a major highway interchange between the new
1-190 and existing Rt. 2; the private development of an
industrial park near the interchange may draw the limited
market of the area away from the state-assisted project;
the state-assisted-park in Gardner is likely to be similar-
ly affected;
(b) detailed knowledge of the siting, design, and schedule
for construction of a major state highway: DCA and the
Holyoke Redevelopment Authority discovered after approval
of a project in 6/75 that DPW is going to build 1-391
through the project area and the plan had to be revised,
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and site preparation work was halted, until the location
and schedule for the road was determined,
(c) eligibility of projects for highway funding: Amherst
planned on and applied for the use of federal "TOPICS"
funds for street construction associated with a res-
idential/commercial project and waited over two years
before being informed by DPW that the town was not
eligible for the program;
(d) need for redevelopment authority expenditures for the
planning of highway access roads: the Woburn Redevelop-
ment Authority was forced to pay for the preparation of
three alternative designs for the construction of a
bridge and highway access road in order to expedite the
development process with DPW;
(e) frequent dependence of DCA approved projects on DPW
expenditures: projects have depended on the construc-
tion or operation of bridges by DPW in Woburn, Peabody,
New Bedford, and Beverly (a waterfront project);
projects have depended on the construction of roads by
DPW in Woburn, Peabody, New Bedford, and Holyoke;
projects have been initiated as a result of highway
construction by DPW in Attleboro and Brockton; in every
case the feasibility of a project has been directly
conditional on the presence of a highway constructed
by DPW.
Although the project plans for the above projects may have
indicated the need for the construction of a highway access road or
bridge (in many cases this dependency was not noted), evidence of
DPW approval or commitment to construct the facility, and the prob-
able schedule for construction, were not required components of the
project plans. In addition, DCA made no effort to ascertain DPW's
position on projects either before or after passing judgment on
projects. Redevelopment authorities have had to deal with DPW with-
out assistance from DCA. Perhaps the most serious problem with the
management of projects has been the failure of the executive branch
of state government to view Chapter 121B assistance to industrial
park projects and DPW infrastructure investments as a single economic
development program devoted to the achievement of valued state
economic development objectives. Choices with respect to the
commitment of state resources have not been made on the basis of
complementary state investments or with reference to economic devel-
opment objectives.
170
Coordination problems stemming from the lack of information
flows between DCA and the departments within the Executive Office
of Economic Affairs, or their precursors,have also been frequent and
damaging to Chapter 121B projects. Although two of the primary goals
for a state-assisted industrial land development program are the
growth of employment and the provision of jobs to the unemployed,
the absence of established communication channels between DCA and
the Departments of Commerce and Development (DCD) and Manpower
Development (DMD) has severely limited DCA's ability to manage pro-
jects with reference to employment needs and opportunities, inform
redevelopment authorities of the availability of state manpower
resources to assist parks in marketing and meeting employment ob-
jectives, target manpower training funds to state-assisted projects,
and require redevelopment authorities to establish employment pro-
grams for projects.
(a) The state's customized manpower training program TAP
(Training Assistance Program), which funds the costs
for firms to train unemployed persons, has not been
employed in 121B projects.
b) Redevelopment authorities have not developed employment
programs by utilizing local CETA funds for manpower
training, establishing job referral relationships be-
tween firms in projects and local vocational education
programs, satisfying the transportation needs of un-
employed persons without access to park locations,
and creating a mechanism for attracting and screening
unemployed persons for jobs with firms in parks.
(c) DCA has not promoted projects in areas of greatest un-
employment, used a measure of local employment need as
a criterion for project approval, or employed labor
supply information to formulate park marketing strate-
gies (ex. identifying target industries for the Gardner
project on the basis of labor force skills similar to
those needed for the declining furniture industry in
the city).
The absence of formal information flows between DCA and DCD
has also deprived redevelopment authorities of potentially valuable
marketing assistance:
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(a) DCD's Business Contact Program has not been used to
provide firms seeking land for expansion or reloca-
tion with information on available property in state-
assisted projects.
(b) Although personnel in DCD are often contacted by firms
seeking industrial land, DCD does not maintain informa-
tion on land available in state-assisted projects or
refer firms to the Bureau of Urban Renewal.
(c) Until recently, redevelopment authorities have been
unaware of the availability of promotional material
on the Commonwealthland literature explaining state
business taxes, from DCD.
(d) Redevelopment authorities have not been informed of the
new public sources of business capital which may aid in
the marketing of projects, such as the Community Develop-
ment Finance Corporation and the Massachusetts Industrial
Mortgage Insurance Agency.
(e) In the case of Palmer, DCA did not seek marketing assist-
ance from DCD when the Miller Brewing Company was choosing
between the project in Palmer and a site in New York State
for the location of a major brewery.
DCA has not taken advantage of the computer information avail-
able at the Department of Employment Security (DES), on the employ-
ment activity of businesses locating in state-assisted industrial
parks, in order to monitor the employment impacts of projects. DES
might be able to supply periodic computer print-outs on employment
in firms in state-assisted parks so that DCA can monitor firms for
compliance with employment performance clauses in land disposition
agreements.
Whereas the lack of adequate information flows with DPW has
caused problems for the physical development of 121B projects, the
failure to communicate with the departments within the Executive
Office of Economic Affairs has weakened the ability of projects to
achieve economic development objectives. Moreover, the absence of
effective integration with the Economic Affairs' departments has
led DCA personnel, and others in state government, to inaccurately view
Chapter 121B,narrowly, as an urban renewal program rather than properly
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identify it as an economic development program.
Due to the absence of formal information flows between DCA and
the Lieutenant Governor's Office of Federal-State Relations, no efforts
have been made to utilize various sources of federal assistance for
Chapter 121B projects, and DCA has not employed the political leverage
of.the Lt. Governor's Office to speed the EDA grant application
approval process for the Chapter 121B projects in Fitchburg, Peabody,
and Gardner or to obtain additional EDA funds for state-assisted
industrial parks. Although the Office of Federal-State Relations
is responsible for dealing with all issues and programs involving
relations between the federal and state governments, no information
system currently exists which provides the Lt. Governor's Office
with timely information on all economic development projects and
programs in the state which depend on federal assistance, or informs
state agencies of the availability of federal funds for economic
development. An information system to report on the flow of federal
funds to Massachusetts, and compare funding levels with those in
other states, is presently being created.
The failure to establish ongoing channels of communication be-
tween DCA and the Office of State Planning has proven to be damaging
to the Chapter 121B program as well as to state comprehensive economic
development planning efforts. Inasmuch as OSP is responsible for all
state planning related to economic and physical growth and develop-
ment, and performs the strategic planning functions of formulating
state development policies and goals which guide the actions of all
units of state government, the absence of information flows has
served to relegate the Chapter 121B industrial land development pro-
gram to the status of a "non-program" which has little place in
overall state economic development efforts. Evidence of the general
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neglect of the program as a tool for state economic development is
plentiful:
* the "Directory of State Development Agencies" makes
a vague reference to the state urban renewal program
but fails to note the existence of a Bureau of Urban
Renewal;
* the "Economic Development Program for Massachusetts",
prepared by the Office of State Planningrefers only
to urban renewal powers for land assembly under the
provisions of Chapter 121B;
* in the program for the Governor's Conference On
Community Revitalizationl Chapter 121B is listed as a
tool for the "(a)cquisition or securing of land for
preservation or future use", but not as a vehicle for
"Industrial and Commercial Development", and is not
listed as a "Community Mechanism for Economic Devel-
opment" (CDCs, CAAs, EDICs, IDCs) or as a "State Pro-
gram To Assist Community Development".
Evidence indicates that the neglect of the Chapter 121B program
derives largely from the lack of collection and exchange of informa-
tion and is not a policy choice based on program analysis. In
an interview, OSP's principal economic development planner expressed
a total lack of awareness of the existence of the fifteen state-
assisted industrial park projects. No study of the history and
impacts of Chapter 121B industrial projects has been prepared which
can serve as a basis for judging the merits of the program.
OSP's disregard for 121B as an economic development tool can
be partly attributed to the neglect of the program by the top level
managers within DCA, and the failure of DCA to manage projects with
reference to economic development objectives. Inasmuch as DCA has
never collected and reported information on the economic development
benefits of the program, persons in state government have formed
negative opinions about the program on the basis of well publicized
crises during the development phases of projects and the identifica-
tion of the program with the discredited label of "urban renewal".
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The common tendency of policy makers to reject old program
names and programs which are associated with prior administrations,
or have come under attack, often results in a failure to appreciate
the benefits and learn from the problems of past programs. Despite
numerous problems with the design and operation of the Chapter 121B
industrial land development program, projects have resulted in posi-
tive net benefits to municipalities and the Commonwealth-,and the
program appears to offer considerable potential for addressing in-
dustrial development needs in the Commonwealth. Attempts to "re-
invent the wheel" at the highest levels of state economic develop-
ment policy making suffer from a failure to appreciate Chapter 121B
and incorporate the 15 years of experience with the program.
The absence of channels for the flow of information between
DCA and federal agencies has also negatively affected Chapter 121B
projects. Although six of the fifteen state-assisted industrial
parks which reached the execution stage have relied on EDA public
facilities grants, DCA has not maintained communications with the
area office of the federal Economic Development Administration.. In
addition, DCA has never attempted to increase the number of EDA
grants going to state-assisted projects or to other public and non-
profit industrial parks in the state. Redevelopment authorities
have applied to EDA for grants without receiving any assistance from
the Bureau of Urban Renewal in preparing grant applications or
arguing for grant approval. DCA has not reviewed grant applications
prior to submission to EDA for compliance with state rules and reg-
ulations or the accuracy of information and does not have copies of
completed applications on file for any of the six projects which
have received grants.
Numerous problems have resulted from the failure to establish
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formal channels of communication and grant-application processing
proceedures between DCA and the EDA office. In the case of Fitch-
burg, the public facilities grant approved by EDA provided only
sufficient funding for the installation of utilities above ground)
even though DCA regulations and the project plan require under-
ground utilities. Inasmuch as the grant application was not sub-
mitted to DCA for review prior to being forwarded to EDA, and no
review proceedures existed between EDA and DCA, the application was
never scrutinized for compliance with state regulations and the
project plan.
In the case of Palmer, DCA approved the sale of the entire
park to a single redeveloper in violation of EDA policy against sales
to "middleman" redevelopers, and without requiring the developer to
sign the four agreements demanded by EDA as conditions for the
receipt of grant funds: statements on civil rights, firm non-reloca-
tion, non-profiteering, and property covenants extending the civil
rights and non-relocation provisions to future purchasers of park
land. DCA personnel were probably unaware of the EDA policy and
conditions on the award of grants. The subsequent dispute among
EDA, the Palmer Redevelopment Authority, and the developer over
compliance with the EDA conditions has brought the project to a
standstill over the past 18 months. DCA has not intervened in an
attempt to mediate the dispute until very recently, despite the large
annual subsidy payments from the Commonwealth (the largest subsidy to
any state-aided project)1 and DCA's position as a neutral but interest-
ed party. As a result of the problems with the Palmer project,
EDA officials will likely be reluctant to support other state-assisted
projects.
Despite the limited resources at the state and local levels for
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supporting industrial land development, DCA has not sought informa-
tion on EDA funding priorities and the availability of grant funds,
or encouraged redevelopment auth.orities to apply for public facil-
ities grants. In addition, although many redevelopment authorities
have maintained useful relationships with SBA 502 Local Development
Corporations to assist firms which qualify for low cost SBA loans
for plant and equipment, DCA has never attempted to establish a
relationship with the area office of the Small Business Administra-
tion in order to expedite the processing of applications for SBA
assistance from firms in state-assisted projects, assist in the
formation of Local Development Corporations in communities where
they do not exist, or obtain the cooperation of SBA in targetting
resources to state-assisted projects.
Many examples of problems resulting from a lack of regional-
federal, state-regional, state-local, federal-local, regional-local,
and intra-local inter-actor information flows can be added to those
cited above. A reading of the cases in this report provides con-
siderable evidence of coordination weaknesses. The critical point
to be made with respect to all of these failures of inter-actor
communication is not simply that contacts should have been madebut
that no formal machinery existed for the flow of information among
project participants in an ongoing and systematic fashion.
Program Conceptualization and Joint Decision Making Across
State Agencies
The absence of an adequate machinery for inter-agency informa-
tion flows both reflects, and perpetuates the failure of state agen-
cies in Massachusetts to conceptualize and make decisions in terms
of programs rather than, as is the case, line agency functions.
Table 1 indicates that, with the exception of the Development Cabinet,
the units of state government involved in activities related to
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economic development are organized in the familiar functional or
line agency form. Functional forms of organizations serve the pur-
pose of increasing specialization and, therefore, technical expertise
in specific areas such as consumer affairs and environmental affairs.
The number of specialists that need to be be hired by an organization
are minimized by the functional form because specialists are pooled
together and shared on a variety of projects and programs. For
example, a single environmental impact specialist can review all
environmental impact statements related to the projects of different
agencies. However, inasmuch as the tasks of organizations require
varying amounts of participation from specialized personnel in
changing sequences, formal integrating mec),igsms must be employed in
order to complete tasks on time while fully utilizing all specialist
resources. The greater the complexity and uncertainty of the task,
the less pre-planning can occur and the more integrating devices are
required to accomplish tasks without waste in resources and extended
periods of time. Thus, gains through specialization must be judged
against loses in the ability of organizations to manage programs or
projects which require the participation of different functional
specialists.
As detailed by Galbraith, the following sequence of integrating
devices must be employed in additive fashion to deal with greater
degrees of task uncertainty and complexity while maintaining the
basic functional form in order to effectively and efficiently manage
projects and programs:
* rules and regulations for predictable and repetitive
activities;
* hierarchy for dealing with unpredictable and unique
activities;
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* targetting or goal setting to reduce the referral of
exceptions through the hierarchy by bringing decisions
down to the points of action;
* investment in vertical information systems to enable managers
to handle more information; and
* lateral forms of organization which cut across lines of
authority: direct contact between two people, a liason
role, task forces, teams, integrating roles, managerial
linking roles, and matrix forms of organization.
Although numerous actors in state government commonly partici-
pate, or should participate, on Chapter 121B industrial park projects,
the Commonwealth does not employ adequate mechanisms for viewing
and managing the resource commitments from different units to pro-
jects as a single urban industrial economic development program
directed toward the achievement of publicly valued objectives.
Similarly, although numerous units of state government perform activi-
ties which are directed toward achieving state economic development
objectives, the lack of integrating mechanisms within state govern-
ment prevents different economic.development resources from being
applied together to meet objectives. The weaknesses of program
conceptualization and joint decision making across state agencies
can be attributed to the inadequacies of current integrating devices.
The rules and regulations for the Chapter 121B program are of
limited usefulness for coordinating the activities of various govern-
ment units because of the unique character of individual projects,
and applicability of the regulations to residential, commercial,
and industrial projects. Inasmuch as most industrial park projects
should involve the participation of units under the jurisdiction of
a minimum of three secretariats (Transportation and Construction,
Economic Affairs, and Communities and Development), the Development
Cabinet is the lowest point in the hierarchy at which shared authority
exists for a project. However, the kinds of decisions required for
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the coordination of project activities are too detailed for the
attention of secretaries. The Development Cabinet would quickly
become overloaded with decisions if the coordination of activities
on individual 121B, and otherprojects depended upon Cabinet action.
Moreover, the previously noted limitations of the Cabinet reduce
its usefulness for achieving coordination: ex. the lack of staff to
prepare program analyses and propose options; the weakness of the
vertical authority structure; and the absence of an information sys-
tem for reporting on program activities among the agencies of the
Cabinet.
In order to limit the number of decisions that must be referred
up through the hierarchy to the Cabinet, decision making should be
brought down to the program manager level and coordination achieved
through goal setting and targets. However, the Commonwealth has not
employed many of the basic methods for fostering program concep-
tualization and joint decision making through goal setting:
(a) the state budget is not organized by programs; a program
budget would identify the expenditures of different units
of government pursuing the same objectives and enable
decisions on expenditures to be based on complementary
activities;
(b) the state budget does not specify outputs to be achieved
by units and, therefore, does not encourage program
managers to plan together to meet specific objectives;
(c) the Office of State Planning does not prepare compre-
hensive economic development plans which specify how
state resources are to be combined to achieve objectives;
(d) the capital budget is not based on the programs and
activities of state units involved in economic develop-
ment.
The only information system for reporting on the activities of
state agencies involved in economic development consists of the
periodic reports of secretariats to the Governor's office on the
status of major-projects. Despite the complexity and uncertainty
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of industrial park development tasks, DCA has no system for collect-
ing and reporting information on the impacts, status, or problems of
individual Chapter 121B projects.
No forms of lateral organization have been employed within
state goverrmient to manage projects and programs other than the
Development Cabinet.
A variety of negative consequences have resulted from the lack
of program conceptualization and joint decision making across state
agencies with respect to 121B industrial projects:
(1) Projects have not utilized all of the specialized state tools
and resources which could have contributed to effective and
efficient performance.
(2) An assessment of the benefits and costs of a Chapter 121B
industrial park project would not encompass all of the costs
borne by the state.
(3) Key personnel responsible for economic development policies and
programs in the Office of State Plaring, the Department of
Manpower Development, and the Department of Commerce and
Development have been unaware of the existence of the Chapter
121B industrial park projects. As a result of its "urban
renewal" label, Chapter 121B is generally viewed as a down-
town and housing program comparable to its discredited and
abandoned federal parent and namesake. Top managers within
DCA share this misconception.
(4) The Bureau of Urban Renewal has failed to manage the program
with an output orientation directed toward the achievement of
economic development objectives.
(5) DCA personnel have been left out of most policy and program
formulation work related to industrial development.
(6) Reviews of state government economic development efforts have
failed to note the state's $10 million commitment and assistance
to 15 industrial parks throughout the Commonwealth.
(7) A potentially valuable data source for studying the motivations
for business location decisions in the state,and the expansion,
birth, and relocation of firms in urban locations in the state,
has been ignored.
(8) Personnel in state agencies are given no direction or incentives
to cooperate with DCA on industrial park projects.
(9) State agencies are unable to decide on internal priorities on
the basis of Chapter 121B industrial park projects. For
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example, highway expenditure decisions are not related to
121B projects.
(10) Local economic development actors are unable to easily grasp
the full range of tools available at the state level for
undertaking economic development projects.
(11) The legislature and the executive are unable to compare the
costs and benefits of the different state programs.
(12) Little impetus exists to creatively combine resources to
achieve economic development objectives.
Creative Combination of Development Resources
As a consequence of inadequate inter-actor information flows,
and too few integrating devices within state government for foster-
ing program conceptualization and joint decision making across state
agencies, the Commonwealth has failed to combine state resources
needed to effectively implement Chapter 121B industrial park pro-
jects or take advantage of opportunities presented by projects for
creatively combining the efforts of different units of state govern-
ment to promote economic development objectives.
As noted in the fifteen project cases in this report, almost
all Chapter 121B industrial parks have needed the assistance of the
Departments of Commerce and Development and Manpower Development
for marketing property, designing marketing strategies to meet local
development objectives, and establishing employment programs for the
training and hiring of unemployed persons. In numerous instances,
projects have not fulfilled their potential for achieving positive
employment benefits, despite'the disposition -of property to businesses,
because of an absence of effort to insure the hiring of the un-
employed. Employment training programs, such as CETA and the Train-
ing Assistance Program, have not been targeted to 121B projects to
assist in marketing and contribute to achieving positive employment
impacts.
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In addition to the negative effects on all projects from poor
coordination, many examples of missed opportunities for achieving
state economic development objectives through the creative combina-
tion of resources can be cited. For example, despite the large
amount of federal funds available for energy research and demon-
stration projectsand a growing federal interest in small scale
hydroelectric power, DCA has made no effort to contact the state
Energy Policy Office or Office of State Planning to investigate the
possibility of obtaining a federal grant for studying the potential,
and developing a demonstration project, for the industrial reuse of
the abandoned millraces in the Holyoke project area. The millraces
are a clean and virtually costless power supply in the highest
energy cost region in the nation and were the original impetus for
the industrial development of Holyoke. Over the July 4th weekend
the millraces in the Holyoke project area were filled with concrete
(other millraces remain in Holyoke and other cities). The City of
Holyoke and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts may have passed up a
unique opportunity for achieving economic advantages and notoriety,
and developing a project with implications for the economic develop-
ment of the entire region.
The Peabody project presents the Commonwealth with a rare op-
portunity for attracting major out-of-state firms to the state and
achieving substantial employment benefits. The park has the poten-
tial to be designed, marketed, and maintained as a first class park
for "blue chip" companies because the large property is one of the
most attractive remaining industrial sites along Rt. 128. However,
the effectiveness of the project in meeting state economic develop-
ment objectives will depend largely on the ability of DCA and the
redevelopment authority to skillfully manage the project with the
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assistance of other state agencies.
Redevelopment authorities commonly view environmental regula-
tions and review processes as obstacles to development rather than
as legit'gmite requirements which may lead to.more physically desir-
able projects. Despite DCA's responsibility for reviewing project
environmental impacts and minimizing negative environmental effects,
the Bureau of Urban Renewal has made little effort to assist re-
development authorities in planning projects to serve environmental
needs, or obtain the services of departments within the Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs to aid projects. In the case of
Peabody, DCA should pursue the possibility of securing a grant for
the preservation of an open area within the project, that would enhance
the physical appearance and marketability of the project.
Although the construction of highways.-and bridges by the De-
partment of Public Works has proven to be important for every Chap-
ter 121B industrial park project, DCA has not cooperated with the
DPW to target public works investments to approved projects or create
opportunities for industrial park development in needy communities.
Evidence indicates that few opportunities exist in older cities for
industrial park development due to inadequate access to major highways,
and that opportunities for industrial parks can be created through
selective highway investment.
Although the Massachusetts economy is characterized by a rela-
tively high proportion of small businesses, the driving force of
the state economy has been the start-up and growth of high technology
and new product firms, and cities in the Commonwealth in need of
economic development efforts may provide "incubation" economies
which enable small under-capitalized firms to start-up and- grow,
DCA has not encouraged redevelopment authorities to dispose of land
to local Economic Development and Industrial Corporations, Industrial
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Development Commissions, or Local Development Corporations for the
construction of modern industrial space for lease to small marginal
firms. The "incubation hypothesis" holds that marginal businesses
start-up in cities because of the availability of business services
and inputs which new firms cannot internalize. Whereas Massachusetts
has an abundance of cheap old industrial space, new industrial space
in attractive locations is rarely built for lease to small firms.
Neither DCA nor the Department of Commerce and Development has
attempted to test whether the "incubation hypothesis" has merit
for Massachusetts cities, by assessing the demand for small amounts
of modern, leased industrial space.
As indicated in the case on Brockton in this report, an analysis
of the economic base of Brockton reveals a high percentage of small
firms. Existing industrial space available for rent may present
inefficiencies, such as poor highway access, which dampen the start-up
and growth of firms. Private developers may not be meeting the demand
for new leased space for small firms due to the risk and/or financial
unattractiveness of such space. Thus, the provision of modern space
for lease to small firms may satisfy an unfilled demand and, thereby,
contribute to the growth of the state economy and the economic
development of depressed urban centers. The Commonwealth may be
neglecting an opportunity for achieving its avowed objective of
urban economic development. A program which combines the provision
of modern space, capital for equipment, and funds for manpower train-
ing to small firms might result in significant net economic benefits
for the state.
Finally, despite the professed commitment of state policy to
the revitalization of Massachusetts' older cities and support for
community development corporations and other local development
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organizations operating in these older cities, the Chapter 121B
program has not been used in conjunction with the industrial develop-
ment efforts of such organizations. As a result, the Commonwealth
finds itself subsidizing industrial parks in such prosperous com-
-munities as Woburn and Peabody but providing mere verbal support for
developments in such needy communities as Boston, Haverhill, and
Springfield. The policy of encouraging the economic development of
older cities is partly based on the view that the state reaps greater
net benefits through reduced costs for welfare payments and services,
and the employment of unemployed persons,by developing depressed
communities, than with continued suburban and ex-urban growth. How-
ever, the Commonwealth has failed to combine development resources
and programs to achieve these valued objectives.
Management of Project Tasks
Despite the complexity of the planning and execution of Chapter
121B industrial park projects and the need for the participation of
numerous actors at the municipal, state, and federal levels, DCA has
placed all of the responsibility for project implementation with the
redevelopment authorities and has played a passive monitoring role.
Neither the components of the project plan nor the management prac-
tices of DCA have provided an adequate basis for the coordination of
project tasks. The fifteen project cases in this report provide
detailed accounts of some of the many coordination problems which
have occurred during the implementation of projects.
Examples of problems which have resulted from inadequate attention
to the integration of tasks include the following;
(a) The participation of the Environmental Impact Review
division of the Executive Office of Economic Affairs
as the last step in the project approval process has
resulted in costly and time consuming delays to make
plan changeq and a neglect of environmental needs in
the initial planning for projects.
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(b) In the case of Palmer, EDA provided a planning grant
without notifying DCA or the Regional Planning Commission,
and the expenditure of federal funds had the effect of
preventing the change of the location for the project
to a less environmentally sensitive site.
(c) In the case of Holyoke, planning was completed and land
assembled for the project before the redevelopment author-
ity received information from DPW on the proposed location
for a highway through the project area.
(d) In the case of Fitchburg, DCA did not review the graht
application submitted to EDA for compliance with the
Chapter 121B rules and regulations and project plan and
the grant provided for above ground installation of
utilities in violation of both the plan and the regulations.
(e) In the case of Woburn, project marketing has been adversely
affected by the seven year delay in the construction of
a bridge by DPW.
The above findings on the importance of coordination for managing
Chapter 121B industrial park projectsand weaknesses of the past
and current efforts at integration,suggest that additional integrat-
ing mechansims are necessary. The tasks required to efficiently and
effectively implement an industrial park project appear to demand
a high degree of both differentiation and integration. The various
individuals, groups, and organization units participating on a pro-
ject should be highly differentiated because they vary widely in the
extent of their involvement, the degree of uncertainty they face in
performing their tasks, and the importance of their participation.
On the other hand, actions must be well integrated in order to achieve
efficient and effective performance due to the high degree of
interdependence among tasks.
In general, project implementation tasks manifest great uncer-
tainty and a considerable amount of information must be processed by
actors during task execution in order to perform efficiently and
effectively. The uncertainty of tasks is a function of the limited
expertise of key actors, such as the redevelopment authority staff
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and board members and DCA personnel, and the great amount of infor-
mation required to perform tasks. The following characteristics of
121B industrial projects account for the considerable demands for
information processing:
(1) the diversity of outputs of projects: employment growth,jobs for the unemployed, positive net fiscal flows to the
municipality, the elimination of blight, multiple reuses,
the attraction of out-of-state firms, etc.
(2) the many resource inputs required for projects: planning
consultants, lawyers, municipal, state and federal funds,
manpower training monies, marketing assistance from DCD,
municipal public works, etc.
(3) the great number of tasks in planning, executing, and
marketing projects and the difficulty in achieving valued
objectives.
(4) the dependence on the decisions of market actors and the
behavior of the'national and regional economies for the
outcomes of projects.
The Chapter 121B program has suffered from inefficient and ineffective
performance as a result of lacking sufficient integrating mechanisms
and lateral forms of organization for processing the necessary amount
of information.
The above examination of integration problems indicated that
Massachusetts'government has not devoted sufficient attention to the
basic coordination mechanisms: rules, regulations, and proceedures;
hierarchy; targetting or goal setting; and vertical information sys-
tems. In addition, the high degree of task uncertainty associated
with industrial park projects, the management limitations of Mass-
achusetts government (i.e. weak vertical authority structure,~lack
of a program budget, absence of capital budgeting, etc.), and the
common weaknesses of public sector organizations, suggest that lateral
forms of organization should be introduced to supplement the basic
integrating mechanisms and the Development Cabinet. With respect to
the coordination of activities among local, state, and federal actors,
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the tools and strategies of project management should be. applied to
effect integration. The reliance on integrating mechanisms to achieve
coordination is accomplished in an additive fashion with each device
contributing to the capacity of an organization to deal with greater
degrees of task uncertainty.
RECOMMENDATI ONS
Rules, Regulations, Proceedures:
Rules coordinate actions by specifying proper behavior in advance
of situations. Rules stabilize the operations of organizations by
eliminating the need to treat situations as unique.
However, rules are- useful only for situations and responses that
can be anticipated in advance. Although the commonwealth relies
heavily on rules and regulations to manage the Chapter 121B program,
the high degree of task uncertainty associated with industrial park
projects does not allow for a reliance on rules and regulations to
achieve coordination. Nevertheless, some changes can be made to
the current rules, regulations, and proceedures to improve coordina-
tion.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD ESTABLISH PROCEEDURES WITH THE AREA
EDA OFFICE FOR THE PROCESSING OF GRANT APPLICATIONS
FOR STATE ASSISTED INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS
DCA should review all grant applications submitted to EDA for state
assisted projects for compliance with state rules and regulations
and the accuracy of information. In addition, DCA should assume
responsibility for assuring that firms and developers execute the
four agreements required by EDA as conditions for the receipt of
grant funds.
RECOMMENDATION: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROJECT PLAN SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING COMPONENTS:
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND RATIONALE FOR STRATEGY:
an account of the local, state, and federal
resources to be used to achieve specific devel-
opment objectives, and a justification of the
strategy proposed;
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* PARTICIPANT APPROVALS AND RESOURCE COMMITMENTS:
a listing of all of the actors involved with the
project and descriptions of the roles they are to
play; a listing of all of the resource expend-
itures required; and evidence of commitments from
all participants;
* A REPORT ON THE DESIGN OF THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT.
SYSTEM: a discussion of external, parent, and
client environmental considerations and the eff-
orts of the redevelopment authority to respond
to these issues (for example, for a project in a
municipality with a community development agency,
a description of the role of the agency and re-
porting arrangements); an account of how the
authority is going to achieve coordination at the
local level;
* A REPORT ON PROJECT TASKS: a breakdown of work
packages of activities; a network diagram, a
milestone chart, and inter-actor reporting methods.
Hierarchy:
Managerial roles are arranged in a hierarchy in order to collect
information and make decisions with respect to situations not Irou-
tinely faced by an organization. As exceptions arise, decision mak-
inig is referred upward in the hierarchy to a point where a shared
manager exists for all of the subunits dealing with the new situa-
tions. Inasmuch as a hierarchy also structures authority and reward
relationships, managers can direct the behavior of task performers in
lower units.
The major weakness of a hierarchy is the finite capacity of each
manager for handling information. The greater the degree of task
uncertainty faced by an organization, the more delays occur between
the time of the upward referral of information, and the receipt of a
decision by operating personnel. In addition, the hierarchy is
limited as a coordinating mechanism in the public sector by the
weakness of the vertical authority and reward structure.
The weak vertical authority structure of Massachusetts' government
and the high degree of task uncertainty associated with industrial
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park projects limit the usefulness of the state government hierarchy
for coordinating project tasks.
Targeting or Goal Setting:
As an organization faces a high degree of task uncertainty the
hierarchy is soon overloaded with exceptions and it becomes more.
efficient to allow lower level employees more decision making author-
ity. In order to insure that personnel choose the appropriate re-
sponses for achieving coordination among many different units, an
organization must set goals or targets.
However, the ability to set targets specific enough to coordinate
activities is a function of the degree of task unecertainty. As
noted above, Chapter 121B industrial park projects manifest a very
high degree of task uncertainty as a result of the numerous inputs,
variety of outputs, and considerable difficulty in achieving ob-
jectives which characterize projects, and the limited skills and
experience of project participants. Targets cannot be easily de-
fined because projects are affected by many external, par-
ent, and client environmental factors. Nevertheless, a number of
target setting mechanisms should be introduced in order to improve
the coordination of activities.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD PRESS THE DEVELOPMENT CABINET TO CALL
FOR THE ADOPTION OF A PROGRAM BUDGET FORMAT FOR
THE STATE BUDGET
The Development Cabinet should pursue the recommendation of the
Governor's Management Task Force to establish a budget organized
by program categories and responsibility centers.
RECOMMENDATION:
RECOMMENDATION:
DCA SHOULD PRESS THE DEVELOPMENT CABINET TO
ESTABLISH A "MANUAL" PROGRAM BUDGET SYSTEMI FOR
THE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVITIES IF THE PROGRAM FORM IS NOT ADOPTED FOR
THE STATE BUDGET
THE STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN PREPARED BY THE
OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING SHOULD BE AN ANNUAL REPORT
WHICH SPECIFIES OBJECTIVES FOR INDIVIDUAL UNITS AND
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HOW STATE RESOURCES ARE TO~BE COMBINED TO ACHIEVE
OBJECTIVES
Vertical Information System:
Vertical information systems enable organizations to process greater
amounts of information during the execution of projects. Informa-
tion systems increase the ability of managers to plan projects prior
to their initiation and to replan in response to exceptions.
Inasmuch as no vertical information system exists in Masachusetts
state government that deals with the status and impacts of Chapter
121B industrial projects, coordination should improve considerably
if DCA adopts the various recommendations in this report on collect-
ing and reporting information. However, numerous factors limit the
usefulness of any information system for achieving the desired de-
gree of coordination for industrial projects:
* a "global" data base which includes information on actors outside
of state government is needed because many project participants
are not units of state governmentrand outside actors are likely to
be reluctant to provide information on a regular basis;
* the formalization of information collection and reporting in a
system requires personnel with the expertise to design and use
such a system and an appreciation of the need for the system;
personnel with these qualities are not likely to be available
at the state or local level;
* the information needed for the system may not be easily obtain-
able at the local level.
RECOMMENDATION: AN INFORMATION SYSTEM SHOULD BE CREATED TO PROVIDE
THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS WITH INFORMA-
TION ON ALL PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS IN THE STATE THAT
DEPEND ON FEDERAL ASSISTANCE AND INFORM UNITS OF
STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL
FUNDS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Lateral Forms Of Organization:
The provision of more information to an organization through an
information system will overload the decision making mechanism if
the mechanism is not expanded to process the additional information.
The creation ot'various formal lateral forms of organization serves
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to -increase the capacity of an organization to process information
during task execution. Lateral forms of organization cut across
vertical lines of authority and lower the point of decision making
to where the relevant information exists. Whereas vertical informa-
tion systems are most useful for situations involving standardquan-
titative information, and an organization with a strong vertical
authority and reward structure, lateral decision processes are
necessary to supplement information systems in situations involving
qualitative and nonstandard information,and an organization with a
weak vertical structure.
Although some forms of lateral relations usually arise spontaneously
when the need exists, lateral forms of organization may not develop
when obstacles or disincentives to lower level cooperation are pre-
sent; for example, parochialism or political opposition. The follow-
ing forms of lateral organization are considered in order of increas-
ing cost and responsiveness to greater task uncertainty.
(1) Direct Contact Between Two Managers Or Project Participants Who
Share A Problem
The direct contact between two project participants is the simplest
form of lateral decision process and is often employed by DCA for
problems with Chapter 121B projects. However, the usefulness of
the direct contact approach is limited by a number of factors:
* Few incentives exist for personnel from different units of
state government to cooperate. Inter-agency communication is
not a behavioral norm in Massachusetts state government and
some agencies, such as DPW, have strong vertical orientations
which deprive lower echelon personnel of the authority to make
decisions.-
* Middle level managers are usually more concerned with short term
departmental success than with longer term effectiveness in
working with other units.
* Units often view their mandates differently; for example, DPW
may view its role as constructing highways and not as economic
development .
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* The occasional nature of direct contacts does not address situa-
tions which require regular consultation due to high degrees of
task uncertainty and inter-actor interdependence.
* Direct contact is limited to two actors.
Goal setting and direction from managers high in the hierarchy can
improve the chances for achieving coordination through direct con-
tacts.
(2) Lia'son Roles To Link Two Units Which Have Substantial Contact
When the volume of contacts between two units is substantial,a
special liason relationship can be created so that an ongoing re-
lationship is established and the responsibility for communication
is assigned to specific personnel. The liason mechanism suffers
from the same limitations as the direct contact approach and is
inadequate for situations of great task uncertainty and task inter-
dependence.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD ESTABLISH AN ONGOING LIASON RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS TO EXCHANGE
INFORMATION AND COORDINATE ACTIVITIES ON PROJECTS
INVOLVING BOTH UNITS
DPW should transmit information to DCA on a regular basis on projects
in planning, funding priorities, and construction schedules. DCA
should review proposed industrial projects which involve DPW par-
ticipation with DPW in order to assess whether the costs and benefits
of the projects warrant DPW expendituresand establish a timetable
for activities. DCA and DPW should meet on a regular basis to ex-
amine the status of projects.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD ESTABLISH AN ONGOING LIASON RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE AREA EDA OFFICE TO MONITOR THE AVAILABILITY
OF FEDERAL FUNDS FOR INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS AND EN-
COURAGE THE USE OF FEDERAL GRANTS WITH STATE ASSIS-
TED PROJECTS
In addition, DCA should assist local nonprofit public purpose organ-
izations in applying for federal grants and in arguing for grant
approval. DCA should assume responsibility for monitoring the flow
of federal funds to projects in the commonwealth and increasing the
use of federal funds for public purpose projects in the state.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD ESTABLISH AN ONGOING LIASON RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE AREA OFFICE OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADMINIS-
TRATION TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESSING OF APPLICATIONS
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FOR SBA ASSISTANCE FROM FIRMS IN STATE ASSISTED
PROJECTS AND INCREASE THE USE OF SBA PROGRAMS IN
STATE ASSISTED PROJECTS
In addition, DCA should assist communities in forming SBA 502 Local
Development Corporations. DCA should also assume responsibility
for monitoring SBA activity in the commonwealth and increasing the
use of SBA programs in the state.
(3) Create Task Forces Composed Of Many Project Participants
Unlike liason roles and direct contact strategies which are appro-
priate for coordinating the activities of two actors, task forces
are established for joint decision making involving many par-
ticipants. Task forces are temporary groups of full or part time
members formed with representatives from each of the affected units.
The temporary task force form of lateral organization is inappro-
priate for managing the industrial park program because the same
units of state government must be integrated on many projects on
a continuing basis.
(4) Employ Teams On A Permanent Basis For Recurring Inter-actor
Decision Making
A team is a group decision making mechanism formed on a permanent
basis to respond to a situation with a high degree of task uncertain-
ty. Teams can be formed at different levels of the hierarchy to
deal with different problem areas. In order to be effective, teams
require an information system for communicating on the activities of
members and supplying relevant "external" information for decision
making.
RECOMMENDATION: AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND POLICY DEVELOP-
MENT TEAM SHOULD BE FORMED WITH PROGRAM AND DIVISION
MANAGERS FROM THE UNITS WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE
DEVELOPMENT CABINET
This permanent team mechanism of middle management personnel should
deal in a more detailed fashion than the Cabinet with the coordina-
tion of activities among units, the exchange of information, the
creation of economic development programs, the initiation of projects,
and the monitoring of the performance of economic development pro-
jects and programs. Middle managers should have the necessary de-
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tailed knowledge and management control of projects and programs to
integrate program operations and pursue innovations.
RECOMMENDATION: AN URBAN INDUSTRIAL PROJECT DEVELOPMENT TEAM SHOULD
BE FORMED WITH STAFF REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE UNITS
OF STATE GOVERNMENT WHICH PARTICIPATE ON SUCH PRO-
JECTS
The team should meet on a regular basis and include representatives
from the proposed Office or Division of Community Economic Develop-
ment in DCA, the Department of Commerce and Development, the Depart-
ment of Manpower Development, the Office of State Planning, and the
Department of Public Works. Representatives from other units of
state government should also be permanent members of the team but
should attend meetings only when appropriate. The team should focus
on the tasks necessary to implement individual projects and achieve
development objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: THE DEVELOPMENT CABINE T SHOULD BE GIVEN ITS OWN
STAFF RESOURCES TO ENABLE IT TO FULFILL ITS POLICY
FORMULATION AND PROGRAM DECISION MAKING FUNCTIONS
As noted by the Governor's Management Task Force in their report,
the Cabinet needs staff for preparing options papers, program anal-
yses, and proposals for management changes to achieve improved coor-
dination across agencies. In addition, the Development Cabinet
should assume an active role in monitoring the implementation of
projects and programs and their progress in achieving development
objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: THE OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING SHOULD CREATE AN ECON-
OMIC DEVELOPMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR REPORTING
TO THE DEVELOPMENT CABINET ON THE STATUS AND IMPACTS
OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS
RECOMMENDATION: THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION AND CONSTRUCTION
MUST OBTAIN BUDGET CONTROL OVER THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS IN ORDER FOR THE DEVELOPMENT CABINET
TO INTEGRATE STATE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS WITH
OTHER ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
(5) Create An Integrating Role When The Leadership Of Lateral
Processes Becomes A Problem
An integrator acts as a surrogate for the general manager (ex.
Governor) who lacks time to manage individual projects. The inte-
grator is not responsible for accomplishing project tasks but for
coordinating the activities of the participants on a project. The
challenge for the individual acting as an integrator is to influence
the decision making behavior of individuals who are not under his
direct authority. In order to achieve coordination, the integrator
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relies on his contact with the general manager, access to information,
competence in the areas of greatest task uncertainty, and skills at
interpersonal dealings.
A member of the Governor's staff) or.-project manager from the Office
of State Planning or Development Cabinet, acting as an integrator on
Chapter 121B industrial projects would have a difficult time gaining
influence over state agencies due to the weak vertical structure and
lack of an infDrmation system in Massachusetts state government, and
an even more difficult time dealing with local project participants
who are not likely to respond to the authority of the Governor.
Nevertheless, if problems develop with coordinating activities among
members of the urban industrial project development team, use of
an integrator may be a worthwhile next step.
RECOMMENDATION: THE DEVELOPMENT CABINET OR OFFICE OF STATE PLANNING
SHOULD HAVE PROJECT MANAGERS TO ACT AS INTEGRATORS
ON MAJOR HIGH PRIORITY AND HIGH VISIBILITY PROJECTS
AND PROJECTS WHICH REQUIRE ESPECIALLY RAPID EXECU-
TION
(6) Shift From An Integrating Role To A Linking-Managerial Role
When Faced With Substantial Differentiation
A reliance on the expertise of the integrator to achieve integration
is inadequate when the degree of task uncertainty and goal diversity
is too great to base decisions on facts, or participants disagree over
goals rather than means. In such situations, the integrator role
can be transformed into a managerial-linking role by increasing the
power of the integrator in the decision process. Although the link-
ing manager does not have line authority over the participants on a
project, he can be given approval power in the decision process,
such as authority over budget requests submitted to the general man-
ager, and a role in initial planning.
In light of the weak vertical authority structure of public organ-
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izations in general, and Massachusetts state government in particular,
managers in line agencies are capable of successfully resisting any
move to establish a linking-managerial role for Chapter 121B or
other economic development projects.
(7) Establish Dual Authority Relations At Critical Points To Create
A Matrix Design
For organizations which face task demands that require both a high
degree of specialization and a high degree of integration, the in-
tegrator role can be strengthened by establishing a dual authority
relationship. At some level of the organization a manager becomes
a member of both a resource or functional unit (ex. DPW) and a pro-
duct or program unit (ex. Bureau of Urban Renewal). Thus, the matrix
organization form creates a power balance and adversary relationship
between the roles of functional specialist and project participant.
A move to a matrix form of organization would represent a radical
change for the design of government organizations and would require
legislative action. Line agency managers would certainly resist the
attempt to reduce their power and operating personnel would likely
object to the dual reporting requirements. Inasmuch as the different
departments of state government are involved to varying degrees on
Chapter 121B industrial projects, dual reporting relationships would
not be appropriate for all units. In addition, despite the demands
of economic development projects for both a high degree of differen-
tiation and integration, most government activities appear to require
more functional specialization than integration.
Creation Of Self-Contained Tasks:
Vertical information systems and lateral forms of organization are
methods for increasing the capacity of an organization to process
information in the face of the greater volumes of information needed
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to efficiently and effectively perform tasks of higher degrees of
uncertainty. The creation of self-contained tasks is an organization
design alternative that responds to greater task uncertainty by re-
ducing the need for information processing.
The amount of information that an organization must process to achieve
a level of performance can be reduced if the design of the organiza-
tion is changed from a functional form to one in which each group
contains the resources required to perform its mission. The self-
containment strategy shifts the authority structure of an organiza-
tion from a functional basis, such as skills, resources, or inputs,
to an output or project basis. Information processing needs are re-
duced in two ways; (1) a single collection of resources (personnel,
etc.) deals with a more limited diversity of outputs; and (2) spe-
cialization is reduced as employees take on multiple functions. In
addition, self-containment reduces the need for information process-
ing because exceptions travel through fewer levels of the hierarchy
before reaching a shared superior for all of the affected resources.
The critical variable for a self-containment approach is the scope
of activities that must be contained. The costs of self-containment
are those connected with a reduction of skill specialization and econ-
omies of scale. If a group internalizes resources that are normally
shared, it must either reduce the specialization of resources which
otherwise would be used on only a limited basis (ex. manpower train--
ing expertise), or duplicate the specialization of the entire organ-
ization in the group.
REC OMME NDA T I ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STATE URBAN INDUSTRIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT PROGRAM SHOULD REMAIN WITH DCA RATHER THAN
BE TRANSFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
DEVELOPMENT OR ANY OTHER UNIT UNDER THE JURISDICTION
OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
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Although the units under the jurisdiction of the Executive Office of
Economic Affairs (EOEA) have the primary responsibility within state
government for economic development programs, and the effectiveness of
industrial park projects is dependent upon coordination with depart-
ments within the EOEA, the tasks required for a state urban industrial
development program require a degree of specialization that would be
lost if the program were transferred to the Department of Commerce
and Development.
Upon initial consideration, a number of factors suggest that the
industrial development program is inappropriately located within DCA:
the Departments of Community Affairs and Commerce and Development
were parts of the same agency when the Chapter 121B legislation was
enacted; the two departments were separated in the late 1960s with
DCD taking over economic development functions and DCA assuming hous-
ing and urban renewal functions; and the industrial development pro-
gram has been incorrectly viewed and operated by DCA as an urban re-
newal rather than an economic development program. However, public
purpose industrial park projects have characteristics which distin-
guish the program from the other economic development activities of
the Department of Commerce and Development:
(1) projects are initiated and carried out by local organizations;
(2) projects are developed to serve the economic development needs
of individual municipalities; and
(3) projects consist of the development of land and physical improve-
ments.
Whereas the Department of Commerce and Development approaches econ-
omic development from the point of view of statewide goals and the
needs of businesses, the Department of Community Affairs deals with
municipalities and views development from the point of view of phys-
ical development projects, the needs of individual communities, and
the problems of poverty and depressed local economies. C.23B s. 3 of
the General Laws of Massachusetts, which defines DCA's powers and
duties, indicates that DCA is the principal state agency to "mobilize
the human, physical, and financial resources available to combat
poverty and provide economic training...(and) encourage and assist
communities in the development, renewal, and rehabilitation of their
physical environment..."
In addition, whereas the principal activities of the Department of
Commerce and Development consist of assisting businesses and studying
state economic development policy issues, DCA personnel work on
various kinds of "projects" and deal with many types of local organ-
izations. DCD's weak efforts to promote and assist Economic Develop-
ment and Industrial Corporations (Chapter 121C), which are local pub-
lic purpose economic development organizations, suggest that DCD per-
sonnel lack the ability and/or desire to relate to local development
organizations. DCD currently lacks any staff with expertise in
developing industrial parks and usually refers inquiries from local
organizations to DCA.
Furthermore, a shift of the 121B industrial development program to
DCD would only eliminate the need for coordination with one secre-
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tariat, and integration problems would remain at the departmental
level within the EOEA,andbetween the EOEA and other secretariats.
Thus, although this report establishes the need for improved coor-
dination of industrial park projects with the Departments of Commerce
and Development and Manpower Development, the need for DCA's special-
-ized functions is a more compelling consideration that calls for the
program to remain with DCA.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD BE REORGANIZED TO INCLUDE A DIVISION OF
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Although DCA assists municipalities, deals with physical development
projects, and views economic development from the point of view of
community needs and poverty, the commonwealth lacks a line agency
capability for assisting with the broad range of community economic
development activities and addressing community economic development
needs in a comprehensive fashion. Despite the state's policy commit-
ment to the revitalization of the older urban centers of the common-
wealth, no single unit of state government has the responsibility
for providing urban development services. In addition, no unit of
state government is responsible for monitoring and assisting the
great number of local public purpose economic development organiza-
tions which exist in the state: EDICs, SBA 502 Local Development
Corporations, Industrial Development Finance Authorities, Industrial
Development Commissions, Community Development Corporations, Redevel-
opment Authorities, Community Action Agencies, municipal Departments
of Community Development, etc.
The absence of a unit of state government responsible for community
economic development has the following negative consequences:
* the commonwealth lacks information on the numbers of local public
purpose economic development organizations and the activities,
needs, and successes of these organizations;
* the commonwealth fails to make creative use of federal funds
available for community economic development purposes;
local actors are confused by the variety of state actors that
deal in some fashion with community economic development;
local actors feel that the state's avowed commitment to urban
revitalization is a policy without any programmatic substance;
information on successful models of urban economic development
projects is not shared.
The organization of DCA should be changed from the present three
divisions of Community Development, Community Services, and Social
and Economic Opportunity, to the following four divisions:
* Housing
* Municipal Services
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* Community Economic Development
Social and Economic Opportunity
The Division of Community Economic Development should be composed
of an Office of Urban Industrial Development, an Office of Central
Business District Revitalization, an Office of Neighborhood Develop-
ment, and an Office of Relocation. The Office of Urban Industrial
Development would be responsible for monitoring and assisting local
economic development organizations undertaking industrial projects.
The office would have jurisdiction over state tools for industrial
development, such as Chapter 121B for industrial projects and Chapter
121C (Economic Development and Industrial Corporaticns), and play an
active role in obtaining federal funds from EDA and SBA. The Office
of Central Business District Revitalization would be responsible for
assisting communities with downtown redevelopment efforts. The office
would have jurisdiction over state tools, such as Chapter 121B for
commercial and residential projects and Chapter 121A, and provide
consultative services to municipalities on possible redevelopment
strategies (ex. SBA 502 Commercial Development Program). The Office
of Neighborhood Development would control the Neighborhood Improvement
Program and assist communities in developing neighborhood preserva-
tion and revitalization programs.
DCA
Division of Division
Housing Municipa
Office of
Urban Industrial
Development
* 121B
* 121C
*EDA
* SBA
* CDCs
LDCs
* IDFAs
* Public Works
of
l Services
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* CDBG
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Community
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RECOMMENDATION: THE DESIRABILITY OF EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE STATE
LAND BANK TO PROVIDE A STATE VEHICLE FOR URBAN
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE EXPLORED
A stronger state development mechanism might re.duce some of the com-
plexity which results from the participation of numerous local actors.
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BUSINESS CONTACT PROGRAM
Integration/C oordination
Findings:
The "Business Contact Program", operated by the Department of
Commerce and Development (DCD) through its regional offices, is a
major eff6rt by the-Commonwealth of Massachusetts to obtain informa-
tion on the needs of, and provide assistance to, individual businesses.
In addition to collecting information on problems faced by firms in
the state, DCD obtains information on the expansion and relocation
plans of businesses.
Inasmuch as DCD collects information on business location de-
cisions, and establishes personal contact with firm executives, the
Business Contact Program is a potentially useful tool for marketing
state-assisted industrial park projects. At present, the marketing
of Chapter 121B industrial projects is not coordinated with Business
Contact Program activities. However, by providing redevelopment
authorities with the names of firms considering expansion or reloca-
tion to a new siteand contact persons within these firms,and/or
providing these firms with information on sites available at state-
assisted parks, the Business Contact Program could assist in the
marketing of Chapter 121B industrial projects. In addition, through
such efforts DCD would be providing a service to firms seeking infor-
mation on available industrial land. To the degree state-assisted
industrial parks are developed to achieve public economic development
goals, cooperation between DCA and DCD in this manner would con-
tribute toward accomplishing these goals.
RECOMMENDATION: USE THE BUSINESS CONTACT PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE AND DEVELOPMENT TO ASSIST IN THE
MARKETING OF STATE-ASSISTED INDUSTRIAL PARKS
The Director of the Bureau of Urban Renewal should meet with the
Director of the Business Contact Program in order to obtain the
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cooperation of DCD,and establish policy and proceedures with respect
to the coordination of activities and exchange of information.
DCA should assume responsibility for collecting information on the
availability,and characteristics of,land in Chapter 121B industrial
park projects and forwarding the information to DCD. DCA should
develop a one or two page form for presenting detailed information
-on individual projects, and a summary form for data on all projects.
Information to be supplied on the forms should include such items as
the number of acres and size of parcels available, the availability
and costs of utilities, distance to major highways, characteristics
of the community, and, if possible, a map showing the location of
the project in relation to major highways. Information for com-
pleting the forms can be obtained from the completed "DCA Chapter
121B Industrial Park Survey" questionnaires and through the recom-
mended new reporting requirements.
The Bureau of Urban Renewal should arrange with DCD a process for
informing DCD personnel in the regional offices about the Chapter
121B industrial park program, the projects in execution in the state,
and the role of the Business Contact Program in assisting in market-
ing. The Director of the Business Contact Program should determine
whether completed copies of the forms on individual projects should
be distributed by DCA directly, or through the central office to DCD
regional offices. DCA should supply copies of the completed forms
to DCD for distribution to firms. A directive from the Commissioner
of the Department of Commerce and Development should be sent to the
regional offices calling for the promotion of land in state-assisted
parks.
If the Bureau of Urban Renewal is transformed into an Office or
Division of Community Economic Development as recommended in this
report, the marketing assistance provided by the Business Contact
Program can be extended to all industrial space and land projects
sponsored by local public purpose organizations to achieve explicit
public objectives; ex. EDIC's, Local Development Corporations,
Industrial Development Commissions, Community Development Corpora-
tions.
Expected Benefits:
provide immediate marketing assistance to struggling projects;
add a service to those now provided to firms through the
Business Contact Program;
use an existing program to better serve state economic
development objectives;
more closely integrate the functions of DCD in dealing with
the needs of businesses, with DCA's role in addressing the
economic development needs of individual communities;
* gain responsiveness from redevelopment authorities in return
for providing marketing assistance;
target marketing efforts to firms considering moves, and
match firms and industrial parks in regions of the state.
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Costs:
* DCA staff time to prepare forms, assemble information, and
instruct DCD personnel.
Actions Required:
* establish policy and proceedures with the Director of the
Business Contact Program;
* prepare forms and assemble information;
present a brief proposal on the use of the Business Contact
Program for marketing state-assisted projects to the
Development Cabinet.
Time Horizon:
* Immediate
Constraints:
* Department of'Commerce and Development may resist idea for
fear of alienating businessmen;
* DCD personnel in the regional offices may lack enthusiasm
for promotional efforts.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
creation of a state-wide computer data bank on available
industrial land at DCD;
closer coordination between DCA and DCD in focusing sources
of business capital to state-assisted projects (ex. Mass.
Business Development Corp., MIMIA).
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DUTIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SPECIALIST TO BE
ADDED TO STAFF OF BUREAU OF URBAN RENEWAL
Management Control: Programming / Organization Development
Findings:
The Bureau of Urban Renewal is grossly understaffed to
efficiently and effectively carry out its varied responsibilities.
One full time staff position and 1/3 to 1/2 of the time of
the Director of the Bureau of Neighborhood Improvem.ent, Urban
Renewal, and Relocation are devoted to managing activities
related to Chapter 121B: (1) the exclusively state-aided
urban renewal program (21 projects in execution; nine active
projects which have received planning assistance; commercial,
residential, and industrial park projects); (2) approximately
90 federally-aided urban renewal projects which the state
also subsidizes; and (3) a number of non-aided development
projects which must be reviewed and approved pursuant to the
121B rules and regulations (ex. Park Plaza, Wellington Circle).
In contrast, the Bureau of Urban Renewal was the largest and
most active unit within DCA during the late 1960's and early
1970's. with a full time staff of 14 and a full time director
who at one point was a commissioner.
Although the end of federal Title 1 funding for urban
renewal, and the commitment of most of the authorized funds
for the exclusively state-aided programwarranted a reduction
in staff because of the drop in the initiation of new projects,.
the drastic cut in personnel was inappropriate in light of the de-
mands of managing the approved projects, and the continued development
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of new state-aided and non-aided projects. The tasks required
to monitor and assist projects and address problems are often
more difficult and time consuming than the staff activities
during the planning of projects.. Inasmuch as the Commonwealth
is committed to substantial subsidies for projects presently
in execution ($20 million total or 1 million/year over 20
years to exclusively state-aided projects and $70 million
total or $3-5 million/year over 20 years to federally-aided
projects), a need remains for DCA to manage projects to
assure that state development objectives are being served.
In addition, despite the serious deficiencies of the urban
renewal program, many of the federally-aided projects which are
being closed out by HUDand the exclusively state-aided
projects in executionrepresent valuable opportunities for
advancing state development objectives. Futhermore, the
Chapter 121B statute continues to be applied to new projects
in the Commonwealth, some of which are of major dimensions.
Projects currently being reviewed by the Bureau include such
high priority developments as Park Plaza, Wellington Circle,
Charlestown Navy Yard, and Kendall Square. "Urban Renewal"
may be dead as a specific program concept, a name applied
to urban development projects, and a source of federal and
state funding, but new publicly subsidized and assisted
development projects continue to be initiated and the legacy
of urban renewal remains in the numerous federally and state--
aided projects which are active and/or offer potential for
achieving valued benefits.
With respect to the Chapter 121B industrial park program
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(15 projects reaching execution of which 2 are completed),
DCA staff resources are inadequate to manage the approved
projects as economic development efforts directed at the
achievement of state and local objectives. The skills necessary
to successfully manage industrial park projects are distinct
from those needed for commercial or residential projects:
ex. techniques of economic base analysis to assess project
feasibility and identify target industries for marketing;
economic impact analysis involving job and multiplier effects;
approaches to marketing industrial land; knowledge of industrial
location theory; familiarity with types of industrial parks.
At present, the single full time staff person lacks sufficient
time to devote to the particular economic development assistance
and monitoring activities recommended by this report. Therefore,
an individual with industrial development expertise should be
obtained to manage the industrial park projects. Moreover,
an economic development specialist must be hired if the Bureau
of Urban Renewal is to be transformed into an Office / Division
of Community Economic Development as recommended by this report.
RECOMMENDATION: AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNER / SPECIALIST /
ANALYST SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE STAFF OF THE
BUREAU OF URBAN RENEWAL
An economic development planner / specialist / analyst should
be obtained by the Bureau of Urban Renewal in order to begin:
(1) redesigning the Chapter 121B urban industrial park
development program from an "input oriented" urban renewal
strategy focused on blighted parcels of land in any
municipality to an "output oriented" program directed
toward achieving public economic development objectives
through industrial development in depressed communities
and other localities where need or opportunity exist;
(2) redirecting the industrial development activities and
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functions of the Bureau of Urban Renewal from an exclusive
concern with Chapter 121B (and Chapter 121A) to develop
a general capacity, and assume responsibility within
state government, for providing industrial development
assistance to municipalities and local organizations in
the Commonwealth;
(3) reorienting the role of the Bureau of Urban Renewal,
together with another individual hired to provide assistance
with respect to downtown revitalization, from a unit
functioning with reference to particular statutes (i.e.
Chapters 121A and 121B) to the primary Office / Division
within state government responsible for Community Economic
Development activities.
With recent assignment of the Bureau of Urban Renewal to DCA's
Division of Community Services, it may be possible to borrow
a staff person with economic development expertise from the Office
of Local Assistance, on a full or part time basis, until a
permanent staff position can be secured.
Some of the initial tasks for the economic development
specialist should include the following:
(a) assist redevelopment authorities in identifying target
industries for marketing, developing marketing strategies,
and marketing project property with reference to specific
economic development objectives;
* instruct redevelopment authority staff in the use of the
methodologies presented in the handbooks prepared by the
Center for Community Renewal Studies at U.Mass. for
conducting economic base studies and marketing industrial
parks,and direct authority personnel to data sources
for employing these methodologies;
Note: A staff member of the Bureau of Urban Renewal
should be responsible for this education effort even
if the Center for Community Renewal Studies is retained
to provide instruction to authority personnel in the use
of the handbooks because these methods of economic
base analysis should be internalized by the Bureau
as part of the broader attempt to manage the program in
terms of outputsand expand the functions of the Bureau
to include provision of industrial development assistance
to municipalities.
* negotiate agreements with redevelopment authorities on
the respective tasks of authority personnel and the
Bureau in preparing economic base analyses and formulating
marketing strategies; the DCA economic development
specialist should play a role in preparing the analyses
for the following reasons: (1) the DCA specialist can
assemble and prepare some of the data needed for all of
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the projects from the same source more quickly than if
inexperienced authority personnel search separately
for the same type of information on their respective
communities; (2) authority staff often lack the
expertise and will to perform the required analyses and
the active participation of the economic development
specialist will provide skills and stimulate activity;
and (3) the DCA specialist will be aware of the feasibility
of utilizing state resources in marketing projects;
use the information collected on the "Chapter 121B
Industrial Park Survey" questionnaires to complete
application forms for obtaining from the Economic
Development Administration the computerized industrial
location service print-outs which will identify the
types of firms likely to be attracted to industrial
parks; the EDA print-outs, which identify target
industries by five digit SIC code and degree of location
match, can supplement the economic base analysis;
Dr. Destackleberg of EDA has agreed verbally to provide
the service for four or five projects; therefore, unless
EDA can be persuaded to provide the service to all of
the state projects, the economic development specialist
should select the four or five projects confronting the
most difficult marketing problems to receive the service;
an explanation of the computer service and a sample
print-out are on file at the Bureau of Urban Renewal;
each print-out will cost approximately $50 for computer
time (but up to $150 worth of time has to be guaranteed
for each project); in order to complete the application
forms to receive the print-outs, the economic development
specialist must gather additional data from published
government sources;
establish schedules with individual redevelopment
authorities for the performance of marketing tasks with
milestone dates for the completion of specific activities;
the schedule should represent a commitment by both
parties to complete the agreed upon tasks; with responsib-
ility for tasks clearly specified, DCA will be able to
notify redevelopment authority boards and local officials
if authority staff fail to complete tasks as agreed,and
authority staff will be in a position to demand action
from DCA and explain a lack of progress to their boards
if DCA does not satisfy its commitment; DCA can use the
schedules to concentrate assistance efforts on those
authorities which perform well;
on the basis of the economic base analysis, the -cases
prepared as part of this report, and other available
information (ex. LUM studies), the economic development
specialist, in consultation with redevelopment authority
personnel, should prepare a basic problem definition/needs
assessment for formulating economic development objectives
and a marketing strategy;
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on the basis of the economic development objectives
for projects agreed upon by the economic development
specialist and the redevelopment authority staffs and
boards, land disposition policy, and provisions to be
included in land disposition agreements with respect to
the performance of firms in meeting development objectives,
should be established;
* subsequent to the identification of target industries,
and formulation of a marketing strategy (ex. performance
provisions, local vs. national market area, ties to
schools for research and development firms, etc.), the
economic development specialist should work with
redevelopment authorities using the marketing handbook
prepared by the Center for Community Renewal Studies
at U. Mass to detail the methods and approaches to
be employed to advertise, contact firms in target
industries, prepare literature, and respond to inquiries;
establish channels of communication with staff of the
Department of Commerce and Development's Business Contact
Program in order to inform them of the availability of
land in state assisted industrial parks, gain their
cooperation in promoting state assisted projects to
firms seeking land, and obtain information on firms
contemplating expansion or relocation; in addition,
the economic development specialist should investigate
with the Department of Commerce and Development the
possibility of promoting state assited projects to out
of state firms (land costs can be reduced substantially
to attract out-of-state firms);
* seek the cooperation of the Department of Commerce and
Development, the Department of Manpower Development,and
redevelopment authorities in targeting the "Training
Assistance Program", a customized manpower training program
which firms can employ at no cost to train a work force,
to state assisted industrial park projects,in order to
support marketing efforts and help projects achieve economic
development objectives related to the hiring and training
of unemployed persons; in addition, the economic development
specialist should pursue with the Department of Manpower
Development the possibility of targeting portions of
local CETA funds for job training programs in state assisted
industrial parks, and obtain the assistance of the Department
in working with local CETA sponsors and redevelopment
authorities in establishing employment programs for projects;
establish a relationship with the area/regional office of
the Small Business Administration in order to provide
information to redevelopment authorities on SBA programs
which may help to market property, expedite the processing
of SBA loans and loan guarantees for firms in state-assisted
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projects, monitor the amount and use of SBA funds in
state assisted projects, assist organizations in communities
in which state assisted projects are located to become
Local Development Corporations which qualify for low
interest SBA business loans for plant and equipment, and
monitor the total amount and use of SBA loans and loan
guarantees flowing into Massachusetts in comparison with
the experience in other states;
maintain communications with public and quasi-public
sources of business capital at the state level, such as
the Massachusetts Business Development Corporation, the
Community Development Finance Corporation, the Massachusetts
Industrial Mortgage Insurance Agency, the Massachusetts
Industrial Finance Agency (proposed), and the Technology
Development Corporation (proposed), in order to obtain
information on the availability of capital, assist in
expediting applications from firms in state-assisted
industrial parks, and closely link state assisted projects
with these capital sources; inasmuch as these public
vehicles for business capital share many of the development
objectives of the Chapter 121B industrial land development
program,and the purported "capital gaps" which warrant
the existence of these vehicles are most evident in the
depressed urban centers in which Chapter 121B should operate,
efforts should be made to target capital to state assisted
industrial park projects;
assemble information on the characteristics and availability
of land in state assisted industrial park projects from
the completed questionnaire, the cases in this report, and
other sources for conveyance to the Department of Commerce
and Development for the listing of projects in the state-
wide computer data bank of available industrial land cur-
rently being created;
(b) establish a relationship with the area office of the Economic
Development Administration in order to monitor the availability
of funding for industrial parks, obtain information on EDA
funding priorities, formulate processing proceedures for state
assisted projects applying for EDA grants, and monitor the
amount and use of EDA funds flowing into the Commonwealth;
(c) follow-up the "DCA Chapter 121B Industrial Park Survey"
conducted with the questionnaire in appendix with a survey
of firms which have located in state assisted parks using
a questionnaire (a sample is presented in appendix) which
gathers information. on items such as the following: what.
factors influenced firms to select project locations; whether
firms expanded, started up, or relocated from another location;
the previous locations of firms; the types of firms which
have located in individual projects; the marketing strategies
and features of parks which proved persuasive in attracting
firms; the linkages of firms with the state economy; and
the employment impacts from firm moves to project locations;
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the questionnaire should be introduced as a required
component of the land disposition process for Chapter 121B
industrial projects as noted in the recommendation on the
reporting of redevelopment authorities to DCA; the questionnaire
should provide information to help assess the "net" economic
development impacts of projects, identify the factors which
are impbrtant for business location decisions, and supply a
valuable data base for examining factors affecting economic
activity in the Commonwealth;
(d) attempt to obtain completed "DCA Chapter 121B Industrial
Park Survey" questionnaires from redevelopment authorities
and other local 6rganizations which have not returned them,
and assemble the data collected into a format for reporting
to the Department of Commerce and Development on the amount
and characteristics of land available in individual
industrial parks; a single page of detailed information
should be prepared on each project ( ex. size of parcels,
costs of utilities, community characteristics), and a
summary page or two should provide information on all of
the state assisted projects; copies of these reports
should be made for distribution through the regional offices
of the Department of Commerce and Development to firms
seeking industrial land; a directive from the Commissioner
of the Department of Commerce and Development, calling for
the promotion of land in state assisted parks, should accompany
the reports; the reports should be revised annually;
(e) contact the statistics unit of the Division of Employment
Security to investigate the feasibility of DCA receiving
computer reports on the employment experience of firms
located in state assisted parks on a regular basis; DES
data may prove to be an invaluable resource for monitoring
the employment impacts from projects and assessing the
net benefits from projects on a periodic basis; the computer
facilities at DES can provide information quickly and at
little expense; the economic development specialist should
discuss with DES personnel the kinds of information
available through the computer which would be useful for
judging net benefits; information should be available on
changes in the number of employees and employee wages, and
other useful data, such as the previous employment status
of employees, the kinds of jobs in parks, and the standard
industrial classification code number of park firms, may
also be computerized; inasmuch as some detailed information
may be considered confidential, the economic development
specialist should attempt to define the level of aggregation
of data suitable for assessing the net benefits from projects;
any agreement on the reporting of information from DES to
DCA will require contact between the Director of the Bureau
of Urban Renewal and the Commissioner of DES;
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(f) develop documents and provide instruction for periodic
reporting by redevelopment authorities to DCA (see the
separate recommendations on reporting requirements in
this report for the suggested contents of these documents):
* effectiveness reporting: a format should be prepared for
reporting on the accomplishment of objectives on a
semi-annual basis;
* process reporting through milestone charts: a sample
chart should be prepared and authority staff should be
instructed on the purpose and use of milestone charts,
which should be submitted on a quarterly basis;
* exception reporting: a format should be preparedand
authority staff should be instructed on the purpose and
use of exception reporting,which should be on a quarterly
basis with milestone chart reporting;
* financial reporting: a format should be preparedand authority
staff sould be instructed on the purpose and use of
quarterly financial reporting;
* annual reports: a format should be prepared;
(g) define a methodology and create a format for the preparation
of fiscal and economic impact analyses of projects; the
methodology and format should be added as a required
component of the project plan (see recommendations on
revised content of the project plan in this report), included
as a component of the annual report, and used to prepare
analyses of current projects;
(h) prepare fiscal and economic impact analyses of all projects
in execution or completed; three separate calculations
should be undertaken: economic evaluation (social costs and
benefits), municipal costs and revenues,
and state costs and revenues; information to produce the
analyses can be obtained from the following sources:
* industrial park survey questionnaire;
* questionnaire for firms in project;
* Division of Employment Security computer print-outs
on job impacts;
Massachusetts Industrial Directory, available from the
statistics unit within the Department of Commerce and
Development, which provides the Standard Industrial Class-
ification code numbers of firms and total firm employment;
firms are listed by municipality and only those firms
that responded to the survey are listed;
cases prepared as part of this report;
214
* annual reports and other literature provided by
redevelopment authorities;
* project files;
new effectiveness reporting instruments recommended by
this report;
in almost every instance, additional information will have to
be requested from redevelopment authorities, municipal
tax collection offices, or municipal agencies;
(i) review the actual costs and disposition proceeds on all
projects and assess the propriety of the current level
of annual state payments; establish conditions for individual
redevelopment authorities to meet in order to either
receive higher state payments or avoid a reduction in state
payments on the basis of actual net project costs;
(j) formulate a "non-relocation regulation" which prohibits the
movement of firms out of high priority development areas
to sites in state assisted industrial parks;
(k) revise the rules and regulations to reflect the recommendations
set forth in this report;
(1) attempt to transfer responsibility for preparation of the
Municipal Monograph Series from the Department of
Commerce and Development to DCA.
Expected Benefits:
obtain individual with the necessary expertise for
redesigning the Chapter 121B industrial land development
program as an economic development program through the
many recommendations in this report;
begin to build a capacity for DCA to serve as the
department, and the office / division of Community
Economic Development to serve as the unit, of state
government responsible for assisting communities in
economic development efforts;
provide needed assistance to redevelopment authorities
in marketing state assisted industrial parks;
obtain an individual with the expertise and time needed
to monitor activities on industrial park projects,
respond to problems, and focus on the important job
of coordinating projects with the resources of other
government agencies;
* effect the changes in the rules and regulations and
statute recommended in this report;
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collect information necessary for assessing the performance
of projects and the programand prepare reports on
performance for the Development Cabinet and the legislature;
Costs:
funding for the staff position.
Actions Required:
increase the budget for Bureau of Urban Renewal to
support an additional staff member;
decision to accept many of the recommendations of this
report on redesigning the Chapter 121B program and move
to establish the capability within DCA to serve as the
lead agency for community economic development.
Time Horizon:
Immediate.
Constraints:
difficulty in securing funding for new staff position
at level necessary to attract individual with requisite
expertise because of negative perceptions of program
held by personnel within DCA and the executive branch of
government.
Complementary / Supporting Actions:
recommended changes to Chapter 121B industrial land
development program and role of Bureau of Urban Renewal
in community economic development;
focus of state policy on the economic development
of depressed urban centers;
recent establishment and proposed enactment of a
variety of public vehicles for business capital
for plant and equipment: Community Development
Finance Corporation; Massachusetts Industrial Mortgage
Insurance Agency; Massachusetts Industrial Finance
Agency (proposed), and Technology Development Corporation
(proposed).
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TRANSFER OF MUNICIPAL MONOGRAPH SERIES TO DCA
Organization Development (form follows function)
Findings:
The present form and content of the municipal monographs
prepared by the Department of Commerce and Development do not
enable these statistical reports to meet their potential for
serving as standardized, comprehensive, concise, and easily
obtainable sources of information useful for local economic
development activities. Monographs are prepared on an irregular
basis for all municipalities and Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas in the Commonwealth. The failure of the monograph series
to directly address local economic development needs may be
partly attributable to the assignment of monograph preparation
to the Department of Commerce and Development, which deals
with economic development from the point of view of business
needs, rather than the Department of Community Affairs, which
considers economic development with respect to the needs of
individual communities and works with local organizations and
government on physical development projects (see recommendation
on establishing an office or division of community economic
development for a fuller account of the different roles of
DCA and DCD).
The most obvious shortcomings of the present monographs,
aside from being outdated, include: the absence of trend data,
unclear maps, overly aggregated industry data for large
municipalities, the absence of state-local comparisons, the
lack of detailed labor supply information, such as wage rates
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and worker skills, and the unattractive appearance of the
report. On the other hand, some of the desirable features
of the current monographs include: the narrative accounts of
municipal economic history, the scope and detail of the information
on local transportation resources, and the degree of dis-
aggregation of retail business information.
With a substantial, but not prohibitive, expenditure of
effort, the mongraphs could become a valuable data source for
local economic development planning and project development,
and a resource for DCA and other government units to use in
assessing the desirability and feasibility of economic development
projects. Inasmuch as well paid consultants who prepare Land
Utilization and Marketability Studies for Chapter 121B projects,
and economic base analyses and feasibility reports for local
organizations and governments, frequently provide reports
which consist of little more than data compilation from
government sources of information, the availability of improved
monographs could save considerable time and expense for local
economic development actors, sharpen the demands placed on
consultant services, and provide a more useful document than
the reports often prepared by consultants. In addition, for
the many municipalities which lack a planning staff or Office
of Community Development, a revised monograph could provide
the information needed for completing applications for federal
funds, such as public works or revenue sharing.
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RECOMMENDATION: REVISE CONTENT OF MUNICIPAL MONOGRAPH SERIES
AND TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR MONOGRAPH
PREPARATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
DEVELOPMENT (Division of Planning, Research, and
Statistics) TO NEW OFFICE / DIVISION OF COMMUNITY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (current Bureau of Urban
Renewal) WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
In order for the 'municipal monograph to meet its potential for
serving as a valuable information resource for community economic
development, the format and content of the report should be
revised, and responsibility for preparation transferred to the
new Office / Division of Community Economic Development. Some
suggested modifications of the present monograph are as follows:
(1) employ one or more economic base analysis methodologies
in order to identify which industries offer the greatest
potential for growth, have declined relative to some
benchmark, and provide export income for the municipality,
and supply a narrative explanation of the methodologies
and the results of the analysis;
provide a table which indicates the growing industries
in the municipality and/or region at the three digit
SIC code level of detail, and compares the local growth
of these industries with changes in these industries
in the nation and the Commonwealth over the same period,
and projections for the growth of these industries;
provide a similar table for declining industries (comparisons
with state and national data will suggest which industries
are declining due to a local comparative disadvantage
and which declines reflect broader trends); data sources
for these tables include the Census of Manufacturers,
Division of Employment Security, and Bureau of Labor
Statistics;
* use the VAMP (Value Added Minus Payroll) measure, which
is a surrogate for profitability, to compare the
changing profitability in the Commonwealth of those
industries growing in a municipality or region with
the changing profitability of those industries nationally,
in order to identify which industries have growth potential
in a municipality or region;
use a methodology, such as the location quotient or
minimum requirements technique, to identify export
and non-export industries;
(2) develop a methodology for identifying target or preferential
industries for municipal economic development;
* for example, list local growing industries in order of
average wage levels with the current mean or median
average annual wage in the municipality marking the
cut-off between preferential and nonpreferential industries;
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other factors to consider include labor intensiveness,
state multiplier effects, energy intensiveness,
local linkages, match of local labor supply, etc.;
provide coefficients from the state input-output
table for all local industries to indicate their
degree of interdependence with the economy of the Commonwealth;
(3) include a table which compares service sector employment
shifts in the municipality or region with shifts regionally
and/or state-wide at the three digit SIC code level of detail;
(4) for large cities (ex. over 60,000 population), disaggregate
local and regional data on manufacturing employment by
three digit SIC code level of detail;
(5) include maps of Massachusetts and New England which clearly
identify the municipality in relation to major highways;
(6) present information on the availability of industrial
space (this may be possible with the introduction of the
state-wide industrial space data bank currently being
created in the Department of Commerce and Development);
(8) provide data for assessing municipal fiscal and economic need;
time series data on unemployment (also underemployment
if available), and comparative data on the state, the
nation, and the municipalities in the state (ex. city
averages in the case of a city) over the same period;
*-time series data on per capita and median incomeand
comparative data on the region (SMSA), the state, and
municipalities in the state over the same period;
time series data on the municipal equalized property
tax rate, and comparative data and comparative mean and
median rates for the state's municipalities over the same
period (data source: Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation);
(9) provide labor supply data, such as wage rates, skills, and
occupational mix;
(10) note all state and federal special designations and the
eligibility of the municipality for state and federal
programs, such as:
EDA designation as an economic development district, a
growth community, and/or a redevelopment area;
*-eligibility for state "Urban Job Incentive" property tax
credit and payroll reduction against state excise tax
liability;
eligibility for investments by the Community Development
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Finance Corporation;
eligibility for federal counter cyclical revenue
sharing, federal public works, and federal community
development block grant funds;
* eligibility for CETA and other manpower training, public
service employment, and job development funding;
(11) provide history of receipt of federal and state community
development, manpower training, and economic development funds;
(12) list major employers in and near municipality with their
five digit SIC codes, and all significant federal and state
government installations or facilities in or near municipality
this information will assist in identifying backward
linkage or "import substitution" opportunities and,thus,
businesses that will contribute most to local economic
development by increasing multiplier effects;
(13) include time series data on the composition of employment
by major sector and within each sector, and show regional
and state comparative data over the period (data source:
Division of Employment Security);
(14) provide a directory of local, state, and federal economic
development organizations with contact names, addresses,
and telephone numbers, including:
municipal governments planning department, community
development agency, public works department, etc.;
public organizations: Redevelopment Authority, Industrial
Development Finance Authority, Economic Development
Industrial Corporation;
private public purpose organizations: Chamber of Commerce,
Industrial Development Commission, SBA 502 Local
Development Corporations, Community Development Corporations,
Small Business Investment Corporation, producer and
consumer cooperatives, etc.;
local banks;
regional planning commission;
CETA sponsor for municipality;
regional office of the Department of Commerce and Development;
directory of state development agencies;
area and regional offices of federal agencies; EDA, SBA,
HUD, FmHA, etc.;
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(15) note major projects undertaken during previous ten years
and major projects planned in or near municipality
during upcoming five years;
(16) utilize an attractive looseleaf binder so that the
monograph will serve as a working document that local
governments and organizations will want to purchase from
the Commonwealth;
* individual sections can be easily removed for copying
or updating;
* sections can be added.
A redesigned and expanded monograph could prove invaluable
to municipal governments and local organizations for a variety
of purposes: comprehensive and project planning; a comprehensive
reference; supplying information needed for completing applications
for federal and state funds; for marketing industrial park
projects; and for defining local economic problems, needs, and
opportunities. Inasmuch as consultants commonly receive from
$1,000 to $10,000 from municipal governments and local organizations
to prepare economic base reports which usually supply less
information and analysis than is proposed for the revised
monograph, the Commonwealth should be able to charge enough for
the monographs to pay for some or all of the staff time needed
for preparation of the expanded documents.
The production of a standardized monograph for all cities
and towns in the Commonwealth offers an opportunity for achieving
tremendous economies in the cost of preparing such reports. If
the municipalities and local organizations which now spend
substantial amounts for consultant services and those that lack
needed reports due to the expense, can be convinced of the
greater usefulness and savings from a revised monograph, the
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staff expenses for revising and producing the monograph might
be covered by orders from local organizations. Alternatively,
DCA could seek a grant to pay for the development and preparation
of the monograph series. The job of updating and refining the
new monograph should prove to be much less demanding than the
initial tasks of development and production of the document.
In light of the limitations of economic base analysis
methodologies, the staff for the municipal monographs (which
might be a single economic development planner) should experiment
with new small area economic development planning techniques.
Whereas the use of any single technique of analysis can be
faulted, a variety of approaches should provide useful results
for the monographs.
Responsibility for the municipal monograph series and
other state services to assist local economic development
should be shifted to the proposed Office / Division of
Community Economic Development within DCA, which should become
the primary unit within state government for assisting municipal
governments and local organizations with economic development
activities and projects. Although the Department of Commerce
and Development is the primary state line agency for economic
development, DCD focuses on the needs of businesses and state-wide
economic activity and issues. The Department of Community
Affairs, on the other hand, is the primary state agency for
providing services to local communities, working with local
organizations, and dealing with local physical development
projects. Due to DCA's role in focusing on local development
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needs and dealing with local organizations, the distinctive
tasks of community economic development should be the respon-
sibility of DCA at the state level.
The economic development planning staff at DCA responsible
for preparation of monographs should establish requirements for
consultant prepared economic base analysis and market feasibility
reports for Chapter 121B industrial park projects and review
reports submitted by consultants.
Expected Benefits:
* offer a standardized and comprehensive document to
guide community economic development activities in all
of the cities and towns of the Commonwealthwhich
supplies more information and a more sophisticated
analysis than is commonly provided by consultants;
enable the numerous local actors involved in economic
development activities to save the considerable expense
of employing consultants to prepare a basic economic base
analysis and assemble relevant data on the municipal economy;
help local actors to sharpen demands for reports prepared
by consultants and limit the use of consultants to more
specialized tasks.
Costs:
the development and preparation of a revised monograph
series as recommended above, for all Massachusetts cities
and townswill require, at a minimum, the full time
services of an economic development specialist and a
typist for a year; however, the redesign of the monograph
should require no more than six months and the production
of monographs could be facilitated through the use of
student interns; as indicated above, the cost for the
initial development and preparation of the monograph
series could possibly be funded through orders from
municipalities and local organizations or a grant from
federal sources.
Actions Required:
discussion with the Department of Commerce and Development
on the transfer of responsibility for the municipal
monograph to DCA;
preparation of a proposal to the Development Cabinet
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for the establishment of an Office or Division of
Community Economic Development within DCA which will
assume responsibility for the monograph series;
a decision on how to fund the development and preparation
of a revised monograph series.
Time Horizon:
Medium / Long Term.
Constraints:
possible resistance of Department of Commerce and
Development;
unavailability of funds.
Complementary / Supporting Actions:
* recommendation on establishing an Office / Division of
Community Economic Development;
* redesign of the Chapter 121B industrial park development
program from an input orientation to a concern for the
objectives of development.
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THE PROJECT PLAN
Project Management: The Plan
Findings:
The required components of a Chapter 121B industrial park
project plan are detailed in the rules and regulations established
by the Department of Community Affairs. Inasmuch as the language
and content of the Chapter 121B statute and rules and regulations
are based on the federal urban renewal program, the elements of the
project plan mirror the type of plan required for federally-aided
residential and central business district commercial projects. Thus,
the project plan for state-aided industrial park projects reflects
th.e narrow focus of the federal program on the physical development
of the project property, rather than a concern for the objectives of
economic development and the organization of activiti-s and resources
to achieve those objectives. In short, the project plan is "input"
rather than "output" oriented.
The physical parcel focus of the 121B project plan is evident
from an examination of the requirements of the rules and regulations
for the-elements of a "Final Project Report" and, a component of
the report, the "Urban Renewal Project Plan". The "Urban Renewal
Project Plan" includes the following items:
(1) Description of Project
(a) Boundaries of Urban Renewal Areas consisting of a
word description and map delineating the project area
boundaries.
(b) Urban Renewal Plan Objectives: the examples provided
in the rules and regulations are the removal of
structurally substandard buildings, elimination of
blighting influences, provision of low and moderate
cost housing, provision of land for needed public
facilities, removal of impediments to land disposition
and development, and achievement of changes in land
use.
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(c) Types of Proposed Renewal Actions: the examples
provided in the rules and regulations are clearance,
redevelopment and/or rehabilitation, provision of
public improvements, and placement of underground
utility lines.
(2) Land Use Plan
(a) Land Use Map showing:
(i) thoroughfare and street rights-of-way;
(ii) all easements and other public uses.
(b) Land Use Provisions and Building Requirements:
(i) statement of uses to be permitted, such as
residential, industrial, or commercial;
(ii) controls on property sold or leased with respect
to items such as maximum densities, land coverage,
setbacks, off-street parking and loading, and
building height or bulk;
(iii)statement of time period during which provisions
will continue in effect;
(iv) applicability of provisions to property not to
be acquired in the project area.
(3) Project Proposals
(a) Land Acquisition
(i) identification of property to be acquired for
clearance and redevelopment, supporting facilities
and project improvements, and rehabilitation.
Cb) Rehabilitation: property rehabilitation standards for
property within project area not to be acquired.
Cc) Redeveloper's Obligation: with respect to the timing
of development and conformity to plans.
The following additional elements of the "Final Project Report"
also demonstrate an "input" orientation by focusing on the physical
development of the project area and fail to address project "outputs"
in terms of economic development needs and objectives:
(1) A Project Area Report consisting of a map of the area
boundaries, data on building deficiencies by block,
the criteria used for judging building deficiencies,
and a statement on meeting the program eligibility criteria.
(2) A Report On Planning Proposals consisting of zoning
proposals, the basis for proposed land uses, a statement
on conformity with the general community plan, a statement
concerning coordination with highway programs, and a
statement describing consultation with area residents and
their reactions to the plan.
(3) A Citizens' Participation Report describing the activities
of the citizens' committee during planning and the role of
the committee during the execution phase.
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(4) A Rehabilitation Report describing the basis for property
rehabilitation standards, the basis for the finding of
rehabilitation financial feasibility, the type and
availability of financing, the administrative organization,
the proposed work program, and the estimates of costs.
(5) A Land Acquisition Report consisting of estimated property
acquisition expenses, a property map, a set of appraisals,
and explanations of estimated acquisition costs.
(6) A Relocation Report based on the requirements in the rules
and regulations for Chapter 79A of the General Laws.
(7) A Project Improvement Report providing information on the
eligibility and costs of project improvements and an
estimate of the cost of site clearance activities.
(8) A Land Disposal Report consisting of a document on land
marketability prepared under separate consultant contract
called a Land Utilization and Marketability (LUM) study,
two reuse appraisals on each property, engineering reDorts
on land conditions, a tabulation of land disposal
estimates, a statement on any provisions for special
taxation, and the identification of site work required
by redevelopers.
(9) A Cost Estimate and Financing Report consisting of a
project expenditures budget for the acquisition, physical
development, and administrative expenses of the project,
a project financing plan indicating local and state shares
of the net project cost, and a justification supporting
the project expenditures budget and the financing plan.
(10) Legal Data consisting of required approvals.
(11) An Environmental Impact Report (not in current rules and
regulations but may be required pursuant to state and
federal environmental regulations).
The required Land Utilization and Marketability study, which
is prepared through a contract with a real estate consultant, serves
as the sole basis for establishing the economic feasibility of a
project. In the language of the rules and regalations, the LUM
study must provide "evidence of marketability sufficient to justify
a conclusion that the land is marketable for redevelopment in
accordance with the Plan and can be dispossed of within a reason-
able time". Thus, economic feasibility is defined only in terms of
whether or not the project property can be marketed, and not in
relation to the achievement of economic development objectives or
benefits greater than costs. The plan does not define objectives
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related to the unique economic conditions of a municipality or
assess the feasibility of meeting such objectives. Specific
development objectives that might be indicated by a project plan
include such items as adding 400 primary labor market quality jobs,
increasing municipal tax revenues by $250,000 annually, providing
six local firms with modern expansion space, attracting firms from
a list of industries which will serve to stabilize the local economy,
supplying 50,000 sq. ft. of land for five businesses sponsored by
local Community Development Corporations, or providing training
and jobs to 250 unemployed local residents. Moreover, without a
definition of economic development needs and objectives, project
plans allow for economic outcomes which may worsen economic and
fiscal problems, such as the disposition of industrial park land
to firms offering "secondary labor market" quality jobs.
In addition to failing to address the issue of project
feasibility with respect to economic development objectives, LUM
studies have not adequately performed. the function of establishing
the marketability of project land. DCA has not specified a
methodology to be used to assess marketability or provided guide-
lines for the content and format of LUM studies.
The LUM studies that have been prepared at great expense for
projects have varied widely in approach and coverage and, in general,
have served no useful purpose. Most LUM study authors purport to
present economic base analyses of communities, but merely offer pages
of information such as demographics, labor force skills, and
industrial composition, reprinted from primary government sources
with the barest assessment of local trends* The better reports
simply identify which industries have been growing or holding
steady in an area and suggest that these are appropriate targets
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for marketing efforts. The vast majority of the LUM studies do
not employ even a simple economic base technique for examing
comparative trends, such as the location quotient or shift share
approaches. Although reports sometimes provide information on
industrial land sale and lease activity in a community, little
attempt is made to examine the supply and demand relationship for
industrial land in an area and note industrial park property in
direct competition with the proposed project.
Inasmuch as redevelopment authorities contract and pay for
LIUM studies, it is not surprising to find that not a single report
concluded with a judgement that a project could not be marketed.
LUM studies invariably neglect to mention complementary development
activities, such as bridge or road construction, which are
necessary to market a project, and fail to indicate the physical
characteristics of parks sought by firms which form the potential
market for the project. These studies do not offer marketing
strategies for projects, either by identifying target industries
in a detailed fashion or by presenting a step by step "how to
market" methodology for redevelopment authorities to follow.
As a result of these shortcomings, redevelopment authority
personnel tend to view LUM studies as documents to fulfill the
DCA application requirements rather than as a data base and
strategy piece for guiding actions. The lack of an output orienta-
tion to LUM studies is partly attributable to the provision of the
rules and regulations which allows studies to be prepared by real
estate appraisers.
Whereas extensive documentation of the physical condition of
the project area is required to establish the eligibility of the
property as either a "decadent, substandard, or blighted open area",
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and detailed information must be provided on the physical character-
istics of proposed redevelopment activities, the project plan does
not contain any discussion or data on the economic or fiscal
problems found in a municipality or the economic development
objectives sought through the project. In addition, although the
project plan contains informatinn on the costs of project develop-
ment, the anticipated revenues from disposition, and the sources
of funds to cover project costs, the requirements for the plan do
not include an account of the benefits to be achieved through a
project or a calculation of the expected benefits relative to the
costs. Thus, the plan does not present an assessment of net benefits
for undertaking a project or the sensitivity of benefits to key
variables. Moreover, the plan does not describe an economic
development strategy designed to address particular needs.
A review of the plans which have been prepared for projects
indicates that objectives are usually stated in very general terms
(see appendix A ) such as increase employment opportunities, and
non-comparative statistical evidence on unemployment, per capita
income, and migration, is presented to establish the need for a
project. Plans often refer to demands by local firms for expansion
space, but invariably do not provide specific information on the
number of firms committed to or considering moving to a park, the
types of industries interested in park land, the square footage
or acreage of the demand for land, or the employment impacts
expected with expansion.
As a consequence of the absence of a clear problem definition/
needs assessment, an economic development strategy designed to meet
those needs, and a description of specific project objectives,
project plans do not contain measures of effectiveness for monitoring
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and judging projects. In addition, project plans fail to address
considerations relative to organizational relationships, constraints,
and environmental variables which affect the development and outcome
of projects. Furthermore, project plans do not include a schedule
for the implementation of activities and an account of the costs
of those activities, which can serve as a basis for monitoring
project progress. Due to the limitations of project plans,
redevelopment authority personnel regard plans as DCA requirements
rather than as useful working documents.
In the section of the normative management framework on project
management, a project plan was characterized as an action document
which defines a project's problem, objectives, measures of perform-
ance, strategy, resource requirements, constraints, organization
design, activities, and schedule. With this project management
view of the project plan as a basis for analysis, the following
weaknesses of the present requirements for a Chapter 121B industrial
land development project plan can be identified:
(1) The 121B project plan or "Final Project Report" presents two
still pictures of the project area - the Present physical
state and the desired future physical state - but does not
serve as an action document which answers the what, why, how,
and who questions that should be asked with respect to the
achievement of economic development objectives. As a result
of its limitations, the project plan is treated by both DCA
and redevelopment authority personnel as a perfunctory effort
for meeting statutory requirements, rather than as the basic
guide for action.
(2) The Final Project Report defines the problem to be addressed
by a project, pursuant to the language of the statute and the
rules and regulations, in terms of the physical deficiencies
of theproject property rather than the economic and fiscal
needs of the community. The needs assessment/problem
definition required for a project plan relates only to
establishing the eligibility of a project on the basis of
the criteria set forth in the statutes (a) a decadent,
substandard, or blighted open area; and (b) impediments to
private development without public intervention (ex.
infrastructure, land assembly, uncertain title). Thus, a
project plan offers no assessment of the economic and fiscal
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needs of a community or the particular economic problem to
be addressed by a project. Following the "parcel" orientation
of federal urban renewal, the Chapter 121B statute and rules
and regulations are based on the simple view that deteriorated
property causes fiscal and economic problems in communities and,
therefore, the elmination of undesirable physical conditions
will relieve these problems. No element of the project plan
considers economic factors that have contributed to physical
decline. In addition, plans do not -present evidence of the
fiscal and economic problems caused by blighted property and,
consequently, imply that all deteriorated property must cause
such problems. The reasoning reflected by the requirements for
project plans can be faulted on a number of grounds:
(a) deteriorated property may not cause fiscal and economic
problems but may represent a natural and healthy evolution of
an economy; (b) the elimination of negative physical conditions
does not automatically lead to positive outcomes (for example,
if the property is not marketed, if firms move out of more
needy communities to park locations, if firms offering
"secondary labor market" quality employment move into a
community with a high percentage of such jobs, or if the
costs of a project exceed the benefits); (c) the causes of
municipal economic and fiscal .problems are complex; and
(d) the characteristics and causes of fiscal and economic
problems are unique to individual communities. Inasmuch as
plans do not contain definitions of local problems, they do
not enable the Commonwealth to determine whether the economic
development needs assessment implied by the legislation,and
indicated in the report which led to the enactment of the
programis being addressed by the selection of projects.
(3) The project plan does not contain a statement of specific
objectives in quantitative or measurable terms or measures
of project effectiveness. Plans usually list objectives in
a very general fashion such as broadening the city tax base
or increasing employment opportunities (see Appendix A
for an example of a statement of objectives from an approved
project plan). The common presentation of a "laundry list"
of generally accepted goals does not allow for measuring and
monitoring the performance of projects, assessing whether
benefits exceed costs, or developing a marketing strategy for
a project.
(4) The Final Project Report does not define a proposed economic
development strategy or justify a strategy in relation to
particular problems and objectives. Fiscal and economic
impact analyses are not required components of the project
plan. Inasmuch as the project plan does not include a
definition of the problem to be addressed or the objectives
to be achieved by a project, it does not contain an explana-
tion of the particular strategy to be employed to meet the
unique needs of a community. By assuming the "physical
parcel" causality of economic problems, the project plan
ignores the differences in economic circumstances of
communities and the differences in strategies appropriate
to achieve valued economic development objectives. The
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importance of local economic conditions and a specific
development strategy is suggested by the following cases:
a project which justified as a facility for the expansion
of local firms may not be warranted as an effort to attract
out of area businesses; a project to provide "primary labor
market" quality employment may be justified whereas a project
marketed to "secondary labor market" quality firms may not be
appropriate; and a prject with warehouse and distribution
uses,which provides high fiscal but low employment benefits,
may be justifiable in one community but not another. The
Final Project Report presents narrow physical development
answers to the questions of "why" - ex. the elimination of
blighting influences, such as obsolete structures and poorly
designed streets - and "what" - ex. land assembly and public
improvements. Moreover, the project plan does not contain
fiscal and economic impact analyses which examine whether
benefits exceed costs',and the sensitivity of project outcomes
to key variables.
(5) Despite the dependence of every pojeect on the actions and
resource exDenditures of a number of federal, state, and
local government andprivate actors, the project plan does
not encompass all of the resource expenditures which are
necessary, or likely t be employedin Project execution
or require evidence of resource commitments and approvals
from all participating actors. For example,although a
project may be dependent on the construction of a bridge or
highway access road by the Department of Public Works, the
requirements for the project plan do not call for evidence
of a commitment from DPW on the necessary expenditure and
the timing of construction. In addition, the Final Project
Report does not include such an expenditure as part of the
public cost of a project and, therefore, fails to embrace all
of the public costs. This lack of a project/program
accounting framework within state government precludes an
accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of economic
development projects and programs, and hinders joint decision
making and coordination across state agencies. Project plans
are prepared by consultants,and the participation of all
relevant state and local actors is not a part of the planning
process. Project plans are "delivered" by consultants to
redevelopment authoritieswhich are left to their own devices
to obtain the support of all participating actors. The ex post
facto attempt to gain the support of participants for the plan
results in delay, confusion, animosity among actors, or a halt
to the project. Inasmuch as project plans focus on the physical
inputs to projects,and not on the desired outcomes or activities
to achieve outcomes, plans fail to note all of the actors who
are likely to participate in the execution of a project and
the resource contributions and approvals required. Pursuant
to the language of the statute, the rules and regulations
call for evidence of approvals from the redevelopment authority
and municipal officialsand a public hearing,but do not require
evidence of approvals or resource commitments from federal,
state, and local participants. A project plan should serve as
a basis for discussionand a means for reaching a common
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understanding of, and agreement onthe purposes of a projectand
obtaining commitments from actors on the tasks and schedule for
accomplishing agreed upon tasks.
(6) The Final Project Report does not contain evidence of local
capability to execute a project. The rules and regulations do not
set forth criteria for assessing redevelopment authority capability,
or require evidence of capability as a component of the project
plan. Thus, DCA does not assess local capability for undertaking
a project through factors such as the "track record" of the
redevelopment authority or municipality (ex. history of urban
renewal activities and controversies), the level and quality of
staffing at the authority, or resource commitments from the
municipality for necessary public improvements that are outside
of the project area. The rules and regulations do not establish
qualifications for redevelopment authority executive directors or
other staff, or indicate the number or kind of staff required for
undertaking a particular kind of project. Redevelopment authorities
have varied considerably in their staff capability and almost all
projects have suffered from staff weaknesses. In a few cases,
redevelopment authority boards have not hired any full time
personnel,but have relied on the part time donated time of board
members to develop and market projects and, as a result, have
experienced delays. In a few instances, projects have come to
a halt after municipalities have refused to pay for staff beyond
the 60 month execution period estimated in the project plan. DCA
lacks any authority over the hiring of authority staff, and the
position of executive- director has often been filled with persons
who lack the requisite expertise and motivation for the job.
(7) The project plan does not identify and address the constraints
affecting a project. For example, LIUM studies do not consider
the present or likely future supply of industrial land which will
compete with a project. In one case, the plan failed to note that
the uneven topography of the project area would require a terraced
park. In the absence of a strategy to deal with this situation,
the prime sites were disposed of firstand the property with less
desirable access and topography was left in a difficult market
position due to the reduced flexibility to draw parcel configura-
tions to suit firm needs. Relevant constraints can be physical,
political, financial, organizational, legal, and market related.
(8) As presently constituted, the project plan does not deal with
strategic aspects of designinga project management system to
efficiently and effectively implement a project. General external,
parent, and client environmental considerations can influence the
organization of project tasks and the emphasis on various measures
of effectiveness. For example, if an active and politically
influential Industrial Development Commission or similar entity
exists in a municipality, it may be advantageous to delegate the
functions of the redevelopment authority to the local organization.
In the case of a municipality which is severely limited in its
bonding capacity, a primium should be placed on timely completion
and cost controlrather than on effectiveness in meeting objectives.
If the citizens of a community have previously voted down a
renewal project, added effort should be devoted to informing residents
on project plans and activities. In addition to project specific
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environmental issues, the project plan fails to address the
five criteria noted in the normative management framework
for evaluating a project management system independently of
the particular task at hand: (1) obtaining multi-actor
commitment; (2) achieving transition or termination;
(3) effecting integration; (4) providing visibility; and
(5) satisfying job security needs. As a result of the failure
to deal with project termination, projects undertaken as the
sole activity of redevelopment authorities have often been
delayed and prolonged by authority personnel.
(9) The project plan does not explicitly consider uncertainty
with respect to resource inputs to the project, the
accomplishment of tasks, and the possible outcomes of the
project. Inasmuch as the Final Project Report does not
contain a calculation of the costs and benefits of the
proposed project, it also does not test the sensitivity of
net project benefits to changes in critical parameters. For
example, project plans do not indicate the impact of varying
rates of park land absorption. In addition, the impact of
delay on the effectiveness of a project is not normally
addressed. Sensitivity analysis of the .costs and benefits
of a project reveals which factors are critical for success
so that managers can focus on these matters.
(10) The requirements for the project plan presented in the rules
and regulations do not call for the delineation of the "tasks"
necessary for project completionor the presentation of the
sequence schedule or responsibility assignments for those tasks.
Without a listing of activities, and an account of the
interrelationships among tasks, DCA and redevelopment authority
personnel, who usually change often during the course of
project execution, have been unable to grasp all of the
activities required for execution and the precedence relation-
ships among activities. As a consequence, DCA staff cannot
monitor the progress of projects and focus on the steps
necessary for completion.
RECOMMENDATION: REVISE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROJECT PLAN
The requirements detailed in the rules and regulations for the
format and content of the project plan,or Final Project Report,
should be substantially altered for industrial land development
projects,to reflect a shift from a focus on the condition and
development of the land parcel,to a concern for economic development
objectives. The project plan should become an action oriented
document based on the principles, concerns, and techniques of
"project management". Thus, the revised project plan should serve
a number of purposes: (a) establish a need/define a problem;
(b) set forth a specific economic development strategy directed at
a particular development problem; (c) examine in a detailed fashion
whether expected benefits exceed expected costs; (d) describe and
justify organizational relationships among actors; (e) list all
resources, actors, and activities and provide evidence of commitments
from actors; (f) specify objectives in quantitative terms,and
measures of progress and effectiveness for monitoring; (g) provide
a graphic portrayal of the interrelationships amongand schedule
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of,project activitiesand identify the most critical sequence of
activities; (h) organize activities into work packages which can
be costed; and (i) assign task responsibilities to individuals and
prepare milestone charts for monitoring implementation.
Although the recommended additions and modifications to the present
requirements for a project plan demand greater effort and expertise,
the examination of the weaknesses of the current components of the
project plan suggests that these changes are needed to provide for
efficient and effective projects.
The revised project plan should include the following components:
(1) Introduction: * a summary of the problem to be addressed
(2) Needs Assessment/
Problem Definition:
(3) Statement of Goals,
Objectives, and
Measures of
Effectiveness
by the project, the proposed strategy,
the key actors, the historical context,
and the expected costs and benefits of
the project.
* as assessment of the economic and fiscal
needs of the municipality based on
criteria established by DCA (ex. state
averages and municipal comparative data
on equalized tax rate, unemployment rate,
extent of underemployment, changing
composition of employment, average annual
wage).
* a detailed definition of the economic
development problem to be addressed by
the project, and evidence of the problem
(ex. provision of expansion space for
local firms not served by the private
market; development of modern industrial
space in a depressed area of a city for
community-based enterprise; generation
of "primary labor market" quality jobs
in a municipality suffering from a
concentration of "secondary labor market"
quality employment; problems of land
assembly for constructing modern indus-
trial structures in desirable locations
in a land scarce urban center; lack of
modern space for small growing firms;
high unemployment in communities within
commuting distance of a site with the
potential for attracting major firms).
* a general account of the goals of the
project in order of priority (ex.
1. positive net fiscal flows to the
municipality, 2. "primary labor market"
quality jobs to under- and unemployed
community residents).
* a quantitative account of the specific
objectives to be achieved through the
project in numerical (total and on a per
unit basis) and narrative terms (ex.
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the number of local firms moving to the
project area and number of sq. ft. of
space to be utilized; the number of
"primary labor market" quality jobs to
be provided to under- and unemployed local
residents; the number of jobs generated
from out-of-state firms moving to project;
the net fiscal returns to the municipality
and Commonwealth).
* a quantitative and qualitative account of
measures of effectiveness, in total and
on a per unit basis, with respect to the
following project benefits: (a) net
municipal fiscal flows; (b) employment
impacts; (c) growth of the state economy;
(d) strengthening agglomeration economies;
(e) induced development; and (f) increased
diversity of the local economy.
(4) Development Strategy
and Rationale for
Strategy
4(a) Fiscal and
Economic
Impact
Analyses
DCA should identify models of types of
projects considered desirable (ex.
intra-municipal relocation project,
community development corporation project
in a depressed area, first class park in
attractive location for attracting out-of-
state blue chip firms, extensive use of
municipally owned property, delegation
of project responsibility to local
organization, project in major "econ-
omically depressed" urban center).
* description of the economic development
strategy proposed to meet previously
identified problem(s) (ex. the provision
of 100 "primary labor market" quality
jobs to unemployed local residents
through the expansion of two local firms
in the primary metals standard industrial
classification category, and the attraction
of two firms providing 25 jobs from
outside of the area in the same industrial
category, to be accomplished with the
promotional assistance of the Department
of Commerce and Development and the
establishment of a customized job train-
ing progam funded through a local CETA
sponsor).
* justification for proposed strategy
(ex. names of local firms committed to
moving to park and number of projected
expansion jobs; recent economic activity
in municipality; evidence of strength
or potential for growth of particular
industries).
* assessment of benefits and costs of
project through fiscal and economic
impact analyses based on methodologies
and assumptions set forth by DCA; three
238
separate analyses should be undertaken:
economic evaluation (social costs and
benefits), municipal fiscal analysis, and
state fiscal analysis; each analysis
should include worst case, best case,
and most probable case variations; each
analysis should also examine the
sensitivity of the project outcome to
such critical variables as costs and
time.
(5) Economic Base and * report prepared by a consultant which:
Marketing Report (1) identifies target industries for
(to replace currentlysrtudy marketing of industrial land by use of
required LUM study) economic base techniques specified by
DCA (ex. VAMP, shift share, etc.);
(2) assesses the supply and demand for
industrial land in the municipality and
region through a methodology specified
by DCA;
(3) idetifies the physical needs of firms
identified as target industries (ex.
rail transport, fuel); and
(4) specifies, in a "how to" fashion,steps
for redevelopment authority personnel
to follow in marketing project land
(ex. promotional materials, trade journals
for advertisements, responses to inquir-
ies).
(6) Participant * a listing of all of the actors involved,
Approvals and or possibly involved, in any way with a
Resource Commitments project and a description of the role
of each actor.
a listing of all resource expenditures
which may be directly or indirectly
related to project development (ex.
value of municipally donated land,
municipal street and sewer construction,
SBA loans and loan guarantees, industrial
mortgages from local banks).
* evidence of a commitment or intent to
expend or the availability of the above
resources from the individual actors.
* with respect to the activities of the
state Department of Public Works, a
memorandum of understanding should be
entered into and form part of the project
plangwhich sets forth the terms of the
commitment of DPW and its relationship
with the redevelopment authority and the
schedule for undertaking and completing
DPW activities.
(Note: a memorandum of understanding
should force DPW to realistically assess
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(7) Evidence of Local
Capability
(8) Statement on the
Constraints and
Uncertainties Facing
the Project
(9) Report on the
Design of the
Project Management
System
whether and when it can provide infra-
structure essential for the development
of a project, and will provide DCA with a
basis for demanding action from the
Governor and/or the Development Cabinet
in the event DPW fails to fulfill its
obligations)
* approvals from participating actors of-
their involvement in the project.
* evidence of local capability to execute
the project pursuant to criteria
established by DCA:
* history of development activity by the
redevelopment authority and other
municipal agencies and .publip .purpose
economic development organizations;
commitment of the authority and the
municipality to employ a specific
number of staff for the duration of
the project execution period with the
qualifications set forth in the project
plan;
* a statement of the chief fiscal officer
of the municipality regarding the
ability of the municipality to isssue
the bonds required for the project,
and the projected impact of the debt
service on local fiscal affairs.
* a listing of the key physical, political,
financial, organizational, legal, and
marketability constraints facing the
project and descriptions of the strategies
of the authority for dealing with them.
* an account of the critical areas of
uncertainty affecting the project.
* a discussion of how general external
(political, economic and social), parent,
and client environmental considerations
influence the relative emphasis on the
following measures of effectiveness:
(a) time, (b) cost, (c) effectiveness,
and (d) citizen satisfactionand efforts
of the redevelopment authority to respond
to these issues; DCA should formulate a
series of strategic questions to be
addressed by the project plan; the plan
should prioritize measures of project
success in relation to strategic issues,
and describe management efforts to deal
with these issues; for example, in a
municipality with a history of citizen
opposition to development projects, the
plan might call for an emphasis on timely
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project completion and describe special
efforts of the authority to inform the
citizenry of development activities.
* submission of evidence of all opposition
to the project (ex. newspaper articles,
a narrative account).
'statement of. land disposition strategy to
foster economic development objectives
(ex. tradeoff of hiring of an unemployed
person for X$ in the land disposition
price).
* Reuse Provisions: statement of regula-
tions, controls, and restrictions to be
imposed on the disposition of property
in order to achieve economic development
objectives.
(a) clauses for inclusion in Land Dis-
position Agreements with respect to the
performance required of firms or develop-
ers (ex. number of jobs for unemployed
local residents, number of acres dis-
posed of to out-of-state firms, number
of persons hired from vocational educa-
tion program).
(b) prohibitions against specific uses
(ex. warehousing and distribution which
provide low job impacts).
(c) promulgating a non-relocation reg-
ulation which prohibits the sale or
re-sale of property to firms moving out
of high priority development areas.
accounts of efforts to address the
following aspects of project management:
(a) obtaining the commitment of all
actors; (b) eventual termination of the
project through out-and-out termination,
adoption by another ongoing organization,
or transformation of the authority into
an ongoing entity; (c) integration of
activities at the local level; (d) pro-
viding information on the project to
local citizens, municipal officials,
and DCA; and (e) the job security needs
of authority personnel.
(10) Report on *-amend current requirements in rules and
Condition of regulations for the "Project Area
Project Area Report" as follows:
* prepare new forms for the presentation
of data on the project area (see pp.
58-61 of rules & regs);
* add to the project area data form a
listing of the eligibility criteria
which property must satisfy to qualify
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as a "blighted open area";
* require the inclusion of the components
of the survey and planning report on
the project area in the Final Project
Report (see p. 52 of rules and regs);
and
* require a statement of the basis for
the determination that the project meets
the statutory requirement that "the
project area would not by private
enterprise alone and without either
government subsidy or the exercise of
governmental powers be made available
for urban renewal".
(11) Physical Renewal Plan *
(12) Report on Project
Tasks
(12)a. Work
Packages
(12)b. Network
Diagram
amend current requirements of rules
and regulations for the "Urban Renewal
Plan" as follows:
* change section 2.b. from "Urban
Renewal Plan Objectives" to "Physical
Development Obj-ectives", and require
more detailed information on physical
development objectives;
* include descriptions of physical
developments outside of the project
area which are related to the project;
* note that maintenance and landscaping
controls may be established along
with parking and loading, density,
land coverage, setback, and building
height regulations; and
* require an explanation as to how the
proposed physical controls relate
to the economic development strategy
and target market for the project.
* work to be done, resources required to
accomplish work, and anticipated time
needed to complete activities are
established; activities are broken down
into increments of work that can be
related to a milestone and are the
responsibility of a single individual
or organization unit.
* a diagram is prepared which graphically
portrays the sequence and interrelation-
ships among activities, and the most
critical sequence of activities for
meeting time and cost targets; the
network diagram is updated periodically
to assess changes in the critical path.
(Note: Inasmuch as network diagrams can
only be employed to represent a sequence
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of activities which are non-conditional
on the outcomes of preceeding Activities,
the diagram can only apply to project
implementation activities up to the
time of' marketing).
(12)c. Milestone a work schedule and budget are prepared
Charts that indicate milestones of progress,
the costs of each work package, the
starting and completion times for each
work package, and the unit or individual
responsible for each work package.
(12)d. Inter-actor methods and schedules for communicating
Reporting among actors involved in the project
should be indicated (ex. monthly meetings,
milestone charts).
(13) Report on Proposed no amendment to current requirements of
Physical Changes rules and regulations for the "Report on
Planning Proposals" except to change
the title of report to "Report on
Proposed Physical Changes"(see PP. 55-
56 of rules and regs).
(14) Report on Citizen amend rules and regulations by changing
Participation the composition of the citizen committee
for industrial projects; projects on
open blighted property rarely have
enough residents to form a committee,
and residents have little interest in
economic development activities which
benefit the community as a whole; the
committee should be composed individuals
with an interest in development activities
and the expertise to direct and control
redevelopment authority behaviorsuch as
community business leaders, persons
active in local economic and industrial
development, representatives of organ-
izations of lower income citizens, and
personnel in municipal governmenth
(15) Rehabilitation amend rules and regulations to require
Report a listing of sources of rehabilitation
financing for industrial buildings (ex.
SBA 502 funds, CDBG funds).
(16) Relocation Report * as currently specified in rules and
regulations.
(17) Land Acquisition- * revise form for "Tabulation Of Property
Report ToBe Acquired" (P. 73)to include a
listing of all individual acquisitions.
(18) Site Improvements * as currmetly specified in rules and
Report regulations (pp. 95-97).
(19) land Disposal Report * amend rules and regulations by requiring
supporting material for the estimated
land disposition proceeds that indicates
per acre prices for the different
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(20) Cost Estimate and
. Financing Report
(21) Legally Required
Approvals
acreage of the project area.
amend current rules and regulations as
follows:
* provide unit costs and quantity figures
for the "Data Supporting Project
Expenditures Budget";
* correlate the account numbers on the
"Data Supporting Project Expenditures
Budget" format with the numbers on the
"Project Expenditures Budget"; and
* add an attachment indicating the public
resources directly and indirectly
contributing toward the development of
the project,which are not part of the
project cost,for purposes of computing
the amount of state aid.
* as currently specified in rules and
regulations (pp. 19-23).
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PROJECT REPORTING
Project Managements The Project Management System
Findings:
The principles and techniques of project management can serve
as a normative framework for examining the practices followed in
managing Chapter 121B industrial land development projects. Inasmuch
as 121B projects are unique, complex, one-time work efforts, the
"project management" approach ought to be applicable to managing
projects.
The common failure of projects to meet time and cost targets
suggests that inadequate attention has been devoted to the require-
ments for effective and efficient project management. The components
of the project plan specified in the rules and regulations do not
call for the delineation of a schedule of activities necessary for
project execution, an account of who is responsible for individual
project tasks, or a listing of all of the resources and actors
contributing to a project. As a result of the absence of a schedule
of tasks, DCA is unable to easily assess the status of projects and
focus assistance efforts on the most critical activities for comple-
tion. Redevelopment authorities often experience setbacks as a
consequence of neglecting to undertake necessary actions.
Without an account in the project plan of all of the resources
and actors directly and indirectly related to a project, DCA lacks
an accurate basis for assessing all of the public expenditures on
a project and the need for assisting with the coordination of
activities across agencies within state government,and between levels
of government. The absence of a full rendering of public costs
reinforces the lack of a program and project budget framework within
Massachusetts' government. Two negative consequences of these
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weaknesses have been an almost total absence of communication between
DCA and other state agencies involved on 121B projects, and a wide-
spread tendency to view the 121B program as an "urban renewal" program
rather than as an economic development program directed toward the
achievement of publicly valued economic development objectives.
No system for reporting on the status and performance of projects
has been established by DCA, and the Bureau of Urban Renewal has made
little effort to monitor projects. Although redevelopment authorities
are required to submit an annual report on activities in Section 52
of Chapter 121B, in a form prescribed by DCA, only a few redevelopment
authorities comply with this statutory requirement,and DCA has not
specified the contents for annual reports or utilized reports which
have been submitted. The failure of DCA to establish an adequate
information system for the regular reporting of data on the status
and impact of projects has limited DCA's ability to assist projects,
improve operations, and assess the costs and benefits of projects,
and has deprived the Commonwealth of a data base for evaluating the
merits of the program.
Lacking a breakdown of work packages of activities which are
related to costs and milestones, DCA is unable to monitor whether
projects are over or under budget and ahead of or behind schedule.
The reports of the state auditor, which include a comparison of actual
cumulative costs with budgeted amounts for expense categories, serve a
limited purpose by revealing instances where expenses exceed the
total budgets for categories, and indicating how closely completed
projects have followed budgets. In order to monitor costs during
the period of project execution, DCA personnel must compare the costs
of activities with the budgeted amounts for these individual "work
packages". 246
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The absence of a complete account of all of the resources and
actors contributing to a project in the project plan reflects a
failure to address the complexity of organizational and task inter-
relationships. Almost every project involves many different function-
al operating units on the local, state, and federal levels. In
addition, tasks are somewhat uncertainand the relationship between
activities and results is necessarily uncertain. The complexity and
uncertainty of project tasks have proven to be problems for redevelop-
ment authority staff1 and the absence of project management efforts
to deal with these difficulties has led to frequent delays and periods
of total inactivity. Chapter 121B industrial land development projects
manifest all of the features which characterize projects for which
the project management approach has proven valuable: (a) one-time
efforts, (b) definable goals, (c) unusual activities in line agencies,
(d) uncertain tasks, (e) task complexity and an uncertain relationship
between activities and results, and (f) numerous actors.
RECOMMENDATION: EMPLOY NETWORK DIAGRAM METHODS
Network diagram methods should be required as part of the project
plan to indicate the sequence of execution activities, and establish
the interrelationships among activities, and the most critical
sequence of activities for meeting time and cost targets. The basic
steps for the use of network diagrams are as follows:
(1) list all project activities in sequence;
(2) organize activities into "work packages" which have
beginning and ending times and are the responsibility
of an individual or an organization unit;
(3) estimate the expected time and cost to perform each
activity;
(4) prepare the network graph depicting the sequence and
interrelationships among activities;
(5) compute the critical path of activities for on-time
project completion; and
(6) update the network periodically.
Expected Benefits:
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achieve clarity in the planning, scheduling, and control
of projects;
encourage detailed planning;
* provide an easy standard method for communicating schedules
and time and cost perfromance targets;
* identify the most critical elements of a project for the
attention of managers;
* embrace all of the resources and actors involved with a
project;
provide a format for comparing actual with planned progress;
create a simple, direct, and comprehensive vehicle for
expressing the complex interrelationships among activities;
employ a method which is easy to understand and explain to
novices, and involves simple calculations.
Costs:
time and expense for modest amount of training of authority
and DCA personnel in the preparation and use of network
diagram methods (est. three 2 hour classroom sessions);
time and effort of authority and DCA personnel in updating
and using diagrams.
Actions Required:
amend rules and regulations to require network diagrams as
part of the project plan and as one method for the regular
reporting of authorities to DCA;
prepare sample network diagram;
provide instruction to authority and DCA personnel.
Time Horizon:
* Medium/Long Term
Constraints:
diagram methods can be used only with predictable activities;
inasmuch as network methods do not allow for activity sequen-
ces which are conditional on the outcomes of previous activ-
ities, network methods cannot be used for marketing tasks;
authority personnel will likely resist the introduction of
network diagram methods.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
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* use of milestone charts;
* revision of the program and project plan from their current
focus on the physical parcel, to a concern for achieving
economic development objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH A SYSTEM FOR EFFECTIVENESS REPORTING
Based on the development strategy, objectives, and measures of
effectiveness specified in the project plan, a format should be
pre'pared fo.r redevelopment authorities to report semi-annually to
DCA on the accomplishment of project objectives. The reports should
include the following:
(a) projected direct outputs in total and on a per unit basis;
(b) actual direct outputs in total and on a per unit basis;
(c) planned indirect or induced outputs in total and on a per
unit basis;
(d) actual indirect or induced outputs in total and on a per
unit basis; and
(e) a narrative account of non-numerical social, political,
and economic outcomes, and a qualitative assessment of
numerical outputs.
Expected Benefits:
obtain necessary data for calculating the fiscal and economic
impacts of projects;
identify for DCA areas where actual outputs are falling short
of planned outputs, so that corrective actions can be taken;
provide information to DCA on the reasons for discrepancies
between planned and actual outputs, so that proper assistance
can be provided;
collect the information required to assess the net benefits
of projects and the program as a whole;
* direct the thinking of redevelopment authority and DCA
personnel toward the achievement of economic development
objectives and away from an exclusive focus on "process"
tasks;
assemble information on economic development outcomes for
reporting by the Bureau of Urban Renewal on program and
project performance to top level managers within DCA, the
Development Cabinet, the Governor, other units of state
government, the legislature, and the pressi
assemble information on economic development outcomes for
reporting by redevelopment authorities on project performance
to local officials, residents, and the press.
Costs:
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* staff time and/or expense of hiring a consultant to determine
the amount and type of information that should be reported,
and design a format for reporting, aggregating, storing,
and communicating the information;
effort required by DCA to convince authority personnel of
the usefulness of collecting and reporting the information.
Actions Required:
amend rules and regulations by inserting a new section on
reporting to DCA which specifies the contents, format, and
timing for reporting on project effectiveness; the new sec-
tion on reporting requirements should deal with effectiveness
reporting, the use of milestone charts, the use of network
diagram methods, exception reporting, the content and format
for the annual reports of redevelopment authorities, and
financial reporting (the management concerns now included
under items III to VI in the section on Project Financing
should be combined with the reporting requirements into a
new section on Management and Reporting) ;
determine whether DCA staff or a consultant will prepare the
reporting system, and obtain any needed finances;
educate authority personnel on how to prepare reports and
the reasons for the introduction of reporting requirements;
use reports to identify and solve problems.
Time Horizon:
Medium/Long Term
Constraints:
limited time and expertise of DCA staff for preparing the
reporting system;
limited financial resources to hire an outside consultant;
authority personnel will likely resist the introduction of
reporting requirements (however, authority board members and
municipal officials should welcome the reports);
lack of staff resources within the Bureau of Urban Renewal
to collect and aggregate information on projects for reports
on the program as a whole, and to provide assistance and
respond to problems indicated in reports;
inasmuch as the plans for projects currently in execution
do not specify economic development objectives in quantita-
tive teims, reporting on these projects will be limited to
actual outputs unless objectives are established for the
uncompleted portions of projects.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
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revision of the program and requirements for the project
plan from a focus on the physical development' of land to
a concern for achieving economic development objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH A PROCESS REPORTING SYSTI USING
MILESTONE CHARTS
Milestone charts should be required as components of the project
plan in order to indicate task responsibilitiesand forwarded to
DCA on a quarterly basis as a vehicle for monitoring the accomplishment
of project tasks. Milestone charts can be prepared from the "work
packages" of activities that are identified in network diagrams and
the estimated times and costs to complete these work packages.
Expected Benefits:
* a clear assignment of responsibility for accomplishing
project tasks;
a simple method for identifying who has failed to perform
activities, which tasks have stalled a project, and which
actions are upcoming;
milestone charts should represent commitments from all
project participants to accomplish specific tasks and,
thereby, serve as documents for holding. people accountable
for performance;
an easy to use reference for focusing the attention of
the numerous actors involved on a project on necessary
activities.
Costs:
if work packages are identified to prepare network diagrams,
little additional effort is required to employ milestone
charts.
Actions Required:
amend rules and regulations to require milestone charts as
part of the project planand as one method for redevelopment
authorities to report to DCA;
prepare a simple milestone chart;
provide instruction to authority and DCA personnel;
* notify redevelopment authorities of the introduction of
milestone chart reporting.
Time Horizon:
* Immediate
Constraints:
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project participants in local, state, and federal government
may resist committing themselves to milestone chart targets.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* requiring the use of network diagram methods;
* introduction of quarterly exception and financial reporting.
RECOMMENDATION: ESTABLISH A SYSTEM FOR EXCEPTION REPORTING
In addition to quarterly reporting on task performance by redevelop-
ment authorities with milestone charts, separate "exception reports"
should be submitted on a quarterly basis which identify only those
activities that are behind schedule, and provide a narrative account
of the reasons for the failure to meet the schedule, proposed
corrective actions to deal with the delays, and assistance requested
from DCA.
Expected Benefits:
* focuses the attention of authority and DCA personnel on the
problems during execution;
* provides information needed by the Bureau of Urban Renewal
to explain the reasons for project delays to top managers,
the Development Cabinet, legislators, and the press.
Costs:
* time and effort of redevelopment authority personnel to
complete forms;
staff time required to prepare a format for exception reports.
Actions Required:
amend rules and regulations to require exception reports as
part of the quarterly reporting requirements for redevelop-
ment authorities;
prepare format for exception reports;
notify authorities of the introduction of exception report-
ing.
Time Horizon:
Immediate
Constraints:
authority personnel will likely resist introduction of
exception reporting;
Bureau of Urban Renewal lacks sufficient staff to respond
to all problems.
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Complementary/Supporting Actions%
* introduction of quarterly milestone chart and financial
reporting;
* monthly exception reporting is the basic reporting method
employed for DCA communication with the Governor's office.
RECOMMENDATION: INTRODUCE QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORTING
Redevelopment authorities should be required to report to DCA on a
quarterly basis on project finances,through a format based on the
project expenditures budget and the costs for work packages of
activities. The report should include the following items:
(a) budgeted expenditures by category and on a per unit and/or
work package" basis;
(b) actual expenditures by category and on a per unit and/or
"work package" basis; and
(c) estimated and actual land disposition proceeds in total
and on a per parcel or per acre basis.
In addition, quarterly financial statements should be submitted to
DCA. The above financial reports should also be required components
of redevelopment authority annual reports.
Expected Benefits:
* reporting of project expenditures in relation to work packages
of activities will enable DCA personnel and local officials
to assess whether budget targets are being met from the
start of project executionand identify the sources of
discrepancies between actual and budgeted amounts; with the
current method of reporting comparisons between planned and
actual expenditures in the reports of the State Auditor,
which presents total figures for expenditure categories with-
out indicating the extent of work accomplished, the closeness
of actual expenditures to the budget cannot be judged until
all work covered by a category is completed,or the amount
budgeted for a category has been surpassed;
* quarterly reporting will enable DCA and local officials to
quickly focus attention on budget overruns;
DCA will be able to adjust the level of state aid payments
to reflect actual project costs during the execution period,
and thereby avoid the problem of major adjustments at the
time of project completion.
Costs:
staff time to prepare a format for financial reporting and
review and act on reports submitted by authoritios;
* effort from DCA to convince authority personnel of the need
for reporting.
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Actions Required:
* amend rules and regulations to require financial reporting
as part of the quarterly reporting by redevelopment author-
ities to DCA; current regulations (see p. 149) require
quarterly preparation of a trial balance and financial
statements,but do not require the reporting of this or any
other financial information to DCA;
prepare format for financial reporting;
* notify redevelopment authorities of the introduction of
financial reporting and provide instruction in completing
forms.
Time Horizon:
* Immediate
Constraints:
* authority personnel will likely resist introduction of
financial reporting;
* Bureau of Urban Renewal lacks sufficient staff to thoroughly
review all reports;
project plans for current projects in execution do not
indicate work packages of activities; however, project plans
contain unit costs for site improvements, acquisition, and
relocation in various sections.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* introduction of quarterly milestone chart and exception
reporting.
RECOMMENDATION: USE A FIRM QUESTIONNAIRE FOR REPORTING ON PROJECT
EFFECTIVENESS
As a required condition for the disposition of land to firms in state-
assisted industrial parks, a questionnaire prepared by DCA should be
completed by businesses and forwarded to DCA by redevelopment author-
ities as a component of the semi-annual reporting on project effec-
tiveness. The firm questionnaire should obtain information for a
variety of purposes:
(a) to assess the "net" economic benefits of projects to the
Commonwealth (ex. information on the prior location of firms,
planned expansion of the number of employees, kind of
employment offered by firms, extent of export orientation
*of firms);
(b) to investigate which factors are important to- location
decisions and, therefore,- are critical for the success of
project marketing;
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(c) to develop a data base on factors influencing economic
development in the Commonwealth.
Refer to appendixG for a sample questionnaire.
Expected Benefits:
collect information essential for assessing the net benefits
of projects;
* assemble a data base on economic activity in the Commonwealth
using DCA's position of leverage;
* obtain information which can help to improve marketing
efforts at all projects, and the location and character of
future projects.
Costs:
* staff time in preparing the questionnaire and the expense
of printing the form;
* staff time necessary to work with the information provided
through the questionnaire.
Actions Required:
prepare and print questionnaire;
* notify redevelopment authority personnel of the introduction
of the questionnaire;
* amend rules and regulations to require the submission of a
firm questionnaire for each firm locating in a state-assisted
industrial project.
Time Horizon:
Immediate/Medium Term
Constraints:
firms will likely resist providing information requested in
the questionnaire;
* authority personnel will likely object to the introduction
of the requirement for the questionnaire;
Bureau of Urban Renewal lacks sufficient staff resources to
aggregate and analyze the information supplied in question-
naires.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
revision of the program- and requirements for the project plan
from a focus on physical development to a concern for achiev-
ing economic development objectives;
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introduction of requirements for semi-annual reporting on
the effectiveness of projects in achieving objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: REQUIRE REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES TO SUBMIT
ANNUAL REPORTS
Pursuant to Section 52 of Chapter 121B of the General Laws, DCA
should demand the submission of annual reports by redevelopment
authorities and specify the required contents for such documents.
The minimum components for annual reports should include the
following:
* an updated project summary similar to the introduction of
the revised project plan: problem addressed by project,
proposed strategy, key actors, historical context of
problem and project, and costs and benefits of project;
* a statement of goals, objectives, and measures of effective-
ness similar to the comparable section of the project plan;
* a narrative account of activities during the previous year,
activities planned for the upcoming year, and the current
status of project;
* a one page report on the amount and characteristics of land
available in project,which also serves as marketing material
that is transmitted to the Department of Commerce and Develop-
ment for promotion activities through the Business Contact
Program;
updated fiscal and economic impact analyses of each project:
an economic analysis of social costs and benefits, an
analysis of municipal costs and revenues, and an analysis
of state costs and revenues;
an updated network diagram of activities with the critical
path identified;
effectiveness reporting requirements, including a comparison
of actual and planned outputs over the year and cumulatively
to date;
updated milestone charts indicating task progress;
an exception report which highlights activities that are
behind schedule;
requirements for financial reporting, including a comparison
of actual and budgeted expenditures over the year and
cumulatively and certified annual financial statements; and
a statement on past litigation, litigation in process or
pending, and possible future litigation.
The requirement for submitting annual reports should be extended from
redevelopment authorities to cover any local public body with
responsibility for implementing a state-assisted industrial project.
Expected Benefits:
availability of current information on the status and impact
of projects collected in a single document appropriate for
communicating to the public, the press, and local officials;
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collection of annual information in a standardized format
which will facilitate preparation of an annual report on
the entire program for the Secretary, the Governor, and the
legislature;
serves as basic information source by which local officials
and residents can demand accountability from the redevelop-
ment authorities.
Costs:
* staff time required to prepare format, modify rules and
regulations, and review annual reports.
Actions Required:
* amend rules and regulations by requiring and specifying the
contents of annual reports in a new section on reporting
to DCA;
* notify redevelopment authorities of the new requirements for
annual reports;
prepare a sample format for annual reports.
Time Horizon:
* Immediate/Medium Term
Constraints:
* authority personnel will likely resist new requirements for
annual reports;
* dependency of revised annual report on other recommendations.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* introduction of a variety of reporting requirements which
form the components of the revised annual report;
* revision of the program and requirements for the project plan
from a focus on physical development to a concern for
economic development objectives.
257
REPORTING TO LEGISLATURE
Management Control,: Programming & Reporting and Analyzing
Performance
Findings:
Despite the enactment of a wide variety of state measures which
bear directly on economic development, and a much greater number
which are indirectly related to economic development, the
Massachusetts legislature lacks any systematic method for evaluating
the impact of these measures or comparing the usefulness of various
actions.
For example, with respect to depressed area development, the
General Court has enacted the Urban Job Incentive tax program, the
Chapter 121B state-aided industrial land development program, the
Chapter 121C Economic Development and Industrial Corporation vehicle,
the Chapter 121A urban development corporation mechanism, and, most
recently, the Community Development Finance Corporation. Of these
measures, only the Community Development Finance Corporation statute
contains a requirement for reporting to the legislature.
Legislative committees cannot assess the merits of legislative
initiatives or, more importantly, compare the net benefits from
actions directed at accomplishing similar objectiveswithout
information on the performance of measures. As a result of the
failure to report to the legislature on the effectiveness of
Chapter 121B industrial park projects, legislators, as well as
personnel within state government, have formed inaccurate judgements
on the desirability of the program on the basis of crises during
the development phases of projectsrather than economic development
outcomes.
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RECOMMENDATION: ALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION SHOULD
CONTAIN PROVISIONS REQUIRING REPORTING TO THE
LEGISLATURE ON PERFORMANCE
All legislation establishing economic development programs, organiza-
tions, or tax incentives should include a provision requiring
periodic reporting to the legislature on performance, in a manner
that facilitates comparisons of the costs and benefits of different
legislative initiatives. Although the methodologies for calculating
the benefits from economic development related activities allow
for wide variations in results as a consequence of differing
assumptions, the introduction of performance reporting requirements
should lead, over time,to the development of standard assumptions
and techniques. Whereas the requirement for reporting on economic
development impacts may be initially restricted to explicit
economic development activities, the requirement should be extended
in the future to include all programs directly or indirectly
related to economic development (ex. highway expenditures, construc-
tion of community colleges).
Expected Benefits:
in lieu of a program budget in state government, performance
reporting may allow for comparisons among economic
development programs;
* force operating units to think in terms of performanc;
* require the collection of information necessary for
assessing the net benefits from programs.
Costs:
time, effort, and expense of collecting, analyzing, and
presenting the information to the legislature;
* personnel with requisite skills.
Actions Required:
identification of all economic development legislation;
amend statutes to require performance reporting to the
legislature;
development of information systems -within agenices;
development of standard reporting format.
Time Horizon:
Medium/Long Term.
Constraints:
* resistance of line agency and local personnel;
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difficulty of collecting information from private sources;
lack of sophisticated methods for assessing "net" economic
benefits; i.e. distinguishing additional economic activity
from development that would have occurred without programatic
action;
* lack of expertise within line agencies for establishing
an adequate information collection system and undertaking
analyses.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* recent interest nationally in "sunset" legislation.
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REVIEW PROPRIETY OF STATE PAYMENTS
Management Control
Findings:
As noted in Table 2 and the accompanying notesand in more
detailed notations in some of the project cases in this report,
the current levels of annual state payments for a number of
projects are improper in relation to the state share of
net project cost specified in the ledger. In addition, in
a number of instances, the project cases indicate that different
figures for the approved net project cost are presented by
various sources for project information: DCA ledger, report
of State Auditor, DCA Chapter 121B Industrial Park Survey
Questionnaire completed by redevelopment authorities, and
case summaries prepared by the Center for Community Renewal
Studies at U. Mass.-Amherst.
An examination of the histories of DCA payments on
projects in the ledger reveals that, in a few cases, DCA
subtracted planning advances from the first annual payments
due on projects, rather than from the state shares of the net
project costs before computing the level of annual state payments,
which is the procedure specified in Section 57 of the statute.
RECOMMENDATION: CONDUCT FINANCIAL REVIEWS OF ALL PROJECTS
RECEIVING STATE PAYMENTS TO DETERMINE THE
PROPER FIGURES FOR THE STATE SHARE OF NET
PROJECT COST AND ANNUAL STATE PAYMENTS
Using the information in Table 2 , the cases, the financial
assistance agreements, and the DCA ledger assess the propriety
of the current state payments for the 12 industrial projects
receiving state aidand make appropriate corrections. Examine
the current annual state payments and the total state payments
to date, check the most recent report of the State Auditor, and
project the total state payment over a twenty year period.
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Table 2
Chapter 121B Subsidies For State-Assisted Industrial Park Projectsa
Projects In Execution;
Locations Name State Shareb Annual State State Paymentsc
of Net Payment to Date
Project Cost (period)
ALttleboro
Industrial Park
Brocktond
Industrial Park
Fitchburg: 231
Industrial Park
Gardner: e
East Gardner
Industrial Park
Holvoke: Millrace
South Project
Iawrence
Industrial Park
Methuen g
Industrial Park
New Bedford: h
Mlaritime Terminal
Newedford 
Industrial Park
New Bedford:
North Terminal
Bulkhead
Northampton:
Millyard
Industrial Park
Palmer
Industrial Park
Peabody: k
Centennial
Industrial Park
Wilmington:
Eames Street
Industrial Park
Woburn m
Industrial Park
None:
returns
exceed costs
$ 284,750
(estimate '69)
$ 553,679
(estimate '75)
$ 511,314
(estimate '75)
$ 981,837
(estimate '75)
$ 600,681
(actual;
amended 8/71)
$14,237-50
$27,033-95
$25,565-70
$35,241.29
(should be
$47,506-75)
$30,034.01
None: -
returns
equal costs
$ 175,227-50 $ 8,761-37.
festimate '63)
$1,204,052 $60,202.60
(estimate; (should be
amended '71) $69,094.22)
$1,451,000 $72,550.00
(estimate '71)
$ 623,047 $29,052-35
(estimate;
amended '75)
$1,792,250 $85,117-55
(estimate '74)
$ 890,714.90 $40,703.62
(being revised) (being revised)
None: -
returns
exceed costs
$1,683,763
(estimate '69)
$84,188.15
No planning or
execution
subsidy -
$113,900-00
('69-'76)
$ 67,067.90
('75-'76)
$ 82,420-36
('75-'76)
$ 66,943.29
('76)
$360,408.12
('63-'76)
$ 74,418.00
(plan. advan.
not recaptured)
$131,420-55
f'63-'76)
$528,854-35
('66-'76)
$435,300.00
('71-'76)
$158,209.40
('73-'76)
$345,251.65
('74-'76)
$ 76,642-50(planning
advance)
$ 44,837.00
(plan. advan.
not recaptured)
$673,495.20
'69-'76)
262
Totals $10,752,315.40 $512,688.09 $3,159,168.20
should be (through '76)
$533,845.17
Notes to Table 2
(a) In all cases, except for Lawrence, the State Share of Net
Project Cost, which is the basis for the computation of
annual state subsidy payments over a 20 year period, is
derived from an estimate of the future project costs minus
an estimate of the future proceeds from land disposition
projected at the time of project approval. The dates for
the above estimates suggest the degree of likelihood that
variation exists between estimated and actual net project
costs. The Bureau of Urban Renewal should request a legal
opinion as to whether the Commonwealth has any obligation
of law to contribute one-half of the actual rather than the
estimated net project cost (examine language in financial
assistance agreement). With the legal opinion as a guide,
DCA should set policy with respect to whether annual state
subsidy payments are to be based on actual net project
costs and the circumstances under which this will be the
case. In the event DCA has no legal obligation to base
annual subsidy payments on actual net project costs, the
Bureau of Urban Renewal may decide to revise payments up-
ward to reflect actual costs in return for actions on the
part of Redevelopment Authorities to foster state economic
development objectives (ex. requiring firms moving to parks
to hire unemployed persons as a condition of the land dis-
position agreements; accepting requirements for reporting
information to DCA). In any case, for the purpose of
collecting the necessary information for assessing the costs
and benefits of projects, DCA should revise all project
budgets and financing plans on the basis of actual costs
and land sale proceeds.
(b) Figures for the State Share of Net Project Cost may not
equal the Annual State Payment multiplied by 20 years for
some projects and in total because planning advances have
sometimes been subtracted from the State Share of Net Pro-
ject prior to the computation of the level of the annual
subsidy. payment.
(c) Figures for State Payments to Date may not equal the Annual
State Payment multiplied by the number of years of payments
because planning advances are sometimes included. Planning
advances should either be subtracted from the first annual
payment (in which case the State Payments to Date will equal
the Annual State Payment multiplied by the number of years
of payments) or subtracted from the State Share of Net Pro-
ect Cost prior to the computation of the annual payment
(in which case the State Payments to Date will include the
planning advance).
d) Brockton: Due to higher than expected land disposition pro-
ceeds and lower actual project costs than in the original
budget, the actual net project cost is less than the original
projection and, therefore, the state share of the net project
cost estimated in '69, which is the basis for the current
level of annual subsidy payments, is greater than - of the
actual net project cost. Refer to the "Note on Net Project
Cost" in the case summary for a more detailed account.
(e) Gardner: The DCA ledger indicates a figure of $511,314
as the state share of the net project cost whereas the
report of the State Auditor lists $411,315 as the state
share (audit for period ending 8/31/76). The financial
assistance agreement and project financial plan should be
examined to determine the -correct state execution subsidy.
The $31,288.96 state planning advance to Gardner was neither
subtracted from the state share of the net project cost
prior to computing the level of annual state payments nor
subtracted from the first annual payment as is customary.
Thus, if annual state payments are continued at their cur-
rent level over a 20 year period, the total state subsidy
payment will exceed the state share of net project cost
by the amount of the planning advance. Therefore, DCA
should adjust the current.annual payment to reflect the
prior planning advances $511,314 state share - (2 annual
payments of $25,565.70 + $31,288.96) = $428,893.64 +
18 years = $23,827.42 annual payment. 263
Notes to Table 2 (continued):
(f) Holyoke: The current annual state payment of $35,241.29 will
result over a 20 year period in a total state share of the
net project cost of $736,527.80 (20 X $35,241.29 plus
$31,702 planning advance). The DCA ledger indicates an
annual papent of $47,506-75 in order to cover the state
share of $981,837 called for in the financial assistance
agreement and the approved project financing plan. Refer
to the "Note on State Payments" in the case summary for a
more detailed account. The State Auditor recommends in the
audit for the period ending 10/31/76 that DCA revise the
financing plan and the level of the annual state payment.
(g) Methuen: Inasmuch as the project proceeded without a munici-
pal or state execution subsidy, the ethics and legality of
the development process are challengeable on a number of
grounds, and the Authority has refused to comply with DCA
requests for information over an extended period of time,
DCA should consider requiring the Redevelopment Authority
to repay the $74,418 planning advance to the Commonwealth.
Refer to the case summary for more detailed information on
the project.
(h) New Bedford Maritime Terminal: The original 1963 estimate of
the net project cost was never revised on the basis of actual
costs and revenues. In addition, the State Auditor has not
audited the project because the Redevelopment Authority
delegated responsibility for the project to the New Bedford
Harbor Development Commission. Therefore, DCA should obtain
the information necessary to establish the actual net pro-
ject cost from the Harbor Development Commission in order to
assess the propriety of the current level of annal state
payments and the actual costs of the project. Furthermore,
DCA should request that the State Auditor prepare a final
audit for the project inasmuch as the project has been
completed.
(i) New Bedford Industrial Park: When the net project cost for
this project was amended in 1971 and a new state share of
$1,204,052 was established, the level of annual state payments
was set by dividing the $1,204,052 by 20 years of payments
without accounting for the lower level of annual payments
between '66-'71 (a lump sum adjustment payment is the custom-
ary method). If the five payments of $33,527.75 from '66-'71
had been properly subtracted from the amended state share
and the remainder divided by 15 years, the level of the
annual payment would have been $69,094.22. Therefore, if
payments of $60,202.60 are continued over the remaining years
of the 20 year period, the total state share of the net
project cost will total only $1,070,677.40 and the Commonwealth
will be legally obligated to pay an additional lump sum
payment of $133,374.60 in order to fulfill the terms of
of the financial assistance agreement with New Bedford.
Hence, the level of the annual state payment should be revised.
The annual payment level corrected for year 1977 is $75,022:
1,204,052 state share minus $528,854 in payments '66-'76 =
$675,198 + 9 remaining years = $75,022/year; no planning
advance.
) Palmer: The net project cost and state share will likely
change if the sale of the entire property to a single
developer is cancelled. In addition, the present net pro-
ject cost should be $100,000 less, the state share should
be $50,000 less, and, therefore, the level of the annual
state payments should be $82,617.55. Refer to the "Note"
in the case summary for a more detailed account.
Furthermore, the state share of the net project cost includes
the payment of one-half of an estimated $1,556,500 in in-
terest costs on project bonds as a consequence of the disaster
relief context of the project. At this point in time, DCA
should assess the actual interest costs on the $2,200,000
in bonds issued for the project. If the current developer
remains with the project, DCA shoild revise the state share
and level of annual payments to reflect the actual bond in-
terest costs and the accurate disposition proceeds for the
property.
Notes to Table 2 (continued)s
(k) Peabody: The project cost is being revised to account for
six years of delay and the imminent receipt of an EDA grant.
(1) Wilmington: Inasmuch as the Town of Wilmington expects to
reap a financial gain of approximately $194,000 from the
assembly and disposition phase of the project, DCA should
consider requiring the repayment of the -'4,8 37 state plan-
ning advance. See the case summary for more detailed
information on the-project.
(m) Woburn: The original 1969 estimates of the net project cost
and the state share have not been revised to reflect actual
costs and revenues. Inasmuch as almost all of the site
improvements have been completed and more than 505 of the
project land has been sold, information should be available
to prepare a more accurate revised project financial plan.
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Compare the projected total of state payments with the approved
state share of the net project cost indicated in the most recent
financial assistance agreement, the project financing plan, the
DCA ledger, the most recent report of the State Auditor, and
the Chapter 121B Industrial Park Survey Questionnaire.
The annual state payment for the following projects
should be revised to accurately reflect the approved state
share of the net project cost: Gardner, Holyoke, New Bedford
Industrial Park, and Palmer.
If the various sources for project information noted
above provide differing figures for the approved net project
cost and state share, DCA personnel should correct these sources
on the basis of the amounts specified in the most recent
financial assistance agreements.
Expected Benefits:
* avoid need for large lump sum corrective payments at
the end of 20 year period;
correct improper state payments and avoid legal actions
against the Commonwealth.
Costs
approximately three days of staff time.
Actions Required:
* review of financial information;
notice to redevelopment authorities of revised payment
levels and accurate figures for approved net project
cost and state share;
correct sources of project information.
Time Horizon:
Immediate.
Constraints:
* limited staff time.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* recommendations on revising state payments to reflect
actual net project costs.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD COMPLY WITH LANGUAGE OF STATUTE BY
SUBTRACTING PLANNING ADVANCES FROM STATE SHARE
OF NET PROJECT COST BEFORE CALCULATING STATE
PAYMENT RATHER THAN SUBTRACTING PLANNING ADVANCE
FROM FIRST ANNUAL PAYMENT
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UPDATE NET PROJECT COSTS
Management Control: Operating and Accounting & Reporting and
Analyzing Performance
Findings:
DCA has failed to collect current information on actual
project costs and land disposition proceeds, compare actual
costs with budgeted costs, and revise financial agreements and
the level of annual state subsidy payments on the basis of
actual net project costs. The reports of the State Auditor,
which compare actual and planned project budgets by the totals
for budget categories, are normally prepared at two year intervals
and do not indicate how planned and actual net project costs
differ for individual project tasks. DCA has neither collected
current information,nor reviewed state audit reportsto closely
monitor the differences between the planned and actual net project
costs in order to revise the level of annual state subsidy payments.
Due to DCA's neglect of its proper monitoring function, annual
state payments for all projects receiving a state execution
subsidy, except for Lawrence, are based on estimates of the
net project cost which have not been updated to reflect actual
experience (see Table 2 ). As a result, some projects are
being subsidized at a rate which will provide more than the
one-half of net project cost called for in the statute, and some
projects are receiving state payments at a level below one-half
of actual net project costs.
Whether or not DCA has a legal obligation to base state
payments on actual net project costs is unclear from the
language of the statute and rules and regulations. On the one
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hand, Section 57 of Chapter 121B of the General Laws states
that "contracts [for financial assistance] shall provide for
a state grant-in-aid equal to one half of the net cost of
each project...", and the section of the rules and regulations
on project financing includes the following language:
B. State Funds
The State Grants Fund is...payable in twenty
installments which are made on an annual basis.
The payments are made based on the estimated net
project cost until the project is completed.
When the project has been closed out, an adjustment,
either higher or lower, will be made to correct the
Commonwealth's share and a revised annual payment
will be processed for the remaining years.
On the other hand, Section 57 of the statute also states that
"the department ... may adjust the annual payment upon final
determination of the net project cost of each approved project"
(emphasis added) and the General Introduction section to the
rules and regulations indicates that "(t)he Department ma
adjust the annual payment upon final determination of the net
project cost" (emphasis added). Moreover, whereas Section
54 of Chapter 121B, which deals with state aid for federal Title
1 projects, clearly requires adjustments to be made in the level
of state payments to reflect actual costs, no such language
can be found with reference to projects only receiving state aid.
If DCA is legally obligated to adjust underfunded projects
to reflect actual net project costs, and to complete all
payments within 20 years, some projects will require sizable
additions to current payment levels. If adjustments to reflect
actual net project costs are deferred until the completion of
projectsas called for in the Statute and rules and regulations,
these projects will demand substantial lump sum adjustments.
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However, DCA is protected from payment increases in excess of
authorized funds because the statute clearly indicates that
state payments will not exceed one million dollars in any
one year, and all payments are contingent upon legislative
appropriations. Nevertheless, even with the legal limit on
.the obligations of the Commonwealth, the question of whether or
not DCA has a legal obligation to-adjust payments on the basis
of actual net project costs remains. In addition to the legal
issue, DCA must consider as a matter of policy whether Dr not
payments should be based on actual net project costsand the
conditions under which payments will be raised.
Whereas DCA's legal obligation to increase payments to
reflect actual net project costs is clouded, the statute
states clearly in Section 57 that "(t)he total state grant-in-
aid for any approved project shall not exceed one half of the
net cost of project." Therefore, in the cases of those projects
currently receiving annual subsidy payments which will result
in a total state subsidy greater than one half of the net
project cost, DCA appears to be obligated to reduce the level
of annual payments. Nevertheless, DCA should consider whether
or not redevelopment authorities should be penalized for reducing
the net project cost below the original estimate.
RECOMMENDATION: COLLECT CURRENT INFORMATION ON ACTUAL PROJECT
COSTS AND LAND SALE PROCEEDS IN ORDER TO
UPDATE THE PROJECTIONS OF NET PROJECT COSTS
Whether or not DCA bears any legal obligation to revise state
payments to reflect actual net project costs, or chooses to do
so as a matter of policy, current information on actual project
costs and revenues should be collected in order to assess
the costs and benefits of individual projects and the program as
a whole, and compare the actual with the planned budgets.
269
Information should be collected through the introduction of the
quarterly financial reporting requirements recommended in '
this evaluation, and the adoption of the recommended modifications
to the reports prepared by the State Auditor.
Expected Benefits:
* obtain information necessary to assess the costs and
benefits of projects for judging the merits of the
program, identifying desirable types of projects, and
reporting to the Development Cabinet, the legislature,
and the public;
ability to compare budgeted with actual net project
costs, and isolate the sources of differences;
ability to meet any legal obligation or effect a
policy to base state subsidy payments on actual net
project costs.
Costs:
* see RECOMMENDATION: INTRODUCE QUARTERLY FINANCIAL
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Actions Required:
see RECOMMENDATION: INTRODUCE QUARTERLY FINANCIAL
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Time Horizon:
Immediate.
Complementary/ Supporting Actions:
see RECOMMENDATION: INTRODUCE QUARTERLY FINANCIAL
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
RECOMMENDATION: DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO REVISE STATE SHARE
OF NET PROJECT COST AND ANNUAL STATE PAYMENTS
ON BASIS OF ACTUAL NET PROJECT COSTS,AND THE
CONDITIONS FOR UNDERTAKING REVISIONS
The Bireau of Urban Renewal should obtain a legal opinion
on whether DCA has any obligation of law to base state payments
on actual, rather than estimatednet project costs. The provisions
of the statute and rules and regulations and language of the
financial assistance agreement should be examined. With the
legal opinion as a guide, the Bureau should establish policy
with respect to the conditions under which increases or
reductions in state payments will be made.
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RECOMMENDATION: REVISE THE STATE SHARE OF NET PROJECT COST
UPWARD IN RETURN FOR ACTIONS BY REDEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITIES TO PROMOTE STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OBJECTIVES
If DCA is under no legal obligation to increase state subsidy
payments for projects being paid at a rate below one half of
the net project cost, the Bureau of Urban Renewal should revise
payments on the basis of actual net project costs on the condition
that redevelopment authorities take specific actions determined
by the Bureau to promote state economic development objectives.
Examples of such actions might include:
negotiating land disposition prices with firms on the
basis of performance objectives (ex. allowing for a
reduced price for firms agreeing to hire a specific
number of unemployed persons);
* including performance clauses in land disposition
agreements (ex. number of jobs, hiring of unemployed
persons, hiring of local residents, use of training
programs, number of "primary labor market" quality jobs);
establishing an employment program for the project
directed at the training and hiring of unemployed local
residents;
disposing of some percentage of the project land to
out-of-state firms;
accepting a non-relocation regulation which prohibits
the movement of firms out of depressed areas in the
state to .locations in the project.
Expected Benefits:
obtain leverage to promote economic development
objectives which are captured more by the state than
the municipality;
* institute non-relocation regulation in order to insure
that projects do not subvert state economic development
objectives by allowing firms to move out of needy
communities.
Costs:
* time and effort to update net project costs and negotiate
conditions with redevelopment authorities;
* expense of higher state payments.
Actions Required:
* collect current information on the actual project costs
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and land disposition proceeds, estimate a new net
project cost, and calculate the revised level of the
annual state payment;
* review each project currently receiving payments at
a level less than that required to meet one half of
the actual net project cost,to assess what actions
the redevelopment authorities should be required to
take as a condition for the increase in state payments;
refer to the cases in this report.
Time Horizon:
* Medium/Long Term.
Constraints:
* limited staff time available to collect and analyze
informat ion;
* resistance of redevelopment authorities to the setting of
terms for increases in state payments;
* a lack of incentive for redevelopment authorities to
care whether the municipalities receive higher payments
from the Commonwealth;
limited expertise of redevelopment authority personnel for
executing actions required by DCA as conditions for an
increase in payments;
* limited amount of funds remaining under $ 1 million
per year authorization*
Complementary / Supporting Actions:
* collection of current information on actual costs and
land disposition proceeds in order to assess costs and
benefits of projects and program;
* introduction of quarterly financial reporting requirements.
RECOMMENDATION: REDUCE LEVEL OF ANNUAL STATE PAYMENTS TO REFLECT
ACTUAL NET PROJECT COSTS ONLY IF:
(1) A REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY REFUSES TO COMPLY
WITH NEW DCA REQUIREMENTS OR FAILS TO TAKE
ACTIONS RECOMMENDED BY DCA TO ADVANCE A
PROJECT; OR
(2) CURRENT LEVEL OF STATE PAYMENTS WILL COVER
MORE THAN 100% OF NET PROJECT COST.
As noted above, the Chapter 121B statute appears to limit the
state subsidy to no more than one half of the actual net project
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cost. However, if a legal opinion finds that DCA is not required
to fund projects on the basis of actual net project costs, DCA
may decide not to reduce state payments because: (a) redevelop-
ment authorities might be penalized for efficiency in reducing
costs and/or obtaining higher than estimated disposition prices; and
(b) DCA has been at fault in not monitoring costs and revenues.
On the other hand, a policy of not reducing state payments to
reflect actual net project costs may lead redevelopment authorities
to overestimate costsand underestimate expected land disposition
proceeds, in project planningand encourage authority personnel
to dispose of land to the highest bidder rather than on the basis
of economic development objectives.
In order to maintain an incentive for efficiency, and mitigate any
disincentive for disposing of land on the basis of maximizing
economic development objectives, state payments should not be
reduced to reflect actual net project costs only if redevelopment
authorities are complying with DCA requests for information,
following DCA suggestions for achieving economic development
benefits, and cooperating with DCA efforts to assist in marketing.
However, in the case of projects receiving state payments which
will total more than the entire net-project cost, state payments
should be reduced because redevelopment authorities are under little
pressure to perform efficiently and effectively.
Expected Benefits:
maintain a financial incentive for efficiency;
obtain leverage for gaining the cooperation of redevelop-
ment authorities in complying with reporting requirements,
following DCA suggestions for achieving economic develop-
ment objectives, and improving marketing efforts;
maintain local financial participation on projects in
order to provide local pressures for efficiency and
effectiveness.
Costs:
payments above one half of actual net project cost.
Actions Required:
collect information on actual project costs and land
disposition proceeds, project new net project cost, and
compare with current level of state funding;
* review each project currently receiving payments at a
level greater than that required to meet one half of the
actual net project cost to assess what actions the
redevelopment authorities should be required to take as
a condition for not having payments reduced; refer to
cases in this report.
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Time Horizont
* Medium/Long Term
Constraints:
* limited staff time available to collect and analyze
information;
* resistance of redevelopment authorities to the setting
of terms for avoiding reductions in state payments;
* a lack of incentive for redevelopment authorities to care
whether the municipalities receive lower payments from
the Commonwealth;
* limited expertise of redevelopment authority personnel
for executing actions required by DCA as conditions for
avoiding decreases in payments.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* collection of current information on actual costs and
land disposition proceeds in order to assess costs and
benefits of projects and program;
* introduction of quarterly financial reporting requirements.
RECOMMENDATION: AMEND LANGUAGE OF STATUTE AND RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO ALLOW FOR INTERIM REVISIONS TO
ANNUAL STATE PAYMENTS PRIOR TO PROJECT
COMPLETION
As noted above, the rules and regulations and statute refer only
to revisions to state payments at the time of project completion.
In addition, they specify a twenty year term for the payment of
the state subsidy on a project. However, due to the considerable
length of time usually required to complete a project, a revision
of the state share of the net project cost at the time of completion
often calls for prohibitively large payments in order to limit the
payment period to the required twenty years. In general, the
longer the period is prior to the revision of the state share, the
greater is the dollar impact on the remaining annual state payments.
Thus, as the total annual commitment for the funding of projects
approaches the $1 million annual authorization limit, DCA will
have little ability to revise payments on the basis of actual net
project costs.
Therefore, in order to base current payments on a more realistic
basisand lessen the need for large revisions at the time of project
completion, the statute and rules and regulations should be
amended to allow for periodic revisions to the level of annual
state payments and the financial assistance agreement. Inasmuch
as the recommended financial reporting requirements will provide
current information on costs and land disposition proceeds on a
per activity, per "work package", and per acre basis, DCA will be
able to revise projections of the net project cost as a project
progresses. 274
Expected Benefits:
establish annual state subsidy payments on a current basis;
avoid the need for large shifts in annual payment levels
late in the 20 year payment period;
induce redevelopment authorities to provide current
information;
* authorize current funding levels.
Costs:
time and effort of staff;
Actions Required:
* amend Section 57 of Chapter 121B and "Project Financing"
section of the rules and regulations.
Time Horizon:
* Medium Term
Constraints:
possibility that request to amend statute will precipitate
broader questioning from legislators about the program.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
other recommendations on revision of state payments to
reflect actual net project costs.
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POLICY ON RECAPTURE OF PLANNING ADVANCES
FOR PROJECTS NOT ENTERING EXECUTION
Management Control: Programming
Finds:
In the cases of six proposed industrial park projects and a
number of proposed commercial and residential projects which did
not advance beyond the planning stage, DCA provided planning
advances which were not recaptured when the projects failed to
enter into execution. Table 3 lists the six industrial projects
and indicates that a total of $272,587.25 was advanced for the six
projects.
The section of the rules and regulations on "Project
Financing" contains the following language with respect to the
recapture of planning funds in such cases;
4. Repayment of Advance
If a project has been rejected locally for
which a Planning Advance has been given, those
monies advanced must be returned to the Common-
wealth within a one year period.
The rules and regulations make no reference to the recapture of
planning funds for projects which are rejected by DCA, or fail to
enter into execution due to insufficient state funds.
Despite the clear requirement for the return of planning
advances for projects rejected at the local level, DCA has neither
requested nor received the advances for the six industrial projects
noted above. Although DCA appears to have a legal right and an
obligation to demand repayment, three factors may impede DCA's
ability to recapture these advances at the present time: (a) a
long period of time has passed for some projects without DCA
attempting to recapture the advances; (b) DCA issued close-out
letters on a couple of these projects in 1975,which indicated
276
Table 3
Chapter 121B Planning Advances For industrial Park Projects
Which Never Reached Execution Stage
Location Project Name Date of State ~Unexpended
Planning Planning Balance
Approval Advance Due State
Fitchburg
Haverhill
New Bedford
New Bedford
North Adams
Southbridge
Airport
Industrial
Park
Route 495
Industrial
Park
Wholesale
Distribution
Center
Air
Industrial
Park
South Branch
Industrial
Park
Southbridge
Industrial
Park
9/69
7/68
4/72
4/72
$55,965-00
$45,108.75
$31,185-00
$38,587.50
$40,775.00
$60,966-00
$ 408.98(as of 8/75)
$3,644.21(as~ of 8/75)
Total $272,587-25
Notes:
(a) Inasmuch as the funds provided by the Commonwealth for planning
purposes were not grants but advances to be subtracted out of
state execution subsidy payments, DCA appears to have a legal
right to require repayment of these advances by the municipal-
ities. However, a legal opinion should be obtained with
respect to: (1) the impact of the long delay of DCA without
requesting repayment; and (2) the obligation of municipalities
to assume the liabilities of Redevelopment Authorities which
are defunct. Nevertheless, DCA may deoide as a matter of policy
not to attempt to recapture these planning advances (a legal
opinion on such an action should be requested). As a point of
information, the reports of the State Auditor on these projects
indicate in a number of cases that the municipalities failed
to provide their required 25% share of the resources for
planning. In such instances DCA must consider the possibility
that state funds were obtained on the false representation that
a project was seriously contemplated when in fact it was not.
In any case, DCA should establish a policy and a course of
action to resolve the status of these projects. It is
recommended that DCA reauest final "close-out" audits of these
projects from the State Auditor and require repayment of
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that the projects could not be considered at that time due to
insufficient state execution subsidy funds; and (c) uncertainty
with respect to the legal obligations of municipalities to assume
the liabilities of defunct redevelopment authorities. In addition,
if DCA bears no legal obligation to require repayment at the
present time, the Bureau of Urban Renewal may decide as a matter
of policy not to attempt to recapture these funds because of DCA's
tardiness in requesting repayment and the probability of hostile
reactions at the local level.
Nevertheless, the approximately one quarter of a million
dollars advanced for the six industrial park projects (in addition
to amounts advanced for commercial and residential projects)
represents a considerable sum of money which could be used to
support other worthwhile projects. Moreover, the reports of the
State Auditor on these projects indicate that in a number of
instances the municipalities failed to provide their required 25%
share of the resources for planning and, in some of these cases,
DCA has no evidence of the completion of a planning document.
Thus, in some cases, DCA should consider the possibility that state
planning advances were obtained on the false representation that a
project was seriously contemplated when in actuality it was not.
The local advance of 25% of the costs for planning, and the require-
ment for the recapture of funds for projects rejected locally, are
the only formal checks to prevent the advance of planning funds
under false pretenses. Nevertheless, DCA will have a difficult
time proving deception and using such an argument to demand the
repayment of advances.
In addition to failing to recapture planning advances for
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projects rejected locally, DCA has not requested the repayment of
the unexpended balances of the planning advances for these six
projects as required by the rules and regulations. The section
on "Project Financing" in the rules and regulations states the
following:
If receipt of an approved project expenditures budget
is not anticipated, any balance of Planning Advance
Funds remaining upon completion of the LPA's planning
expenditures shall be promptly remitted to the
Department.
Table 3 indicates that relatively small sums of unexpended planning
advance funds remain in the accounts of at least two projects.
Inasmuch as final close-out audits have not been prepared for these
six projects, the books on these projects remain openand final
restitutions have not been made to DCA.
RECOMMENDATION: FORMALLY CLOSE-OUT PROJECTS WHICH RECEIVED
PLANNING ADVANCES BUT DID NOT ENTER INTO
EXECUTION
(1) DCA should request a legal opinion on its right and obligation
to recapture planning advances for projects not entering into
execution, considering the three factors noted above.
(2) All projects which have received planning advances, but have
not entered into execution should be identified. The amounts
of the planning advances, and the unexpended balances for these
projects, should be determined by consulting the DCA ledger
and the latest audit report. Final close-out audits for these
projects should be requested from the State Auditor.
(3) With the legal opinion as a guide,/and the available financial
information on these projects assembled, DCA should establish
a policy with respect to the recapture of funds. DCA may
decide to demand repayment only from those municipalities which
failed to advance the required 25% local share of expenses.
(4) DCA should formally close-out each project after the final
audits have been completed by sending letters to the redevelop-
ment authorities and municipal officials setting forth the
required payments and actions. In all cases the unexpended
balances from the advances should be recaptured. If DCA
decides not to demand the recapture of an advance, a copy of
the completed planning document should be obtained for the DCA
files as a condition of avoiding repayment.
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(5) DCA should amend the rules and regulations to include provisions
on the status of planning advances in the event of DCA
rejection of a project, or a lack of sufficient state execution
subsidy funds.
Expected Benefits:
recapture of planning advances which can be used for other
worthwhile projects;
formal close-out of projects from the active files;
clarification of the status of planning advances in the
cases of projects rejected by DCA/or not funded by DCA due
to insufficient funding.
Costs:
time and effort required to request final audits and review
each project;
possible ill will of redevelopment authorities and local
officials if either the planning advances or the unexpended
balances of advances are recaptured.
Actions Required:
obtain legal opinion on DCA's rights and obligations;
* amend rules and regulations;
request final audits from the State Auditor;
* review finances of each project;
notify redevelopment authorities and local officials;
obtain copies of planning documents.
Time Horizon:
Immediat'e/Medium Term
Constraints:
* possible lack of adequate staff resources at the Office of
the State Auditor to undertake final audits soon;
resistance of redevelopment authorities and local officials.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* establishing policy on recapture of advances for projects
moving into execution without state subsidy.
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POLICY ON RECAPTURE OF PLANNING ADVANCES FOR PROJECTS IN
EXECUTION WITHOUT STATE AID
Management Control: Programming
Findings:
In two cases, Methuen and Wilmington, DCA advanced planning
funds, the projects moved into the execution phase without the need
for additional state financial assistance, and the planning advances
were not recaptured by DCA.' The 121B statute states that planning
advances shall be repaid out of state execution payments but makes
no reference to projects not receiving such aid. The rules and
regulations also fail to address such a situation.
In Methuen, the project property was sold for the cost of
acquisition, not including the planning expenses funded by the
state advance. In the case of Wilmington, the town is expected to
gain approximately $194,000 from the assembly and disposition of
the project land if the $44,000 planning advance is not returned
to DCA. The circumstances surrounding the Methuen project suggest
that the development process can be challenged on legal and ethical
grounds. See the project case for a detailed account.
RECOMMENDATION: REQUEST A LEGAL OPINION ON WHETHER OR NOT DCA
CAN RECAPTURE PLANNING ADVANCES ON PROJECTS WHICH
MOVE INTO EXECUTION WITHOUT THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
STATE AID AND ESTABLISH POLICY WITH RESPECT TO
SUCH CASES
Obtain a legal opinion on DCA's right and obligation to recapture
planning funds from projects in execution which do not require
additional state aid. The language of the statute, rules and
regulations, and planning advance agreement should be reviewed.
If DCA has the authority, but no obligation, to demand repayment
of planning advances, policy should be established with respect
to such cases, and the language of the rules and regulations and
planning advance agreement should be amended to clearly reflect
that policy. In addition, a provision should be added to the
statute which sets forth unequivocably the rights and obligations
of redevelopment authorities and DCA in such situations.
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RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD REQUIRE THE REPAYMENT OF PLANNING
ADVANCES WHEN THE PROCEEDS FROM PROPERTY
DISPOSITION EXCEED DEVELOPMENT COSTS
However, inasmuch as the statute and rules and regulations do not
set forth planning advance recapture provisions for such cases,
DCA may not want to apply this policy to the Wilmington project.
Nevertheless, if DCA has the right, but no obligation, to request
repayment of the planning advance, the Bureau of Urban Renewal
may want to establish terms for not requesting the repayment of
the advance which will serve to promote state economic development
objectives. Refer to the project case for recommended actions to
help achieve valued development objectives.
RECOMMENDATION: DCA SHOULD REQUIRE THE REPAYMENT OF PLANNING
ADVANCES SO THAT MUNICIPALITIES AND THE
COMMONWEALTH SHARE EQUALLY IN SUBSIDIZING A
PROJECT
Thus, for cases in which the proceeds from land disposition do not
cover all project costs, including planning expenses, the
Commonwealth should bear one half of the net project cost in
keeping with the basic formula of the statute.
However, if DCA has the right to demand repayment, the Bureau
should consider recapturing all of the planning funds in the
case of Methuen, because of the lack of cooperation exhibited by
the redevelopment authority and the questions noted in the case
concerning the ethics and legality of the development process.
DCA staff should ascertain the actual net project cost for the
project.
Expected Benefits:
determination of whether or not DCA has the right and/or
obligation to recapture planning funds from projects in
execution which do not receive execution assistance;
possible recapture of planning funds;
* DCA may gain leverage for persuading redevelopment author-
ities to take actions to further state economic development
objectives;
establish future policy on the recapture of planning
advances.
Costs:
staff time and effort.
Actions Required:
request legal opinion- on issue from DCA legal affairs;
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* with the legal opinion as a guide, DCA should establish
policy with respect to the recapture of planning funds;
* amend the rules and regulations, planning advance agreement,
and Chapter 121B statute to reflect the policy on
recapture;
examine the Wilmington and Methuen projects and determine
a course of action with respect to each.
Time Horizon:
Medium Term.
Constraints:
resistance of redevelopment authorities and municipal
governments in Wilmington and Methuen to return of planning
advance funds or to DCA's terms for not demanding a return
of funds;
* difficulty of amending language of statute without precip-
itating a broader inquiry of the program by legislato.rs.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
283
REDESIGN LEDGER
Management Control: Operating and Accounting
Findings:
The official repository for information on the history of state
payments to projects, the approved net project cost, and the
approved state share of the net project cost, is the DCA ledger
book. Information is entered manually on simple lined ledger paper
which contains no printed or written headings for recording specific
types of information. The dates of payments, payment figures, and
calculations of balances are difficult to read. The top of the
page presents the name of the project, the municipality, the net
project cost, the state share, and, sometimes, the amount of the
planning advance. Arithmetic errors and computational mistakes,
such as failing to list and subtract the planning advance prior to
computing the annual state payment, are evident.
RECOMMENDATION: A NEW FORMAT SHOULD BE DESIGNED FOR THE LEDGER
The new format should be designed to include the following
information: dates of project approval and amendments to project
financial plan; net project cost; state share of new project
cost; annual state payment; amendments; state payments each year;
total payments to date; and the balance. If possible, a
computerized operation should be employed to supplement the manual
system. In the absence of a computer system, a second ledger
should be maintained in order to protect against theft, loss, and
mutilation.
Expected Benefits:
* uniform maintenance of information;
* protection against theft, loss, or mutilation;
* improved legibility;
collection of additional information.
Costs:
time and effort to prepare new format and transfer
information;
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* time of staff person to transfer information to computer.
Actions Required:
* prepare new ledger format;
* obtain computer services.
Time Horizon:
* Immediate/Medium Term
Constraints:
unavailability of computer services.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* review of finances on all projects.
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STATE AUDITS
Management Control: Operating and Accounting & Reporting and
Analyzing Performance
Findings:
The Office of the State Auditor, pursuant to Section 52 of
Chapter 121B, periodically audits redevelopment authorities. Audit
reports are prepared on an irregular basis of from one to two years
and are issued from five to ten months after the closing day of
the audit period.
Considerable variation exists in the scope of audit activities,
the format used to present information, and the level of detail of
the information presented. No standard format is employed for
presenting basic "Statistical Data" on projects (ex. location;
project area; proposed land uses; estimated net project cost).
This lack of consistency creates the impression that the auditor
presents whatever information is provided by redevelopment author-
ities, rather than collecting the same data for all projects.
Whereas some reports present detailed balance sheets and a comparison
of approved cost estimates with actual project costs, many reports
offer simplified balance sheets with little information and no
comparison of actual and planned costs. Moreover, inasmuch as the
comparison of actual and planned expenditures is presented by budget
category without any indication of unit costs or costs for "work
packages" of activities and the amount of work completed, the
comparison is of limited use for monitoring projects until a budget
category has been exceeded or the project is completed.
The contents of the audits cover the general requirements for
"fiduciary" auditing which involves the accuracy of information and
an accounting of the use of funds. However, although the auditor
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may look for authorizations from the redevelopment authority board
for hiring, rates of pay, and the award of contracts, the auditor
does not search for DCA approvals of contracts and expenditures of
over $1,000 which are required by the rules and regulations. In
addition, the audits do not include an assessment of compliance with
the rules and regulations with respect to such items as land
disposition, leasing, acquisition, and the letting of site prepara-
tion contracts. For example, although the auditor has, in a few
instances, checked whether the payments to contractors are proper,
and land disposition prices close to the appraisals, the audits did
not report on the propriety of the land disposition process (ex.
proper advertising) or the contractor bidding and selection process.
Inasmuch as the scope of audit activities is limited to
fiduciary concerns, audit reports do not address "operational" or
"performance" auditing issues such as the efficiency and effective-
ness of activities. In order to review performance aspects of
projects, the auditor would need information on costs, the accomplish-
ment of activities, and the achievement of objectives, which is
not currently collected and reported by redevelopment authorities.
Despite the above shortcomings, the reports of the state
auditor are a source of critical information on the terms of
disposition agreements, the accuracy of annual state payments,
project costs, problems, and the status of projectswhich would
not otherwise be available to DCA. The weaknesses of the reports
can largely be attributed to DCA's failure to introduce proper
reporting requirements, provide the State Auditor with a useful
format and questions for conducting audits, and utilize the reports
which are prepared.
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In the case of New Bedford, the audit reports on the redevel-
opment authority have failed to include projects which have been
delegated to other local public bodies. As a result, the Common-
wealth has almost no information on the status of these projects,
and no unit of state government has examined the propriety of the
use of state funds.
RECOMMENDATION: WORK WITH THE OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR IN
DEVELOPING A STANDARD SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES, CONTENT,
AND FORMAT FOR AUDIT REPORTS ON CHAPTER 121B
PROJECTS
The Bureau of Urban Renewal should identify questions to be
addressed by audits, and the information which should be obtained
to respond to those questions. The Bureau should decide for itself
how audit reports can be most useful for control purposes, and
approach the State Auditor's Office with suggestions for changes
to the current reports. The contents of audits should be
correlated with the information to be obtained through the new
reporting system. Recommended additions to the report might
include the following: a standard format for statistical infor-
mation; a list of items to be reviewed for DCA approval; and a
list of activities to be reviewed for compliance with the rules
and regulations. A format should be developed for comparing the
actual with the planned budget, which includes land disposition
proceeds as well as costs, and is based on unit costs and revenues
and the costs of "work packages" of activities. This format
should be the same as the one used for the new financial reporting
requirement.
DCA should also pursue with the State Auditor the possibility of
gradually expanding audit functions to include the concerns of
performance auditing. With the adoption of new mechanisms for the
reporting of information to DCA, and the introduction of new "ouput
oriented" requirements for the project plan, the auditors will have
specific efficiency and effectiveness issues to examine.
In order to provide a complete audit document, and eliminate the
present need to consult prior audit reports for a full history of
project activities, the most recent audit report should incorporate
the narrative information from earlier reports. In addition, the
Bureau of Urban Renewal should request that audits be prepared for
projects which are controlled by local public bodies other than
redevelopment authorities.
Expected Benefits:
* redevelopment authorities will be required to provide
standard information;
* auditor will monitor for compliance with rules and
regulations;
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audit reports will serve clearly defined purposes;
DCA personnel will understand and use audit reports.
Costs:
staff time and effort required to determine recommended
changes and negotiate with Office of State Auditor.
Actions Required:
establish recommendations for changes to audit reports;
contact Office of State Auditor.
Time Horizon:
* Medium Term
Constraints:
possible staff limitations at the Office of State Auditor
to assume added performance auditing functions.
Complementary/Supporting Actions:
* new reporting requirements.
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ROUNDING OFF FINANCIAL FIGURES
Management Control
Findings:
Financial computations and record keeping involving the
financial data in the project plan and the ledger are unnecessarily
complicated, cumbersome, and prone to error due to the practice
of carrying figures to the penny. Many examples of arithmetic
mistakes can be found in the calculations and recordings of the
net project cost, the state share of the net project cost, and the
annual state execution subsidy payments in the DCA ledger, the
reports of the State Auditor, and the project plans. Inasmuch as
DCA lacks such basic information as the current costs and revenues
of projects, the use of figures carried to the cent presents a
distorted impressibn of' the accuracy of the numbers used.
RECOMMENDATION: BARRING ANY LEGAL RESTRICTIONS, DCA SHOULD
ADOPT A POLICY OF ROUNDING ALL FINANCIAL
FIGURES TO THE NEAREST $10
DCA should request a legal opinion on the adoption of such a policy.
Expected Benefits:
* fewer arithmetic errors;
* fewer mistakes in transfering or copying financial
information;
* greater ease in completing and checking computations.
Costs:
* none
Actions Required:
request a legal opinion;
amend rules and regulations;
notify redevelopment authorities;
* request approval from Administration and Finance;
amend ledger and financial assistance agreements.
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Time Horizon:
* Immediate
Constraints:
* possible legal obstacles;
* possible resistance of Administration and Finance.
Complementary/supporting Actions:
financial reviews of all projects and revisions to present
state payment levels.
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COST ACCOUNTS/COST CONTROL
Management Control: The Control Structure
Findings:
Although DCA has responsibility for approving every
site clearance and project improvement expenditure and
redevelopment authority supply or equipment purchase or
rental of $1,000 or greater, contracts for real estate
services (appraisals and LUM studies), the survey and
planning budget, and the project financing plan, the
Bureau of Urban Renewal does not maintain accounts of
standard costs for project activities as a basis for
judging estimates and actual project costs. Inasmuch as
most redevelopment authorities and municipal governments
have little other development experience with which to
compare the costs of Chapter 121B project activities,
contracts are usually awarded without the aid of any
comparative cost control mechanism for assessing the
reasonableness of expenditures. In the opinion of the
former director of the 121B program, the level of payments
for project goods and services have been consistently
inflated, especially for planning and other consultant services.
Although the rules and regulations require public
bidding for site clearance and improvement work, in many
instances too few contractors are capable of undertaking
the work, or are interested in submitting bona fide bids,
to create the conditions for an effective competitive
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bidding process. The Final Project Report must contain
a statement on site clearance and improvements which
includes unit cost estimates for each site improvement,
the quantities involved, and an explanation of the basis
for unit prices. However, without cost accounts based on
historical and/or current market costs, DCA cannot assess
the legitimacy of the estimated costs. Competitive bidding
is not required for the award of consultant contracts. For
all consultant services other than planning (for which no
contract award process is specified), the regulations
indicate that the consultant is to be chosen by the
redevelopment authority from a list of names approved by
DCA, and a narrative justification for the selection is to
be provided to DCA.
In addition, DCA's authority and responsibility for
the control of project costs are not clearly defined by
the regulations. Although the statute and the rules and
regulations specify that DCA must find the proj ect
financial plan sound as one of the six conditions for project
approval (the only condition dealing with project expenditures),
the regulations do not set forth criteria for making that
finding, or DCA's role in approving individual expenditures.
Whereas the regulations call for DCA approval of contracts
for site clearance and improvement work, redevelopment
authority purchases of equipment, and real estate services,
the language of the regulations does not specifically refer
to DCA approval of the amounts of the contracts. The regulations
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state that fees for real estate services shall be "based
on prevailing rates in the community for equivalent services"
and require evidence of local prevailing rates and a
statement on the basis for the selection of the consultant.
However, there is no specific provision which declares that
DCA shall make a determination that the amounts are
reasonable. In addition, the regulations do not describe
how contracts for planning consultant services are to
be awarded or require DCA approval of such contracts.
RECOMMENDATIONS: COST ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED
ON THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:
* planning services for each of the
components of the survey and planning
application and the final project report;
* appraisal reports;
* LUM studies or other economic
feasibility studies;
* site clearance work (unit costs);
* various site improvements (unit costs);
* legal assistance services;
* management and maintenance of acquired
property;
* acquisition expenses: preparation of
contracts for acquisition appraisals,
option negotiations, title searches, etc.;
* redevelopment authority staff salaries.
The cost accounts should contain actual
project expenditures for these items
on past projects and average costs
for these items based on historical
costs adjusted for inflation. In addition.
DCA should conduct an annual survey
to determine current costs for these
items in the private market.
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Expected Benefits:
Costs:
Actions Required:
Time Horizon:
Constraints:
Complementary/
Supporting Actions:
RECOMMENDATION:
Expected Benefits:
Costs:
Actions Required:
* increased capability for DCA and
redevelopment authorities to assess
the proper costs for activities;
* improved cost control by DCA.
* time and effort of DCA staff in
preparing a format for the cost
accounts, assembling the data, and
performing the annual survey of market
costs.
* see costs.
* medium term.
* unavailability of historical data.
* introduction of new efficiency
reporting requirements.
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS SHOULD BE
AMENDED TO CLEARLY REQUIRE DCA TO MAKE
A DETERMINATION THAT ALL PROJECT
EXPENDITURES OF $1,000 OR GREATER ARE
REASONABLE
* clarify DCA's responsibility and
authority in cost control;
* increase DCA's attention to cost control,
* staff time and effort to maintain
cost accounts for making comparative
judgements on estimated and actual
project costs, and review all project
expenditures of $1,000 or greater.
* amend rules and regulations by
noting DCA's role in approving expenditures;
* set up and maintain cost accounts on
project activities.
Time Horizon: * medium term.
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Constraints': * resistance of redevelopment
authority personnel to an increase
in DCA's review powers;
* inadequate staff resources to establish
cost accrounts and expeditiously review
project expenditures.
Complementary/
Supporting Actions: * introduction of efficiency reporting
requirements.
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Table t
Economic Development Administration Public Facilities Grants
For Public and Nonprofit Industrial Parks In Massachusetts
Municipality Project Name Recipient Contact Approval Amount
Date
Boston Alsen-Mapes
Industrial Park
Marine
Industrial Park
Charlestown
Navy Yard
Brockton,
Fall River
Fitchburg
Gardner
231 Industrial
Park*
East Gardner
Industrial Park*
Gloucester
Haverhill
indicates Chapter 121B State-
aided industrial parks
Economic :
Development &
Industrial
Commission
EDIC
Boston
Redevelopment
Authority
Industrial
Development
Commission
Fitchburg
Redevelopment
Authority
Gardner
Redevelopment
Authority
Cape Ann Econ.
Development
Committee
Economic
Development
Industrial
Corporation
Phil Corbett
725-3342
Phil Corbett
725-3342
Chris Knowles
722-4300
George
Darmody
City Hall
K. Lindner, FRA
R. Moriarty,
City Hall
Charles
Asher, GRA
632-3775
Don Field
281-1744
William
Kenned
374-0549
June '74
Sept. '76
Nov. '76
June '74
Sept. '68
March '75
June '73
March '71
Feb. '74
$ 412,000
$3,438,400
$3,710,000
$ 308,000
$1,032,000
$1,812,000
$1,026,900
$ 68o,ooo
$i,424,000
June '66 $1,669,000
New Bedford Maritime
Terminal*
North Terminal
Bulkhead*
Newburyport
Development
Authority
it
Harbor
Development
Commission
Industrial
Development
Commission
Markham
458-8766
"t
Paul
Saunders
Fred Rueben
Fred
Cusick
Dick
Walega,
Plann. Dept.
Mayor's
Office
Joe
Sullivan
North
Attleboro
Palmer
Plymouth
Pittsfield
Taunton
Worcester
Palmer
Industrial Park*
Palmer
Redevelopment
Authority
Mel
Coombs
Berkshire Al
County Develop. Mauden
Commission
Industrial
Development
Commission
Air
Industrial Park
Dec. '73
Aug. '69
Jan. '74
June '72
Oct . '72
March '68
April '76
413-499-4474
Bill
McAloon
George
Ciccone
June '74
Feb. '76
Aug. '76
$ 471,000
517,000
$ 360,000
$ 299,000
$ 945,000
$ 394,000
$ 231,000
$ 858,000
$ 422,000
$2,529,000
Lowell C ity Tom
Chicopee Air
Industrial
Park
Western
Met. Dev.*
Corporation
Eric
Peerson
413-593-6421
June '75 :1 ,522,QU
In Processing:
Wareham Town of
Wareham
Jack
Healey
295-0800
Centennial
Industrial
Park*
Peabody $2,666,559
Redevelopment
Authority
Plymouth
Peabody
PART III
CHAPTER 121B INDUSTRIAL LAND
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CASES
PART III
CHAPTER 121B INDUSTRIAL LAND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT CASES
* ATTLEBORO
* BROCKTON
* FITCHBURG
* GARDNER
* HOLYOKE
* LAWRENCE
* METHUEN
NEW BEDFORD (3)
* NORTHAMPTON
* PALMER
* PEABODY
* WILMINGTON
* WOBURN
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Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost
(Financial Gain):
State Payments
to Date:
City Financial
Gain:
Status:
Model Aspects:
ATTLEBORO
Attleboro Industrial Park
150 acres
Industrial
($1,300,000) approximate amount by which dis-
position proceeds will exceed total costs of
project development
-0-
$1,300,000 estimated gain exclusive of tax
revenues; can be viewed as return for donation
of municipal property for project; approx.
$1,000,000 obtained up to present time has been
invested by Authority to provide income for oper-
ations.
All of project property has been assembled and
all site improvements have been completed. As
of 4/77, approximately 64% of park land had been
sold to firms. Project has provided substantial
net positive fiscal flows to city and net
additional jobs from expanding local firms and
out-of-area firms moving to park locations.
* Principally an intra-community industrial re-
location project: industrial park project was
developed to serve expansion needs of firms
located near congested Central Business District;
most of firms which have moved to park have come
from locations within Attleboro.
* A substantial amount of municipally owned tax
title property was utilized for the project:
approximately 2/3 of land used for park was
municipal property which was transferred to
Redevelopment Authority for a nominal payment.
* No state or municipal execution subsidy required:
proceeds from land disposition exceed project
development costs; total proceeds from disposi-
tion of approximately 64% of project property,
less costs *for site improvements which have been
financed mostly out of proceeds from land sales,
have amounted to approximately $1,000,000; it
is estimated that when property disposition has
been completed and all development-costs have
been incurred, disposition proceeds will exceed
project development costs by at least $1,300,000;
inasmuch as City of Attleboro donated 108 acres
of municipally owned property for 150 acre
project, financial gain from development of
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project can be viewed as a return for municipal
property; however, Authority has retained
$1,000,000 for investments which provide income
to pay for ongoing operations.
* Project in a heavily industrial city of modest
size which has experienced long term growth but
contains mostly jobs offering somewhat low average
annual wages: population of city grew steadily
from 1920 to 1970, including an increase from
23,809 persons in '50 to 32,907 persons in '70,
but has remained stable since 1970; manufacturing
jobs account for approx. 73% of total city employ-
ment ('74 DES) and almost 18,000 manufacturing
jobs in Attleboro rank city ninth in Commonwealth;
Attleboro does not suffer from serious fiscal or
unemployment problems and income statistics indi-
cate that city population is more prosperous than
those of Bristol County and Commonwealth; never-
theless, overall average annual wage in city
($8,216 in '74: DES) and average annual wage in
manufacturing ($8,674 in '74: DES) are somewhat
low compared with fitures for other cities in
Commonwealth.
* Executive Director and Board members of Redevelop-
ment Authority initiated project as members of
local Industrial Development Commission: Authority
Executive Director and Board members had partici-
pated in successful development and marketing of
a smaller industrial park without state involve-
ment (i.e. no use of eminent domain powers, state
planning advances, or execution subsidies) as
members of local Industrial Development Commission.
* Development Strategy: land parcels are sold by
Redevelopment Authority to individual firms.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers: eminent domain powers
were used to acquire only a couple of small parcels;
need for use of eminent domain powers was only
reason application was made to DCA.
* No state advance of planning funds; No state
execution subsidy.
* Project was made possible by construction of 1-95
by Commonwealth; project was initiated after state
completed work on 1-95 which passes along a border
of park.
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* No assistance provided by DCA with respect to
development activities or coordination with other
state agencies; DCA management control and project
management weaknesses have limited benefits
achieved by project; Failure of DCA to establish
an adequate information system for regular report-
ing of data on status and impacts of projects has
limited ability of DCA to monitor and assist
project and Commonwealth to assess merits of
and improve design and operation of program;
Absence of a "non-relocation" regulation allows
firms to move from high priority development areas
to locations in park and, thus, allows project
to subvert statte economiic development objectives;
inasmuch as Attleboro's employment problem is not
a matter of high levels of unemployment but of
a concentration of low wage jobs, firm selection
criteria and an employment program, which have
not been established, are required to insure that
public employment objectives are met through
hiring of local under- and unemployed residents
in "primary labor market" quality jobs; absence
of an information system for reporting on project
impacts has deprived DCA of data on previous
locations of firms which have moved to park and
number and characteristics of persons employed
by these firms at present and in past; since
project has resulted in significant positive
net economic development benefits, lack of de-
tailed information on impacts is especially un-
fortunate; without a detailed analysis of project
costs and benefits, state legislators and policy
makers in executive branch of state government
formulate inaccurate views of program based on
crises during development phases rather than
economic outcomes; failure of DCA to establish
a "non-relocation" regulation to prohibit move-
ment of firms out of high priority development
areas, such as New Bedford, Fall River, or
Brockton, may have allowed project to subvert
state economic development objectives.
municipal: Limited amount of municipal infrastructure
investment: city spent approximately $75,000
for some initial utility improvements; remaining
project site improvements, by far most of project
infrastructure, were financed entirely-rom
proceeds of land sales.
Redevelopment Authority in-house planning:
executive director of Authority prepared project
plan.
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Actors: * City of Attleboro: assumed $75,000 cost of
initial site improvements and donated 108 acres
of- municipal property.
* Attleboro Redevelopment Authority: was formed
in order to undertake industrial park project;
Board and staff personnel are members of local
Industrial Development Commission which initiated
project; four members of Board are bankers;
executive director has maintained a personal
commitment to project; in addition to preparing
project plan, exeuctive director has assumed
responsibility for all phases of development and
marketing; Authority prepares an annual report
which indicates fiscal impact of project as well
as activities occurring during year; additional
activities of Authority have included: assistance
on a federally funded solid waste disposal study;
assistance to local industry on meeting anti-
pollution regulations; work related to creating
a regional water district; and obtaining free
land fill to improve grading of industrial park;
Authority has accumulated approximately $1 million
from proceeds of land sales which has been invested
to supply income for operating expenses.
* Industrial Development Commission: conceived of
project after successfully completing a smaller
industrial park without state involvement; formed
Redevelopment Authority with City approval in
order to utilize eminent domain powers; provided
funding for staff of Authority and planning ex-
penses.
* DCA: has played a minor role in past; DCA has
exhibited a "hands-off" attitude toward project
because no state planning or exeuction subsidy
funds have been required; see above section on
DCA under program components for comments on DCA's
past role.
Performance
Process Measures: Note: Due to limited project records at DCA and
lack of an adequate information system for reporting
on status of projects, little information is
available on project development process.
* Implementation Process: project execution phase
was approved in 3/66; executive director has been
responsible for preparing project plan, supervising
development activities, and marketing park; al-
though plan prepared by exeuctive director lacked
104
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proper DCA format and qualities of a professional
presentation, it reflected clear and detailed
thinking about project; at time of first contact
with DCA, following activities had already occurred:
plan was completed; acquisition prices had been
negotiated with a local firm; disposition nego-
tiations had begun with three other local firms;
city had authorized transfer of 108 acres to
Redevelopment Authority; costs of an access road
and utilities had been determined; standards for
park design, landscaping, and maintenance had
been prepared; and city had committed $75,000 for
initial improvements; although original project
plan called for a 7 to 10 year land absorption
period, recession of early seventies brought land
sales to a halt; at present time, all of project
property has been assembled and all site improve-
ments have been completed; as of 4/77, approxi-
mately 64% of park land had been sold to firms.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Attleboro, as
measured by tax rate on equalized value, is
significantly lower than median average for Mass.
cities ($43.20 for Attleboro compared to, $48.10
median in '76) and has remained stable over a
number of years, except for a recent sharp rise
in '77 (real estate tax rate per $1,000 AV in-
creased by $8.50 in '77); city experienced a
steady increase in population from 1920 to 1970
but has experienced a levelling off of population
since '70; only 57.5% of city's housing units
were built prior to 1939 according to 1970 Census;
Attleboro is a major industrial center in Common-,
wealthdespite its modest sizewith manufacturing
jobs accounting for approx. 73% of total city
employment ('74 DES); position of Attleboro in
1-95 Boston to Providence corridor has proven
to be an attractive location for industry; con-
centration of jewelry industry in Attleboro and
nearby Rhode Island communities strongly sug-
gests presence of agglomeration economies which
serve to maintain that industry in city; on a
negative fiscal note, Attleboro has neglected
to improve and replace old bridges, roads, and
city facilities; a major renovation of city
sewer system is underway; costs of these necessary
physical improvements will increase demands on
city tax base; nevertheless, local fiscal need
is a weak basis for justifying state assistance
and a public industrial park project in Attleboro.
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* Employment Need: as indicated above, Attleboro's
economy is dominated by manufacturing: approxi-
mately 77% of all manufacturing jobs (approx. 56%
of all city employment in. '74: DES) consist of
employment in two industry categories of electrical
machinery (approx. 43.2% of manufacturing employ-
ment in '74: DES) and jewelry (approx. 34% of
manufacturing employment in '74: DES); Texas
Instruments is largest employer with more than
6,000 employees (approx. 37% of manufacturing
employment in '74: DES; 27% of all city employment)
and Balfour and Swanks are principle employers in
jewelry; unemployment rate in city is consistently
below state average (4.6% in 1/77 compared with
a state figure of 7.6%); general prosperity of
residents is indicated by a comparison of percent-
ages of city's population in lowest two income
groupings and city per capita income with figures
for Bristol County and Commonwealth (1970 Census):
incomes under $3,000 A 5%, B 8.6%, Mass. 6.4%;
incomes $3,000-$5,999 = A 10.0%, B 15.1%, Mass.
11.8%; per capita income = A $3,385, B $2,938,
Mass. $3,425; however, overall average annual
wage for all city employment is somewhat low
($8,216 in '74: DES) and average annual wage for
manufacturing is relatively low ($8,674 in '74:
DES); jewelry industry offers a low average
annual wage ($7,994 in '74: DES) and electrical
machinery firms provide a modest average annual
wage ($9,132 in '74: DES); therefore, state
assistance and a public industrial park project
can only be justified on basis of employment need
if land is marketed to firms offering "primary i
labor market" quality employment and an employ-
ment program is established to insure that under-
and unemployed local residents are hired.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: Project has pro-
vided substantial net positive fiscal flows to
Attleboro; city expects to gain approximately
$1,300,000 from assembly and disposition of
project property; as of 11/74 park was contributing
$252,281 per year in taxes to city as compared
with a pre-park real estate tax payment of $350
per year from property; as remaining land is sold
this return will increase significantly; in
addition, considerable industrial development
has occurred outside of park boundaries as a
consequence of roads and utilities brought to
area for project; as of 11/74 this induced
development had resulted in an additional $59,301
in annual taxes to Attleboro; total net increase
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of $311,000 in annual taxes traceable to project
translated into a tax rate reduction of approxi-
mately $1. 50 in 1974; furthermore, although no
information is available on reuse of space vacated
by expanding local firms which have located in
park, one objective of project was upgrading of
CBD after manufacturing firms move to park.
* Employment Impacts: due to lack of an adequate
information system-for reporting on impacts of
projects, detailed information is not available
on number of new jobs that have been added to
state and local economy from firm expansions,
business start-ups, or out-of-state firms moving
to park due in part to advantages of park loca-
tion, or characteristics of persons employed by
these firms; nevertheless, local firms have ex-
panded to locations in park and retention of
these firms within Attleboro has allowed for
physical access to jobs for unemployed city resi-
dents; however, absence of a "non-relocation"
regulation which prohibits movement of firms out
of high priority development areas may have
allowed project to subvert state economic develop-.'
ment objectives by permitting such moves; in
addition, inasmuch as public employment objectives
are served by project only if park is marketed
to firms offering "primary labor market" quality
jobs to under- and unemployed persons, absence
of firm selection criteria based on employment
impacts and a public employment program have
limited employment benefits from project; an
appropriate employment program might consist of
targeting of manpower training funds to project,
inclusion of performance clauses on hiring of
unemployed as part of disposition agreements,
and establishing referral relationships between
firms and vocational education programs.
* Growth of the State Economy: if in-state firms
have expanded, businesses started-up, or out-of-
state firms located in park due in part to in-
creased efficiency from advantages particular
to park and Attleboro, such as excellent high-
way transportation resources, availability of
low wage labor, or presence of agglomeration
economies related to jewelry or electrical
machinery industries, project has contributed
to state economic growth; without more detailed
information on kinds of firms located in park
and reasons for location decisions of firms, it
is difficult to assess contribution project has
made to economic growth; however, evidence of
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expansion of local firms to park, and original
justification for project as an effort to provide
space for local firms seeking to move out of in-
efficient, congested space in CBD, suggest that
project has succeeded in promoting growth; never-
theless, without more detailed information,
effect of agglomeration economies or other park
advantages in contributing to growth cannot be
assessed.
* Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: concen-
tration of jewelry industry in Attleboro and
nearby Rhode Island communities strongly suggests
that agglomeration economies are present; if park
land has been sold to firms in jewelry or jewelry
related businesses, project has contributed to
strengthening these economies which provide
aggregate economic benefits to state economy by
enabling local expanding firms, firm start-ups,
and/or out-of-area firms in jewelry and related
industries to locate in Attleboro and has promoted
growth by providing modern space to these firms
which was not available.
* Induced Effects: considerable industrial develop-
ment has occurred outisde of park boundaries as
a consequence of roads and utilities brought to
area for park project.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy:
lack of detailed information on firms which have
located in p.ark precludes an assessment of whether
project has achieved its potential for increasing
diversity of Attleboro's economic base.
The Attleboro Industrial Park project was conceived
of and initiated by members of the local Industrial
Development Commission. The Commission had acquired
a successful "track record" with the development
of a smaller industrial park in Attleboro without
state assistance of any kind. The need for the
use of eminent domain powers precipitated the
formation of the Redevelopment Authority and the
application to DCA. The project was undertaken
to serve the needs of a particular market: local
firms located near the congested centtal business
district which needed expansion space. Three
local firms were committed to moving to the park
even before DCA was first contacted about the
project. All of the available evidence indicates
that the Board members and the Executive Director
of the Redevelopment Authority have been skilled,
dedicated, and honest. In order to remedy the
current lack of information on the impacts from
3OB
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the project, a questionnaire has been sent to
the Authority.
Judgement: The City of Attleboro does not warrant state
assistance and a public industrial development
project on the basis of local fiscal or unemploy-
ment problems. However, the project may have
been justified on the basis of a potential for
achieving public employment and state growth ob-
jectives, evidence of agglomeration economies,
a need to diversify the local economy, a potential
for positive net municipal fiscal flows, and a
potential for induced development. In addition,
the recourse to eminent domain powers to assemble
the property suggests that private development
of the site may not have been possible. The
absence of an information system for reporting
on the impacts of the project has seriously limited
the ability of DCA to assess the outcomes of the
project. Nevertheless, it appears that the pro-
ject has provided substantial positive fiscal
flows to Attleboro and employment benefits to
local residents, and has contributed to the
growth of the state economy. By providing
modern industrial park space within Attleboro,
the project has enabled unemployed local resi-
dents to have physical access to jobs and has
enabled jewelry and jewelry related firms to
locate and expand in Attleboro where they can
take advantage of agglomeration economies not
available at other locations. Nevertheless, the
absence of firm selection criteria based on
employment and other economic development objec-
tives, the failure to establish an explicit
public employment program to insure that under-
and unemployed local residents are hired by
firms offering "primary labor market" quality
jobs, and lack of a "non-relocation" regulation
to prohibit the relocation of firms out of high
priority development areas to park locations,
have limited the employment and other benefits
derived from the project. For a project in a
community not suffering from fiscal and unemploy-
ment needs to serve publicly valued economic
development objectives, steps must be taken to
manage the project with reference to specific
objectives.
In summary, the key factors which have contributed
to the general success of the project include:
a large amount of municipally owned property, a
competent and dedicated Redevelopment Authority
Board and Executive Director, the construction
of a major interstate highway, a local market of
30q-
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expanding firms (which may or may not be related
to agglomeration economies), and a desirable
location.
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Location: BROCKTON
Project Name: Brockton Industrial Park
Size: 188 acres
Type: Industrial
Reuse:
Net Project Cost: $569,500 (original budget estiMate 1169)
State Share: $284,750 (one-half of estimated net project cost;
principal only)
City Share: $284,750 (one half of estimated net project cost
not including bond interest costs which are entirely
borne by city.
State Payments to Date:
Note on Net
Project Cost: $1901,000 of city'is share of net project cost
consists of estimated cash value of municipal
property donated for project. Actual project
costs to 6/76 have been $124,190 below project
budget estimate and actual disposition proceeds
from land sales have been $112,508 grea-ter than
budget estimate. As a result, current net project
cost is $332,801 or $236,698 below projected net
project cost. Because $190,000 of net project
cost to 6/76 represents estimated value of miuni-
cipally owned land donated for project, actual
cash net project cost is $142,801. Inasmuch as
Commonwealth has paid $113,900 to city in eight
equal installments since 1969, city is currently
assuming a cash net project cost burden of only
$28,901 (ignoring any interest costs borne by
city on funds initially advanced by Brockton for
development expenses). Furthermore, in light
of fact that Redevelopment Authority is not
currently assuming any additional project costs
for administration or marketing efforts, state
payments of $14,237.50 in years '77 and '78 will
eliminate any local cash share of net project
cost, and payments beyond '78 will represent
net positive cash flows to city. Moreover,
any additional sales of remaining land parcels
will serve to decrease net project cost and,
therefore, more quickly eliminate local cash share
of net project cost and provide positive net
cash flows to Brockton. These calculations assume
that Commonwealth will maintain annual payments
at their current level and no additional costs will be
incurred by Authority for project. Thus, if no addi-
tional land is sold, no additional costs are incurred,
and Commonwealth pays entire $284,750 original
estimated state share of net project cost in annual
payments through 1987, city will receive $141,948 from
state beyond all net cash project costs. In effect,
city would be paid $141,948 by state for donation
of municipallyjowned land for, project. Thus, Brockton' s
share of actual net project cost would consist of a non-
cash subsidy equal to difference between $190,000 esti-
mated value of donated land and $141,948 from state,
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whereas Commonwealth would subsidize project with $284,750
in cash. Of course, if $190,000 over estimates value
of municipal land donated for project and/or additional
land is sold (which is likely at some time in
future even without additional marketing efforts),
Brockton may end up receiving net positive "trans-
fer payments" from Commonwealth as a consequence
of development of this project.
Status: Approximately 75% of park property has been sold
to firms. However, due to low labor intensity
of some uses (warehousing, distribution) and poor
quality of jobs offered by firms, project has
not achieved its potential for providing positive
employment benefits. Failure to establish firm
selection criteria based on employment objectives,
specify uses in disposition agreements with firms,
and insure firm hiring of unemployed are attribut-
able to weak project management by DCA, Redevelop-
ment Authority, and Industrial Development Com-
mission. No marketing efforts are currently under-
way or planned for remaining land in park.
Model Aspects: * Project developed entirely on donated city owned
property: property had been a wetlands area used
for a city dump; estimated value of property was
included as a cost of project and, therefore,
city donation of land was originally intended
to serve as part of municipal share of net project
cost.
* Redevelopment Authority delegated responsibility
for development of project to local Industrial
Development Commission: pursuant to Section 50
of Chapter 121B, Brockton Redevelopment Authority
delegated its functions for planning, development,
and marketing of project to Industrial Development
Commission and continued to serve merely as a
conduit for state payments.
* Project in a major "economically depressed"
urban center: city had been a major manufacturing
community as largest shoe producing center in
nation; with post-World War II flight of most
of shoe industry city had little other industry
to build on; city now manifests "depressed" area
characteristics of chronic high unemployment,
high real estate taxes, and general physical de-
cline; Brockton is sixth largest city in Common-
wealth and continued population growth may move
city past New Bedford and Fall River into fourth
position; city has experienced an overall employ-
ment shift from relatively high wage manufacturing
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jobs to large numbers of relatively low wage.
jobs in service sector industries and a shift
within manufacturing portion of economy to lower
wage jobs; this change in composition of eco-
nomic base, which has increased proportion of
"secondary labor market" quality jobs in city,
accounts for simultaneous occurrence of high
unemployment, a large population increase,
relatively high family incomes, and an increasing
city fiscal burden- from added demands on city
services.
* Development Strategies: (a) parcels are sold
by Industrial Development Commission to individual
firms; no information is available on whether
any other strategies are used.
Program Components:-
state: * No eminent domain powers: all property for
project was donated by city; land had been used
as a city dump.
* No state planning advance: there is no evidence
that DCA advanced any funds for survey and planning
phase of project.
* State execution subsidy.
* Feasibility of project a consequence of con-
struction of State Route 24 by Commonwealth:
project property is divided into two large sections
by an "interstate quality" express highway also
known as Fall River Expressway; Route 24 runs
directly from Fall River to Boston, passing
through Brockton and connecting with Rt. 128 13
miles north of Brockton; highway funding was
provided by Federal Highway Administration and
Mass. Department of Public Works.
* Failure of DCA to properly monitor and manage
project with reference to state and local eco-
nomic development objectives has resulted in
low employment benefits from project and im-
proper levels of state assistance payments, and
has contributed to present project standstill;
Future progress and greater achievement of economic
development objectives will depend largely on
ability of DCA to assist Authority or some other
local public body in formulating and executing
a marketing strategy for project; lack of DCA
monitoring of a comparison of actual project
costs with original estimated budget, has
allowed project to come almost to point where
annual state payments provide net .positive cash
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flows to city - i.e. city will soon not be
assuming any cash subsidy for project but will
be receiving cash revenues from Commonwealth;
failure of DCA to insist on firm selection
criteria based on quality and number of jobs
provided- by businesses locating in park, and
review disposition agreements to insure that
reuse with respect to employment objectives is
specified, has allowed for land sales to firms
with low labor intensity uses and poor employ-
ment quality and for firms to substitute low
labor intensity uses for verbally agreed upon hi-gh
labor intensity uses; absence of an adequate reporting
system has deprived DCA of information needed to com-
pare actual with estimated costs and assess impacts
from project; current state of project inactiity is
partly attributable to failure of DCA' to provide market-
ing assistance and general support, despite investment of
a considerable amount of funds of Commonwealth in
a project with potential to achieve valued state
economic development objectives (state is actually,
assuming entire net project cost for this project);
therefore, DCA should require that local officials
in Brockton determine which public body shall
assume responsibility for marketing of remaining
land in park and should assist that body with
marketing in following ways: help to formulate
firm selection criteria based on assets of park
and desired quality and labor intensity of firm
employment; assess whether access to Rt. 24
from park should and can be improved with federal,
state, or local funds; help local public body
establish an employment program for park, with
assistance of Dept. of Manpower Development, by
targeting of manpower training funds, improving
of transportation to park for inner city resi-
dents, and requiring firms locating in park to
hire some unemployed persons; and obtain cooper-
ation of Dept. of Commerce and Development in
marketing park through its business contact pro-
gram and out-of-state promotional activities and
helping to target public sources of business
capital to park (ex. MIMIA, MBDC, SBA, etc.)
municipal: * Municipal expenditures: total city share of
net project cost (principal only) was originally
projected to be $284,750; however, see above
introductory "Note on Net Project Costs."
federal: * Partial funding for highway necessary for
feasibility of project.
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Actors: * City of Brockton: advance of up-front develop-
ment expenses; see introductory "Note on Net
Project Costs" for discussion of city subsidiza-
tion of project.
* Brockton Redevelopment Authority: Authority
was formed in 11/57; Authority has been active
with a federally and state aided low/moderate
income housing and comercial urban renewal pro-
ject since 1970 and with a residential/commercial
Central Business project subsidized with state
urban renewal funds and federal Community Develop-
ment Block Grant funds since 1974; little
information is available in DCA files on role
of Authority in initiating and managing industrial
park project; Authority delegated responsibility
for planning, developing and marketing project to
local Industrial Development Commission; at present,
park does not receive any attention from Authority
staff despite absence of marketing activity from
Industrial Development Commission; Authority
Executive Director views industrial park project
as a failure and is not interested in any attempts
to generate positive benefits from remaining land;
director considers poor access to adjacent Rts.
24 and 123 as a major liability for future
marketing efforts; Authority has recently been
engulfed in controversy over its CBD project so
it is unlikely that Executive: Director will find
time or inclination for working on industrial
-park.
* Industrial Development Commission: at present
time, no information has been obtained on nature
of activities of local Industrial Development
Commission with respect to planning, development,
and marketing functions delegated by Authority to
Commission for this project; DCA also lacks
information on current status of Commission but
it is known that no marketing efforts 'with respect
to park are now underway.
* DCA: see above section in program components.
* Dept. of Public Works: responsible for con-
struction of Rt. 24 which was essential for
development of project.
* Dept. of Commerce and Development: in order
to help future marketing of park to achieve state
and local economic development objectives, DCD
should provide marketing assistance through its
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business contact program and out-of-state promo-
tional activities and lend support for targeting
of public sources of business capital to park
(ex. MIMIA, MBDC, CDFC, SBA, etc.).
* Dept. of Manpower Development: in order to in-
sure that future marketing of park will achieve
desired employment objectives, and as a boost
to marketing effort, DMD should assist local
public body to develop an employment program for
hiring and training of unemployed by park firms;
ingredients for such a program might include:
targeting of manpower training funds (ex. CETA,
TAP); requirements for firms locating in park to
hire under- and unemploycd persons; improvement
of transportation from inner city to park; on-
going training relationships established with
local Vocational schools; and identification of
target industries based on existing skills of
local residents and quality and labor intensity
of jobs offered by firms.
Performance
Process Measures:
Effedtiveness
Measures:
* Implementation Process: little information is
available from DCA files on activities during
planning and execution phases; critical dates
suggest that project moved at a decent pace
through all phases of development; survey and
planning application was approved in 10/66; DCA
did not advance funds for planning and it is not
known how plans were prepared; project execution
phase was approved in 2/69; all site improve-
ments have been completed and acquisition pre-
sented little problem because all land was
municipally owned; marketing probably began in
1972; approximately 50 out of 188 project acres
remain unsold at present time; most of sold
property was disposed of in '72 and '73; only
two minor sales occurred between 7174 and 6/76;
actual project costs to 6/76 have been $124,190
below budgeted costs and all improvements have
been completed; total disposition proceeds to
6/76 have exceeded original estimated returns
by $112,508; combined effect of these two
factors has been to reduce net project cost from
a projected $569,500 to an actual $332,801; at
present, no active marketing effort is being
undertaken to promote sale of remaining acreage.
* Fiscal Need: Brockton clearly warrants state
assistance and aid and a public project on basis
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of fiscal need; tax burden in Brockton, as measured
by tax rate on equalized value, is substantially
higher than median average for Mass. cities and
has increased considerably and steadily over a
number of years, especially recently; $54.20 in
'76 and $61.00 in '77; prior to World War II,
city was major shoe producing center in nation,
but it lost most of that industry to Maine and
southern communities which offered cheaper labor
during post-war period; local political domination
by shoe producers limited development of other
industries prior to war; city consistently has
one of highest unemployment rates in Commonwealth;
physical decline in some older neighborhoods is
evident; concentration of unemployed and low wage
earners has led to increased demands on city
services; despite these growing problems, however,
Brockton remains an attractive community in which
to live and continues to account for 57% of jobs
(with only 49% of people) in a densely populated
and majcr employment SISA in Commonwealth.
Employment Need: despite evidence of many "de-
pressed area" characteristics, Brockton manifests
other features which, at first glance, appear
to suggest a city of greater prosperity: (a)
substantial population growth (an increase of
33,060 persons, 53%, from 1955 to 1975, including
an increase of 6,648 persons from '71 to '75);
(b) a median income level almost equal to figure
for its Metropolitan Area; and (c) percentages
of city population in lowest two income groupings
are higher than percentages for SMSA but almost
equal to percentages for Commonwealth as a whole
(1970 Census: incomes under $3,000 = B 6.6%,
SMSA 5.7%, Mass. 6.4%; incomes $3,000-$5,999
B 11.9%, SMSA 10.7%, Mass. 11.8%); however,
these statistics reflect a high number of multi-
income families which are a result of predominantly
low wage employment offered by industry mix in
city; prior to World War II, almost entire work
force was employed in shoe industry or in firms
supplying needs of shoe industry; in 1929, sixty
shoe producers employed 30,000 workers; when shoe
firms left city, littlesother industry remained
due to prior discouragement of other industries
by shoe manufacturers who controlled city govern-
ment; manufacturing now accounts for approximately
24% of city employment, with wholesale and retail
trade contributing approx. 34% and service firms
approx. 19% of city's jobs (1974: DES); approx.
24% of manufacturing jobs are in relatively low
wage and declining leather and leather products
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firms ($8,500 average annual wage in city: '74);
in addition, even lower paying textile and
apparel firms ($6,995 average annual wage in
city: '74) have recently replaced many leather
firms in old mill buildings in Brockton and now
account for approx. 25% of manufacturing employ-
ment as well; moreover, strong growth of whole-
sale and retail trade and services in Brockton
has, with exception of wholesale jobs (only 14%
of these two sectors), increased number of jobs
paying below average annual wage in city (DES:
'74 average annual wages in city = all employment
$7,900, all manufacturing a $8,500, retail =
$5,241, wholesale = $10,354, services = $7,167);
as a consequence of this shift from manufacturing
to services, Brockton now manifests highest per-
centage of total employment in wholesale and retail
trade of any Major Labor Market Area in Common-
wealth (approx. 34% compared with next highest
Boston at approx. 28%) and second highest per-
centage of employment in all services (approx.
62% compared with Boston at 71%); however, whereas
Boston leads all areas in high paying Finance,
Insurance & Real Estate service sector, with
9% of total employment, Brockton just beats out
New Bedford for last place with 4% of total
employment in this service sector; these shifts
in total employment mix, and mix within manu-
facturing, largely account for simultaneous
occurrence of population growth, high unemployment,
increased fiscal burdens from greater demands on
city services, and relatively good family incomes
in Brockton; Brocktcn's new jobs manifest
characteristics of what has been termed a "second-
ary labor market," which include low pay, ab-
sence of job security, high turnover, lack of
advancement opportunity, no unionization, poor
working conditions, etc.; with shift to these
lower paying jobs and rise in cost of living,
families have been forced to rely on more than
one wage earner or more than one job for princi-
pal wage earner (thus accounting for relatively
high median family income level in city);
secondary labor market qualities of these jobs
encourage workers to move frequently between
unemployment and welfare and empiloyment status;
this high rate of job turnover results in high
unemployment rates while, at same time, offering
ready availability of employment which attracts
unemployed migrants seeking jobs; studies have
statistically linked total levels of welfare pay-
ments, unemployment rates, and prevalence of
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multi-income families with jobs offering
"secondary labor market" quality employment;
one recent study has also found a stronger
relationship between "sub-employment" (i.e.
secondary labor market employment) and crime
than between degree of unemployment and crime;
therefore, although growth of textile, apparel,
food processing, retail, and selected service
employment is now hailed by some as marking a
recovery for Brockton, increases in relative
proportion of these jobs with secondary labor
market qualities will actually serve to worsen
Brockton's fiscal and employment problems; if
jobs added to city pay less than current average
annual wage and encourage migration, growth
will not achieve economic development objective
of higher per capita income, but will reduce
that measure of economic well being; statistical
evidence indicates that Brockton's economic
mix is adverse relative to its SMSA: (a) although
Brockton contributes 57% of jobs in SMSA, al-
most 31% of SMSA employment is accounted for by
manufacturing jobs (which pay more than other
sectors on average) compared with only 24% for
City of Brockton; and -(b) Brockton accounts
for 80% of textile and apparel, 60% of leather,
64% of service, and 60% of wholesale and retail
trade in SMSA (these low wage :sectors account
for 60% of SMSA employment), but only 22% of
higher paying jobs (approx. $11,500 average
annual wage) in growing primary metal, fabri-
cated metal products, and machinery (ex. electri-
cal) industry groups in SMSA; therefore, in
light of detremental shift of employment mix
in Brockton, state assistance and aid and a pub-
lic industrial park project have been justified
only if park has been marketed to firms offering
"primary labor market" quality employment and
a program to employ under- and unemployed persons
has been initiated.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: although detailed
figures have not been collected, project definitely
has resulted in positive net fiscal flows to city;
up to present time, project has cost city only
$28,901 in cash for net project cost subsidy,
donation of municipally owned land valued at
$190,000, and modest amount of interest costs
on advances of intial development expenses;
property,which had been a city dump, was not con-
tributing tax revenues prior to project and it
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is unlikely that unimproved 188 acres could have
been readily sold for $190,000 or a private park
as large as this project would have been
developed; 75% of project property was quickly
marketed and has been contributing substantial
tax revenues to city; as Commonwealth continues
to pay originally estimated state share of net
project cost in annual installments, Brockton's
fiscal returns from project will improve (see
introductory "Note on Net Project Costs");
furthermore, if remaining land is sold, additional
annual tax revenues will flow to city.
* Employment Impacts: as a result of DCA, Redevelop-
ment Authority, and Industrial Development Commission
Project management weaknesses, parh has not achieved its
potential for meeting employment needs of state
and community which justified undertaking of
project; neither DCA, Authority, nor IDC required
that disposition agreements with firms specify
uses in order to insure that desirable numbers
of jobs and job quality would result; consequently,
largest firm to locate in park, Knapp Shoe Co.,
has built a warehouse, retail outlet, and a large
parking lot on land purchased in park, rather
than factory which had been promised in a verbal
agreement; Knapp has retained its factory in New
Hampshire while locating a warehouse in Brockton
in order to maintain its long established national
trademark and bring distribution closer to major
market areas; lack of firm selection criteria
and limited review by DCA and Authority allowed
additional low labor intensity warehousing and
distribution uses to locate in park; absence of
firm selection criteria related to state and
local economic development objectives has allowed
much of park property to be sold to firms offering
"secondary labor market" quality employment;
location of these firms in park violates original
rationale for project and serves to worsen fiscal
and employment problems in Brockton while utilizing
scarce prime modern space which might have been
used to lure firms with more desirable employment
impacts; Brockton and park offer a number of
features which should be attractive to industrial
concerns; park is situated at junction of state
Routes 24 and 123, close to 1-95 and 13 miles
south of Rt. 128 on direct "interstate quality"
Rt. 24; Brockton is located within one of most
densely populated areas in country and suppliers
and major market areas are within easy reach;
various major port facilities are close and easily
accessible: Boston 21 miles, Fall River 31 miles,
New Bedford 33 miles, Providence 31 miles, and
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New York City 210 miles; good rail, trucking and
airport services are available within or near
Brockton; specialized business services of Boston
area are readily accessible; city offers-low
wage and skilled labor; despite generally negative
shift in Brockton's industry mix, city has been
able to attract firms in fabricated metal products,
machinery (ex. electrical), and printing and
publishing manufacturing groups which provide
jobs of good pay and quality and has experienced
growth in transportation, communications, and
utilities sector which also generally offers
"primary labor market" quality employment (Brockton
manifests higher percentage of total employment
in this sector of any Major Labor Market Area
in state); nevertheless, potential of park for
attracting desirable firms has not been realized
and evidence indicates that this is largely
attributable to poor project management; in
addition, until recently, inner city residents
have lacked physical access to jobs in park
due to inadequate public transportation.
Increased Diversity of Local Economy: although
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and
selected services each contribute significant
portions to Brockton's total employment, shift
in industry mix from better paying manufacturing
to lower paying jobs in these three sectors
demonstrates a need for efforts to attract
higher quality manufacturing jobs to city;
devastating .impacts from concentrating and in-
creasing number of "secondary labor market
quality" jobs have been previously discussed in
above section on employment need; thus, although
project would be justified if it attracted
"primary labor market quality" firms to Brockton,
project has not achieved this objective.
Growth of the State Economy: aggregate state
economic benefits will have been achieved to
degree: (a) firms in park are expanding local
firms, start-ups, or out-of-state firms which
have located in park due to availability of
cheap labor or other advantages particular to
Brockton (ex. agglomeration economies related
to concentration of leather production, labor
skills, low wage labor, proximity to suppliers
or markets, urbanization economies which aid
"incubation" of small firms, etc.); (b) space
vacated by local firms which move to park is
filled by other firms because of these same
local advantages; and (c) achievement of local
fiscal and employment objectives reduces fiscal
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demands on Commonwealth (by reducing expenses:
welfare, unemployment compensation, city aid,
etc.) and, thereby, need for taxes which impair
competitive position of state for business in
general; inadequate information on firms located
in park is available for assessing aggregate
benefits of types a and b; nevertheless, evidence
that low labor intensity uses, such as warehousing
and distribution, have been located in park
suggests that aggregate state growth benefits of
types a and b have been minimal (i.e. limited
local firm expansion of employment, goods, and
services, no business start-ups, and little addi-
tion to employment and "production" of goods and
services from out-of-state firms); relatively
low number of jobs in park and absence of an
explicit public employment program to insure hiring
of unemployed persons have also led to limited
state economic growth benefits of type c; moveover,
evidence that some firms in park offer "secondary
labor market" quality employment suggests that
project may have provided dis-benefits by in-
creasing concentration of low wage, high turnover
jobs which serve to increase in-migration of poor,
raise unemployment rate, add to demands on municipal
services, and, thereby, augment fiscal pressures
on state; however, project has provided positive
fiscal returns to city which contribute to state
benefits of type c; nevertheless, despite good
potential of project for achieving state economic
growth benefits of all three types, project which
has been developed up to present has not provided
these positive benefits.
* Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: continued
concentration of leather production in Brockton
(approx. 25% of total manufacturing employment)
suggests that agglomeration economies related to
this industry may be present in city; however,
dominance of leather, textile, and apparel industries
(approx. 50% of manufacturing employment) may be
accounted for more simply by presence of cheap
mill space and a low wage labor force; nevertheless,
recent growth of small firms (average 15 employees!
firm) in machinery (ex. electrical) industry group
which offer relatively high wages ($11,100 average
annual wage: '74) suggests that combination of
cheap space, low wage labor, and availability of
services, suppliers, and resources in Brockton
may be providing for "incubation" support for
fledgling firms in this growth sector for Common-
wealth; however, inadequate information is avail-
able on firms located in park to judge whether
project has contributed to economic growth by
enabling small firms to take advantage of these
- -- -- -- 
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Narrative:
Judgement:
economies; moreover, these purported economies
are too weakly supported by evidence to be
considered a valid basis for justifying project.
* Induced Effects: no evidence of additional
development resulting from project.
No further information is available to add to
that which has already been presented.
The City of Brockton warranted state assistance
and aid and a public development project because
of serious and growing fiscal and employment needs,
the potential for employment and local fiscal
benefits, a need for increasing the diversity of
the economic base, the potential for adding to
growth of the state economy, and features, such
as good transportation resources, a strategic
location, and continued economic activity in
the city, which suggested that the project could
be marketed. As a community manifesting the
characteristics of a "depressed" urban center,
Brockton offered the potential for achieving
state and local economic development objectives
related to growth and distribution. The site
consisted of property wholly owned by the city
and was strategically located adjacent to a new
major state highway. Due to these attractive
features and the absence of an assembly problem,
the land might have been sold at auction by the
city for a privately developed industrial park
($550,000 in site improvements for 188 acres
would not have been prohibitive for a private
project) but public objectives might not have
been well served by private development of this
industrially developable land which is an asset
in short supply in Brockton.
Although detailed information on the effectiveness
of the project in meeting state and local develop-
ment objectives has not been collected, the
existing evidence garnered from interviews, ob-
servation, and a file search indicates that the
project has' failed to achieve these objectives,
despite the disposition of 75% of the park land,
due largely to weaknesses in public program design
and DCA project management. In particular, the
absence of reuse restrictions in disposition agree-
ments to insure desired labor impacts, the failure
to seek and select firms offering "primary labor
market" quality employment (note: the rules and
regulations do not require disposition to the
highest bidder if other objectives are to be
achieved through sale to a lower bidding firm),
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and the lack of an explicit employment program
to provide jobs, training, and transportation
services to the under- and unemployed, have
limited or eliminated any net employment benefits
from the project. The neglect of record keeping
at DCA and lack of an information system for the
regular collection of data on project impacts
have limited the ability of DCA to effectively
monitor and assist projects (if that is what DCA
had wanted to do) and the Commonwealth to assess
the merits and improve the design of the program.
The inadequacy of the existing information
collection devices (ex. state audit reports)
has been more problematic in the case of Brockton
due to the delegation of responsibility for
project development by the Redevelopment Authority
to the Industrial Development Commission. Thus,
there is no evidence that DCA ever approved of
the disposition agreements for this project as
required by the program rules and regulations in
order for DCA to fulfill its minimal regulatory
functions. The current state of project inactivity
is partly attributable to DCA's adoption of a
"hands-off" attitude which limited the state's
role to regulatory functions and left the local
personnel to develop the project with whatever
resources they could obtain on their own. Desp te
the merits, even the necessity, of a "local
initiatives approach" to program management in
a state of strongly independent local communities,
such as Massachusetts, DCA's total neglect of
support and monitoring functions has deprived
local actors of information resources and coordin-
ation assistance in dealing with other government
units which only DCA can provide. Moreover, DCA
adopted its minimal role despite the investment
of substantial amounts of state funds in a project
which offered good potential for achieving valued
state and local economic development objectives.
Disposition of the remaining approx. 50 acres in-
a manner which serves to achieve development ob-
jectives will depend largely on the ability of
DCA to assist a local body in formulating and
executing a marketing strategy based on desired
objectives. In particular, the low quality of
employment offered by Brockton's current industry
mix and the worsening shifts in that mix, demand
that the marketing strategy focus on firms which
can provide jobs with annual wages higher than
the current mean average annual wage and "primary
labor market" quality characteristics. The addi-
tion of more low wage jobs not only fails to im-
prove conditions in Brockton, but serves to increase
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the unemployment rate, the burdens on city services,
and the level of in-migration of the poor. For
these reasons, public development of a park on
this site was preferable to sale of the land for
private development. However, as a result of
the failures of project management by the public
bodies involved, the public objectives which
warranted a public project have not been achieved.
l'ill i ll lll llllilli IMilll llMlllll li llll llll |
Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse: -
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
EDA Grant:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
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231 Industrial Park
94.2 acres; 72.3 developable acres
Industrial
proposed: 75% light industry; 25% research
$3,020,000 (audit) or $2,919,358 (ledger) or
$3,004,158 (questionnaire)
$ 553,679
$ 654,321 (audit) or $ 553,679 (ledger) or
$ 638,479 (questionnaire)
$1,812,000
$ 67,067.90 ('75-'76: 2 payments of $27,033.55
plus $13,000 planning advance)
All site improvements have recently been com-
pleted. Marketing efforts have begun with
assistance of a $12,000 grant from EDA for hiring
of full time marketing services.
* Grant from federal Economic Development Admin-
ist-ration (EDA) to fund site improvements:.
$1,812,000 award was approved in 3/75; conditions
on receipt of grant include a "non-relocation"
regulation which prohibits relocation of firms
from other communities to park project; therefore,
project market is limited to expanding local firms,
business start-ups; and branch plant expansions
of out-of-area firms; all EDA funds haye been
received.
* Project in an economically "depressed" urban
center: city was a major manufacturing community
but has experienced a long term gradual decline
and recent (post-1970) loss of 1/3 of its industrial
jobs (loss of 4,000 out of 12,000 manufacturing
jobs); city is located in somewhat isolated and
economically "depressed" Rt. 2 corridor region.
* Grant from federal Economic Development Adminis-
tration to obtain assistance on a fulltitne basis
to market project: marketing assistance is funded
with $12,000 out of $1,812,000 grant; marketing
services are provided through a contract with
Fitchburg Office of Economic Development.
*.Local Development Corporation is available to
acquire land and construct industrial buildings
utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease or sale to
qualifying firms.
*Development Strategies: (a) land parcels are
to be sold by Redevelopment Authority to individual
firms; and (b) land parcels may be sold to Local
Development Corporation which purchases and
builds on parcels utilizing SBA 502 financing and
leases or sells structures to qualifying firms.
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Program
Components:
state: * No eminent domain powers: five of six parcels
in project area were acquired through negotiation
and city exercised option held on sixth parcel
to purchase 64 acres for $100,000 from Weyerhouser
Corp.; all six owners were pleased to dispose of
unimproved and unused property, despite its location
at junction of Rts. 2 and 31; although eminent
domain powers were not employed, property was de-
clared open blighted land so that public takings
could have proceeded if necessary; property con-
tained swamp, a brook, and one residence which had
to be acquired.
* State planning advance: $13,000 was advanced
by DCA in 1974 for preparation of an. Environmental
Impact Report required by state Office of Environ-
mental Affairs; however, DCA did not advance funds
for survey and planning,because of a shortage of
funds in 1973, but agreed to reimburse city for 75%
of planning expenses as provided for by statute
through annual payments during project execution
phase.
* State execution subsidy.
k No state infrastructure investment was associated
with project; however, state plans to construct
1-190 from Worcester area up to Leominster, with
Rt. 2 interchange situated near eastern corner of
Fitchburg rather than western corner where indus-
trial park is located; although 1-190 construction
will improve transportation services for project,
unfavorable location of park relative to new inter-
change may result in private industrial park
development adjacent to 1-190 in Fitchburg or
Leominster which will draw market away from public
park project
* Successful completion of project largely depend-
ent on ability of DCA to assist Redevelopment
Authority in formulating and executing a marketing
strategy directed at achievement of state economic
development objectives, to secure commitments
from departments -within Executive Office of Eco-
nomic Affairs on targeting resources to boost
park marketing effort, and to obtain from Office
of State Planning policy guidelines and an economic
development plan directing state investment of
resources in Rt. 2 corridor communities; weak
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municipal:
federal:
Actors:
marketability of project demands coordination
of state tools to target development to park;
targeting of public sources of business capital,
manpower training programs, and Dept. of Commerce
and Development promotion activities may enable
project to achieve valued state economic develop-
ment objectives; in past, problems have arisen
because DCA has not provided technical and
coordination assistance: (a) failure of DCA to
review grant application to EDA has resulted in
grant funding only adequate for construction of
utilities above ground, despite requirements of
program regulations and project plan for under-
ground installation; (b) DCA did not inform
Authority of need for a permit from Office of
Environmental Affairs to move a creek, so that
action was undertaken in violation of state regu-
lation; and (c) lack of DCA coordination of
activities with Dept. of Transportation Planning
has resulted in poor siting of industrial park
relative to proposed 1-90 interchange (highway
might have been planned with interchange near
project or project might have been developed at
a site near proposed interchange).
* Municipal expenditures: $1,000,000 urban
renewal bond was issued for a 10 year term in
1976 at a 5.3% interest rate ($1.5 million total
bonding projected); city will bear all of
interest expense of bond; city has provided
$60,500 for planning expenses, $102,000 or
$172,785 for acquisition expenses, and $2,367
for relocation payments; total city share of
net project cost (principal only) is projected
to be $654,371 (audit) or $638,479 (questionnaire)
of $553,671 (ledger); furthermore, city will
bear project costs equal to amount of estimated
disposition proceeds (approx. $519,000) until
such time as land is sold.
* Extension of city'sewerage system to project
area by municipal Dept. of Public Works.
* EDA grant: grant of $1,812,000 approved in
3/75 has been received in full.
* City of Fitchburg: advance of most of up-front
planning and development expenses, and assumption
of costs of municipal execution subsidy, bond
interest, bonding for extension of city sewerage
line to project area, and carrying project costs
equal to amount of estimated disposition pro-
ceeds until actual land sales.
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* Fitchburg Redevelopment Authority: formed in
1/64; employs a full time executive director for
development and marketing; engaged in a federally
aided Neighborhood Development Program (NDP)
project from 7/72 to 6/73; approximately 3/4 of
$472,016 in project costs were paid by HUD and
remaining 1/4 by city; activities included
creation of two off-street parking lots and
two tot lots, separation of some storm drains
and sewerage lines; and replacement of some water
mains, streets, and sidewalks.
*Fitchburg Dept. of Public Works: extended
city sewerage system to project area.
* Fitchburg Industrial Development Commission:
full time executive director of local commission
is available to assist firms interested in
locating in park in securing funding for plant
and equipment.
* Fitchburg Office of Economic Development: is
providing marketing services to project through a
$12,000 EDA funded contract with Authority.
* Local Development Corporation: is available
to acquire land and construct buildings utilizing
SBA 502 financing for lease or sale to qualifying
firms.
* DCA: limited role assumed up to present has
contributed-to numerous problems; no assistance
was provided by DCA to Authority when application
was made to EDA for grant; project marketing will
depend upon ability of DCA to provide assistance
to Authority.
* EDA: provided grant for site improvements and
for retaining full time marketing services.
* Office of State Planning: should provide guide-
lines and an economic development plan for in-
vestment of state resources in "Rt. 2 corridor"
communities; Ayer to Greenfield corridor is
isolated from major transportation corridors for
flow of economic activity (ex. NY/Hartford 1-86
corrodor); state resources have gone into communi-
ties in this corridor, ex. Fitchburg State College,
1-190 construction, etc., without a plan analyzing
what can and should occur in region.
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* Dept. of Commerce and Development: should pro-
vide marketing assistance through business con-
tact program and out-of-state promotional
activities and lend support for targeting of
public sources of business capital to park (ex.
MIMIA, MBDC, CDFC, SBA, etc.).
* Office of Environmental Affairs, Environmental
Impact Review Section: required preparation of
an Environmental Impact Report for project.
* Dept. of Transportation Planning: has planned
for construction of 1-190 without considering
industrial park projects; proposed I-190/Rt. 2
interchange location will not help project much
and may serve to draw limited market away from
state assisted project.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: planning and develop-
ment stages have been completed in relatively
rapid fashion; survey and planning application
was approved by DCA in 9/73, execution stage
began in 2/75 with DCA approval of EIR and Final
Project Report, and acquisitions and site improve-
ments were completed by 5/77; EDA grant was re-
ceived in 2/75; all six parcels were acquired
between 4/17/75 and 6111/75, five through
negotiated settlements and one pursuant to a city
option on property; contract for public works
was executed in 4/76 and construction completed
by 9/76; Redevelopment Authority attempted to
form a project area committee but little interest
was expressed by area residents; only family
living on site relocated through own efforts to
nearby location; mitor opposition to project
arose from environmentalists concerned about
relocation of a brook and from mayor who com-
plained to newspapers because of his fears about
a need to raise tax rate; however, environmental-
ists were satisfied after preparation of EIR and
mayor signed all necessary approvals; Fitchburg
DPW completed extension of city sewerage system
to project area in timely fashion; although pro-
ject was not delayed by DCA, program mismanage-
ment was evident when DCA misplaced site improve-
ments contract sent by Authority for approval
(contractor was given go ahead from Authority
without DCA approval and DCA approved contract
after work was completed), failed to notify
Authority of need for a permit to move a brook,
and did not review grant application to EDA to
insure that grant covered cost of placing site
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utilities underground as required by regulations
and project plan; at present, all site improve-
ments have been completed: brook straightened
and swampland filled with dirt from on site hill,
access road to front of each parcel and two cul-
de-sacs built, railroad spur constructed off
Boston and Maine line, and power lines, streak
lights, and sewerage lines installed; active
marketing efforts have begun.
* Planning: city advanced $60,500 for all survey
and planning expenses (except EIR) because of
a shortage of state funds; firm of Anderson-
Nichols prepared project plan and EIR; two
alterations to plan were approved by DCA as
"minor plan changes": (a) an extension of project
boundaries from 92 to 94 acres in order to accomo-
date an access road from a city street; and (b)
a change of allowed reuses from specific items
such as research and testing, light manufacturing,
etc. to simple designation of industrial reuse.
* Marketing: active marketing efforts have
recently begun; a $12,000 EDA grant is partly
financing services of a full time marketing
person from Fitchburg Office of Economic Develop-
ment; a committee of five prominent local citizens
has been formed to sell prospective park clients
on assets of city and park location; analyses
identifying industries likely to be attracted
to city have been prepared by executive director
of Industrial Development Commission and by
EDA computer package; full-time IDC executive
director is also available to assist firms with
their capital needs; Local Development Corpor-
ation is available to construct space to suit
needs of qualifying firms with SBA 502 financing;
as a condition of receipt of EDA grant, project
must comply with "non-relocation" regulation
which prohibits movement of firms from other
communities to park; therefore, marketing will
be limited to local expansions, start-ups, and
branch plants of out-of-area firms; marketing
promises to be difficult due to a number of
factors: (a) isolation of city in "depressed"
Rt. 2 corridor relative to primary state economic
corridors and centers, (b) poor siting of park
relative to proposed location of I-190, (c)
competition from private parks in Fitchburg
(95 acres), and Leominster (60 acres) and
state assisted park in Gardner, (d) proximity
to New Hampshire with its lower tax burden,
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Effectiveness
Measures:
(e) decline of regional economy relative to
remainder of state, and (f) decline of Fitchburg
while neighboring Leominster has grown; Land Use
and Marketability Study for project estimated a
14 year absorption period for project; a mar-
keting strategy for project should be based on
three park assets: (a) a skilled low wage labor
force, (b) land disposition prices below competi-
tion ($7,000 - $9,000 per acre compared with
$10,000 - $15,000), and (c) availabilty of a
Local Development Corporation to provide SBA
financing for plant and equipment for small
businesses; one local firm is presently committed
to purchase of 2 acres and construction of a
6,500 building to consolidate a 10 employee
industriaf electric apparatus repair service now
located in Fitchburg and Gardner; nevertheless,
in order to successfully market project and
achieve state economic development objectives,
DCA must provide marketing assistance and obtain
commitments from units within Executive Office
of Economic Affairs for targeting of resources
to park; DCA stratagy should encompass both
Gardner and Fitchburg projects in order to in-
sure that competition between two projects is
not mutually damaging; if DCA can prevail upon
Dept. of Transportation to alter planned route
for 1-190 (if this is desirable when industrial
park projects are considered together with other
important variables) both Gardner and Fitchburg
projects may benefit considerably.
Fiscal Need: tax burden in Fitchburg, as
measured by tax rate on equalized value, is
slightly below median average for Mass. cities
but has increased significantly from '76 to '77;
substantial loss of industry since 1970 has
weakened tax base even more than is currently
reflected by tax rate (lag before owners of
industrial property stop paying real estate
taxes); despite loss of 1/3 of 12,000 manu-
facturing jobs since 1970, manufacturing continues
to account for almost 50% of city's employment;
in addition, Fitchburg accounts for nearly 50%
of firms and jobs in heavily industrialized
Fitchburg-Leominster SMSA which-serves as
economic center for North-Central Mass.; how-
ever, whereas economy of adjacent Leominster
has improved with concentration of plastics
industry, Fitchburg has experienced industrial
flight which has resulted in abandoned plants
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and disinvestment in housing stock; nevertheless,
high wage jobs in fabricated metal products,
paper and allied products, and machinery (ex.
electrical) industry groups now account for 62%
of industrial employment in Fitchburg; thus,
Fitchburg warrants state assistance and aid on
basis of fiscal need; fiscal strain is evident
and promises to grow worse; on other hand, city
remains important economic center for North-
Central Mass. region and manufacturing continues
to dominate employment; presence of privately
developed park in city suggests that private
investors perceive of a market demand for modern
industrial space; however, availability of pri-
vate park and willingness of property owners to
sell to'Authority suggest that land assembly is
not a problem for private developers.
* Employment Need: "depressed area" character-
istics of city also qualify Fitchburg for state
assistance and aid on basis of employment need;
unemployment rate in city is consistently 2 to 3
percentage points higher than state average (11.1%
in 3/76); lack of economic opportunity has led
to migration from city and a loss of population;
impoverishment of community is evident from a
comparison of percentages of city population in
lowest two income ranges compared with SMSA and
State figures in 1970 Census and from per capita
income comparisons: incomes under $3,000 = F 8.4%9
SMSA 7.0%, Mass. 6.4%; incomes $3,000-$5,999
F 15.2%, SMSA 12.7%, Mass. 11.8%; per capita
income = F $2,992, SMSA $3,152, Mass. $3,425;
thus, state assistance and aid and public develop-
ment initiatives are justified on basis of local
employment need.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: probability of
positive net fiscal flows to city from project
is highly uncertain given negative marketing
factors faced by project and high cost of project
to city despite EDA grant:- interest on $1,000,000
bond, approx. $650,000 city share of net project
cost, carrying of estimated $519,000 in costs
equal to projected disposition proceeds until
time of land sales, and municipal expense from
extension of sewerage system; however, if project
achieves a moderate rate of absorption through
concentrated state efforts, it is likely that
project will result in a modest positive net
fiscal flow over life of project.
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* Growth of State Economy: availability of
modern space in park may allow out-of-area firms
to locate branch plants in Fitchburg to obtain
efficiency advantages of low wage skilled labor;
in addition, to extent that industrial flight
has resulted from unavailability of modern hori-
zontal space, park may allow for local firm
expansion that otherwise would not occur in the
city (land costs in public park are lower than
in private park); a judgement on whether project
contributes to growth of state economy must await
evidence of local firm expansions, start-ups,
or location of branch plants of out-of-area firms;
location of project in area of high unemployment
shouldserve to promote employment objectives
of state and, thus, contribute to state economic
growth by reducing fiscal demands on Commonwealth
(through lower welfare costs; local aid, etc.)
and, thereby, need for taxation which impairs
competitive position of state for business in
general.
* Employment Impacts: in light of high levels of
local unemployment and population migration from
city due to lack of employment opportunities,
project should provide positive employment
benefits if land can be marketed; compliance with
EDA "non-relocation" regulation prohibiting re-
location of firms from other communities to park
will prevent project from resulting in a "zero
sum" transfer of jobs that doesn't add to total
employment; relative isolation of Fitchburg
suggests that jobs will not be taken by outside
commuters; however, if Authority is not somewhat
selective in marketing project to firms which
offer "primary labor market" quality jobs, addi-
tion of firms with "secondary labor market"
quality jobs to city may serve to perpetuate or
worsen low per capita income (addition of jobs
paying less than current average income and in-
duced in-migration), high unemployment rates
(from high job turnover rate typical of such
firms), dependency on public assistance payments
(high job turnover syndrome), burdens on city
services, and overall decline of residential and
business fabric of city; therefore, in order to
achieve employment impacts which serve state
economic development objectives, marketing
strategy should include criteria for firm selection
on basis of employment impacts and an employment
program should be initiated to insure that unem-
ployed are hired and trained by park firms;
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approx. 62% of industrial employment in Fitch-
burg is accounted for by high wage jobs in
fabricated metal products ($10,500 average
annual wage; 23% of manufacturing employment
in '74; DES), paper and allied products ($13,000
annual wage; 21% of employment in '74: DES), and
non-electrical machinery ($12,500 annual wage;
18% of employment in '74: DES) and city mani-
fests a high overall average annual manufacturing
wage ($10,750 in ;74: DES); low wage jobs in
retail ($5,400 average annual wage in '74: DES)
and selected services ($6,000) reduce overall
average annual wage in city; presence of skilled
low wage labor force should provide opportunity
for attracting jobs of higher quality than
current average; if measures suggested here to
achieve desirable employment impacts are taken,
project would be justified on basis of potential
employment impacts.
*-Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: although
Fitchburg does not manifest particular agglomer-
ation concentrations, dominance of plastics
industry in adjacent Leominster suggests that
economies for this industry group may be present;
location of plastics or plastics related firms
in park may strenthen this agglomeration and
availability of efficient modern space may allow
local Leominster firms to expand that otherwise
would not for lack of efficient local space;
nevertheless, higher and rising oil prices have
dampened growth of plastics industry; however,
off-shore oil may provide somewhat of a counter
force to boost plastics in Mass.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy: in-
asmuch as a variety of industry groups are well
represented in Fitchburg and manufacturing con-
tinues to account for a large portion of city
employment, project cannot be justified on basis
of increasing local economic diversity.
* Induced Effects: no evidence of a potential
for induced development resulting from project.
Narrative: Project area of 94.2 acres was open blighted land
with swampy conditions, a meandering brook, and
only one residential structure. The site is
situated at the junction of state routes 2 and
31. Access to the project area is good. No
zoning change was required for the project and
an industrial project for the site conformed with
the Fitchburg Comprehensive Plan of 1969. The
FITCHBURG
Judgement:
property has become an attractive physical area
with the completion of site improvements. Never-
theless, the economic decline of the city and
stagnation of the region suggest that the project
will face formidable marketing problems. In
order for the project to achieve state economic
development objectives, resource commitments and
cooperation from various state government units
must be applied to the marketing effort. At the
present time, howeVer, the state lacks guidelines
and an economic development plan for the Rt. 2
corridor communities. Despite the absence of
state policy for the region the state is currently
expending resources in Fitchburg on state college
expansion and, through DCA, on a neighborhood
improvement program and housing for the elderly.
Without an overall state policy for the region,
program managers are reluctant to make decisions
with respect to resource commitments and expendi-
tures may be wasted for lack of necessary comple-
mentary actions.
The Fitchburg 231 Industrial Park project can be
justified on the basis of the local fiscal need,
the local employment need, the potential for em-
ployment benefits, and some evidence that the
project is marketable. However, the net fiscal
flows from the project to the city may be negative
and the willingness of property owners to sell
to the Redevelopment Authority suggests that. pri-
vate assembly of land was not a problem. Never-
theless, the high cost of infrastructure develop-
ment would probably have precluded competitive
private market development of the site. The
development of another industrial park in Fitch-
burg by private interests indicates that some
people perceive of a potential demand for modern
industrial space in a city containing many vacant
older mill structures. Despite the industrial
decline experienced by Fitchburg, the city
manifests a high percentage of high wage and
state growth industries. If DCA can provide
the necessary marketing assistance to the project,
positive employment impacts should follow from
successful marketing. Due to the considerable
effort required from DCA and units within the
Executive Office of Economic Affairs to market
the project, policy guidelines and an economic
development plan from the Office of State
Planning on the Rt. 2 corridor communities
generally, and this project in particular, would
help to mount a marketing effort which has
potential for achieving valued state economic
development objectives.
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Inasmuch as marketing ef forts are now beginning,
DCA should attempt to define its role is dis-
cussions with Redevelopment Authority personnel.
Firm selection criteria and an employment program
for the park should be established as soon as
possible. DCA staff should explain the land
disposition rules and regulations to Authority
personnel and urge that performance objectives
be included in disposition agreements whenever
possible. DCA should obtain a copy of the Author-
ity's grant application to EDA for its files.
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Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:-
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
EDA Grant:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
GARDNER
East Gardner Industrial Park
140 acres; 108 disposable acres
Industrial
proposed: 20% heavy industry; 70% light industry;
5% warehousing; 5% distribution
$2,049,528 (ledger) or.$1,830,000 (audit) or
$1,730,074 (U. Mass. summary)
$ 511,314 (ledger) or $ 411,315 (audit) or
$ 411,315 (U. Mass. summary)
$ 511,314 (ledger) or $ 391,785 (audit) or
$ 391,785 (U. Mass. summary); does not include
bond interest costs which are borne entirely by
city
$1,026,900 (audit) or $926,974 (U. Mass. summary)
$ 51,131 ('75-'76: 2 payments) plus $31,288.96
planning advance
Although planning and development phases of pro-
ject have extended for a decade, all of project
property has been acquired and all site improve-
ments have been completed. Marketing efforts
for project began in 1976. Due to weak market-
ability of industrial land in Gardner, DCA should
assist Authority in formulating a market strategy
and obtaining resources of units within Executive
Office of Economic Affairs to augment marketing
activities.
* Grant from federal Economic Development
Administration (EDA) to fund site improvements:
grant was approved in June 1973; conditions on
receipt of grant include a "non-relocation" pro-
vision which prohibits relocation of firms from
other communities to park; therefore, project
market is limited to expanding local firms,
buesinss start-ups, and branch plant expansions
of out-of-area firms; all EDA funds have been
received; as a consequence of delays and other
problems which have increased project costs, EDA
grant is considered essential for continuation
of project.
* Project in small economically stagnant city in
"depressed" Rt. 2 corridor: park has been
developed on only property which could accomodate
a needed rail spur; Gardner is a somewhat isolated
community of approximately 20,000 persons which
makes it one of smallest cities in Commonwealth.
* Local Development Corporation available to
acquire land and construct industrial buildings
utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease or sale
to qualifying firms.
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* Development Strategies: (a) land parcels are
to be sold by Redevelopment Authority to individual
firms; (b) land parcels are to be leased by Re-
development Authority to individual firms; and
(c) land parcels may be sold to Local Development
Corporation which purchases and builds on parcels
utilizing SBA 502 financing and leases or sells
structures to qualifying firms.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers. ?
* State planning advance; $31,238.96 in state
funds was advanced for planning; advance was not
subtracted out of first annual exeuction payment
to city as is customary and was not subtracted
out of state share of net project cost before
annual state payment was calculated.
* State execution subsidy.
* Successful completion of project largely depend-
ent on ability of DCA to assist Redevelopment
Authority in formulating and executing a marketing
strategy directed at achievement of state economic
development objectives, to secure commitments
from units within Executive Office of Economic
Affairs on targeting of resources to boost park
marketing effort, and to obtain from Office of
State Planning police guidelines and an economic
development plan directing state investment of
resources in Rt. 2 corridor communities; weak
marketability of project at an isolated location
in a generally depressed region demands coordin-
ation of state tools to target development to
park; targeting of public sources of business
capital, manpower training programs, and Dept.
of Commerce and Development promotion activities
may enable project to achieve valued state
economic development objectives.
No state infrastructure investment directly
related to project development; however, state
plan to construct 1-190 from Worcester to
Leominster will affect project; although con-
struction of 1-190 will improve transportation
services for park, unfavorable location of pro-
ject relative to proposed 1-190 and Rt. 2 inter-
change may result in private industrial park
development adjacent to 1-190 in Fitchburg or
Leominster which will draw market away from
Gardner project.
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municipal: * Municipal expenditures: $750,000 urban renewal
bond was issued for a 15 year term in 1975 at a
7.2% interest rate; city will pay all of interest
expense of bond; in addition, city has provided
$19,000 for some acquisition expenses and $2,600
for planning expenses out of general local revenues;
total city share of net project cost (principal
only) is projected to amount to $511,314 (ledger)
or $391,785 (Audit).
federal: * EDA grant: grant of $1,026,900 approved in 6/73
for site improvements has been received in full.
Actors: * City of Gardner: advance of most of up-front
development expenses and assumption of costs of
municipal execution subsidy, all bond interest
expenses, and foregone real estate tax revenues
($262 in '66).
* Gardner Redevelopment Authority: was formed in
1966 to develop an industrial park at only avail-
able site in city able to accomodate rail spur
demanded by expanding local firms; executive
director also serves in that role for Local De-
velopment Corporation attempting to market an
industrial park developed with private resources
20 years ago; executive director has held a full
time job with LDC since 1960 and a~job with
Redevelopment Authority since its formation in
1966.
* Gardner Industrial Development Corporation:
Local Development Corporation headed by Redevelop-
ment Authority Executive Director is available
to acquire land from Authority and construct
buildings utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease
or sale to qualifying small businesses.
* DCA: has played a limited role up to present
time; DCA did not assist Authority in applying
to EDA for a grant; project marketing will
largely depend upon ability of DCA to-provide
active assistance to Authority.
* EDA: has provided a grant for site improvements.
* Office of State Planning: should provide guide-
lines and an economic development plan for invest-
ment of state resources in "Rt. 2 corridor" communi-
ties; Ayer to Greenfield corridor is isolated
from major transportation corridors for flow of
economic activity; state resources have gone into
communities in this corridor without a plan
analyzing what can and should occur in region.
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* Dept. of Commerce and Development: should pro-
vide marketing assistance through its business
contact program and out-of-state promotional
activities and lend support for targeting of
public sources of business capital to park (ex.
MIMIA, MBDC, CDFC, SBA, etc.).
* Conservation Commission: had to issue an
approval for project regarding likely environmental
impacts.
* Department of Natural Resources: held up
approval of a permit for approximately one year.
* DPW: refused for a long while to accept an ease-
ment over Route 2 layout for water and sewer
construction and only accepted easement after
considerable pressure was brought to bear.
* Division of Water Pollution Control: held up
a certificate on adequacy of sewerage treatment
plant.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: project implementation
has been subject to many delays during planning
and execution stages; survey and planning phase
was approved by DCA in 10/66 but execution approval
was not granted until 8/71; as a result of delays,
original $920,000 city bonding commitment was
insufficient to meet project expenses; therefore,
Authority applied to EDA for a grant to finance
site improvements; however, EDA approval was
delayed for two years when personnel were trans-
ferred to Pennsylvania for one year to provide
emergency assistance in aftermath of hurricane
Agnes; an amendment to state environmental law
required Authority to re-apply for an environment-
al permit through local Conservation Commission;.
due to internal mismanagement, contractor for
sewar lines and access roads completed work in
two years at a cost of approx. $1,270,000 although
original contract called for a one year con-
struction period and a cost of approx. $1,228,000;
costs of public facility construction were
significantly greater than original planning
estimates because unstable condition of ground
required a new pile design and excavation of
full width of roads; Mayor of Gardner held up
bond issue for 18 months because he feared that
taxes would have to be raised to service debt;
all of EDA grant has been received by Authority
and site preparation work has been completed.
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* Planning: numerous difficulties delayed pro-
ject during planning phase: (a) absence of
state guidelines on what constitutes open
blighted land led local bond counsel to refuse
to authorize bond issue for project; (b) DCA
Commissioner rejected project because town lacked
a zoning ordinance; (c) planning proceeded when
Supreme Court decision was cited which indicated
that absence of a zoning ordinance was in-
sufficient grounds for rejection of a project
but DCA's planning consultant, nevertheless,
rejected finished project plan due to lack of
a zoning ordinance; (d) Department of Natural
Resources held up approval of a Hatch Act permit
for a year; (e) Dept. of Public Works refused
to grant an easement over Rt. 2 layout for sewer
and water construction and finally capitulated
only after considerable pressure was brought to
bear on Commissioner; and (f) Division of Water
Pollution Control held up a certificate on sewer-
age treatment plant over a disagreement with con-
sulting firm that had designed plant; over
course of planning several different consultants
were used: Lordwood Assoc. determined project
contours, Whitman and Howard was plagued by in-
ternal problems and was unable to fulfill its
obligations, and John Brown Assoc. completed
planning work and assisted through execution
stage.
* Marketing: Authority Executive Director markets
both private non-profit and state-aided industrial
parks; 20 acres remain available in private
park despite 20 years of active marketing;
marketing efforts for state assisted project began
in 1976; although no firms have purchased parcels
at this time, three firms are currently negoti-
ating in earnest; Authority responds to inquiries
by providing information on local labor market,
recreation and educational facilities, avail-
ability of transportation and utilities, and
excellent waste disposal and water supply; all
inquiries are followed up with phone calls and
letters; local banks cannot supply industrial
financing but tax exempt industrial revenue bond-
int is available for firms that qualify; target
industries that have been identified by Authority
include metalwork, pharmaceuticals, electronics,
and woodworking; Authority claims that it stresses
industries which are compatible with existing
skills of labor force; Authority advertises in
"Wall Street Journal," "American Industrial Pro-
perties Report," and other periodicals which reach
GARDNER
Effectiveness
Measures:
eastern and national markets; slow progress of
marketing private non-profit park suggests that
isolation of Gardner seriously limits market-
ability of state-assisted project; thus success-
ful marketing of state assisted project is
largely dependent on assistance from DCA; a mar-
keting strategy should be based on assets of
park, such as a skilled low wage labor force
and a high quality water supply; close proximity
to New Hampshire with its lower tax burden repre-
sents a serious constraint for project; a DCA
assistance strategy should encompass both Gardner
and Fitchburg project only 6 miles away in order
to insure that competition between two projects
is not mutually damaging.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Gardner, as measured
by tax rate on equalized value, is about equal
to median average for Mass. cities and has in-
creased slightly in recent years: $47.50 in '70
to $48.20 in '76; since many major capital im-
provements have recently been completed, such
as a water supply system, a new sewerage treatment
plant, extensive recreational facilities, and a
new high school, capital expense pressures on
taxes should moderate in future; Gardner has re-
tained a strong manufacturing base which accounts
for approx. 62% (DES: 1974) of jobs in city;
historical "Chair City of the World" title con-
tinues to accurately reflect concentration of
furniture and fixtures industry group which ac-
counts for approx. 46% (DES: 1974) of city's a
manufacturing jobs; although city has lacked
economic vitality, stability of manufacturing
in.-mill buildings has prevented severe fiscal
strain; thus, while there is a definite need
to lower fiscal burden in Gardner a modest degree,
fiscal need is a weak basis for justifying public
industrial development in city.
* Employment Need: despite continued dominance
of manufacturing and concentration of furniture
industry in Garnder, city regularly exhibits high
rates of unemployment (11.7% in 3/76); although
significant percentages of Gardner's workers
engage in production of firearms, fabricated
structural metal products, and office and store
machines and devices, in addition to furniture,
city has not experienced economic growth; city
population has remained stable since 1930 near
20,000 persons; inasmuch as annual births sub-
stantially exceed deaths there has been a con-
tinual annual out-migration from c.ity; thus,
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evidence of a lack of employment opportunities
and a normally high unemployment rate suggest
that public development efforts are warranted
on basis of employment need; in addition, iso-
lation and stagnation of local economy, limited
resources of local banks, and absence of private
development activity indicate that private parties
would not have developed an industrial park with-
out public support; on other hand, continued
presence of a substantial manufacturing base
suggests that a park may be marketable with pro-
per state support.
* Net Mfunicipal Fiscal Flows: probability of
positive net fiscal flows to city from project
is highly uncertain given above negative marketing
factors; despite grant from ET)A, project will
cost city interest expense on $750,000 bond, a
small amount of annual foregone tax revenue from
property since 1966 ($262 in 1966), and $400,000
to $500,000 in i municipal subsidy; achievement
of positive net fiscal returns will depend upon
ability of DCA and Redevelopment Authority to
muster resources and cooperation of other state
government units and design a marketing strategy;
successful marketing effort which attains a
moderate rate of absorption is likely to pro-
duce modest positive net fiscal flows to city.
* Growth of State Economy: in light of continued
concentration of furniture industry which sug-
gests presence of agglomeration economies, and
absence of private development of modern
industrial park facilities in Gardner, project
may allow for expansion of local firms and
location of business start-ups and out-of-area
branch plants in furniture related and other
businesses that otherwise would not have occured;
development of project on only site in city
capable of accomodating rail service may provide
increased efficiency advantages which will
precipitate growth from these same sources; in
addition, availability of modern space in park
may allow out-of-area firms to locate branch
plants in city to obtain efficiency advantages
of excellent water supply and low wage skilled
labor; however, a judgment on whether.project
contributes to growth of state economy cannot
be made apriori but must await evidence of expansion
of local firms, business start-ups, and location
of out-of-area firm branch plants in park; loca-
tion of project in an area of high unemployment
should serve to promote public employment
objectives and, thus, contribute to state
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economic growth by reducing fiscal demand on
Commonwealth (through lower welfare costs, local
aid, etc.) and, thereby, need for taxation which
impairs competitive position of state for busi-
ness in general.
* Employment Impacts: in light of high level of
local unemployment and population migration from
city due to lack of employment opportunities,
project should provide positive employment bene-
fits if land can be marketed; compliance with
EDA "non-relocation" regulation prohibiting re-
location of firms from other communities to park
will prevent project from resulting in a "zero
sum" transfer of jobs that doesn't add to total
employment and allowing for movement of firms
out of other high priority development areas;
relative isolation of Gardner suggests that jobs
will not be taken by out-of-city' commuters; how-
ever, if Authority is not somewhat selective in
marketing project to firms which offer "primary
labor market" quality jobs, addition of firms
with "secondary labor market" quality jobs to
city may serve to perpetuate or worsen low per
capita income (addition of jobs paying less than
current average income and induced in-migration
of poor), high unemployment rates (from high
job turnover rate typical of such firms), de-
pendency on public assistance payments (high job.
turnover syndrome), burdens on city services,
and general decline of residential and business
fabric of city; therefore, in order to achieve
employment impacts which serve state economic
development objectives, marketing strategy should
include criteria for firm selection on basis of
employment impacts and an employment program
should be initiated to insure that unemployed
persons are hired and trained by park firms;
presence of skilled low wage labor force should
provide opportunity for attracting jobs of
higher quality than current average; however,
weak marketability of site does not offer much
public leverage for "stick" approach - i.e. re-
quiring firms locating in park to hire unemployed
as a condition of land disposition; nevertheless,
if measures suggested here to achieve desired
employment impacts are taken and achieve some
degree- of success, project will be justified on
basis of employment impacts.
* Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: concen-
tration of furniture industry in Gardner sug-
gests that agglomeration economies of some sort
are present; if project allows for expansion of
GARDNER
local firms, start-ups, and/or location of out-
of-area firm branch plants in furniture related
businesses, which only had option of less
efficient space, project will serve to strengthen
agglomeration economies and promote economic
growth.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy: with
approximately 61% of Gardner's employment con-
sisting of manufacturing, and approx. 46% of
manufacturing employment accounted for by furniture
industry, project can be justified as an attempt
to broaden local economic base; heavy dependence
of city on furniture industry leaves local govern-
ment and residents of city very vulnerable to
shifts in that one industry.
* Induced Impacts: Gardner is one of smallest
cities in Commonwealth; although academic debate
continues over what constitutes a minimum threshold
size for an urban center to prosper, there is
little doubt that small size and isolation of
Gardner limit services and resources available
for industry; if Gardner loses population, city
may pass a minimum threshold size for maintenance
of services and provision of physical, capital,
and labor resources essential for continued
operation of local manufacturing firms; on other
hand, employment expansion which results from
project may push city past threshold needed for:
additional services and resources which will
spur additional employment growth; however, as
should be obvious from this discussion, issues
of threshold urbanization economies are far too
uncertain to justify development of a public
project.
In 1955 the Florence Stove Company closed oper-
ations in Gardner leaving many residents un- -
employed. Private citizens responded by raising
$350,000 for the development of an industrial
park through a non-profit Local Development
Corporation and the construction of a speculative
industrial building. After unsuccessful efforts
to market the park and building over a few years,
the City of Gardner assumed responsibility for
promoting the park in 1960 and hired the current
executive director of the Redevelopment Authority
to direct the promotion drive. Soon thereafter,
the building was sold, a second structure was
built and leased, and a third building was con-
structed by a firm which purchased a parcel in
Narrative:
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the park. SBA 502 funds were utilized to con-
struct two of these buildings. In attempting
to marke.t the park, it was learned that local
industry demanded rail facilities which were not
available at the park. The Gardner Redevelopment
Authority was formed in 1966 to respond to this
need for a modern park with rail facilities.
Due to the poor grades of the available land in
Gardner, which has the highest elevation of any
city in the Commonwlealth, only one site was
identified which could accomodate a rail spur.
Delays which beset the project during the planning
and execution stages extended the development
process for a decade. The delays also resulted
in increased project costs which were prohibitive
for the city to assume. Therefore, the Authority
applied for and received a grant from EDA for
the funding of site improvements. Although the
mayor resisted the project for fear of increasing
property taxes, local business and general
community support was strong enough to prevail
upon the mayor and obtain his cooperation.
The East Gardner Industrial Park is justified on
the basis of employment needs, potential emplcy-
ment benefits, a need for diversification of the
local economy, a potential for strengthening
agglomeration economies, the absence of private
industrial park development, the unmet demand
for park land with rail facilities, and some
evidence that the project can be marketed. How-
ever, in order for the project to achieve desired
economic development objectives, DCA must provide
assistance to the Authority in formulating a"
marketing strategy based on the assets of the
area, such as a low wage skilled labor force and
a high quality water supply, and firm selection
criteria related to the quality of employment
desired, and secure the resources and cooperation
of units within the Ececutive Office of Economic
Affairs which are needed to market the project
and achieve economic development objectives (i.e.
targeting of public sources of business capital,
manpower training programs, and Dept. of Commerce
and Development business contact program and
promotion activities). Due to the considerable
effort required from state government in dealing
with an uncertain market situation, policy guide-
lines and an economic development plan from the
Office of State Planning, related to this project
and the investment of state resources in other
Rt. 2 corridor communities would help to mount a
marketing effort which has the potential for
achieving valued state economic development ob-
jectives.
Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
State Payments to
Date:
Note on State
Payments:
Status:
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Millrace South Urban Renewal Project
project area: 51.5 acres
area of development: 12.5 acres
Industrial
proposed: 100% light industry
$1,963,674 (original budget estimate 6/30/75)
$ 981,837 (one-half of estimated net project
cost; principal only; however, current level of
annual payments is calculated on basis of a
$736,527.80 state share)
$ 981,837 total grant value: $799,127 cash plus
a non-cash grant-in-aid valued at $182,710 (one-
half of estimated net project cost not including
bond interest costs which are borne entirely by
city)
$ 66,943.29 ('76: 1 payment of $35,241.29 plus
prior $31,702 planning acvance)
Current annual state payment of $35,241.29 will
result over 20 years in a total state share of
$736,527.80 (20 X $35,241.29 = $704,825.80 plus
$31,702 planning advance). Ledger calls for an
annual payment of $47,506.75 in order to cover
state share of $981,837 specified in financial
assistance agreement and approved project financing
plan. State Auditor notes that net project cost
should be reduced because actual survey and
planning costs of $21,801.92 fell below approved
budget of $42,270. Nevertheless, a reduction of
net project cost by $20,468.04 cannot account
for current -level of annual state payments.
State Auditor recommends in audit for period
ending 10/31/76 that DCA revise financing plan
and level of annual state payment.
Although project area consists of 51.5 acres,
development site has been limited to 12.5 acres
due to excessive expense of developing entire
area as originally planned. All project property
has been acquired and demolition activity is
underway. No other site improvements have begun.
One firm has completed renovation work on two
mill buildings which it currently leases and
intends to acquire. Due to reduced size of
project and considerable city-expense, Holyoke
may not receive positive net fiscal benefits from
project unless project spurs development of re-
maining land in project area. Development of
project must be more closely coordinated with
activities of DPW related to construction of
1-391 through project area.
HOLYOKE
Model Aspects: * Some renovation of old mill buildings for
industrial uses: Northeast Wire Co. has under-
taken with its own resources substantial renov-
ation work on two old structures which it
currently leases and intends to acquire; however,
Holyoke residents and officials doubt that any
potential exists for reuse of existing buildings
and unique millraces (such as for industrial
power) and have generally favored demolition of
present structures; demolition work on project
site began in 11/76 but has not been completed.
* Some municipally owned tax title property
used for the project: at one point, Redevelop-
ment Authority delayed project in order to
allow some tax delinquent property to revert to
city ownership so that land could be obtained
for project at a nominal cost.
* Project in a medium sized "economically
depressed" urban center: city was once a major
manufacturing center with a diversified economic
base but has experienced a long terrm gradual
economic decline; Holyoke was known at one time
as "Paper City of the World" as a result of
concentration of paper industry; city was first
planned industrial center in nation due to a
60 foot drop in Connecticut River which allowed
industrialists to channel river's flow through
canals to power mills; population of Holyoke
has declined steadily since 1920, including a
drop from 54,661 persons in '50 to 46,790 in '75;
city suffers from problems of high real estate
taxes and consistently high levels of unenploy-
ment; vital statistics on city residents reveal
a high proportion of elderly people, a recent
in-migration of a large Puerto Rican population,
and a relatively poor total population compared
with populations of SMSA and Commonwealth;
nevertheless, manufacturing continues to account
for approx. 45% of total city employment (DES
'74), including large numbers of high wage jobs
in state growth industries, and signs of a
possible economic recovery are evident.
* A Local Development Corporation is available
to acquire land and construct industrial
buildings utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease
or sale to qualifying firms.
* Development Strategies: (a) land is cleared
and parcels are sold by Redevelopment Authority
to individual firms; (b) land parcels with
existing mill structures are sold by Authority
HOLYOKE
Authority to individual firms; and (c) a real
estate agent is employed to assist in develop-
ment and marketing.
Program Components:
state: * No use of eminent domain powers: sole privately
owned parcel was purchased through a negotiated
settlement for $412,500, even though owner owed
real estate taxes to city; remainder of project
site was municipally owned land donated to project;
estimated value of donated municipally owned
property and foregone municipal real estate taxes
on privately ow-ned land were included as part of
project costs and serve as a non-case grant-in-
aid in meeting part of city's share of net project
cost.
* State planning advance: a comparatively modest
$31,702 was advanced by state for planning;
planning expenses were reduced due to utilization
of a planner from Planning Board for much of
work; despite relatively low planning budget of
$42,270, actual costs for survey and planning
amounted to only $21,801.92.
State execution subsidy.
* Project feasibility considerably enhanced by the
construction of interstate 391 by the state:
proposed new highway will pass through project
area and on/off ramps will be built within 100
yards of site; highway funding is being provided
by Federal Highway Administration and Mass.
Department of Public Works.
* Future progress and eventual success of project
-depend largely on ability of DCA to coordinate
efforts with Department of Public Works: high-
way construction in project area will not be
completed for at least five years (highway is
currently in preliminary design phase); phasing
of development of project and construction of
site improv'ements must be closely coordinated
with construction of highway with respect to both
timing and placement-; at present time, Redevelop-
ment Authority does not have preliminary site
plans of DPW and project plan does not take into
account timing and siting of highway construction;
placement and design of entrance and exit ramps
are critically important to markeability of in-
dustrial project; up to present time, DCA has
not provided technical assistance or coordination
services to project.
HOLYOKE
municipal:
-Actors:
* Municipal expenditures; 20-year urban renewal
bonds totalling $2,095,000 were issued in 1976
at a 7 1/4% interest rate; total city share of
net project cost (principal only) is projected
to equal $981,837; financing plan calls for
city to assume $799,127 in cash plus a non-cash
grant-in-aid of $182,710 which consists of
donated municipally owned land valued at $68,750
and foregone real estate taxes of $113,960 owed
on privately owned land acquired for project;
in addition, city will bear entire cost of
interest expenses on bonds issued for project.
* City government in-house planning; local
Planning Board provided services of a planner
to Redevelopment Authority.
* City of Holyoke: assumption of costs of
municipal execution subsidy and interest on
bonds.
* Holyoke Redevelopment Authority: in addition
to state-aided Millrace South industrial project,
HRA has been active with four federally and state-
aided urban. renewal projects; three of these
projects are in process of being closed-out by
Dept. of Housing and Urban Development; a pro-
poased state-aided central business district
project was voted down by City Council; in
addition to an Authority Executive Director and
Director of Administration, city Community
Development Administrator directs activities of
Redevelopment Authority.
* City of Holyoke Development Administrator:
aggressive individual directs federal community
development funding, city planning, and Redevelop-
ment Authority activities; will play a key role
in determining future of project.
* DCA: has played a limited role up to present
time; in future, must provide technical assistance
in marketing, assessing fiscal impact of project,
and coordinating project activities with DPW.
* DPW: is responsible for constructing critical
interstate highway through project area.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: project was approved
for survey and planning phase in 3/73 and for
project exeuction phase in 6/75; subsequent delays
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Effectiveness
Measures:
have resulted from (a) a desire to wait until
some of property was acquired by city through
tax title process in order to save on acquisition
expenses, and (b) poor planning work; although
project area consists of 51.5 acres, develop-
ment site has been limited to 12.5 acres due to
great expense of developing entire area as
originally planned; at present time, all land
for project has been acquired and demolition
activity is underway; no other site improvement
work has begun; Northeast Wire Co. has completed
renovation work on two mill buildings which it
leases and intends to purchase.
* Planning: major portions of original plan were
inadequate and had to be prepared a second time
because of deficient engineering designs, a
failure to accurately identify sewerage lines,
-and a lack of attention to future construction
of a highway through project area.
* Marketing: Redevelopment Authority is confident
that property disposition will proceed well;
Northeast Wire Co, is presently leasing two
buildings that it intends to purchase; Authority
has advertized throughout New England and has
received a large number of inquiries; neverthe-
less, marketing may prove to be difficult because
of problems with size and configuration of parcels
and uncertainty related to construction of Rt. 391.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Holyoke, as measured
by tax rate on equalized value, is slightly
greater than median average for Mass. cities
and has increased over a number of years, with
a substantial rise from '76 to '77; long term
decline of industry and loss of population have
seriously weakened tax base; in addition, in-
creasing relative impoverishment of population
has increased demands on city services; according
to 1970 Census figures over 77% of all of housing
units in city were built prior to 1939 (as com-
pared to a 55% figure for SMSA); fire has become
a frequent occurrence in city; brick tenement
buildings constructed over a hundred years ago
continue to serve as shelter for many of Holyoke's
poor; many of massive mill buildings which line
canals in city's industrial center now stand
empty; thus, Holyoke warrants state assistance
and aid and a public industrial development
project on basis of fiscal need.
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* Employment Need: despite steady decline of
industry in Holyoke since 1920, manufacturing
continues to account for approx. 45% of total
city employment (DES '74); jobs in historically
dominant paper and allied products industrial
category account for a large proportion of
manufacturing employment (approx. 22% in '74:
DES) and provide good wages ($9,900 average
annual wage '74: DES); in addition, city mani-
fests a large number of high wage jobs in non-
electrical machinery industrial category
($11,244 average annual wage; 18% of manufacturing
employment in '74: DES) which is a growth sector
for Commonwealth; nevertheless, overall average
annual wage for all city employment is low
($7,950 in '74: DES) and average annual wage for
manufacturing is relatively low ($8,960 in '74:
DES); unemployment rate in Holyoke is consistently
higher than state average (5.3% in 3/70; 11.0% in
3/76); general impoverishment of residents is striking-
ly evident from a Comparison of percentages of city
population in lowest two income groupings and city
per capita income with figures for Springfield-
Chicopee-Holyoke SMSA and Commonwealth (1970- Census):
incomes under $3,000 = H 11.0%, SMSA 6.8%, Mass. 6.4%;
incomes from $3,000 to $5,999 = H 15.8%, SMSA
12.8%; Mass. 11.8%; per capita income = H $2,933,
SMSA $3,225, Mass. $3,425; in addition, a mostly
poor Puerto Rican population of approx. 6,000
persons has recently migrated to city and is
steadily increasing; therefore, state assistance
and aid and public industrial land development
can be justified in Holyoke on basis of employ-
ment need; in addition, presence of a signifi-
cant number of high wage manufacturing jobs
suggests that project can be marketed to firms
offering "primary labor market" quality jobs;
moreover, two private industrial parks in city,
Holyoke and Springdale Industrial Parks, have
been filled to capacity and a third, Holyoke
"91" Industrial Park, has had success in dis-
posing of property.
Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: Holyoke will not
forego any real estate tax revenue during
development of project because all of.property
used for project was either municipally owned
or severely tax delinquent; nevertheless, and
despite prospect of a favorable market situ-
ation in Holyoke in near future, a project as
small as one contemplated may not return more
to city in tax revenues than substantial costs
of city share of net project cost and interest
expenses on bond issue; in addition, whereas
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disposition price to Northeast Wire Co. is approx.
$15,000/acre, net project cost was based on total
disposition proceeds of $281,576 or $22, 26/acre;
if Authority does not receive projected disposition
proceeds, net project cost will increase; however,
$182,710 of city share of net project cost con-
sists of two non-cash grants-in-aid, one of which
represents an amount of delinquent real estate
taxes owed on land acquired for project which
city would probably never have collected; due
to uncertainty of probably fiscal impacts of pro-
ject, DCA should conduct a fiscal impact analysis
of project to assess sensitivity of project's
fiscal impacts to changes in costs, revenues, and
land area.
* Employment Impacts: although we do not know
how many new jobs will result from firm expansions
and start-ups as a result of project or character-
istics of those persons likely to be employed,
features of project, such as excellent highway
transportation (adjacent to new 1-391, close to
1-91 and Mass. Turnpike), low wage labor, re-
sources of a major SMSA, and agglomeration economies
related to concentration of paper and printing
industries, should provide economic advantages
which contribute to growth, and in-city location
of project provides under- and unemployed local
residents with physical access to jobs; however,
in order to insure that public employment objectives
are met through hiring of under- and unemployed
city residents in "primary labor market" quality
jobs, firm selection criteria and an explicit
employment program should be established; an
employment program might include targeting of
manpower training funds to project, inclusion
of performance clauses on hiring of unemployed
as part of disposition agreements, and estab-
lishing referral relationships between firms
and vocational education programs; due to lack
of an adequate information system for reporting
on project impacts, detailed information is not
available on employment impacts from expansion
of Northeast Wire Co. on site.
* Growth of the State Economy: if in-state firms
expand, businesses start-up, or out-of-state
firms locate in project due in part to increased
efficiency from advantages particular to site
and Holyoke, such as highway transportation,
low wage labor, or agglomeration economies re-
lated to paper and printing industries, project
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will contribute to state economic growth; thus,
if a firm moved to site in order to use mill-
races as a power source project would contribute
to state economic growth; up to present time,
Northeast Wire Co. has expanded employment on
site; however, without more detailed information
on reasons for location decision of firm, it is
difficult to assess whether project has made a
unique contribution to that growth; small size
of available parcels will rule out movement of
major production facilities to site.
* Induced Effects: possibility of future re-
development of property within project area but
not currently included in development project
has influenced owners to maintain their properties
and keep up with tax payments to city; in addition,
demolition of fire hazardous structures and
renovation of two buildings in project area
have served to stabilize land prices and stir
local business interest in general area; however,
likely long-term consequences from these perceived
changes in attitude cannot be judged at present
time; moveover, impact of highway on industrial
activity in area should be greater than renewal
project; on a further note, industrial project
may contribute somewhat to increase chances
for development of a multi-million dollar com-
mercial project in Holyoke which has been pro-
posed by a wealthy local resident with a desire
to build a unique multi-media and urban archi-
tectural showpiece; however, link between two
projects appears to be tenuous at best.
-* Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: concen-
tration of employment in two industrial cate-
gories of paper and allied products and printing,
publishing, and allied (approx. 50% of manu-
facturing employment or 22.5% of total employment
in city in '74: DES) suggests that agglomer-
ation economies related to these industries may
be present in city; historical Tominance of
paper industry in Holyoke, once known as "Paper
City of the World," lends support for this
supposition; thus, if project is marketed to
firms in these industrial categories agglomera-
tion economies may be strenthened ind growth may
occur which otherwise would not for lack of
suitable modern space within Holyoke; inasmuch
as jobs in paper and allied products category
offer relatively high wages ($9,913 in '74: DES)
but firms in printing, publishing, and allied
category provide low wages on average ($7,954
in '74: DES), care should be taken in marketing
to firms in latter category.
HOLYOKE
Narrative:
Judgement:
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy:
inasmuch as a variety of industry groups are
well represented in Holyoke and manufacturing-
continues to account for a large portion of city
employment, project cannot be justified on basis
of increasing local economic diversity.
In 1973 the Holyoke City Council directed the
Redevelopment Authority to pursue the idea of
an industrial park project. A survey of industrial
development sites which had been made over a de-
cade before had identified the Millrace South
site as a prime candidate for development. By
1973 the site consisted mostly of vacant old mill
structures which posed serious fire hazards.
Strong support for the project has been evident
from the public, the press, businessmen, and local
officials.
The City of Holyoke warrants state assistance
and aid and a public industrial development pro-
ject on the basis of local fiscal and employment
needs, a potential for achieving employment and
state growth benefits, evidence of agglomeration
economies, a high probability of :induced develop-
ment, and factors, such as the superior highway
transportation available at the park and the
successful marketing of private parks in Holyoke,
which suggest that demand exists for the project.
As a community manifesting many of the character-
istics of a "depressed" urban center, Holyoke
offers an opportunity for achieving state and
local economic development goals related to
growth and distribution. In light of the need
for substantial and costly infrastructure in-
vestment, the difficult demands of land assembly,
and a lingering uncertainty concerning the demand
for industrial space within the City of Holyoke,
it is doubtful that development of this potential
scope would occur by the private sector with the
construction of the highway as the single induce-
ment.
The good potential of the Holyoke area for future
economic growth and the impending construction of
Route 391 through the project area suggest-that
the small project can be marketed. However, in
order for the project to provide net-positive
fiscal returns to the city and the Commonwealth,
it appears that the entire original project area
must be developed in some fashion (this may re-
sult as a by-product of the smaller project).
3S4
HOLYOKE
Future project progress will benefit considerably
from strong DCA assistance with marketing and
the coordination of project activities with DPW.
In addition, DCA should prepare a fiscal impact
analysis of the project to assess the sensitivity
of positive fiscal benefits to:.changes in key
project parameters. Furthermore, in order to
insure that public employment objectives are met
through the hiring of under- and unemployed city
residents in "primary labor market" quality jobs,
firm selection criteria and an employment program
should be established.
The rejection on the part of the residents and
officials of Holyoke of the existing mill buildings
and unique millraces as resources which might
be creatively put to good advantage may represent
a short-sighted view which will limit the benefits
derived from these structures. With the advent of
the energy crisis and the prognosis of a long term
worsening of the shortfall between energy needs and
availability, the federal government has recently
begun to study the potential for small scale hydro-
electric power generation. The millraces represent
a clean, existing, and virtually costless source
of power in the highest energy cost region of
the nation. Therefore, a study of the potential
for the industrial use of the millraces should be
undertaken prior to eliminating the millraces and
mill structures. Holyoke and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts may be passing up a unique opportunity
for achieving economic advantages and substantial
notoriety, DCA staff should pursue this notion
with officials in Holyoke and state personnel in
the Offices of State Planning and Energy Policy.
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Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
LAWRENCE
Lawrence Industrial Park
130 acres
Industrial
some manufacturing, some distribution, some
warehousing
$1,201,361 (actual; budget amended 8/71)
$ 600,681 (one-half of net project cost;
principal only)
$ 600,681 (one-half of net project cost not
including bond interest costs which are borne
entirely by city)
$ 360,408 ('63-'76: 12 payments = 6 payments
of $26,160.25, 5 payments of $30,034.01, and 1
payment of $53,276.57; no planning advance; net
project cost amended in 1971)
All development work was completed and all of
property in park was sold to industrial firms
by end of 1969. Park has achieved significant
fiscal and employment benefits for city and
Commonwealth. However, park has failed to
achieve its full potential due to weaknesses
of program design and project management.
* Project successfully developed and marketed
in a major "depressed" urban center: city was
a major manufacturing community as one of
largest textile centers in nation prior to World
War II; most of that textile industry moved into
Southern states during '50s; population declined
from 80,536 persons in '50 to 66,915 persons in
'70; city now manifests "depressed" area character-
istics of continually high unemployment and high
real estate taxes but some signs of an economic
recovery are evident.
* Principally an intra-community industrial
relocation project: 100% of land in park has
been disposed of and most of firms which have
located in project have been expanding local
businesses; all of firms which have moved to
park have been in-state concerns.
* Post-completion project monitoring and economic
development assistance to project firms is pro-
vided by local Economic Development and Industrial
Corporation.
* Development Strategies: (a) majority of park
land was sold to a -single redeveloper who marketed
parcels to individual firms; and (b) a small
number of parcels were sold by the Redevelopment
Authority to individual firms.
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* Additional features of model are not known due
to absence of project records at DCA and City of
Lawrence; project was completed in 10/66; Redevelop-
ment Authority was dissolved.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers?
* No evidence of state planning advance; No
technical and coordination assistance provided
by DCA; No evidence of state infrastructure in-
vestment.
* State execution subsidy.
municipal: * Municipal expenditures: municipal bond(s)
of at least $1,200,000 (actual amount unknown)
were issued; total city share of net project cost
was $600,681 (principal only); original project
budget was amended in 8/71 to reflect actual pro-
ject costs; city also bears all of interest costs
on bonds for project; it is not known if additional
municipal expenditures or donation of municipally
owned land contributed to development of project.
Actors: * City -of Lawrence: provided funding of unknown
magnitude.
* Lawrence Redevelopment Authority: nothing is
known about reasons for formation, staffing, pub-
lic support, efficiency of implementation pro-
cess, or composition and capability of board.
* Lawrence Economic Development and Industrial
Corporation: EDIC organized pursuant to Chapter
121C of General Laws monitors project and pro-
vides assistance to firms .selling and purchasing
property in park.
* DCA: no assistance was provided in past; DCA's
failure to obtain cooperation of other state
agencies has been cited as having been a problem
for project; current Director of Community Develop-
ment in Lawrence claims that DCA staff have lacked
expertise and have failed to help with project
development, that program regulations fail to
reflect renewal process, and that payment method
is overly complex and prone to delay.
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Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: project was approved
in 8/60, completed (i.e. 100% of land sold; most
of it to a single redeveloper who marketed
parcels to firms) in 10/66, and completely
marketed to businesses by '69; it was first pro-
ject approved by DCA under Chapter 121B statute
and only project approved until New Bedford
Maritime Terminal in 1963; due to lack of records
and unavailability of anyone connected with
development of project, no information has been
obtained on project initiation, planning process,
or efficiency of execution and marketing phases;
DCA files contain no information on use of
eminent domain powers, ownership status or prior
condition of property, or extent of infrastructure
investment in project; current city Community
Development Director claims that DCA was inept
and that project success is attributable to
dedication, skill, aggressiveness, and cooper-
ation of city personnel; relatively short 9 year
period from concept to project completion to
marketing of all of land to businesses indicates
that project was a success in terms of process
of development (therefore, absence of project
records is an even greater loss and additional
investigation may be worth effort).
* Planning: nothing is known about contents
of plan, how and whether a plan was prepared,
who prepared plan, or how planning was funded;
there is no evidence of state advances of planning
funds.
* Marketing: no information is available re-
garding original conception of a market for
project; all of park land has been sold to
individual firms; however, some firms are holding
vacant land for future expansion; most of firms
which have located in park were locally expanding
businesses but some firms relocated from other
parts of state; most of project property was
sold to a single redeveloper who marketed par-
cels to firms; uses present in park include
manufacturing, distribution, and wholesaling;
some commercial interests have sought parcels
In park but city development office has rejected
a mix of uses; some of parcels have changed hands
over time which has resulted in some decrease in
labor intensity of park use.
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Measures: * Fiscal Need: Lawrence clearly warrants state
assistance and aid on basis of fiscal need; city
is an old industrial center which manifests many
characteristics of a "depressed community": a
21% loss of population from 1945 to 1970, con-
sistently one of highest unemployment rates in
state, relatively high percentages of population
in lowest two income ranges. (1970 Census: in-
comes under $3,000 = Law. 9.1%, Mass. 6.4%;
incomes $3,000-$5,999 = Law. 14.7%, Mass. 11.8%),
80% of housing units built prior to 1939, youth
delinquency problems, and 1/6 of population con-
sisting of mostly poor Spanish speaking people;
city was once one of major textile mill centers
in nation but suffered from exodus of most of
these firms to South during 1950s (15,525 jobs
lost out of 17,167 total textile jobs in '50);
fiscal picture in Lawrence is bad and growing
worse: approx. $2.2 million in uncollected
taxes, high equalized tax rate (but far below
Boston, Cambridge, & Chelsea), and a $20/$1,000
AV tax rate rise in 1977; in addition, City plans
to start construction on a new $20 million high
school in '78.
* Employment Need: "depressed area" character-
istics of City also qualify Lawrence for state
assistance and aid on basis of employment need;
unemployment rate in City is consistently one
of highest in State ('60 = Law. 4.33%, Mass. 4.19%;
'70 = Law. 4.46%, Mass. 3.82%; '75 = Law. 13.95%,
Mass. 11.2%); during '60s, highly trained por-
tions of work force experienced high unemploy-
ment; four leading industry groups in Lawrence
(leather, textile mill products, rubber products,
and apparel), which account for 55.5% of manu-
facturing employment in city (DES: 1974), offer
relatively low paying and "secondary labor market"
quality jobs (i.e. high turnover, low pay, low
security, etc.); however, despite a general
industrial decline, Lawrence has retained a large
manufacturing base (approx. 52% of total employ-
ment) and has attracted some jobs in high wage,
state growth industry groups of fabricated metal
products ($10,100 average annual wage '74) and
non-electrical machinery ($12,000).
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: although detailed annual
information has not been collected by either City or
DCA, project has definitely resulted in substantial
positive net fiscal benefits to city; whereas proper-
ty provided approx. $20,000 annually to city in taxes
before project, tax payments to Lawrence from project
property totalled approx. $660,000 in '75; in addition,
unused land currently held by firms for future expansion
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needs will increase fiscal returns to city at some
time in future.
* Employment Impacts: lack of data on increased
employment from expansion of firms which moved
to park, on residence and characteristics of
workers employed in park, and on reuse of space
vacated by expanding local firms, precludes a
precise assessment of employment impacts from
project; nevertheless, in general, employment
impacts from park appear to meet state economic
development objectives; in-city location of park
provides for physical access to jobs for under-
and unemployed city residents; firms which might
have expanded out of City have been able to
remain in close proximity to "needy" labor force;
park may have precipitated expansion of local
firms which find positive advantages in a Lawrence
location and, therefore, would not have expanded
to sites out of Lawrence; in-state firms from
out-of-area have located in City where employment
needs are greatest; some of these out-of-area.
firms may have been able to expand employment
only because of availability of cheap labor in
City; in addition, although information on status
of park property prior to project is not avail-
able, Lawrence is a 6.75 acre land-scarce
community and it is unlikely that firms locating
in park would have been served by private market
development at this or any other sites in city;
however, turnover of some parcels in park has
decreased employment impact from project by
substituting low labor distribution and ware-
house uses for manufacturing; in addition, no
reuse restrictions were placed on park redeveloper
and a number of original firms purchased par-
cels for warehousing and distribution uses;
City Community Development Director claims that
project has not resulted in as many jobs as had
been hoped; moreover, no explicit public efforts
were made to seek or require "primary labor
market" quality businesses for park or to estab-
lish programs for providing training and job
access to unemployed; failure to restrict reuse
and to provide for hiring of unemployed has
significantly reduced positive project employ-
ment benefits below potential level of such benefits;
an estimated 620 jobs are located in project.
* Growth of the State Economy:. aggregate state
economic benefits have been achieved to degree:
(a) firms in park have expanded or started-up
because of availability of cheap labor or other
advantages particular to Lawrence (ex. agglomer-
ation economies of some type, labor skills,
superior highway access, etc.); (b) space
vacated by local firms which have moved to park
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has been filled because of these same local
advantages; and (c) achievement of local fiscal
and employment objectives has served to reduce
fiscal demands on state (welfare, unemployment
compensation, city aid, etc.) and, therefore,
need for increased taxes which would mar competi-
tive position of Commonwealth for business as a
whole; due to absence of an adequate information
system for reporting on project impacts, informa-
tion is not available for assessing in a con-
vincing fashion whether any of three types of
growth benefits bave occurred; nevertheless,
rapidity of park marketing and attraction of
out-of-area firms suggest that state has received
aggregate benefits of first type, and achievement
of positive fiscal and employment impacts from
project in a city with considerable need indi-
cates that benefits of third type have also been
accomplished; no information is available with
respect to second type of benefit; however,
evidence that low labor intensity uses, such as
warehousing and distribution have been located
in park suggests that state growth benefits have
been limited; in addition, absence of an explicit
public program to insure hiring of unemployed
persons has probably served to limit benefits
of third type; in summary, despite good potential
of project for achieving state economic growth
benefits of all three types, project failed to
fulfill its potential due to weaknesses at pro-
ject management.
* Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: although
information is not available on markets or
supplies of firms located in park, continued
concentration of textile, leather, and apparel
industry groups (approx. 43% of manufacturing
firms and jobs: DES 1974) in Lawrence suggests
that agglomeration economies of some sort may
be present; ease of marketing 130 acre park
reinforces suspicion that agglomeration economies
may be at work for some firms; however, this
evidence is far from persuasive on matter.
Increased Diversity of the Local Economy:
inadequate information has been collected to
assess whether firms which have located in park
have added to diversity of local economic base;
however, lack of reuse restrictions on disposi-
tion of parcels in park significantly weakened
likelihood that project would meet diversifi-
cation objectives; because land for industrial
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Narrative:
park development is limited in Lawrence, failure
to maximize potential for using park to meet
local needs is all more significant.
* Induced Effects: no evidence of additional
development resulting from project.
The Lawrence Industrial Park was the first pro-
ject approved pursuant to Chapter 121B. Neither
DCA nor the now defunct Redevelopment Authority
maintained records on the project which are
available at the present time. In addition, no
one directly connected with the project is
presently working in Lawrence or for DCA. There-
fore, little is known about the reasons for the
project or its development history. The project
was approved in 1960, the property was com-
pletely disposed of by the Redevelopment Authority
in 1966, mostly to a single redeveloper, and the
developer completed parcel dispositions by 1969.
Despite the "depressed" character of the City of
Lawrence, the project was marketed over a rela-
tively short period of time. Lawrence remains
a major manufacturing center and indications of
renewal potential and economic attractiveness
are evident. Although the Central Business
District continues to lack vibrancy, an early
downtown renewal effort has resulted in new
buildings and an attractive park area. Lawrence
accounts for approximately 37% (DES: 1974) of
the firms and employment in the heavily in-
dustrial Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA. Machinery and
electrical machinery employment now account for
20% of the manufacturing jobs in Lawrence.
Major firms such as Honeywell, General Tire, ITT,
and Malden Mills have moved into and renovated
old mill space and Gillette, Raytheon, and
Hewlett-Packard are providing jobs to Lawrence
residents after moving to neighboring Andover.
Interstate highways 495 and 93 pass by Lawrence
providing easy access to the interstate network.
Thus, although Lawrence exhibits many "depressed
area" characteristics, various features of the
city suggest that state interventions to assist
in industrial development, such as the 121B
industrial park project, have a potential for
success. Nevertheless, one major factor which
continues to impede economic renewal in Lawrence
is the close proximity of the city to New Hampshire
with its more favorable tax burden.
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Judgement: The City of Lawrence warranted state assistance
and aid because of serious employment and fiscal
needs, a potential for achieving positive fiscal
and employment impacts, a need to diversify the
local economy, evidence of agglomeration economies,
a potential for adding to growth of the state
economy, and features, such as good highway
transportation and continued economic activity in
the city, which suggested a market potential
for the project. As a "depressed" community,
Lawrence offered the state an opportunity for
meeting economic development objectives related
to growth and distribution. The successful de-
velopment and marketing of the project demon-
strated that an industrial land development
project could be marketed in a depressed community
and suggested that the unavailability of modern
industrial space was a constraint which contributed
to the economic decline of the city (the case
did not, of course, demonstrate that a project
could be marketed in any depressed community).
Private developers and/or sources of finance had
apparently considered Lawrence to be too risky
for industrial park development or had experienced
assembly problems or costs which precluded
competitive development. The limited avail-
ability of suitable land for an industrial park
in Lawrence was an additional reason for the
need for public action.
Although detailed information on the effective-
ness of the project in meeting state economic
development objectives has not been collected,
the existing evidence indicates that benefits
from the project include substantial positive
net fiscal flows to the city, employment bene-
fits for the unemployed, employment growth, net
positive fiscal flows to the state, and the
distribution of employment to a needy community.
Nevertheless, the park has not achieved its
maximum potential benefits because of weaknesses
in public program design and project management.
In particular, the absence of reuse restrictions
on land in the park, the failure to seek firms
offering high quality employment, and the lack
of a public program to provide jobs to the un-
employed, have resulted in less than optimal
employement benefits. Finally, the inadequate
record keeping at DCA and failure to establish
an information system for the collection of
data on project impacts have severely limited
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the ability of the Commonwealth to assess the
merits of the program and DCA to design a more
effective program. The neglect of these
matters on the part.of DCA reflects a serious
and gross failure at program management which
has consistently undermined state industrial
and urban development efforts. Inasmuch as the
Lawrence Industrial Park resulted in significant
positive net economic development benefits, the
absence of detailed data on project impacts is
expecially unfortunate. Without a detailed
analysis of project costs and benefits, state
legislators and personnel in the executive branch
of government formulate inaccurate views of the
program based on crises during development
phases rather than economic outcomes.
Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
Town Share:
State Payments:
Status:
Model Aspects:
METHUEN
Methuen Industrial Park
245 acres; 150 acres developed
Industrial
-0- land was sold to a redeveloper for cost of
acquisition.
$74,418 planning advance (has not been recaptured
by state)
Project has been completed and all land has been
sold to firms. Industrial Park has provided
substantial positive fiscal benefits and has added
a large number of new jobs to town. However,
as a result of a number of local and state pro-
ject management weaknesses, net benefits from
project have been limited and project may not
have been justified.
* No state or municipal execution subsidy required:
land was assembled through use of eminent domain
powers and subsequently sold to a single redeveloper
for cost of acquisition.
* Solely a land assembly project: all project land
was disposed of in raw condition without any infra-
structure improvements.
* Project in a relatively prosperous and growing
community; population increased from 24,477 per-
sons in '50 to 35,456 in '70; manufacturing em-
ployment has grown steadily and private industrial
park development has been strong; town has not ex-
perienced fiscal or unemployment problems; income
statistics on population indicate that town is com-
paratively more prosperous than SMSA and Commonwealth;
nevertheless, town manifests a very low overall
average annual wage due to a high percentage of
low wage jobs in retail and selected services
categories which is a result of "suburban" char-
acter of town and a very low average annual wage
in manufacturing.
* Park land was marketed to major firms including
Nabisco, Columbo Dairy, and Raymers Express.
* Project was initiated by local businessmene
* Development Strategy: land in park was sold
to a single redeveloper who marketed parcels to
individual firms.
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Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers: a variety of criteria
were cited to qualify for use of eminent domain,
including diversity of ownership, uncertain
title, improper size and shape of lots, inadequate
access to rear tracts, inadequate streets and
utilities, swamp and soil conditions, and a
history of failed private attempts to assemble;
however, a DCA consultant questioned legality of
use of eminent domain by noting that individual
parcels were of sufficient size (10 to 62 acres)
for private development and by claiming that,
since local growth was not impeded by condition of
property, project merely represented a way to
increase tax base.
* State planning advance: $74,418 in state funds
advanced for planning was not recaptured when
project proceeded without execution assistance.
* No state execution subsidy; No state infra-
structure investment associated with project.
Failure of DCA to perform regulatory role ade-
quately and manage project with reference to state
economic development objectives reduced public
benefits from project and resulted in a develop-
ment process of questionable legality; Redevelop-
ment Authority initiated eminent domain takings
prior to receiving DCA project approval (which
is illegal);. sale of assembled property to single
redeveloper for acquisition price without requiring
developer to produce specific amounts of public
benefits indicates either that property was not
worth more assembled than in parcels, and thus
was not a legitimate candidate for use of eminent
domain, or, more likely case, that town did not
receive appropriate compensation for property
and developer gained financial advantage of public
assembly; there is no evidence that DCA approved of dis-
position price or was kept informed of activities during
disposition process; it appears that developer may have
been lined up prior to initiation of project and "public
knowledge" and bidding requirements of disposition pro-
cesswere not fulfilled; failure of DCA to promulgate a
"non-relocation" regulation prohibiting movement
of firms out of needy communities to publicly
assisted project may have allowed for flight of
firms from high priority development areas (how-
ever, no information is now available on prior
locations of firms located in park).
METHUEN
municipal:
- Actors:
* Municipal expenditures: town provided $26,306.25
to Redevelopment Authority for planning and
administrative expenses which was not recaptured
upon sale of land to redeveloper; town also ad-
vanced $153,313.15 to Authority for acquisition
expenses which was recaptured from proceeds of
sale of land to redeveloper; in addition, town
built a new water storage tower as part of project
to serve firms in park and add to town capacity.
* Town of Methuen: advance of acquisition funds,
funding of some administrative and planning ex-
penses, and construction of water tower.
* Methuen Industrial Development Cormission: local
businessmen and bankers initiated project as mem-
bers of Commission.
* Methuen Redevelopment Authority: was formed in
1966 to undertake industrial park project; execu-
tive director serves as a consultant on an hourly
basis.
* DCA: failed to properly execute regulatory
functions; there is no evidence that DCA approved
of disposition agreement or monitored disposition
process to insure "public knowledge" and com-
pliance with regulations; DCA back-dated letter
of project approval to avoid legal challenges to
Authority's premature initiation of eminent domain
process; no cooperation agreement between town
and Authority was executed; correspondence and
entries in DCA file end in 7/71 after project was
approved by DCA.
* Water Commissioner: required construction of
new water tower for project.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: approval for survey
and planning phase was given in 5/67 and project
approval was granted in 7/70; DCA files provide
little information on planning and execution
phases of project; no project plan is on file
with DCA; planning expenses noted in audit indi-
cates that a plan was prepared by consultants;
due to lack of staff at time, DCA retained a
planning consultant to review project plans;
Authority proceeded with eminent domain takings
prior to receipt of DCA approval which is legally
required; DCA back-dated approval letter a few
months in order to avoid legal problems with
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Measures:
METHUEN
premature use of eminent domain; DCA approved
project despite lacking necessary legal docu-
mentation of local approvals; 150 acres acquired
through eminent domain for $153,313.15 were dis-
posed of to a single redeveloper in raw condition
for cost of acquisition; land parcels were subsequently
sold to Nabisco, Columbo Dairy, and Raymers
Express Terminal; approximately 100 acres remain
within perimeter of project area for future
development by Authority; no correspondence from
the Authority is in DCA file for period since
DCA approved project; last file entry is dated
7/71.
* Fiscal Need: although original project approval
was partly based on a supposed need for balancing
local tax base, health of Methuen fiscal affairs
compared with other Mass. communities should not
have justified state assistance on basis- of fiscal
need; tax rate in Methuen has remained stable
over a numbet of years and tax rate on equalized
value is among lowest for municipalities in state;
although wholesale and retail trade, and selected
services account for most local jobs, with approxi-
mately 39% and 29% of town employment respectively
('74 DES), manufacturing employs approx. 16% of
Methuen's workers in stable industries and has
been growing; private industrial land developers
have been active in Methuen and two large private
industrial parks, one of 175 acres and one of
600 acres, have been developed; town population
has increased by 68% since 1930 compared with an
increase of 14% in SMSA over same period; during
decade of '60s Methuen experienced a net in-
migration of 5,137 people; Methuen is largely a
residential community and most working residents
commute to jobs in surrounding communities (a
working population of approx. 16,000 residents
and only 6,000 local jobs in '74); overall, popu-
lation growth and vigorous private market activity
have provided Methuen with a solid tax base.
* Employmeni Need: although decline of textiles
in Greater Lawrence Area included substantial
losses in Methuen, town has been able to attract
firms in electrical machinery and food industry
groups; percentages of town population in lowest
two income groupings are low compared to SMSA
and state figures (1970 Census): incomes under
$3,000 = Meth. 6%, SMSA, 6.8%, Mass. 6.4%; incomes
$3,000-$5,999 = Meth. 9.9%, SMSA 12.0%, Mass.
11.8%; town medium income of $9,739 (1970 Census)
was considerably higher than those of SMSA = $8,746
and state = $8,607; unemployment rate in Methuen
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is consistently below state average; therefore,
Methuen does not appear to warrant state
assistance or public industrial development
initiatives on basis of local employment need;
however, town manifests a very low average annual
wage ($5,700 in '74: DES) due largely to high
percentages of employment in low wage categories
of retail trade and selected services; never-
theless, inasmuch as Methuen is principally a
residential community with a majority of its
working force commuting to jobs in other com-
munities, most of these low paying service jobs
appear to represent voluntary part-time and
secondary employment (i.e. housewives in middle
income families, students, etc.) rather than
"involuntary" employment of primary wage earners;
however, in addition to low wage service jobs,
town manifests a very low average annual wage
in manufacturing sector ($7,500 in '74: DES)
due to high percentages of manufacturing jobs
in low wage categories of electrical machinery,
food, and apparel; many of employees in these
jobs are probably reverse communters from
Lawrence, Haverhill, and Lowell; thus, project
in Methuen might have been justified on basis
of employment need only if under- and unemployed
persons were provided with "primary labor market"
quality jobs; close proximity of. town to high
unemployment areas of Lawrence (12.1% in 3/76),
Lowell (10.1% in 3/76), and Haverhill (13.5% in
3/76) may allow for physical job access for
under- and unemployed persons; however, special
public efforts necessary to fulfill this potential,
such as targeting job training programs to
project, attracting and providing transportation
for unemployed persons, and obtaining employment
commitments from firms locating in park, were
never initiated; attractive location (Rts. 93
and 495), large size of parcels, low cost of
land, and desirable features of park might
have provided necessary leverage needed by state
and Redevelopment Authority to achieve employ-
ment objectives through such actions; sale of
entire property to a single redeveloper for
cost of acquisition might have been justified
if performance provisions related to hiring of
unemployed persons had been included in disposi-
tion agreement (rules and regulations allow for
sales to other than highest bidder if public
benefits are maximized).
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* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: although detailed
information is not available, net fiscal flows
from project have been substantial due to
following: there was no need for a local
execution subsidy since land was sold for cost
of acquisition, modest municipally funded adminis-
trative and planning expenses amounting to
$26,000 were incurred as entire property was
sold to redeveloper in unimproved condition soon
after assembly was completed, and redeveloper
disposed of land to major firms in a short period
of time; in addition, remaining undeveloped 100
acres within boundary of project area offer
potential for future additional tax revenues;
nevertheless, sale of project land to redeveloper
for cost of acquisition, without meeting regu-
lations on disposition process or obtaining DCA
approval of disposition, suggests that re-
developer received benefits of assembly process
achieved with public purpose powers which should
have been captured by town and state (property
should be worth more assembled than in individual
parcels); therefore, although town has received
substantial positive net fiscal benefits from
project, Methuen should have received even more
benefits (either through a higher disposition
price or a commitment of developer to public
objectives); moreover, there is a high probability
that private development would have occured on
property without public intervention and town
would have received most of tax returns currently
attributable to project;
Employment Impacts- although detailed inform-
ation on number, salary levels, and character-
istics (i.e. residence, ethnicity, etc.) of
employees in park is not available, employment
by major firms in park has definitely added sub-
stantial numbers of jobs to Methuen; however,
because Methuen does not manifest characteristics
of a depressed community and special public
efforts to insure hiring of under- and unemployed
by firms offering "primary labor market" quality
employment 'were not instituted, park probably
has had a limited impact on meeting state employ-
ment objectives; in addition, although no inform-
ation exists on where firms in park were
previously located (if anywhere), absence of a
state "non-relocation regulatio" which would
prohibit movement of firms out of high priority
development areas to park locations adds to un-
certainty with regard to net employment benefits
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from project; thus, although project has netted
many new jobs for Methuen, considerable un-
certainty remains with respect to whether or
not project has been justified on basis of
employment impacts; moreover, if private de-
velopment would have occured without public
intervention, net employment benefits to town
from project may be negligible.
* Growth of the State Economy: .lack of inform-
ation on prior location and previous size of
firms now located in park precludes a definitive
assessment of net state economic growth from
project due to expansion of firm employment,
movement of out-of-state firms into Commonwealth,
business start-ups, and reuse of vacant space;
if this highly marketable park has proven attractive
to firms because of greater efficiency in trans-
portation, modern.space, or access to inputs or
markets, project may have been justified as con-
tributing to growth of state economy; however,
legitimate questions with respect to legality
of use of eminent domain powers and development
process for this project suggest that private
development at site would have occured without
public intervention: site was well located for
highway access without requiring additional
state highway investment, property consisted of
relatively large size parcels of from 10 to 62
acres, all of land was sold at cost of acquisi-
tion to a single developer, disposition process
was not conducted with full "public knowledge,"
available evidence indicates that DCA never
approved of disposition process or price, and
it appears that redeveloper may have been con-
nected with project from time of its conception;
good probability that private development would
have occurred without public action indicates
that project cannot be justified on basis of
growth of state economy; moveover, failure of
DCA to utilize opportunity presented by highly
attractive park to promote employment objectives
of state has limited fiscal benefits of project
to state (through lower welfare costs, municipal
aid, etc.) and, therefore, impact of project on
reducing state taxing needs which partly deter-
mine competitive position of Commonwealth for
business in general.
* No Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: al-
though Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA manifests various
sorts of agglomeration economies related to
concentration of specific industries, no con-
nection is apparent between firms which have
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Narrative:
Judgement:
located in park and any particular agglomeration
advantage.
* Increased Diversity of the Economic Base:
although project was initially advanced as an
effort to expand and broaden local tax base, and
Methuen suffered from loss .of textile firms during
'50s, fiscal strength of Methuen indicates that
local economic diversity is a weak basis for
project acceptance.
* Induced Effects: there is no evidence of
additional development resulting from project.
No additional information on the development of
this project is currently available.
Although the Methuen project was developed without
any need for state or municipal execution subsides
and successfully marketed, and the major firms
locating in the park have provided substantial
numbers of new jobs to the town, a sufficient
number of questions have arisen with respect to
the original basis for the project, the legality
of the development process, the net employment
impacts to the state and the town, the fiscal
needs of the town, and whether those persons most
in need gained access to jobs, to place in doubt
the desirability of the Methuen project. In
order for a project in a municipality without
fiscal or employment problems to serve state
economic development objectives, unique public
objectives for the project must be formulated
and the state, through DCA, must play an active
role in managing resources and activities to
accomplish those objectives. Thus, for a highly
marketable site in Methuen, project objectives
might include: disposition of a target percentage
of land to out-of-state firms; requirements for
firms locating in the park to hire the unemployed;
disposition to firms providing "primary labor
market" quality employment; and a priority for
firms which.better satisfy state import sub-
stitution goals or are export businesses highly
input interdependent with the state economy.
State initiatives which should be part of the
project might include an employment program to
provide job access and training to the unemployed
and state government efforts to promote the park
to out-of-state firms. The failure of DCA to
design the program and manage projects with an. out-
put orientation directed toward the achievement
of state economic development objectives has
meant that projects like Methuen have not proven
37 it
METHUEN
justified in exeuction. In addition, the absence
of an adequate information system for reporting
project impacts has deprived DCA and the Common-
wealth of an ability to assess the costs and
benefits of projects and the merits of the program.
The apparent failure of DCA to properly fulfill
its regultory role with respect to the Methuen
project highlights a number of management failures
at the state level and specific problems with
the design of the program. The authority of DCA
with respect to projects not receiving execution
subsidies is weakly defined. In the past, DCA
personnel have adopted a "hands off" attitude
with regard to such projects, believing that
state intervention would not be welcomed at the
local level and that the state had little authority
over projects not receiving execution subsidies.
In support of an opposing view, one can argue
that the execution subsidy is only one of several
components of a program and not any more signifi-
cant to the program than the other components. In
the case of Methuen, the state has provided
planning funds to the project and authorized the
use of state powers of eminent domain by the local
authority. The state retains the legal authority
over the use of eminent domain powers and state
government has an obligation to insure that the
public purposes which warrant the use of such
powers are fulfilled when these powers are employed.
The Methuen Redevelopment Authority utilized
eminent domain powers under questionable circum-
stances and disposed of the property to a single
redeveloper at project cost without obtaining
DCA approVal of the disposition price or agree-
ment or complying with the regulations on "public
information." The potential for abuse of eminent
domain powers at the local level is great because
of the large differences in financial gains which
can result from public as compared with private
market land assembly. Moreover, in addition to
the components of the Chapter 121B program, pro-
jects frequently depend on state assistance in
the form of public works projects, such as bridges
and highways. In order for these investments
to serve public goals, close supervision and
active assistance from DCA is required. In addi-
tion, DCA concern for project objectives is
necessary to insure that public goals are not
being subverted by projects; for example, by en-
couraging the flight of industry out of high
priority development areas into industrial parks
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in more prosperous communities. However, DCA
has never been provided with the staff with the
expertise necessary for providing project
assistance and managing the program with respect
to economic development objectives. Moreover,
the design of- the program, as delineated in
the legislation and rules and regulations which
are based on the federal urban renewal program,
reflects an input focus concentrating on the
development parcel and a corresponding regulatory
role for DCA rather than a concern for publicly
valued outputs. In addition, DCA experiences
difficulty exerting control over projects because
of the limited sanctions available to apply
against Redevelopment Authorities for non cooper-
ation and DCA's failure to establish an inform"
ation system for supplying information needed
for effective management control. In general,
DCA relies on periodic audits by the State Auditor,
threats of investigation by the Attorney General's
Office, and informal verbal cajoling and political
pressure to exercise control. However, the
state audits deal only with financial records
and do not consider performance objectives, plan
compliance, or compliance with the rules and
regulations. DCA currently lacks a reporting
system for monitoring the activities of Redevelop-
ment Authorities in these matters. Although an-
nual reports are required by statute, DCA has
not enforced the requirement, developed a format
for reporting information, or used the reports
that have been submitted. If projects were more
dependent on DCA for assistance, and Authorities
would automatically be more dependent if projects
were concentrated in depressed communities, DCA
might have more leverage for exercising control.
In any case, in order for the program to achieve
publicly valued objectives, DCA must play an
active role in providing assistance and managing
resources and activities across units of state
government, as well as aggressively monitoring
the development process for compliance with the
rules and regulations. If the regulations are
considered to be too cumbersome, they should be
revised and not simply ignored.
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I Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Execu. Approval:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
EDA Grant:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
II Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Plann. Approval:
Execu. Approval:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
State Payments to
Date:
-Status:
.III Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Plann. Approval:
Execu. Approval:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
Maritime Terminal
2 acres
Industrial
large freezer-warehouse which receives waterborne
shipments of frozen fish and meat
5/13/63
$350,455 (original budget projection)
$175,227.50 (one-half of originally estimated net
project cost; principal only)
$175,227.50 (one-half of originally estimated net
project cost not including bond interest costs
which are borne entirely by city)
$131,420 ('63-t76: 15 annual payments of
$8,761.37; no planning advance)
Little information is available on history, current
status, or effectiveness of project. Development
-work has been completed and all of land- has been sold
to a fish freezer company. Project has provided sub-
stantial employment and fiscal benefits.
New Bedford Industrial Park
295.8 acres
Industrial
1962
5/13/65
$2,408,104 (1971 amended budget projection)
$1,204,052 (one-half of amended estimate of net
project cost; principal only)
$1,204,052 (one-half of amended estimate of net
project cost not including bond interest costs
which are borne entirely by city)
$ 528,854 ('66-'76: 5 payments of $33,527.75
and 6 payments of $60,202.-60; no planning advance;
net project cost amended in 1971)
Little information is available on history,
current status, or effectiveness of project.
Development work has been completed and most of
land has been sold. Park has provided substantial
employment and fiscal benefits.
North Terminal Bulkhead
19 acres
Industrial
no land has been sold
1965
7/11/67
$2,902,000 (driginal budget projection)
$1,451,000 (one-half of originally estimated net
project cost; principal only)
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City Share:
EDA Grant:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
$1,451,000 (one-half of originally estimated net
project cost not including bond.- interest costs
which are borne entirely by city)
$ 435,300 ('71-'76: 6 payments of $72,550; no
planning advance)
Little information is available on history of
project. Development work has been completed
but no land has been sold. Several firms have
expressed interest in property but recessionary
economy and uncertainty with regard to depend-
ability of old New Bedford-Fairhaven bridge
have inhibited marketing (project located north
of bridge and bridge must open to allow passage
of vessels carrying water-borne cargo). Site
is a prime candidate for location of service
and support activites for Georges Bank oil
exploration and development.
* Many features of these project models are
unknown due to absence of adequate project
records at DCA and delegation of responsibility
for projects by Redevelopment Authority to
local public bodies; information has been
requested from these public bodies through
questionnaires.
* Redevelopment Authority delegated responsibility
for development of all three projects to local
public bodies: pursuant to Section 50 of
Chapter 121B, New Bedford Redevelopment Authority
delegated its functions for planning, developing,
and marketing of these projects to local public
bodies and continued to serve merely as a con-
duit for applying for and receiving state aid;
New Bedford Industrial Development Commission
assumed responsibility for "Industrial Park" and
"North Terminal Bulkhead" projects and New Bed-
ford Harbor Development Commission developed
"Maritime Terminal" project; due to absence of
adequate records at DCA, little information is
available on circumstances of initiation of pro-
jects.
* Projects are in a major economically depressed"
urban center: New Bedford is fourth largest
city in Commonwealth and suffers from problems
of fiscal strain and continually high levels of
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unemployment; city was major whaling port in
nation in mid-19th century and a leading textile
center until 1930s; New Bedford has relied on
fishing industry which has been declining until
recently to support local economy since flight
of textiles; city has undertaken a number of
major urban renewal projects since mid-1960s;
a few federally and state aided industrial
projects have recently served to increase diver-
sity and size of economic base.
* Two projects are waterfront industrial develop-
ments: Maritime Terminal and North Terminal
Bulkhead projects were developed on blighted water-
front property north of New Bedford-Fairhaven
bridge.
* Development Strategies: (a) parcels have been
sold by local public bodies to individual firms;
(b) a parcel has been leased by a local public
body to an individual firm (Maritime Terminal); no
information is available on whether other strategies
have been used.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers?
* No evidence of state planning advances for any
of three projects.
* State execution subsidy: state shares which
were calculated from original budget estimates
have not been revised on basis of actual costs.
* State provided funding for construction of an
arterial street and Rt. 18/1-195 interchange
which are essential for marketability of Maritime
Terminal and North Terminal Bulkhead projects;
Marketability of North Terminal Bulkhead project
is constrained by undependability of old New
Bedford-Fairhaven bridge which must open to
allow waterborne cargo to reach site and un-
certainty as to whether DPW will replace bridge;
road improvements were part of two urban renewal
projects developed with federal, state, and
municipal funds; state DPW was responsible for
construction of road projects and is responsible
for operation and decision on replacement of
bridge.
* Inadequate record keeping at DCA and lack of
an appropriate information system for regular
reporting of data on project status and impacts
NEW BEDFORD
municipal:
have limited ability of DCA to effectively
monitor and assist projects and Commonwealth to
assess merits of and improve design and opera-
tion of program; Future disposition of North
Terminal Bulkhead property can be aided with
DCA assistance on marketing and coordination
with DPW on replacement of New Bedford-Fairhaven
bridge; since responsibility for these projects
was delegated by Authority to local public bodies,
DCA does not receive even limited amount of
information on project status and comparison of
budgeted and actual costs normally provided in
periodic reports of state auditor; thus, DCA does
not have any information on actual net project
costs of two projects which have completed
development and disposition and, therefore, is
unaware of propriety of current level of annual
state subsidy payments; in addition, no unit of
state government exercises any oversight or moni-
toring control over these projects, despite
considerable investment of state funds and
regulatory responsibility of DCA; furthermore,
absence of an adequate information system has
denied Commonwealth detailed information on two
projects which apparently have had beneficial
economic outcomes from point of view of state
economic development objectives.
M unicipal expenditures: total city shares of
net project costs (principal only) were esti-
mated as follows: Maritime Terminal = $175,227.50;
New Bedford Industrial Park = $1,204,052; and
North Terminal Bulkhead = $1,451,000; in addition,
city bears all of interest costs on bonds issued
to finance projects; due to absence of an inform-
ation system for reporting comparisions between
actual and budgeted project costs, DCA does not
know if, by how much, or in what direction
original projected net project costs, which are
basis for current levels of annual state pay-
ments, vary from actual net project costs; how-
ever, it is virtually certain that some variation
exists; state auditor does not report on these
projects in periodic audits of Authority because
responsibility for projects was delegated to two
local public bodies; DCA lacks any information
on whether or when bonds were issued for these
projects or amounts or terms of such bonds;
information is also not available on whether any
of property used for projects had been municipally
owned; city assumed costs of unknown magnitude
in connection with highway projects essential for
development of these three projects.
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federal: * Partial funding for urban renewal projects
which included highway improvements which are
essential for feasibility of these three projects.
Actors: * City of New Bedford: has provided funding of
uncertain magnitude; no information is available
on whether municipally owned land was donated,
real estate tax revenue was foregone during
development phases, or any other costs not
otherwise accounted for were incurred by city.
* New Bedford Redevelopment Authority: was
formed in 10/60; Authority delegated responsi-
bility for planning, developing, and marketing
three projects to local public bodies formed for
purpose of industrial development activities;
no information is available in DCA fines on role
of Authority, if any, in initiation and manage-
ment of these projects; Authority has apparently
served merely as a conduit for applying for and
receiving state aid; during Mayor Harrington's
reign of mid- and late sixties and under adminis-
tration of executive director Howard Baptista
during that period and into early '70s, Redevelop-
ment Authority aggressively pursued and under-
took a variety of large federally and state
aided urban renewal projects which are currently
completing a close-out process which is pro-
jected to end by 1979; four major projects were
undertaken with a public investment of approx.
$70,000,000 divided among federal, state, and
municipal sources; projects include: (a) a water-
front industrial project which has been success-
fully marketed to fishing industry related firms
and includes a housing development and extensive
street work; (b) a central business district
project which encompasses industrial, commercial,
and residential development as well as major
street work; (c) a housing project consisting of
considerable rehabilitation and new construction
activity; and (d) a neighborhood development
project which includes some land clearance and
housing rehabilitation; with end of federal cate-
gorical grant programs and-change to present
Community Development Block Grant program New
Bedford receives substantally less funding than
previously; however, full completion of present
projects will provide considerable activity for
Authority over next few years; Authority received
strong support from all sectors of community,
but that support waned as city assumed greater
than anticipated costs for large number of pro-
jects; Authority also applied for and received
planning advances from DCA for two proposed
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state-aided industrial projects which were never
pursued by Authority beyond planning stages:
$38,587 for an Air Industrial Park (of which
$3,644.21 remains unspent by Authority) and
$31,185 for a Wholesale Distribution Center (of
which $408.98 remains unspent by Authority);
former executive director Baptista was found
guilty of embezzling federal funds and has been
incarcerated for his crime; present executive
director Henry Horne has seen no need for more
active involvement by Authority with marketing
of North Terminal Bulkhead project.
* New Bedford Harbor Development .Commission:
assumed functions'of Authority with respect to
planning, developing, and marketing Maritime
Terminal project; no information is currently
available on activities of NBHDC during these
phases; a questionnaire has been sent to Paul
Saunders, Director.
* New Bedford, Industrial Development Commission:
assumed functions of Authority with respect to
planning, developing, and marketing Industrial
Park and North Terminal Bulkhead projects; no
information is currently available on activities
of NBIDC during these phases; a questionnaire
has been sent to Fred Rueben and. Fred Cusick.
* Southeastern Regional Planning and Economic
Development District (SRPEDD): responsible for
reviewing and approving projects; responsible
for preparation of Dec. 20, 1976 "New Bedford-
Fairhaven Route 6 Bridge Corridor Planning
Study Report" which includes analyses by Craig
L. Moore of Center for Business and Economic
Research at U. Mass. of economic development prospects
for New Bedford Harbor and constraints on development
of North Terminal.area presented by existing bridge;
city and SRPEDD have a history of hostile relations.
* DCA: see above section in program components;
has not been a party to discussions between City
of New Bedford and DPW over replacement of New
Bedford-Fairhaven bridge even though present
bridge constrains marketing of state-aided North-
Terminal Bulkhead project.
* Dept. of Public Works: responsible for con-
struction of arterial street and Rt 18/1-195
interchange which are essential for feasibility
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of two projects; responsible for operation of
New Bedford-Fairhaven bridge and decision on
replacement; City of New Bedford and DPW are
currently engaged in discussions with regard to
establishing bridge replacement as a DPW priority.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: little information
is available from DCA files on activities of
all three projects during their planning, execu-
tion, and marketing phases; Maritime Terminal
project, when approved for execution in 5/63,
was only second project approved by DCA pur-
suant to Chapter 121B statute; all project im-
provements were completed and entire property
was sold to a single company for a large fish
and meat freezer-warehouse; although project is
located north of old New Bedford-Fairhaven
bridge, company claims that bridge does not
hinder current operations which depend upon
receipt of waterborne cargo shipments and is
not expected to be a problem with future increases
in cargo shipments unless bridge becomes fixed
in a closed position over an extended period of
time; planning phase for New Bedford Industrial
Park project was approved sometime in 1962 and
execution approval was given in 5/65; all site
improvements have been completed and most of
property has been sold; planning phase for North
Terminal Bulkhead project was approved sometime
in 1965 and exeuction approval was granted in
7/67; although site development work has been
completed, no land has been sold as yet; several
firms have expressed interest in site, including
two foreign automobile manufacturers considering
a staging area and parts distribution center for
imported vehicles and a company proposing a
scrap-iron processing and exporting enterprise;
according to various memoranda prepared by Craig
L. Moore of Center for Business and Economic
Research, U.Mass., as appendices to a recent
report entitled "New Bedford-Fairhaven Route 6
Bridge Corridor Planning Study Report," some
businesses likely to be interested in site, such
as two just noted, will find that current width
of New Bedford-Fairhaven bridge presents a severe
constraint which precludes use of modern economi-
cal wide body ships; nevertheless, Moore con-
cludes that present bridge width does not in
general represent-a major obstacle to marketing
of North Terminal Bulkhead property because most
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industries likely to locate in area use cargo
vessels which can be accomodated by current bridge
and no need for a general cargo facility is
expected in light of a projected decline in
overall waterborne shipments through port of
New Bedford; he notes that both companies now
receiving bulk of cargo shipments north of
bridge, including storage-freezer firm in Mari-
time Terminal, find no problems with current
capacity of bridge; in separate analyses examining
bridge capacity as a constraint on North Terminal
development Moore concludes that: (a) fishing
industry is not likely to move north of bridge
due to current plans to reconstruct two better
situated piers and expected modest growth in
fleet over next decade; (b) coal mining in South-
eastern New England offers little potential for
adding to demands on New Bedford harbor; and (c)
a variety of factors indicate that a Container-
ized Cargo facility will not be located in New
Bedford; however, in an analysis of potential
for harbor development related to oil explora-
tion and development in Georges Bank, Moore
states that New Bedford is in a good position
to benefit from long term service and supply
activities (as a result of proximity to lease
sites, port and marine facilities, truck and rail
services, machine shop facilities, favorable labor
situation, and tendencies of oil companies to
favor multiple staging areas and fishing ports)
and North Terminal area is a prime site for
location of.such activities (expansion area, rail
linkages, sufficient draft, etc.); nevertheless,
although size of ships which would be used for
such activities can be accomodated by present
bridge, potential of bridge opening breakdowns
and delays as a result of increase in traffic
serves as a deterrent to location of Georges Bank
related activities in North Terminal area; in
summation, Moore judges that undependability of
bridge is a serious constraint for any development
likely to increase number of bridge openings,
whether or not -related to Georges Bank; DPW has
not considered bridge replacement to be a top
priority but negotiations are now underway be-
tween DPW and City of New Bedford on matter.
Effectiveness
Measures: * Fiscal Need: New Bedford clearly warrants
state assistance and aid and public initiatives
for industrial development on basis of fiscal
need; tax burden in city, as measured by tax
rate on equalized value, is about equal to median
average for Mass. cities and has generally
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increased since 1966, with exception of sharp
declines in '75 and '76 (accompanying large
increases in state aid) which will be largely
off-set by steep tax increases in '77 and '78
(a $20 tax rate increase is projected for fiscal
year '78); city was major whaling port in
nation in mid-19th century (10,000 seamen manning
ships at its peak) and since flight of most
textile firms, city has relied on a fishing
industry which declined steadily until 1970;
however, due to weak service sector in New Bed-
ford, income from fishing has not greatly
multiplied local economic activity; city con-
sistently manifests one of highest unemployment
rates in Commonwealth; city population has declined
from 102,477 in '60 to 100,345 in '75 and, thus,
New Bedford has experienced a net out-migration
of residents; city has undertaken a number of
major urban renewal projects since mid-'60s which
have added significantly to tax rate as a result
of new debt service demands but haven't yet
reached completion point when additional tax
revenues will flow to city; physical decline in
some older neighborhoods is evident while histori-
cal restoration efforts and a new downtown com-
mercial street appear promising; concentration of
unemployed and low wage earners in city has led
to increased demands on city services (New Bed-
ford spends largest fraction of budget on police
and fire expenditures--20%-of any of six largest
cities in Commonwealth--six cities average 17%
and rest of state 12%--but lowest fraction--l%--
on health and hospitals--six cities average 11%
and rest of state 4%).
* Employment Need: "depressed area" character-
istics of New Bedford also qualify city for state
assistance and aid on basis of employment need;
unemployment rate remains consistently 1.5 to
4.5 percentage points higher than state average:
'60 = NB 6.45%, Mass. 4.19%; '70 = NB 5.44%, Mass.
3.82%; '75 =_ NB 14.59%, Mass. 11.2%; 4/75 un-
employment rate of 15% was highest in state and
one of highest in nation; New Bedford's economy
proved to be extremely vulnerable during recent
recession; rates of unemployment have been con-
sistently high despite a slight decline in popu-
lation and a continual net migration of persons
out of city; despite net loss of approx. 8,200
manufacturing jobs* since '50 (approx. 26%), in-
cluding a net loss of approx. 1,318 manufacturing
jobs between '70 and '74 (approx. 6%), New Bedford
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remains a heavily industrialized city (approx. 55%
of total employment consists of manufacturing jobs)
and accounts for approx. 81% of total employment in
a heavily industrialized SMSA (approx. 50% of jobs
in manufacturing); however, although manufacturing
employment usually pays higher wages than services,
New Bedford manifests a relatively low average
annual wage of approx. $7,700 ('74: DES) due to
concentration of low wage manufacturing industries
and a low wage mix of service industries; three low
wage industry groups of apparel ($5,876 average
annual wage: DES '74), electrical machinery ($6,613
average annual wage), and textile mill products
($7,718 average annual wage) account for respectively
approx. 33%, 9.7%, and 9.5%, or approx. 52%, of
total manufacturing employment; moreover, composi-
tion of manufacturing employment has been worsened
by steady shift since '50 of increases in apparel
jobs ('50-'74 gain = 2,695; '70-'74 gain = 281)
accompanied by decreases in low but higher paying
textile mill products jobs ('50-'74 loss = 9,145;
'70-'74 loss = 725); in addition, New Bedford had
next to lowest percentage of total employment in
service sectors of eight Major Labor Market Areas
in Commonwealth in '73 (approx. 45% was well below
state average of 62%); moreover, average annual
wage for service sector jobs in New Bedford LMA
was lowest in state at $5,950 in '73; New Bedford
also manifested highest percentage of seasonal
service jobs (26.2%) in '73 of all LMAs; seasonal
sensitivity and low average annual wage of services
in New Bedford are attributable to high percentage
of retail trade in service sector; New Bedford
lMA had lowest percentage of total employment in
normally high wage finance, insurance, and real
estate service sector (approx. 3%) and next to
lowest percentage of total employment in normally
high wage transportation, communications, and
utilities service sector (approx. 4%) of all major
Labor Market Areas in Commonwealth and these
sectors averaged unusually low annual wages of
approx. $7,600 and $9,800 respectively (DES '74);
employment in transportation, communications, and
utilities service sector has grown by only 68 jobs
from '60 to '74 while number of jobs in finance,
insurance, and real estate service sector has grown
steadily but slowly for a net increase of 562 or 70%
over period; wholesale and retail trade employment
in New Bedford dropped by 1,250 jobs between '70-
'74, after a gain of 1,604 over period '60 to '70;
from preceeding analysis, it comes as no surprise
to find that percentages of New Bedford SMSA's
population (dominated by city) in lowest two income
groupings in '70 Census were much higher than state
averages and median and per capita incomes for SMSA
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compared unfavorably with state figures: incomes
under $3,000 = SMSA 10.3%, Mass. 6.4%; from $3,000-
$5,999 = SMSA 17.3%, Mass. 11.8%; median income
SMSA $7,145, Mass. = $8,607; per capita income
SMSA $2,872, Mass. $3,425; in an economic base
analysis of New Bedford, Craig L. Moore, et al. of
Center for Business and Economic Research, U. Mass.,
found that New Bedford exhibited one of lowest
ratios of service jobs to manufacturing jobs (1.22
or approx. 6 service jobs for each 5 manufacturing
jobs) among a comparison of 17 SMSAs similar to New
Bedford in terms of size and presence of a port;
weakness of service sector tends to lower multiplier
effects through local economy of earnings from fish
industry which, though actually accounting for only
4.6% of manufacturing employment and 2.7% of total
employment, contributes production with value equal
to 14% of total. dollar value of goods and services
in city and jobs with high average annual wages
(approx. $10,864: DES '74); limited number of high
quality service jobs also serves to limit attractive-
ness of city for industry; although central business
district urban renewal project which is nearing com-
pletion will likely add to numbers of high quality
service jobs, it is certain that number of such
jobs created will not be enough to replace lost
manufacturing jobs; evidence indicates that New
Bedford cannot rest its hopes for future on becoming
a regional service center; large and increasing
dependence of New Bedford on apparel and other low
wage industries suggests two problems for local
economy: (a) employment offered by these industries
manifests characteristics of what has been termed
a "secondary labor market" which include low pay,
absence of job security, high tjurnover, lack of ad-
vancement opportunities, no unionization, poor
working conditions, etc.; jobs with these qualities
have been linked to high rates of unemployment (from
higher participation rates resulting from entrance
of second and third family wage earners into labor
market; from high job turnover due to combination of
unattractiveness of jobs relative to welfare and
unemployment compensation and ready availability of
these jobs which allows for shifts between employed
and unemployed status), high levels of welfare pay-
ments (as workers shift status), and greater de-
mands on municipal services (as a consequence of
low earnings, high unemployment, welfare-employment
syndrome, etc.); and (b) apparel industry is
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labor intensive and very competitive and, there-
fore, highly sensitive to wages; imports have
accounted for a steadily increasing share of
domestic sales and sales are responsive to
cyclical fluctuations in consumer spending; hence,
although growth of apparel industry is generally
viewed as desirable by business and municipal
leaders, an increase in relative proportion of
New Bedford's jobs with such secondary labor
market qualities will actually serve to worsen
New Bedford's fiscal and employment problems and
continued concentration of apparel industry will
serve to increase vulnerability of New Bedford's
economy to changes in apparel demand or competi-
tive position of U.S. or New England (Craig L.
Moore estimates that apparel is responsible for
approx. 32% of city's export income); in general,
if jobs added to city pay less than current
average annual wage (such as apparel, electrical
machinery, or low paying services), growth will
not achieve economic development objective of
higher per capita income but will reduce that
measure of well being as it induces in-migration
of unemployed seeking jobs; consequently, in
light of documented employment problems in New
Bedford, state assistance and aid and public in-
dustrial park projects are justified only if
parks are marketed to firms offering "primary
labor market" quality employment and employment
of under- and unemployed persons is achieved.
Note: Average annual wage figures presented
here from Mass. Dept. of Employment Security data
for 1974 may be somewhat misleading since they
are mean averages which may be skewed by large
numbers of part-time or part-of-year workers in
retail trade, apparel, and other low wage industies.
Nevertheless, it is believed that in case of New
Bedford, average annual wage figures derive
mostly from "forced" part-time employment rather
than "voluntary" pdrt-time employment of house-
wives, students, etc. and, therefore, accurately
reflect negative qualities of "secondary labor
market" jobs.
Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: although detailed
figures have not been collected, Industrial Park
and Maritime Terminal projects have apparently
resulted in positive net fiscal returns to city,
whereas North Terminal Bulkhead project may or
may not provide positive fiscal flows depending
upon speed of future disposition of land and
eventual reuse; Maritime Terminal project was
developed and sold within a relatively short time
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period and estimated city share of net project cost
was a modest $175,227.50; although city share of
estimated net project cost for Industrial Park pro-
ject was $1,204,052, most of project property was
sold rapidly and project is large; however, due to
absence of an information system for reporting
comparisons between actual and budgeted costs, DCA
does not know if, by how much, or in what direction
original estimated net project costs, which are
basis for current annual state payments, vary from
actual project costs; in addition, DCA lacks informa-
tion on whether bonds were issued for projects or
amounts or terms of such bonds, on whether municiaplly
owned property was used for projects, and on whether
and how much city tax revenue would have been paid
on sites in absence of projects; nevertheless, inas-
much as land for Maritime Terminal and Industrial
Park projects was contributing modest tax revenues
to city before projects, and annual tax revenue re-
ceived in '75 from Maritime Terminal project property
was $492,609.86 and from Industrial park property
was $322,437.50, projects have provided substantial
net positive fiscal flows to New Bedford; $1,451,000
city share of estimated net project cost for North
Terminal Bulkhead project would represent a large
municipal burden if accurate; as with any project,
longer city carries this expense, as well as project
costs equal to estimated disposition proceeds, prior
to disposition, lower will be eventual net fiscal
returns from project when taxes and expenses are dis-
counted to their present values at start of project;
in light of high estimated city cost and uncertainty
with respect to other city expenses and eventual
disposition proceeds, time, and reuse, an accurate
judgement on likely fiscal returns from this project
cannot be made; nevertheless, if city continues to
bear costs without disposing of property for a few
more years, project will probably not return positive
fiscal benefits to city.
* Employment Impacts: Redevelopment Authority
executive director has indicated that Maritime
Terminal and Industrial Park projects have pro-
vided substantial employment benefits to New
Bedford; however, whether or not these projects
have achieved their potential for meeting em-
ployment needs of state and city cannot be
accurately assessed without more detailed inform-
ation on types of jobs and characteristics of
employees in projects, i.e. private firms can
provide poor jobs; previous analysis of New Bed-
ford's employment needs concluded that public
projects are justified on basis of employment
need only if jogs of "primary labor market"
quality are provided to under- and unemployed
77,11
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persons; location of any firms offering "secondary
labor market" quality employment in projects has
probably served to worsen New Bedford's fiscal and
employment problems while occupying scarce city
space needed for attricting high quality jobs;
although detailed information has not been collected,
movement of freezer-storage facility to Maritime
Terminal suggests that project provided employment
paying wages comparable to those of existing food
processing industry in New Bedford which, at approx.
$8,200 (DES '74), is slightly higher than approx.
$7,700 (DES '74) average annual wage in city; sub-
stantial numbers of new jobs of unknown quality have
resulted from Industrial Park project; despite
"depressed area" characteristics of New Bedford's
economy previously discussed, city has shown promise
for attracting good paying jobs in rubber ($10,259
average annual wage in '74; DES; steady growth since
'50 with 703 net new jobs added '50-'74 and 54 net
new jobs added '70-'74), primary metals ($11,102 in
'74; 198 net new jobs added '50-'74 and 42 net new
jobs added '70-'74), and fabricated metals ($9,125
in '74; 180 net new jobs added '50-'74 but 225 net
jobs lost '70-'75); New Bedford offers a number of
features which should be attractive to industrial
concerns: a number of vocational schools and a
"labor relations climate" considered desirable
by industrialists; low wage labor; skilled labor;
integrated transportation system including a
commercial airport which offers regularly scheduled
flight service, buses, interstate highways through
city, railroads, trucking, and a deep-water harbor
with good docking facilities; and easy access to
major market areas such as Boston (51 miles),
Providence (31 miles), and New York City (210 miles);
after a long term decline in fish catches, New
Bedford has experienced steadily increasing catches
since '71 and annual catch value records since '75;
New Bedford remains largest catch port on east
coast and enforcement of 200-mile fishing limit
on foreign vessels will add significantly to
fishing activity in New Bedford; projections
based on enforcement of 200-mile limit on foreign
fleets and improved fishery management efforts to
restore stocks of depleted species indicate a
59% increase in New Bedford tommage and a
doubling of current value of catch through port
of New Bedford by 1985; since current local
fleet operates at about 50% of capacity, only a
390
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modest expansion of New Bedford's fleet is ex-
pected over next decade; thus, Craig L. Moore,
in an analysis of expansion of fishing industry,
concludes that estimated fleet expansion needs
will be served by reconstruction of two piers
and, therefore, North Terminal area is not likely
to be needed for fishing vessel use; on other
hand, North Terminal site is a prime property for
location of new fish processing enterprises;
Moore also discounts possibility that coal
development in Southeastern New England will
lead to increased demands for harbor space and
feasibility of location of a Containerization
Cargo facility in North Terminal area; however,
Moore finds that New Bedford and North Terminal
area are prime candidates for location of service
and support activities for Georges Bank off-
shore oil development; he notes that a service
and supply base which provides modest benefits
over a long time period is preferred to short
term construction related activities which pro-
vide high dollar flows (construction jobs are
unlikely to go to local residents whereas city
residents can be trained for longer term and
good quality supply and service jobs; limited
space available in New Bedford will require a
choice between these two uses); Moore also indi-
cates that undependability of existing New
Bedford-Fairhaven bridge in face of increasing
demands for openings presents a serious con-
straint for location of oil development related
functions at North Terminal (although width of
current bridge is not a constraint); however,
magnitude of recoverable deposits of oil and/or
gas in Georges Bank area, if any, will not be
known until drillings are underway in earnest in
'78 and '79; without opportunity for large eco-
nomic benefits from location of long term oil
related support activities or other major enter-
prises which would be constrained by present
bridge, bridge replacement may not be warranted;
benefits possible from industrial development
in North Terminal area should be weighted against
cost of new bridge; Moore indicates that busi-
nesses currelty located north of bridge which
depend upon receiving waterborne cargo shipments
do not find bridge to be a problem; no analysis
was found which considered how recent designa-
tion of port as a foreign-trade zone will effect
demand for space in North Terminal area; inas-
much as foreign-trade zone status allows for
foreign goods to be stored, processed, and de-
livered before duties are paid, care should be
39
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taken by DCA, Redevelopment Authority, and
Industrial Development Commission to insure that
labor intensive uses are located in North Ter-
minal Bulkhead site; in summary, North Terminal
Bulkhead property appears to offer good potential
for achieving valued state and city economic
development objectives; however, in order for
that potential to be realized, firm selection
criteria based on provision of adequate numbers
of primary labor market quality jobs should be
established and public programs to insure that
under- and unemployed city residents are hired
should be initiated.
* Increased Diversity of the Economic Base: in-
asmuch as "secondary labor market" quality jobs
account for approx. 50% of New Bedford's manu-
facturing employment and a dominant percentage of
total city employment and have been growing as a
proportion of city's economic base, efforts to
attract higher quality manufacturing jobs to city
are warranted; in addition, concentration of
apparel industry (approx. 33% of manufacturing
employment) suggests that city is highly vulner-
able to shifts in an industry which is extremely
sensitive to changing production costs and quality
of producers throughout world as well as U.S.
government policies on apparel imports; negative
impacts to New Bedford from concentrating and
increasing number of "secondary labor market"
quality jobs has been discussed previously in
above section on employment need; since precise
information is not available on firms which have
located in Industrial Park project, an accurate
assessment of project success at increasing
local economic diversity cannot be advanced;
executive director of Authority has indicated
that park has significantly increased diversity
of local economy; location of freezer-storage
facility in Maritime Terminal project adds to
food processing industry (assuming firm did not
move from another city location) which is well
represented in city but offers average annual
wages which are slightly higher than average
annual city wage; North Terminal Bulkhead pro-
ject offers potential for attracting business
activity which will diversify local economic base.
Growth of the State Economy: aggregate state
economic benefits will have been achieved to
degree: (a) firms in park are expanding local
firms, start-ups, or out-of-state firms which
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have located in park due to advantages particular
to New Bedford (ex. cheap labor, waterfront site,
harbor facilities, agglomeration economies related
to apparel production or marine or fishing
activities, labor skills, proximity to suppliers
or markets, etc.) and to project (low cost land,
large assembled site, waterfront location, trans-
portation facilities, etc.); (b) space vacated
by expanding local firms is filled by other firms
seeking these same advantages of a New Bedford
location; and (c) achievement of local fiscal
and employment objectives reduces fiscal demands
on Commonwealth (by lowering expenditures: ex.
welfare, unemployment compensation, city aid,
etc.) and, thereby, need for increased taxation
which would impair competitive position of state
for business in general; information available on
firms located in Industrial Park is inadequate to
accurately assess any of these three types of
aggregate growth benefits from that project; how-
ever, project has evidently benefitted state
economy by providing net positive fiscal flows
to New Bedford and by inducing out-of-area firms
to locate in a center of high unemployment; al-
though detailed information on freezer-storage
firm located in Maritime Terminal is not avail-
able, it appears that project has added to state
economy by providing an assembled and developed
waterfront property which is a scarce resource
for inducing development to occur that otherwise
would not take place; any assessment of achieve-
ment of state growth objectives by North Terminal
Bulkhead project must await disposition of
property.
* Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: increasing
concentration of apparel production in New Bedford
(approx. 33% of total manufacturing employment)
suggests that agglomeration economies related
to this industry may be present; however, this
phenomenon may be more simply accounted for by
availability of cheap mill space and low wage
labor force; concentration of firms related to
marine and fishing activities may provide eco.
nomies of some type to other firms; however, it
is difficult to identify firms that locate due
to economies from concentration of harbor related
firms as opposed to simple needs or advantages of
a harbor location.
* Induced Effects: no evidence of additional
development resulting' from projects.
Narrative: No further information is available to add to
that which has already been presented.
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Judgement: The City of New Bedford warranted state assist-
ance-and aid and public industrial development
projects on the basis of serious and growing
fiscal and employment needs, the potential for
employment and local fiscal benefits, a need for
increasing the diversity of the local economic
base, the potential for adding to growth of the
state economy, and features, such as unique har-
bor resources and an advantageous location with
respect to markets and suppliers, which suggested
that the projects could be marketed. As a com-
munity manifesting the characteristics of a
"depressed" urban center which nevertheless
offered the potential for economic renewal, New
Bedford presented an opportunity for achieving
state and municipal development objectives re-
lated to growth and distribution. However, due
to the lack of information on the prior status of
the properties used for the projects and the cir-
cumstances attendant to the initiation of the
projects, no assessment can be advanced as to
whether or not private development would have
occurred without public actions and whether pri-
vate development would have resulted in more or
less desirable economic development outcomes.
The failure of DCA to establish an adequate in-
formation system for reporting on the actual
costs and impacts of projects has deprived DCA
of the data necessary to monitor and assist pro-
jects and assess the effectiveness of projects
in achieving their goals. Since responsibility
for these projects was delegated by the Redevelop-
ment Authority to two other local public bodies
and the state auditor has, as a result, not
audited the books on these projects, DCA lacks
the information needed to execute even its
minimal regulatory functions. Although DCA may,
as a policy choice, want to continue annual
subsidy payments at their current levels even
if actual project costs have been less than the
original budget estimates, as a financial in-
centive for.local bodies to complete projects
on time and under budget, DCA should still main-
tain accurate accounts of actual costs and sub-
sidies in order to assess whether benefits are
exceeding costs and insure that municipalities
are not receiving positive net cash flows through
state payments greater than the total municipal
share of the net project cost. Therefore, it
is recommended that DCA request of the state
auditor and the Redevelopment Authority, that the
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books of these three projects be subjected to
audit as specified by statute and DCA establish
an appropriate information reporting system.
DCA's neglect of the reporting of project im-
pact information has also denied DCA and the
Commonwealth the data which is necessary to
examine the benefits from these projects. In-
asmuch as two of these projects in New Bedford
may have resulted in substantial positive net
economic development benefits, the absence of
data is especially unfortunate. Without a
detailed analysis of project costs and benefits,
state legislators and personnel in the executive
brange of state government formulate inaccurate
views of the program based on crises during
development phases rather than economic out-
comes. Questionnaires on all three projects
which were sent to the appriate public bodies
have not been returned as of yet.
Disposition of land in the North Terminal Bulk-
head project in a manner which serves to maximize
economic development objectives can be aided by
DCA with assistance in formulating a set of firm
selection criteria based on employment objectives
and encoufaging DPW to establish the replacement
of the New Bedford-Fairhaven bridge as a top
priority if the potential economic benefits
warrant such an action. Due to the dominance of
low quality jobs in New Bedford's economy,
project land- should only be marketed to firms
which offer jobs with average annual earnings
higher than the current mean average annual wage
in New Bedford and "primary labor market" character-
istics and agree to hire an adequate number of
under- and unemployed city residents. The
addition of low wage jobs would contribute to-
ward increasing the unemployment rate and de-
mands on city services and inducing the in-
migration or stopping the out-migration of the
poor. Public industrial' development projects
have been found to be justified in New Bedford
only if they provide good jobs to under- and un-
employed city residents.
Although New Bedford needs additional service
jobs, especially in the higher paying services,
and services are expected to grow, the extreme
comparative weakness of the service sector
suggests that New Bedford cannot survive as a
regional service center but must continue to
rely on manufacturing.. 3- t
Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
State Payments
to Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
NORTHAMPTON
Millyard Industrial Park
108.35 acres; 88 disposable acres
Industrial
Proposed: 50% light industry; 5% office;
10% warehousing; 10% distribution; 10% assembly;
10% service; 5% research
$1,246,094 (budget estimate amended 3/75)
$ 623,047 (one-half of estimated net project
cost; principal only)
$ 623,047 (one-half of estimated net project
cost not including bond interest costs which are
borne entirely by city)
$ 158,209.40 ('73-'76: 2 payments of $17,659.05,
1 payment of $51,838.95, and 1 payment of
$29,052.35 plus prior $42,000 planning advance)
All of project property has been acquired and
all site improvements, except for electricity in-
stallation, have been completed. 5.7 acres have
been sold to two firms. After months of negoti-
ations on a disposition agreement with a develop-
ment corporation for sale of all of remaining land,
deal recently collapsed when prospective developer
failed to raise limited amount of necessary up-
front cash. Authority has a full time marketing
director who functions as both an executive
director and a real estate agent.
Initiated principally to serve as an intra-
community industrial relocation project; local
industrialists asked city to develop an industrial
park because they needed expansion space and
claimed that industrially zoned land large
enough for a modern industrial park development
was not available; inability of a local firm,
Multi-colar of Florence (a village within
Northampton), to find suitable expansion space
was impetus for forming Redevelopment Authority
and seeking an appropriate site and state aid
for development.
* Project in a stable city of modest size which
has not experienced difficult unemployment or
fiscal problems but relies heavily on low wage
service sector employment.
* A Local Development Corporation is available to
acquire land and construct industrial buildings
utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease or sale to
qualifying firms.
* Development Strategies: (a) majority of park
land was to be sold to a single developer who
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NORTHAMPTON
would market parcels to individual firms;
(b) land parcels have been sold by Redevelopment
Authority to individual firms; and (c) a real
estate agent has been retained on a fee and
commission basis to market project.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers; most of land was owned
by a potato farmer-and a potato processing plant
was located on property; 16 parcels have been
acquired for $678,322 (plus an estimated $80,000
in outstanding court cases).
* State planning advance; $42,000 was advanced
by state for planning.
* State execution subsidy.
* No state construction of infrastructure directly
related to development of project.
* DCA has provided little assistance to project
in past; Future success at marketing park to
serve public economic development objectives can
be aided considerably by assistance from DCA in
formulating and implementing a marketing strategy;
due to dominance of low wage service employment
in Northampton, park will achieve public employ-
ment objectives only if property is sold to
manufacturing firms offering "primary labor
market" quality employment and an employment
program is established to provide local residents
with jobs in park (i.e. to insure that good jobs
are not filled by immigrants); now that disposi-
tion of all of remaining property to a single
developer will not proceed, DCA should assist
Authority in establishing firm selection criteria
based on desired job impacts and assets of site
and Northampton, developing performance specifi-
cations regarding job impacts for inclusion in
disposition agreements, and obtaining cooperation
of other units of state government for marketing
effort and designing an employment program.
municipal: * Municipal expenditures: 20 year urban renewal
bonds totalling $1,250,000 were issued in 1970 at
a 6.2% interest rate; total city share of net
project cost (principal only) is projected to
equal $623.047; in addition, city will bear entire
cost of interest expenses on bonds issued for
project and cost of carrying project costs equal
to amount of estimated disposition proceeds
($391,260) until such time as land is disposed.
NORTHAMPTON
Actors: * City of Nort hnmpton: advance of most of up-front
development exvenses and assumption of costs of
municipal execution subsidy, a minimal amount of
foregone real estate tax revenues during period
land is held by Authority, and carrying project
costs equal to amount of estimated disposition
proceeds until land is sold by Authority.
* Northampton _Redevelopment Authority: was formed
in order to uIndertake industrial park project;
in order to Save on expenses, an executive direc-
tor has never been hired; progress of project
has been depenident upon activities of a full-
time secretary, donated time of Chairman of
Board, and, since 4/76, services of a marketing
director retained on a fee and commission basis;
secretary res igned in 11/75; with approval of
City of Northampton and DCA, Authority entered
into an agreewent with Walter J. Murphy on 6/11/76
to retain him os a marketing director responsible
for both admindstrative functions of an executive
director and marketing strategy and disposition
responsibilittes of a real estate agent; in addi-
tion to industrial park project, Authority re-
ceived a planntng advance of $57,000 from DCA in
1974 and completed planning work for a prop9sed
state-aided downtown renewal project known as
"Pleasant River Project" which never received
state or local approval.
* DCA: has played a minor role up to present
time; technical assistance has not been provided
except for a recent effort to redraft a dis-
position agreement; see above section on DCA
under program components for comments on future
role of DCA.
Dept. of Manpower Development: should assist
in formulating and implementing an employment pro-
gram for park: ex. establishing customized man-
power training programs through TAP or a CETA
sponsor, solving worker transportation problems,
establishing training and employment referral
relationships with vocational education schools
and programs, etc.
*Dept.of Commerce and Development: should
assist by promoting park to in-state (through
business contact program) and out-of-state firms
and helping to target public sources of business
capital to park (ex. MITMIA, MBDC, SBA, CDFC, etc.).
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Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: delays have resulted
from court cases over eminent domain takings and
inadequate and untimely planning work by consultant;
project was approved for survey and planning phase
in 4/68 and for project execution in 12/69; at
present time, all project land has been acquired
by Authority, although final acquisition costs
remain unsettled, and all site improvements, ex-
cept for electricity installation, have been com-
pleted; actual cost of project improvements ex-
ceeded original budget by $191,491 ($524,091 actual
compared with $332,600 budgeted).
* Planning: planning consultant firm, Lordwood
Associates, lacked technical engineering expertise
and proper number of staff for satisfactory per-
formance; inability of firm to adequately plan
for drainage problems caused a long delay; con-
tractors experienced difficulty following designs
for site improvements; parcel configuration proved
to be unacceptable for marketing.
* Marketing: Redevelopment Authority has been un-
successful at marketing despite continuous efforts
since 1972, except for sale of two small parcels
to local firms (a 3.7 acre parcel in '74 and a
2 acre parcel in '76); supposed demand from local
firms which precipitated project has not material-
ized; professional quality advertising has been
used to promote project in a variety of mediums
such as newspapers, real estate journals, industrial
show displays, mailings to firms, etc. but an
individual to direct marketing efforts on a full
time basis was not obtained until 6/76; initial
park marketing effort was directed at science-
research types of firms which might find educa-
tional resources and academic climate of area
attractive; although Mass. has experienced growth
of these types of firms, recessionary economy
during period of park marketing dampened growth
in these areas; a market analysis was prepared
for park by Prof. Odiorne, Dean of Business School
at U. Mass., in 7/75 but efforts to attract firms
in six industrial categories identified in his
report proved fruitless; marketing director is
currently directing his attention at expanding
firms within a 50 mile radius of project; recently,
after a number of months of negotiations on a
disposition agreement with a newly forming
development corporation, Mega Corp., which had
agreed to purchase all of remaining property,
NORTHAMPTON
Effectiveness
Measures:
deal collapsed at moment of final agreement be-
cause developers were unable to raise limited
amount of necessary up-front capital; agreement
between Authority and marketing director calls
for combination of administrative functions with
marketing responsibilities in a single position
and provides for an annual consultant fee of
$15,000 as well as a percentage commission on
sales (agreement was approved by DCA in 6/76);
in a letter to State Auditor in 12/76, Authority
Chairman states that two positions have been
combined in order to save on expenses and com-
pensation method has been adopted in order to
provide a performance incentive; as a result of
policies of Authority, State Auditor notes that
a situation could arise in which marketing
director and an outside broker could both receive
a commission for sale of same parcel of land.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Northamptont, as
measured by tax rate on equalized value, is some-
what lower than for most Mass. cities and has
remained relatively stable over a number of
years (approx. $41 in '76) city has not experienced
fiscal strain due to stabilizing influence on
local economy exerted by major educational and
health institutions; employment in city is
dominated directly and indirectly by presence of
Veteran's Administration and Cooley Dickinson
Hospitals, Smith College, and nearby (9 miles)
University of Mass. campus at Amherst (as well
as several smaller educational institutions);
growth of student body at U. Mass from 7,000 to
25,000 students over past decade has added
significatnly to housing demand in Northampton;
tax rate has increased only modestly despite
construction of two new schools and a new sewage
treatment plant and increases in number of
municipal employees; thus, fiscal need is a weak
basis for justifying state assistance and aid
and a public industrial development project.
* Employment Need: as suggested above, service
sector jobs account for a large majority of jobs
in Northampton (DES '74: approx. 73% in-all
services; 35% in selected services; 30.5% in
wholesale and retail trade); manufacturing ac-
counts for approx. 24% (DES '74) of total city
employment; however-, although jobs in selected
services category offer low wages (DES '74: $7,181
average annual wage), employment in major educa-
tional and health institutions provides features,
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such as job security, internal advancement
opportunities, fringe benefits, etc., which
distinguish these service jobs from typically
"secondary .labor market" quality service employ-
ment; in addition, stability and growth of em-
ployment in institutions contributes toward
stabilizing other service employment in city;
thus, in contrast to other cities with high
percentages of employment in low wage service
categories, such as Brockton, which suffer
from high rates of unemployment and severe de-
mands on city services, unemployment rate in
Northampton is consistently two or three per-
centage points below regional and state averages
(3.1% in '70; 6.7% in '76) and there is no evi-
dence of fiscal strain; in addition, institutions
provide large amounts of "export" income to city
from out-of-area students and hospital patients
who come to city on a temporary basis for services;
this export income then "multiplies" local economic
activity as it is spent and respent; nevertheless,
overall average annual wage in city is very low
(DES '74: $7,506) and manufacturing jobs also
offer relatively low, if somewhat higher average
annual wages (DES '74: $9,303); a comparison of
1970 Census income statistics for city population
with SMISA and State figures indicates that, al-
though city has a lower percentage of very poorest
households, city population is generally worse
off: incomes under $3,000 = N 5.8%, SMSA 6.8%,
Mass. 6.4%; incomes $31000-$5,999 N 13.7%,
SMSA 12.8%, Mass. 11.8%; per capita income =
N $3,002, SMSA $3,225, Mass. $3,425; in addition,
availability of low wage employment has recently
attracted a Puerto Rican population of approx.
1,000 persons; therefore, although Northampton
does not suffer from severe employment problems,
and is unlikely to in future, dominance of low
wage service industries has provided limited em-
ployment opportunities for residents; thus, em-
ployment need may be an adequate basis for justi-
fying state assistance and aid and a public
industrial park project only if land is marketed
to manufacturing firms offering "primary labor
market" quality employment and an employment pro-
gram is established to insure that under- and
unemployed local residents are hired.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: project property
had been providing limited tax revenues to city
before acquisition by Redevelopment Authority;
however, in light of slow progress of marketing,
higher than budgeted project expenses for some
items, and significant project costs assumed by
CYtO0
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Northampton, city may be somewhat pressed to
gain positive net fiscal flows from project
(when annual revenues and expenses are dis-
counted back to start of project); nevertheless,
if recent deal with a single developer for all
of remaining property had been consumated, city
would have earned substantial positive net
fiscal flows; if marketing proceeds in future
at a modest absorption rate, city will probably
receive positive net fiscal flows; if remaining
82 acres are sold for a price near to $8,000/acre
obtained on prior sales of two small parcels (82
X $8,000 $656,000), disposition proceeds will
greatly exceed estimated $391,260; two firms
which have located in park currently pay approx-
imately $13,500 in annual real estate taxes; thus,
it is still likely that project will bring signi-
ficant positive fiscal flows to city.
*- Growth of the State Economy: if original
basis for project had proved valid, and expanding
local firms which lacked alternative sites for
expansion (private developers found city too
risky or land assembly too difficult for de-
velopment of a modern industrial park) had moved
to park, project would have provided positive
aggregate economic benefits to state economy;
although detailed information has not been
collected on two small firms which have located
in park, it appears that these two firms were
expanding local businesses and park has contributed
somewhat to growth; if in-state firms expand,
businesses start-up, or out-of-state firms locate
in park due in part to advantages offered by
park, project will contribute to state economic
growth; features such as large size of park,
attractive physical resources (rail, airport,
scenic beauty, etc.), excellent highway access
(1-91 borders park and Mass. pike is only 14
miles away), low land costs, educational resources
of region, and desirable characteristics of area
as a place to live, may make park a suitable
location for a major out-of-state firm seeking
a site in region; unless public efforts are
initiated to insure that project achieves its
potential for employing under- and unemployed
persons, park will not serve to reduce state
fiscal demands in that manner (i.e. lower welfare
costs, reduced state aid to cities, etc.) and,
thereby, need for taxation which impairs com-
petitive position of Commonwealth for business
in general.
Narrative:
NORTHAMPTON
* Employment Impacts: in order for project to
achieve state employment objectives in a city
dominated by low wage service jobs, park must
be marketed to manufacturing firms offering
"primary labor market" quality employment and
public efforts to provide jobs to under- and
unemployed local residents are necessary; in
addition, since DCA has not promulgated a "non-
relocation" regulation, firms may move out of
high priority development areas, such as Spring-
field and Holyoke, to park locations and, thereby,
subvert economic development objectives; due to
absence of an adequate information system for
reporting on project impacts, detailed information
is not available on employment impacts of two
firms currently located in park; however, although
project presents good potential for achieving
state economic development objectives, necessary
components for effective project management, such
as an employment program, firm selection criteria,
performance clauses for disposition agreements,
and a "non-relocation" regulation, have not been
established.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy: due
to extremely high proportion of service jobs in
Northampton, successful marketing of park to
manufacturing firms should indrease diversity
of local economy.
* No Evidence of Agglomeration Economies.
* Induced Impacts: no evidence of additional
development resulting from project.
The Northampton Redevelopment Authority was formed
at the request of local industrialists for the
purpose of undertaking an industrial park project
to serve local expanding firms. However, as
implementation delays beset the project, public
support for the effort waned and the local press
took aim at the Authority. By the time the land
for the project had been acquired and developed,
demand for space from local firms was no longer
evident and the national recession limited the
possibility of attracting companies from outside
of the state. A recent attempt to dispose of all
of the remaining property to a single development
entity failed after agreement on disposition terms
had been reacheck because the prospective pur-
chasers were unable to raise the required capital.
This experience has indicated that, on the one
103
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Judgement:
hand, some private interests view the property
as marketable, while on the other hand, the
project is considered risky. The assets of the
industrial park include: (a) a physically
attractive setting; (b) completion of all utility
and site improvement work except for electricity;
(c) a strategic location with respect to
national markets; (d) immediate access to the
interstate highway network; (e) close proximity
to numerous educational institutions (major colleges
and universities as well as junior colleges and
vocational schools); and (f) a skilled low wage
labor force. Negative marketing factors include
proximity to New Hampshire with its more favorable
tax structure and an inability to guarantee a
supply of natural gas.
The City of Northampton does not warrant state
subsidization of and support for an industrial
park on the basis of severe fiscal or employment
problems, the presence of local agglomeration
economies, or a potential for induced development.
If local firms had needed expansion space which
was not available on the private market, the
project would have been justified on the basis
of local and state growth objectives. Due to
the high proportion of low wage service jobs in
Northampton, the project may be justified on the
basis of a potential for achieving positive
employment impacts and a need to increase the
diversity of the economic base. In addition,
the park offers potential for adding to growth
of the state economy by contributing to the
expansion of local firms and serving as a site
for major out-of-state firms.
It is doubtful that the entire project can be
marketed solely to local firms within an accept-
able period of time given the limited industrial
base of the area and a sluggish economy. However,
the attractive features and large size of the
project may enable the state to achieve growth
objectives by successfully promoting the property
to major out-of-state firms. In order to achieve
these gains for the Commonwealth, DCA should
obtain the assistance of the Department of Com-
merce and Development in promoting the park to
major firms considering locations in the region.
In addition, DCA should prepare a fiscal impact
analysis of the project to assess the sensitivity
of positive net fiscal flows to delays in marketing.
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In order for the Millyard Industrial Park project
to achieve the positive employment benefits which
largely justify the project, DCA should: (a) pro-
mulgate a "non-relocation" regulation to prohibit
the movement of firms out of high priority develop-
me-nt areas to parcels in the park; (b) assist
the Authority in formulating and executing an
employment program for the park, with the coopera-
tion cf the Dept. of Manpower Development, in
order to provide under- and unemployed city resi-
dents with good jobs; (c) assist the Authority in
establishing firm selection criteria based on
desired employment impacts and the assets of the
park and Northampton; (d) work with Authority in
drafting job performance clauses for disposition
agreements; and (e) obtain the cooperation of the
Dept. of Commerce and Development in bringing public
sources of business capital to focus on the project
in order to enhance marketing efforts and gain
leverage for the measures to achieve employment
objectives.
Location:
Project Name
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share
Town Share:
EDA Grant:
State Payments to
Date:
Note:-
Status:
PALMER
Palmer Industrial Park
164.2 acres; 151.79 disposable acres
Industrial
proposed: 40% light industry; 15% assembly; 10%
heavy industry; 10% office; 10% research; 5%
service; 5% warehousing; 5% distribution
$4,529,500 (original budget extimate 4/74)
$1,792,250 (includes one-half of estimated
$1,556,500 interest costs on urban renewal bonds)
$1,792,.250 (estimate includes one-half of estimated
$1,556,500 interest costs on urban renewal bonds)
$ 945,000 for public facility improvements;
additional Technical Assistance Grant of unknown
magnitude
$ 345,251.65 ('74-'76: 3 payments of $85,117.55;
plus prior $89,899 planning advance)
State and town shares of project costs are likely
to change with upcoming reformulation of project
resulting from cancellation of prior sale of most
of project property to a single developer. In
addition, the above net project cost approved
for project should have been $100,000 less:
first, $200,000 should be added to net project
cost because the sale price to the developer was
$600,000 rather than the $800,000 listed in the
financial plan ($200,000 difference represents
escrow funds paid by developer which would revert
to Authority, one half of principal plus accrued
interest, if developer failed to achieve number
of jobs in park by specified date agreed to in
contract but otherwise would be returned with
all interest to the developer); second, $300,000
should be subtracted from net project cost be-
cause disposition agreement with developer calls
for three $100,000 grant payments to town which
were not included as part of the listed disposition
price.
Although most of site development work has been
completed and entire property has been sold to
a developer, project activity is at a standstill
due to refusal of developer to agree to conditions
of EDA grant. EDA is withholding approx. one-
half of grant funds which are needed to complete
remaining site work pending compliance of developer
with requirements or cancellation of disposition
agreement with developer. Administrative funds
for Redevelopment Authority have been exhausted
and no staff are currently employed to work on
project. Board has recently requested assistance
from DCA in mediating current impasse. No land
has been sold to individual firms. Indictments
are pending against developer and town project
consultant. 06
PALMER
Model Aspects: * Project initiated as a disaster relief effort
to rebuild local economy in aftermath of a major
fire which caused substantial job loss: 1968
fire destroyed many old textile and paper mills
in Bondsville village within Palmer which elimin-
ated 482 jobs (approx. 4,100 total employees in
Palmer); with a 16% local unemployment rate,
town was declared a federal disaster area and
Economic Development Administration offered
assistance; on recommendation from EDA, town hired
a consultant who learned of applicability of
state-aided industrial renewal program and prepared
and submitted an application to DCA for assistance.
* In an exception to general policy as a conse-
quence of disaster relief situation, DCA approved
of inclusion of bond interest costs in determination
of Commonwealth's share of net project cost:
letter from DCA indicating policy change was
written in 7/70 but budget including estimated
interest costs was not approved until 4/74.
* Grant from federal Economic Development Adminis-
tration (EDA) to fund public facilities improve-
ments: $945,000 grant was approved in 10/72;
conditions on receipt of grant include a "non-
relocation" provision which prohibits relocation
of firms from other communities to park, and a
"non-profiteering" provision which limits return
to "middle-man" developer of entire property;
compliance with first provision limits project
market to expanding local firms, business start-
ups, and branch plant expansions of out-of-area
firms; EDA stopped payment of grant in 1975 after
$486,262 had been received by Authority because
developer who purchased entire property in 1974
refused to sign non-profiteering agreement and
a required industrial park covenant (which commits
subsequent purchasers in park to civil rights
and non-relocation provisions) and to re-execute
non-relocation and civil rights statements which
had been part of original disposition agreement;
EDA has a general policy of objecting to strategy
of sale of entire park to a single developer who
markets parcels to individual firms because of a
concern that benefits on federal grant subsidy would
not be captured by town or business firms (Chapter
121B program does not require sale of property
to highest bidder and it is doubtful that there
are enough developers with access to capital to
privide for a competitive bidding situation in any
case); EDA officials claim that they were never
informed of sale to a single developer and DCA
personnel were either not aware of EDA policy or
saw no need to inform EDA of proposed sale; in
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light of current non-cooperation of developer,
EDA is-requesting that sale agreement be termin-
ated as a condition for release of remaining
EDA funds.
* Grant from EDA to fund major feasibility study
on industrial development in town: study was
undertaken prior to Authority application for
DCA survey and planning funds to identify a
development site and assess feasibility of an
industrial park project.
* Project in small industrial town situated in
rural area: population of approx. 11,600 persons
has been growing slowly but steadily since 1950
(9,533 persons); town has long been a manufacturing
center as a consequence of availability of river
water power (2 principal rivers); Palmer continues
as a location for manufacturing because of proximity
to resources and services of Springfield-Holyoke-
Chicopee center and presence of Mass. Turnpike
interchange at town.
* Land disposition agreement with single developer
marketing entite park relates disposition price
to developer performance in bringing jobs to park:
200 jobs are required by 3/1980 or unsold property
will revert to Authority at no cost; 750 jobs
are required by 3/1984 or one-half of $200,000
escrow fund plus accrued interest will revert to
Authority; this is only example of a performance
oriented disposition agreement in state-aided
urban renewal program.
* A Local Development Corporation is available to
acquire land and construct industrial buildings
utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease or sale to
qualifying firms.
* Development Strategies: all land in park has
been sold by Authority to a single developer for
marketing of parcels to individual firms; how-
ever, objections from EDA, failure of developer
to agree to EDA conditions, and indictment of
developer - for bond forgery, and town consultant
- for conflict of interest, will probably lead to
cancellation of sale; in future, Redevelopment
Authority will most likely sell parcels to individual
firms.
PALMER
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers: all twenty-three parcels
in development plan have been acquired, including
nine parcels outside of project area to be used
to improve access to park; to 4/76, three parcel
acquisitions have been settled with owners, in-
cluding one parcel donated by Town of Palmer,
for a cost of $2,651; twenty parcels remain un-
settled with pro tanto payments totalling $221,351
made on sixteen of these parcels; land damage
litigation proceedings are pending against Authority
on twelve unsettled parcels.
* State planning advance: $89,899 in state funds
was advanced for planning; amount was subtracted
out of total state share of net project cost when
level of annual state payments was computed, rather
than out of first annual state payment as is
customary.
* State execution subsidy: due to fire disaster
DCA made an exception to normal policy by including
one-half of estimated bond interest costs as
part of state share of execution subsidy.
* No state infrastructure investment was directly
associated with project development.
* Failure of DCA to accurately review and actively
monitor project and coordinate activities with
other state government units, regional planning
commission, and EDA has contributed to delay and
controversy; Future progress of project is largely
dependent on ability of DCA to mediate a settlement
between EDA, Redevelopment Authority, Selectmen,
and developer, and assist Authority in formulating
and executing a marketing strategy directed at
achievement of state economic development objectives;
DCA inaccurately calculated net project cost and,
therefore, state share of execution subsidy, by
not carefully reviewing terms of disposition agree-
ment: neglect of $300,000 in grants to town from
developer and inclusion of a $200,000 escrow pay-
ment as part of disposition proceeds, even though
funds will be returned to developer upon satis-
factory performance pursuant to terms of disposition
agreement (DCA has not modified assistance agree-
ment to account for these errors which were noted
in state audit reports); DCA approved planning
funds for project despite objections raised as
to soundness of project by Regional Planning
Commission and State Water Resources Commission
through A-95 review process required for all
401J
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federally-funded capital projects; this commit-
ment and expenditure of state planning funds
provided major leverage for forcing approval of
project execution on EDA and state A-95 clearing-
house over a variety of objections: water
pollution, environmental impacts on green belt
and residential community, costs and benefits,
truck traffic congestion, etc.; failure of DCA
to coordinate activities with other units of
state government and Regional Planning Commission
contributed to delays during approval process and
development of animosity between Authority and
these actors; DCA gave little consideration to
objections raised to project despite its own re-
quirements for reviewing environmental impacts,
potential for DCA to work out a compromise among
conflicting parties because state aid was a necessary
and sufficient ingredient for undertaking project,
and resulting appearance of conflict between
state agencies which creates inter-agency hostility
and suggests that all state goals are not accepted
as valid (i.e. environmental protection); al-
though there is some uncertainty as to serious-
ness of interest expressed by Miller Brewing
Co. in park location, DCA did not provide or ob-
tain from other state agencies promotional assist-
ance for advocating advantages of Mass. location
to a major out-of-state firm considering a move
to Commonwealth; quality of water at site and
size of property could have accomodated needs of
a brewery which cannot be satisfied at many
industrial locations; whereas promotional efforts
were left to developer and consultant in Palmer,
New York State wooed Miller to a site in that state
with helicopter rides and meetings with repre-
sentatives of Governor and key state business
leaders; although ultimate location decision may
have been based on such factors as availability
- of resources, proximity to markets, taxes, and
features of site, there is little doubt that
Commonwealth lacked a mechanism for responding
in a sophisticated manner to a major firm interested
in moving to a state location; DCA's lack of
knowledge of EDA requirements and/or monitoring
of project for compliance with EDA requirements
led DCA to approve of disposition of entire park
to a single redeveloper in violation of EDA
policy and without obtaining developer commitment
to EDA conditions; subsequent dispute between EDA
and Authority and developer, as a consequence of
these failings, has led to a chain of events which
have brought project to a standstill over past 18
/1o
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months; until very recently, DCA has not inter-
vened in an attempt to settle dispute and advance
project, despite large commitment and annual pay-
ments of a state execution subsidy to project
(largest state subisdy to any state-aided renewal
project) and DCA's position as a neutral but
interested party to dispute; DCA can and should
play an active role in mediating dispute; it
now appears that EDA will require withdrawal of
developer from project and assumption by Redevelop-
ment Authority of marketing of parcels to individual
firms as conditions for release of withheld funds;
DCA should make its own position with respect
to future of project clear and mediate a settle-
ment among all parties so as to minimize liti-
gation which could tie up project indefinitely;
in addition, DCA should assist Authority in re-
planing project to preserve more environmentally
valuable land along river and in formulating and
executing a marketing strategy; ingredients for
a marketing strategy directed at achieving state
and local economic development goals might include
criteria for selection of firms with desirable
job impacts, targeting of public sources of
business capital and manpower training funds to
project, funding of a full time marketing person
through an EDA grant, town Community Development
funds, state discretionary EDA 304 funds, some
other funding source or on a contingency basis,
and marketing assistance from Dept. of Commerce
and Development through business contact program
and promotion activities to out-of-state firms.
* Municipal expenditures: approx. $2,200,000 in
urban renewal bonds have been issued by town;
since DCA has made exception of including interest
costs on bonds as part of net project cost, town
will assume only one-half of an estimated
$1,556,000 in interest costs; town has provided
$50,900 from general municipal revenues for
preparation of a town master plan required by
DCA for approval of state-aid, preparation of
application for EDA grant, and rental of office
space; to 4/76, town had avanced a total of
$2,575,000 for execution stage of project; total
town share of net project cost (principal and
interest) is projected to be $1,792,250; further-
more, if developer is forced to withdraw from
project and town returns disposition proceeds,
Palmer will bear project costs equal to amount of
estimated disposition proceeds .($600,000) until
such time as land is disposed of.
municipal:
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federal: * EDA grants; a grant of $945,000 was approved in
10/72 for public facilities improvements;
$486,262 has been released to Authority up to
present time with remainder being withheld pending
a resolution of dispute concerning developer; a
technical assistance grant of unknown magnitude
was approved in 11/69 to prepare a major feasibility
study on industrial development in town.
Actors: * Town of Palmer: -advance of most of up-front
development expenses and assumption of costs of
municipal execution subsidy -(1/2 of principal
and interest expense of net project cost after
deduction of EDA grant), a minimal amount of
foregone real estate tax revenues (if sale to
developer is cancelled and Authority assumes
ownership of property until individual parcels
are sold), donation of one parcel of municipally
owned land, and carrying costs equal to amount
of estimated disposition proceeds until land is
sold by Authority.
* Palmer Redevelopment Authority: pursuant to
EDA requirements for applying for grant funds,
an Overall Economic Development Program Committee
(OEDPC) was formed in 1/69, four months after
fire, in order to establish a set of development
goals; after OEDPC recommended development of
an industrial park, Palmer hired a consultant,
at suggestion of EDA, to prepare detailed work
for application for a technical assistance grant
to fund a feasibility study and subsequent appli-
cation for a project public facilities grant;
after consultant discovered that state-aided
urban renewal program could be used for an
industrial park on "blighted open land," Palmer
Redevelopment Authority was formed in early 1970
by a vote of town meeting in order to qualify
for state assistance; Authority was composed of
individuals previously active in OEDPC and became
vehicle through which EDA and DCA funds were
sought; however, town consultant retained responsi-
bility for preparing applications to EDA and DCA;
after DCA approved application for survey and
planning funds and agreed in 7/70 to pay one-
half of net project cost (contient upon EDA
approval), and town meeting voted by a slim mar-
gin in favor of ~n industrial park bond issue
in 6/71 after two prior rejections, Authority
hired former Chief of Planning for EDA in New
England as executive director; director proved
to be effective and competent but left Authority
as a result of personality conflicts with some
members of Authority Board; a tense and hostile
relationship developed between Authority and
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Board of Selectmen despite strong support from Select-
men during planning and approval stages; second execu-
tive director hired by Authority advised against turning
developer's down payment over to Selectmen despite a
prior promise by_ Authority to do this made at.time of
town meeting approval of project; Board of
Selectmen have refused to release $114,000 owed
to Authority to complete engineering and con-
struction work on needed rail spur; Authority
has received unfavorable press coverage as a
result of delay of project since 1975 and general
public support has waned as-a result of failure
of Authority to satisfy expectations; recently,
only citizen willing to run for a vacant seat on
Authority Board was a vocal opponent of project;
due to absence of a cash flow as a result of
current stalemate between EDA, Board of Selectmen,
and developer, Authority released its most recent
Executive Director and secretary in summer of
1976 and closed down its office; since that time,
however, renewed interest in dealing with current
problems has emerged, and members of Authority
Board have asked for assistance from DCA in
mediating an agreement among all parties.
* Palmer Board of Selectmen: project was endorsed
strongly by Board of Selectmen in three town
meetings called to approve an industrial park
bond issue; however, a tense and hostile relation-
ship has prevailed between Selectmen and Authority
over most of period of project execution;
Selectmen have refused to release $114,000 due
to Authority for engineering and construction
work on a rail spur required in agreement with
developer; EDA requested in 5/76, as one of four
conditions for release of funds, that Selectmen
and Authority review and approve in writing all
land sales by developer for compliance with non-
profiteering formula suggested by Authority.
* Palmer Town Meeting: town meeting voted in 11170
not to fund industrial park despite promotional
efforts by Authority and support from Selectmen
and Finance Committee; defeat has been attributed
to fiscal conservatism of town's people, inter-
village jealousy within Palmer, and opposition
of local industry which feared that wage pressures
would result from additional firms; project's
supporters lobbied for approval at 6/71 town
meeting over intervening six months and loss of
two of town's largest employers over period raised
unemployment rate to 18%; despite these factors
and continued support of town committees, park
4,3
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proposal was defeated once again on 6/5/71; how-
ever, four days later Selectmen called a special
town meeting for 6/21/71, and second largest
town meeting vote ever recorded approved a bond
issue by a slim seven vote margin.
* Lower Pioneer Valley Regional Planning Commission:
until advent of industrial park project, Palmer
had never dealt with Regional Planning Commission;
in accordance with its A-95 review powers, estab-
lished by federal edict in 1969, which required
that state agencies and regional planning agencies
review all federally funded capital projects and
offer non-bidding opinions, Commission staff com-
mented adversely in 4/70 on Palmer's application
to EDA; items questioned by Commission staff in-
cluded adequacy of level of detail in proposal,
rationale for site selection, pollution impact
on water quality in a recently improved river,
visual and noise impacts on surrounding residential
areas, impact of increased truck traffic on three
mile road through a residential area between park
and Mass. Turnpike, cost of park to town, destruction
of a green belt along river front, aid lack of an
effort to integrate project with other development;
town consultant reacted vigorously by disputing
substance of these objections and rebuking Commission
for failing to raise these issues during prior
year and one-half application planning process;
despite Commission objections, DCA approved a
survey and planning advance and a project execution
grant, contingent upon EDA project approval, and
EDA was prepared to approve project subject to
a town vote committing local share of funds and
an adequate plan for sewage treatment; however,
federal legislation was passed which provided
Regional Planning Commissions with power to require
preparation of Environmental Impact Statements
for federally aided projects; eager to force a
re-evaluation and a change in use of industrial
park project, Commission requested a ruling from
Environmental Protection Administration relative
to Palmer project which had already received tenta-
tive approv-al; EPA ruled that Commission could
require an EIS and EDA agreed; when Authority re-
submitted application to EDA in 11/71, with amend-
ments related to water system and other problems
raised earlier, Commissionareiterated its past
objections and added questions concerning size
of project, demand .for industrial space, lack of
development controls, and availability of services
for park; although Authority tried to meet ob-
jections of Commission in order to avoid time
and expense of an EIS, Commission continued to
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object to project in order to force a change in
use for site; Selectmen and Authority proceeded
to solicit support of Congressional Representatives;
on 8/10/72, at a meeting attended by area Congress-
man , a representative from Senator Brooke's
office, PRA, LPVRPC, Selectmen, and EDA (but no
representative from DCA), Director of Commission
conceded that park might help to alleviate un-
employment problem in area and, outnumbered 25 to
1, agreed in writing to drop objections to project;
project was then approved by DCA and EDA without
need for an EIS; whereas project was supported by
local officials as an attempt both to create
jobs and add to local tax revenue, Regional Planning
Commission had pressed for a decentralized solution
to unemployment which would not have provided
equivalent property tax benefits to town; Com-
mission entered into planning process too late
to achieve compromises over its concerns for re-
creation space and environmental impacts; EDA
Technical Assistance Grant had been approved with-
out knowledge of Commission.
Consultant to Town of Palmer: after a local
OEDPC had determined that an industrial park was
needed, town hired a consultant, at suggestion of
EDA, to prepare grant applications; Dr. Ronald
Stinnett of Washington Group, Inc. was hired in
6169, eight months after fire, for a fee of $30,000;
he helped to form a site selection committee to
choose best location for a park and prepared and
submitted an application to EDA for a Technical
Assistance Grant to fund a major industrial
feasibility study; Stinnett discovered state-
aided industrial renewal program and recommended
that town form a Redevelopment Authority in order
to receive assistance; consultant prepared project
funding applications which were submitted to EDA -
for a public facilities grant, and to DCA - 4or
a planning advance, on 4/1/70; when Regional Planning
Commission raised objections to project, Stinnett
vigorously contested substance of objections and
criticized Commission staff for failing to attend
meetings during application planning process;
however, since Stinnett's contract with Town of
Palmer contained a prov.ision for an additional
stipend based on amount of federal and state money
brought to town, he had an incentive to push ahead
with project and a disincentive to delay project
or alter scope or character of project which might
reduce or jeopardize federal and state funds;
after all final project approvals were received
from EDA and DCA in 10/72, Stinnett found a developer
who tried unsuccessfully to interest Miller Brewing
""5.
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Co. in park location; when this developer failed
to meet payments on options he held on property,
a close friend of his picked up options and a
disposition agreement was soon entered into be-
tween new developer and Authority; Stinnett's
incentive contract which related compensation to
amount of federal and state dollars received by
town may account for failure to include developer's
projected $300,000 grant to Palmer as part of
disposition proceeds and, thereby, increase state
aid by $150,000; Stinnet has been indicted for
receiving a finder's fee of $125,000 from developer
in addition to his salary from Authority, and on
a conflict of interest charge for serving as
Vice President of Palmer Industrial Park, Inc.
which is responsible for promoting park for developer.
* DCA: see section in program components above.
* EDA: in aftermath of disastrous 1968 fire,
EDA offered to assist town in efforts at rebuilding
its industrial base; in order to qualify for
assistance, EDA required that town form a local
committee to establish development goals; after,
Committee determined that an industrial park
should be developed, EDA recommended that town
hire a consultant to prepare necessary applications
for aid; upon receiving an application from con-
sultant, EDA approved of a grant to fund a major
industrial feasibility study which was completed
and submitted to EDA in 1/70; however, EDA refused
to release a copy of study for a number of months
and, thus, deprived Regional Planning Commission
of information necessary for assessing economic
feasibility of project; consultant submitted an
application for a public facilities grant to EDA
in 4/70; Regional Planning Commission exercised
its non-binding A-95 review powers by raising a
number of objections, on project application to EDA;
nevertheless, EDA was prepared to approve appli-
cation on conditions that town vote its share
of project funds and an adequate plan for sewage
treatment be prepared; when Regional Planning
Commission subsequently received a ruling from
EPA agreeing that Commission could require pre-
paration of an EIS according to a new federal
law, EDA agreed; when project application was
resubmitted to EDA in 11/71 with amendments re-
flecting previously noted issues and approval of
town bonding, Commission continued to object to
project; at a meeting of major parties to dispute,
except DCA, with Congressional Representatives,
EDA officials sympathized with town's wish to
avoid preparation of an EIS; after Regional Planning
Commission agreed in writing to EDA to drop its
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objections, EDA awarded a grant of $945,000; EDA
personnel had not been swayed by Commission's
objections that project was not in best interests
of town; approx. one year after Authority had
executed a disposition agreement with a single
developer for entire property in park and EDA
had advanced approx. one-half of grant funds,
EDA expressed disapproval of sale to single de-
veloper; evidence is unclear as to whether EDA
had ever been informed of disposition at time of
sale, but EDA stopped further payments pending
receipt from developer of signed statements on
civil rights, non-relocation, park covenants ex-
tending civil rights and non-relocation provisions
to future purchasers, and non-profiteering which
EDA required to fulfill its responsibilities;
EDA has a general policy against sales to middle-
man developers in order to insure that benefits
of public subsidies accrue to municipality and
manufacturing firms rather than to developer;
developer claims that he signed first two of
these statements as part of disposition agreement
and he refuses to re-execute these agreements or
sign other two statements; EDA insists strongly
on non-relocation prohibition as a necessary regu-
lation required by statute which insures that
projects lead to additional jobs rather than
simply transfer employment or encourage plant
piracy; EDA has indicated to Authority that non-
relocation covenant remains with property in-
definitely so that project will continue to meet
economic development objectives which justified
a public subsidy; EDA also insists that profit of
developer be limited by formula to insure that
public subsidy benefits business firms rather than
middleman; hence, in a letter dated May 28, 1974
EDA specified four conditions for release of
withheld portion of grant funds: civil rights
agreement signed by developer, non-relocation
assurance signed by developer, industrial park
covenant signed by developer which commits future
owners of park property to first two assurances,
and agreement on a formula for non-profiteering
signed by developer, Authority and Board of Select-
men; as a consequence of developer's refusal to
comply with these conditions, EDA officials have
recently indicated that withdrawal of developer
and assumption of marketing of parcels to firms
by Authority will precipitate release of funds.
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* Dept. of Commerce and Development: DCD should
have been contacted by DCA to provide marketing
assistance to Authority when Miller Brewing Co.
was considering locating in park; Commonwealth
lacks a sophisticated mechanism for responding
to opportunities for attracting major firms to
Commonwealth locations; with regard to future
marketing efforts in Palmer, DCD should provide
marketing assistance through its business contact
program and out-of-state promotional activities
(water quality is a major asset for park) and
lend support for targeting public sources of busi-
ness capital to park (ex. MIMIA, MBDC, CDFC, SBA,
Farmers Home Admin., etc.).
* Water Resources Commission: in A-95 review
process Commission indicated that waste-water
runoffs would pollute Swift River.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: despite various delays
during planning phase, project implementation
proceeded in a rapid fashion from initial pro-
ject conception through to marketing to a single
developer; project delays since disposition of
park land to developer have resulted from re-
fusal of Board of Selectmen to release funds for
engineering and construction work on rail spur,
weak market demand, loss of Authority staff, and
dispute with EDA over required conditions for
sale of property to single developer and non-
cooperation of developer with respect to these
conditions; fire occurred in 10/68; town formed
an Overall Economic Development Program Committee
in 1169; committee report recommending an in-
dustrial park was completed by 3/69; consultant
was hired by town in 6/69; EDA Technical Assistance
grant for feasibility study was awarded in 11/69;
industrial feasibility study which identified
project site, target industries, and necessary
improvements was. completed in 1/70; Redevelopment
Authority was formed in early 1970 in order to
apply for state aid; town hired a consultant firm
to draft a master plan as required for receipt of
state renewal assistance; on 4/1/70 consultant
submitted an application for a public facilities
grant to EDA and an application for a state
planning advance to DCA; pursuant to A-95 review
process, Regional Planning Commission raised ob-
jections to application to EDA during 4/70;
despite Commission's objections, which were non-
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binding on both EDA and DCA, DCA approved appli-
cation for a planning advance and committed it-
self to approval of an execution subsidy, con-
tingent upon EDA approval, in 10/70, and EDA
approved of project subject to town approval and
a plan for sewage treatment; however, in 11/70,
town meeting voted not to fund project; even after
unemployment rate in town rose to 18% as two
major employers closed down operations, town
meeting failed to approve project on 6/5/71; how-
ever, a strong effort to bring out vote at a
special town meeting called for 6/21/71 succeeded
in gaining town approval by a 7 vote margin;
Authority hired an executive director and retained
planning and engineering consultants to prepare
a final project report; however, with a change
in federal environmental law, Regional Planning
Commission achieved power to require an EIS;
when revised application was submitted to EDA
by Authority in 11/71, Regional Planning Com-
mission once again raised objections; in 12/71
state A-95 clearinghouse approved project subject
to resolution of problems raised by Regional
Planning and Water Resources Commissions; attempts
to resolve differences with Planning Commission
proved fruitless, because Commission was interested
in forcing a change in proposed property use;
however, when Congressional Representatives were
asked to intervene, and a meeting of all inter-
ested parties was held in 8/72, Planning Commission
agreed. to drop its objections and requirement
for an EIS; EDA and DCA both approved project
in 10/72; construction of improvements began in
10/73; a financial assistance agreement was
negotiated with DCA on 4/16174; on July 15, 1974,
almost entire property was sold to a single
developer, J.B. Williams of Memphis, Tennessee;
site construction work, except for a rail spur,.
was completed in 1975; developer failed to make
a $100,000 payment due to Authority on 8/1/15
according to disposition agreement because
Authority failed to complete a rail spur as re-
quired by disposition agreement; Authority lacked
funds for completing rail spur because Selectmen
were refusing to pay $114,000 due to Authority
for that purpose, and EDA was withholding payment
of almost half of grant pending developer execution
of civil rights, non-relocation, industrial park
covenant, and non-profiteering statements;
approx. one year after property disposition, EDA
personnel had objected to sale of property to a
419
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Effectiveness
Measures:
single developer and claimed that they were not
informed of disposition at time of sale;
developer Williams has been indicted for bond
forgery and consultant Stinnett on a conflict
of interest charge; project has remained at a
standstill for eighteen months; Authority
executive director and secretary were released
in summer of '76 and office was closed due to
a lack of funds; Authority has lost support of
public and business community; EDA officials indi-
cated at a recent meeting with DCA personnel that
funds will be released if sale of park land to
developer is cancelled; members of Authority Board
have recently expressed an interest in having DCA
assist in resolving current problems; no parcels
have been sold by developer to firms; a failure
of Authority to pay previous owners of property
in project area on schedule may lead to renewed
litigation and eventually to higher acquisition
costs.
* Fiscal Need: Project was supported by citi-
zens and local officials partly as an attempt
to restore tax revenue lost as a result of
major fire in 1968 and closing of two major
firms in 1971; nevertheless, tax burden in
Palmer, as measured by tax rate on equalized
value, is significantly lower than median average
for Mass. cities even though it increased signifi-
cantly from '72 to '73; Palmer has remained an
industrial center with approx. 56% of town's
jobs in manufacturing (DES: '74); in '74, 36
manufacturing firms were located in Palmer
employing an average total of 2,011 employees;
good rail facilities, interstate highway access
(an interchange of Mass. Turnpike is located at
Palmer), and close proximity to Springfield con-
tinue to make town an attractive location for
industry; in addition, town serves as a bedroom
community for some Springfield commuters and
this helps to boost local fiscal strength; thus,
despite loss of major employers in town, fiscal
need is a weak basis for justifying state
assistance and a public project in town.
* Employment Need: during 1971 when project was
approved at town meeting, Palmer had an unemploy-
ment rate of 18%; however, just prior to fire in
'68, town manifested an unemployment rate of
3.6%, which was below state average; with loss
of 482 jobs as a result of fire in a town with
approx. 4,100 total workers, and -2,000 total
manufacturing employees, unemployment rate in-
creased from 3.6% to 8%; thus, it appears that
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many workers who lost their jobs reside in
rural communities near to Palmer; a comparison
of percentages of town's population in lowest
two income groupings with SMSA and State per-
centages indicates that Palmer's residents fare
slightly better than those of SMSA as a whole
and about same as population of Commonwealth as
a whole; town population has grown slowly but
steadily from 9,533 persons in '50 to 11,680
persons in '70 and net in-migration has occurred;
however, these figures on relative prosperity
of Palmer's citizens may be somewhat deceiving
because they include commuters to Springfield
and neglect impact of job losses in Palmer on
nearby rural communities; report of committee
formed after fire to define development objectives,
offered view that Palmer needed an industrial
park in order to maintain its industrial character
and avoid becoming a bedroom community; there-
fore, in light of severe job losses incurred
by town, importance of manufacturing in Palmer
for nearby rural communities, and attractive-
ness of town as a location for manufacturing,
project may be justified on basis of employment
need.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: at present time,
probability of positive net fiscal flows to
town from project is somewhat uncertain given
current project standstill and possibility of
extended litigation; however, a number of factors
indicate that town will reap positive fiscal
benefits from project: town experienced only
one or two years of foregone taxes between time
of acquisitions and disposition to developer;
EDA grant and DCA assumption of one-half of
net principal and interest costs (largest DCA
grant ever for a state-aided project) limit town
execution subsidy to an estimated $1,792,250;
and park has a good market potential due to
its large size, high quality of water supply,
and advantageous location with respect to high-
way access and rail facilities; however, if
sale to developer is cancelled and Authority
assumes responsibility for marketing project,
town will forego real estate taxes and assume
costs equal to amount of estimated disposition.
proceeds ($600,000) until such time as property
is sold; therefore, achievement of positive net
fiscal flows will depend upon ability of DCA and
Authority to formulate and execute a marketing
strategy, including securing of resources and
cooperation of other units of state government
in marketing effort.
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* Growth of State Economy: availability of a
high quality water supply almost attracted an
out-of-state brewery to locate a major facility
on site; water quality may serve to attract
out-of-state firm branch plant, or allow for start-
ups or firm expansion that otherwise would not
occur; aside from superior quality of water
and transportation resourceshowever, it is diffi-
cult to see how public project will contribute
to state economic growth except for meeting
employment needs of persons who otherwise would
represent a fiscal drain on state and, thereby,
increase taxes which would dampen growth.
* Employment Impacts: in light of loss of major
employers in town from '68-'72 and consequent
high rate of unemployment, project should provide
employment benefits if land can be marketed; com-
pliance with EDA's "non-relocation" regulation
prohibiting relocation of firms out of other
communities to park location will prevent project
from resulting in a ''zero sum" transfer of jobs
that doesn't add to total employment and allowing
for movement of firms out of other high priority
development areas, such as Springfield and
Holyoke, in opposition to state development ob-
jectives; however, in order to maximize positive
employment benefits an employment program should
be initiated to insure that unemployed persons
are hired by firms moving into park; despite
attractive features of Palmer as a location for
manufacturing, there is little evidence to
suggest that private industrial land development
will occur without public initiatives.
* Maintain Diversity of the Local Ecomony: al-
though approx. 56% of Palmer's employment consists
of manufacturing, approx. 19% of wholesale and
retail trade, and approx. 13% of services, threat
of a long term shift from a manufacturing base to
bedroom community status suggests that project
is justified as an effort to maintain diversity
of local economic base.
* No Evidence of Agglomeration Economies.
* Induced Impacts: no evidence of induced develop-
ment resulting from project.
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Narrative:
Judgement:
The fire which destroyed the 100 year old Bonds-
ville mill complex in Palmer was the nation's
most costly industrial fire of 1968. Federal
and state agencies immediately offered to assist
in any industrial rebuilding effort. However,
the small Town of Palmer was ill-equipped to
deal with the disaster. Palmer had no zoning,
no master plan, no institutions for economic
development, and. no experience in attracting
new industry. Although DCA offered aid, its
failure to lend active assistance, coordinate
all parties, and carefully monitor the project,
contributed to violations of EDA requirements,
improper state funding commitments, and hostility
among the various parties involved with the pro-
ject.
The late entry of the Regional Planning Commission
into the planning process seriously limited its
ability to incorporate concerns for open space
and recreation use or change the site of the pro-
ject to better serve environmental needs. EDA
had awarded a grant for a feasibility study
without informing the Commission or other state
agencies. After the grant was awardedi and DCA
followed with the advance of planning funds, the
Planning Commission had little opportunity to
alter the project in a constructive manner so
it adopted a posture of opposition. EDA subse-
quently extablished a process for informing
state and regional agencies of possible applica-
tions by requiring applicants to fill out a
"notice of intent" prior to filing applications.
In the future, DCA should arrange to receive
such information from the area EDA office on a
regular basis in order to monitor EDA activity
with respect to state assisted projects and
other industrial park developments in the Common-
wealth. In addition, in order to provide for
closer coordination and cooperation between. DCA
and other state and regional agencies, an
A-95 type review process should be established
for state assisted projects which do not receive
federal support.
DCA exhibited little concern for the objections
raised to the project by the Regional Planning
Commission and the State Water Resources Com-
mission despite its own obligation for reviewing
environmental impacts and the evidence of consider-
able local opposition from two town meeting
rejections of the project and the final slim
I
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vote margin of approval. Moreover, DCA was the
only actor capable of mediating conflicts among
all of the parties since state aid was a necessary
and sufficient condition for the project to
proceed and DCA's position in state government
allowed for influence with other state government
units and the Regional Planning Comission. From
this experience it appears that DCA's "hands off'
attitude, and abdication of project approval
responsibility to -EDA and other actors, was a
major project management failure which contributed
to project delay, inter-actor hostilities, and
the current stalemate situation. In addition,
the failure of the Authority to include $300,000
in part of the disposition price had the effect
of inappropriately increasing the state share
of the net project cost by $150,000. These issues
indicate that DCA cannot expect local officials
and Authority rembers to represent the interests
of the Commonwealth and a more active role for
DCA is necessary to assure that state expenditures
are proper and achieving their intended purposes.
The Palmer Industrial Park project can be justified
on the basis of employment needs, potential em-
ployment benefits, a need for maintaining the
diversity of the local economy, a potential offered
by superior water quality to add to growth of
the state economy, and evidence that the project
can be marketed. However, the town does not suffer
from fiscal problems and the choice of a site for
the park may not be justified due to negative
environmental impacts. In order for the project
to achieve desired economic development objectives,
DCA must mediate the current impasse and assist
the Authority in formulating and executing a
marketing strategy.
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Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
EDA Grant:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
PEABODY
Centennial Industrial Park
296 acres; 250 disposable acres
Industrial
proposed: 85% light industry; 5% office;
5% distribution; 5% service
$1,781,429.80 (being revised)
$ 890,714.90 (being revised; one half of esti-
mated net project cost less EDA grant; principal
only)
$ 890,714.90 (being revised; one half of esti-
mated net project cost less EDA grant, not including
bond interest costs which are borne entirely by
city)
$2,666,559 (pending; for initial portion of pro-
ject)
No annual subsidy payments have been made pending
revision of project budget estimates; $76,642.50
was advanced for planning.
After six years of delay causing problems, the
process of property acquisition which began at
the end of 1976 is almost completed and site im-
provement work and marketing efforts are expected
to begin in the fall of 1977.
* Project of major proportions situated at one
of most attractive remaining Rt. 128 industrial
locations is to be designed, marketed, and main-
tained as a "first class" park for "blue chip"
companies: 296 acre industrial park, with approx.
250 disposable acres, is located at junction of
Rt. 128 and 1-95, adjacent to a Boston and Maine
rail line; site is cnly 18 miles from Boston on
U.S. 1; these and other features (such as low
real estate tax rate and low land disposition
prices) provide Commonwealth with a rare oppor-
tunity for attracting major out-of-state firms
and promoting state employment objectives; how-
ever, project effectiveness with respect to state
economic development objectives will depend largely
on ability of state government, primarily but not
exclusively DCA, to successfully manage project.
Grant from federal Economic Development Adminis-
tration (EDA) to fund site improvements: although
grant has not yet been approved, every indication
suggests that approval is imminent; project will
be developed in two phases reflecting division
of large site into two approximately equal por-
tions of about 150 acres; grant for initial por-
tion amounts to $2,666,559; conditions on receipt
of grant include a "non-relocation" provision
which prohibits' relocation of firms from other
PEABODY
communities to park; therefore, potential market
for project is limited to expanding local firms,
business start-ups, and branch plant expansions
of out-of-area firms.
* Project in generally prosperous and growing
community: population of city has grown from
22,645 persons in '50 to 45,503 persons in '75
or by 100% over period Boston Metro. Area popu-
lation increased by 14%; Peabody has attracted
significant numbers of jobs in high wage, state
growth industries of fabricated metal products,
machinery (ex. electrical), and chemicals and
continued concentration of leather industry
(approx. 30% of manufacturing employment in '74)
provides substantial numbers of well paying
jobs ($10,484 average annual wage '74: DES);
large number of low wage service sector jobs,
mostly retail and selected services, appear to
employ "voluntary" part-time workers (ex. house-
wives, students, etc.), secondary family wage
earners from middle income families, or non-
residents because statistics indicate that city
population is relatively prosperous.
* A Local Development Corporation is available
to acquire land and construct industrial buildings
utilizing SBA 502 financing for lease or sale to
qualifying firms; low cost SBA financing for
plant and equipment is available through Essex
County Economic Development Corporation.
* Development Strategies: (a) land parcels are
to be sold by Redevelopment Authority to individual
firms; and (b) land parcels may be sold by
Authority to Local Development Corporation which
purchases and builds on parcels utilizing SBA
502 financing and leases or sells structures to
qualifying firms.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers: several residents of
project area contested Redevelopment Authority
takings in court by disputing finding of blight;
although Authority experienced little difficulty
arguing and winning its case, protracted liti-
gation'was time consuming and costly; although
project execution phase was approved in 10/69,
property acquisition did not begin in earnest
until 12/76 due to a variety of problem delays;
all project property is expected to be acquired
by fall of 1977.
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* State planning advance: $76,642.50 in state
funds was advanced for planning.
* State execution subsidy: amount is being re-
vised due to delays and recept of EDA grant.
* Project dependent upon state construction of a
connector road and bridge linking park to adjacent
Route 128: Redevelopment Authority has experienced
considerable delay from DPW with road and bridge
development process; however, Authority breached
original agreement with DPW in 1970 by failing to
meet deadlines for planning work because of other
problems.
* Future of project will benefit considerably
from active DCA assistance with marketing and
DCA coordination efforts with DPW; Project effect-
iveness in achieving state economic development
objectives is largely dependent on DCA's ability
to require and assist with formulating an employ-
ment program for park with cooperation of Depart-
ment of Manpower Development; in order for project
to achieve its potential for attracting major
firms and, thus, contribute to growth of state
economy, DCA should assist Authority by: (a)
helping to formulate a marketing strategy and
firm selection criteria based predominantly on
attracting major out-of-state firms offering large
numbers of high quality jobs, (b) bringing public
sources of business capital and manpower training
resources to- focus on project by coordinating
activities with units within Executive Office of
Economic Affairs, and (c) obtaining cooperation
of Department of Commerce and Development in
promoting site to major firms; in addition,
timely completion of access road and related
bridge by DPW, which are essential for project
success, can be aided by DCA coordination efforts;
in order for project to fulfill its potential
for achieving state employment objectives, DCA
and Authority, with assistance of Dept. of Man-
power Development, should formulate and imple-
ment an employment program for project to provide
jobs for under- and unemployed persons from near-
by communities; elements of such an employment
effort might include: (a) using leverage afforded
by attractive property to require firms to hire
unemployed persons as a condition of sale (rules
and regulations allow for sale to other than
highest bidder if public objectives are to be
served), (b) establishing training and employment
referral relationships. with vocational education
schools in nearby communities, (c) targeting
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manpower training funds to park, and (d) pro-
viding for transportation needs of workers in
nearby depressed urban centers; in past, DCA
has limited its role to passive regulatory
functions; Redevelopment Authority recently
requested assistance from DCA on marketing and
coordination. with DPW.
* Municipal expenditures: City of Peabody has
advanced funds to Authority on an "as needed"
basis for planning, engineering contract,
acquisition (46 parcels for estimated $1.631
million), relocation ($188,650 estimate), and
administrative costs in anticipation of issuing
$2.3 million in bonds; however, total city share
of net project cost (principal only) is unknown
pending revision of project budget estimates in
light of extended project delays since pre-
paration of original budget and recept of EDA
grant (DCA requested budget revision some months
ago but has not yet received changes); in
addition to assuming one-half of net project cost
less EDA grant (assuming revised estimates prove
accurate), city will pay entire cost of interest
expenses on bonds issued for project; further-
more, city will bear project costs equal to
amount of estimated disposition proceeds until
such time as land is disposed (disposition pro-
ceeds originally estimated to equal approx.
$4, 275, 000).
EDA grant: grant of $2,666,559 for site im-
provements is likely.
* Administrative grant from the Essex County
Economic Development Corporation: area Local
Development Corporation pledged up to $20,000
in 1/3 matching funds for administrative costs
associated with project.
* City of Peabody: advance of most of up-front
development expenses and assumption of costs of
municipal execution subsidy, all bond interest,
foregone real estate tax revenues during period
between acquisition and disposition ($34,750 in
' 7 7 ), and carrying project costs equal to amount
of estimated disposition proceeds until actual
land dispositions.
* Peabody Redevelopment Authority: formed in
3/65; in its only major activity other than
industrial park since formation, Authority com-
pleted planning phase for a proposed federally-
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aided downtown renewal project which was re-
jected by a vote of City Council on 4/29/71;
according to report of state auditor, Authority
board has expended a great deal of time and
effort in determining a format for conducting
meetings, researching abilities and salaries
of administrative staff, reviewing contract
awards, and rescinding contracts and previous
votes of meetings; audit report also notes that
a good deal of dissension has plagued Board and
Board membership has changed often; several
problems during planning and execution phases
of industrial park project have resulted in
disputes between Authority and other actors:
at one point, city officials objected that pro-
ject did not conform to general city plan and
zoning map, relocation difficulties led to court
battles with site residents, and objections of
Planning Board to project resulted in dismissal
-of Authority executive director in 11/75; most
recent executive director resigned over a dis-
pute with Board regarding his future status; as
a result, Authority is currently seeking a new
executive director.
* Local Planning Board: objected to declaration
of project area blight; disagreements between
Planning Board and Authority led to ouster of
Authority executive director in 11/75.
* Conservation Commission: due to presence of
wetlands in project area, local Conservation
Commission had to approve of project before
grant application would be accepted by EDA;
Commission has required that some land remain
undeveloped to preserve a small wetlands environ-
ment.
* Essex County Economic Development Corporation:
area Local Development Corporation is able to
channel low cost SBA loan assistance for plant
and equipment to qualifying firms which choose
to locate in park.
* DCA: DCA has played a limited regulatory role
up to present; DCA did not assist Redevelopment
Authority in applying to EDA for grant funds;
state personnel have not discussed project with
EDA personnel and DCA does not have a copy of
application submitted to EDA (therefore, DCA
has not checked application contents for com-
pliance with state rules and regulations); see
above section on DCA under program components
for recommendations on future role of agency.
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* Dept.of Public Works: responsible for con-
struction of highway access road and bridge
essential for project; Authority claims that
DPW has delayed development process but Authority
breached original agreement with DPW in 1970;
Authority and DPW are close to reaching a new
agreement on construction of road and bridge;
Commonwealth shares cost of construction with
federal government.
* Dept. of Commerce and Development: should
assist by marketing project to major out-of-
state firms and helping to target public sources
of business capital to project (ex. MIMIA, MBDC,
SBA, etc.).
* Dept. of Manpower Development: should assist
in formulating an employment program for pro-
ject to provide job access for unemployed with
firms in park: ex. customized manpower training
programs through TAP or CETA sponsor, solving
worker transportation needs, establishing training
and employment referral relationships with
vocational education shools and programs, etc.
* EDA: is providing a grant for site improve-
ments; EDA personnel have never contacted DCA
staff concerning grant application.
* Federal Righway Administration: providing
funding for road and bridge construction and
must make a determination as to whether projects
will cause a minor or major impact on environment.
Performance
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: project implementation
has been substantially prolonged by a great num-
ber of problems during planning and execution
stages; survey and planning phase was approved
in 6/67 but execution approval was not granted
until 10/69; in addition to delays, Authority
encountered problems which included hostility
from city officials and Planning Board members,
staff problems, legal problems with consultant
contracts, acquisition difficulties, and problems
in negotiating interim financing; due to many
delays, execution activities related to acquisi-
tion, engineering, financing, and relocation did
not get underway until 1976; approval of EDA
grant is expected shortly; grant application
to EDA was delayed for six months while local
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Conservation Conmission considered impact of
project on wetlands in project area; an agree-
ment between Authority and DPW on construction
of necessary access road and bridge is now
reaching final form; as a result of extended
project delays to date and imminent receipt
of a grant from EDA, DCA has requested and
received a revised marketability study from
Authority and has requested, but not yet re-
ceived, a new project budget; acquisition act-
ivity is currently proceeding well and is ex-
pected to be completed, along with all remaining
relocation and engineering tasks, by fall of 1977;
site improvement construction is expected to
begin near end of 1977; marketing efforts are
expected to begin as soon as improvements are
under way.
* Planning: following difficulties delayed
project during planning phase: (a) project
did not conform to general plan and zoning map
of city (a condition of DCA approval); (b)
Authority spent considerable time attempting
to find a planning consultant acceptable to
both DCA and Authority after DCA rejected initial
choice of Authority; and (c) DCA demanded re-
visions to final project plan submitted for
approval.
* Execution: delays which occurred during
execution phase were more severe than those of
planning phase: (a) in 1970, Authority failed
to meet planning deadlines agreed to with DPW,
so DPW cancelled agreement on timing of con-
struction of essential access road and bridge
and subsequently delayed further work on these
projects for five years; (b) protracted liti-
gation ensued when residents of project area
unsuccessfully contested finding of blight in
a court action; (c) other residents of project
area successfully challenged adequacy of project
relocation plan, which had been approved by DCA,
through court action and Authority was forced
to prepare a new relocation plan; (d) during
entire litigation period (1969 through 1975)
from various court challenges, city was unable
to issue bonds to pay for development expenses;
(e) without bond monies, funds for administrative
expenses of Authority were soon depleted and
interim financing was obtained which added
interest costs to project; (f) Planning Board
objected to declaration of blight and forced
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Effectiveness
Measures:
dismissal of Authority executive director; and
(g) until Jan. 1977, Authority was unable to
find a suitable site for relocation of pig farm
as required by relocation plan.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Peabody, as
measured by tax rate on equalized value, is
significantly lower than for most Mass. cities
and has remained stable over a number of years:
$39.60 in '70 and $41.70 in '76; in addition,
a major school building program has recently
been completed, private real estate development
activity continues in city, and an expansion of
North Shore Shopping Center and construction of
a new Sears, Roebuck & Co. store promise to add
to city's tax base; consequently, Peabody does
not warrant state assistance and aid and a public
industrial development project on basis of fiscal
need.
* Employment Need: Peabody has been known as
"Leather City of the World" and leather firms
continue to be primary employers in city, supplying
30% of jobs in manufacturing at good wage levels
($10,484 average annual wage in '74: DES);
manufacturing is predominant business activity
in city and accounts for approximately 40% of
total employment (with high overall average annual
wage of $10,590 in '74: DES); as leather in-
dustry continues to decline in importance, lost
jobs are being replaced by new employment oppor-
tunities; 100-plus acre Peabody Industrial Center
and smaller new industrial sites have been filled
by firms attracted to modern facilities located
adjacent to Rt. 128; Peabody has attracted
significant numbers of high wage manufacturing
jobs in industries which are growing in Common-
wealth as a whole: fabricated metal products
($9,471 average annual wage in '74: DES), machin-
ery ex. electrical ($10,975), and chemicals and
allied products ($13,185); unemployment rate in
city is consistently below rate for state and
rates for most of other cities in Commonwealth;
general prosperity of residents is suggested by
comparison of percentages of city population in
lowest two income groupings with Boston Metro.
Area and State figures from 1970 Census: incomes
under $3,000 = P 4.7%, B.M.A. 6.1%, Mass. 6.4%;
from $3,000-$5,999 = P 8.2%, B.M.A. 10.8%,
Mass. 11.8%; thus, despite concern of Peabody
residents over a recent high rate of unemployment
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(8.1% in 3/76), Peabody's unemployment and
underemployment problems are not as severe as
those of other cities in Commonwelath and pri-
vate market activity appears to be strong enough
to provide for a favorable transformation of
economic base; nevertheless, due to a very
large number of low wage retail jobs (approx.
33% of total city jobs; $5,011 average annual
wage '74: DES) and substantial number of low
wage jobs in selected services category (approx.
13% of total city jobs; $5,947 average annual
wage '74: DES), Peabody manifests a relatively
low overall average annual wage ($7,881 in '74:
DES); however, in light of generally favorable
statistics on incomes of residents of Peabody,
it appears likely that bulk of these low paying
jobs employ "voluntary" part-time workers (ex.
housewives, students, etc.), secondary family
wage earners from middle income families, and
non-residents of Peabody; therefore, Peabody does
not warrant state assistance and aid or a public
industrial park development on basis of local
employment need; nevertheless, highly attractive
features of park property, such as low real
estate taxes, comparatively low land costs, and
excellent transportation resources, may provide
Commonwealth with needed leverage for promoting
public employment opeqtives; in addition, highly
marketable industrialiland in Peabody project
is within close proximity to north shore communi-
ties which suffer from more critical unemployment
problems: (3/76) Lynn 10.5%, Salem 10.2%,
Beverley 8.2%; thus, state efforts and a public
project in Peabody may be warranted on basis of
employment need only if explicit initiatives to
provide jobs to unemployed are included as part
of project.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: despite likeli-
hood that city will bear a substantial expense
for project even with EDA grant, factors such
as large size of project, good market potential
of site, and low amount of annual tax revenues
foregone by city between time of acquisition
and disposition of land ($34,750 in '77), indi
cate that project will provide considerable net
positive fiscal flows to city if it is success-
fully marketed; project delays which have been
experienced up to present have not been costly
because tax revenues continued during period
and only minimal expenses were incurred; due
to presence of pig farm, need for access road
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to Rt. 128, extremely difficult topography, and
need for costly infrastructure improvements, it
is doubtful that, even with attractive location
of property, private development would have
proceeded on such a large scale in absence of
a public project; however, it is highly probable
that some private industrial development would
have proceeded on property if access road alone
was initiated by public sector; therefore, "net"
fiscal flows to city from project should be re-
duced somewhat to account for private develop-
ment that would have occurred with only a highway
project, although probably not enough to eliminate
significant net fiscal flows to city from project.
* Growth of the State Economy: if project even
partially fulfills its potential for providing
sites for out-of-state "blue chip" companies
interested in a regional location, it will contri-
bute to state economic growth; in addition,
location of park near intersection of Rt. 128
and 1-95 may provide more efficient space for
expanding in-state firms than is otherwise avail-
able, and, thereby, enable expansion to occur
that would not without project; furthermore, if
project achieves its potential for promoting em-
ployment objectives of state through hiring of
under- and unemployed persons in "primary labor
market" quality jobs, park will reduce fiscal
demands on Commonwealth (through lower welfare
costs, local aid, etc.) and, thereby, need for
taxation which impairs competitive position of
State for business in general.
* Employment Impacts: Redevelopment Authority
will be seeking major firms offering "primary
labor market" quality jobs; desirable features
of park may attract such firms; proximity of
park to areas of high unemployment should pro-
vide needy persons with physical access to job
sites; however, in order to insure that jobs are
made available to those persons who will provide
for maximization of state employment objectives,
an employment program must be designed and
established for park; elements of such a program
might include focusing of state's "Training
Assistance Program" to project, establishing a
different "customized manpower training program"
for park with a CETA sponsor, requiring firms
locating in park to hire a specific number of
unemployed persons as a condition of land dis-
position, linking vocational education programs
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to park or to individual firms in park, solving
transportation needs of unemployed persons from
depressed urban centers, etc.; if Authority com-
plies with EDA regulation prohibiting relocation
of businesses from other communities to park,
project will not attract firms and. jobs out of
high priority development areas as privately
developed "128" park projects have done; in sum-
mary, project offers tremendous potential for
achieving positive employment impacts, but
explicit public efforts must be made to provide
job access to those most in need.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy:
although Peabody has a strong manufacturing base,
declining leather industry continues to dominate
composition of manufacturing employment; pro-
ject should assist with transition of Peabody
economy by bringing to city industries other
than leather and, thereby, increasing diversity
of local economic base.
* Induced Impacts: construction of access road
to Rt. 128 will probably stimulate additional
private development in area.
* No Evidence of Agglomeration Economies: if
project is marketed to major firms, it is not
likely that area economies, other than general
"urbanization" economies, will play much of a
role in attracting firms; however, if firms in
leather industry or firms which sell to or buy
from leather firms move into park, project may
serve to strengthen agglomeration economies and
contribute to economic growth related to these
economies.
Adjacent to the Chapter 121B state-aided Cen-
tennial Industrial Park in Peabody is a smaller
industrial park which was developed by the
City of Peabody without any state or federal
assistance on municipally owned property. From
their experience with the first park, city
officials learned that: (a) the area was highly
attractive to industry; and (b) major firms
like Gillette were interested in the area but
the parcels in the first park were too small
for their needs. The state-aided project may
achieve its potential for attracting "blue chip"
firms if the park is well designed, strict
standards for maintenance and landscaping are
enforced, and the initial disposition of parcels
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to firms, which establish the character of the
park, are selective. The large size of the
available parcels, superior transportation
features of the park - easy access to good rail,
air, and ocean transport services and immediate
proximity to the junction of Rt. 128 and 1-95,
low cost of the land (approximately 1/2 the
cost of competing park property: $20,000/acre
versus $40,000/acre and up), and closeness to
Boston are park features which should guarantee
park marketability. The presupposition of park
desirability has been reinforced by the receipt
of numerous inquiries from interested firms
before active marketing efforts have begun. For
example, a division of Gulf and Western Industries
has expressed serious interest in the park. The
"non-relocation" provision of the EDA grant is
a desirable restriction which will lead the pro-
ject to better achieve state economic develop-
ment objectives by precluding the movement of
firms out of depressed areas into the park. The
major question with respect to the future market-
ing success of the project is the performance
of the national economy.
State assistance and aid and a public industrial
park project in Peabody are not justified on the
basis of local fiscal or employment needs, a
need to diversify the local economy, the presence
of agglomeration economies, or a potential for
induced development. A project in prosperous
Peabody can- only be justified on the basis of a
potential for contributing to aggregate state
growth through the attraction of major out-of-
state firms and a potential for meeting state
employment objectives by providing "primary labor
market" quality jobs to under- and unemployed
state residents.
Although there appears to be some legitimate
question as to whether or not the project site
is "blighted," the area contains difficult
terrain that requires costly site improvements.
Despite the excellent location of the property,
it is doubtful that a private developer would
undertake as large and costly a project, even
if the 128 access road and bridge were constructed.
However, some private development would probably
occur on the site without a public industrial
park project if the access road existed. In
any case, private development would not offer
the same potential for fostering public economic
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development objectives. Nevertheless, in order
for the project to fulfill this potential, an
explicit strategy for firm selection and an em-
ployment program to provide under- and unemployed
persons with access to and skills for jobs are
necessary. The attractiveness of the Peabody
industrial park presents the Commonwealth with
a rare opportunity for considering which firms
most satisfy state growth and employment ob-
jectives and instituting an employment program
to achieve valued objectives. The project area
is a prime site which the Commonwealth can pro-
mote to major out-of-state companies that will
find the cost of land in the park significantly
lower than in comparable parks. In order to
attract such high quality firms, the project must
be intelligently, professionally, and tastefully
managed. In order to serve public purposes, the
project must be managed with reference to state
economic development objectives.
The requirement of the local Conservation Com-
mission to preserve a wetlands area in the park
might be turned to good advantage if the scenic
value of that portion of the property can be
improved, possibly with assistance from a unit
within the Executive Office of Environmental
Affairs. DCA should provide assistance to the
project by helping the Authority to formulate
a marketing strategy, coordinating highway and
bridge construction activities with DPW, and
obtaining the cooperation of units within the
Executive Office of Economic Affairs for marketing
efforts directed at out-of-state firms, focusing
public sources of business capital to the pro-
ject, and implementing an employment program.
Inasmuch as marketing is expected to begin in
the fall of 1977, DCA should begin now to define
its role with respect to the project in discussions
with Redevelopment Authority personnel. The
Peabody Redevelopment Authority currently lacks
a precise marketing strategy for attracting
major firms. If parcels are initially marketed
to firms which construct physically unattractive
buildings or cut-up large parcels, the future
potential of the project for obtaining major-,
firms might be impaired. In addition, DCA should
obtain a copy of the Authority's application to
EDA in order to insure that its contents comply
with state rules, regulations, and policies.
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Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost
(Financial Gain):
State Payments to
Date:
Town Financial Gain:
Status:
Model Aspects:
WILMINGTON
Eames Street Industrial Park
39.6 acres; 30 disposable acres
Industrial
proposed: 75% light industry; 15% research;
10% assembly
($150,000) estimated amount by which disposition
proceeds will exceed total costs of project develop-
ment
$44,837 advance of planning funds (have not been
recaptured by state)
$194,000 estimated gain if state does not recapture
planning advance (exclusive of tax revenues)
All of project property has been disposed of to a
single redeveloper on a lease/purchase basis.
Redeveloper has sold two parcels to firms. Project
is currently at a standstill because redeveloper
lacks funding for constructing an interior road
and town refuses to pay for road. Disposition
agreement runs until end of 1977.
No state or municipal execution subsidy required:
the proceeds from land disposition exceed project
development costs; total proceeds from disposition
of project property are expected to equal $375,000
and total project development costs are expected
to amount to no more than $225,000; therefore, "net
project cost" is expected to be a net financial
gain of approximately $150,000; Redevelopment
Authority has executed a lease/purchase agreement
with a redeveloper for all of property in park at
a disposition price of $375,000 and has received
$139,232 from sale of approx. 8.5 acres by redevel-
oper to two firms; 'total project costs to 9/76,
which cover almost all of project expenses antici-
pated, were. $215,074; this figure includes $44,837
advanced by Commonwealth for planning; thus, if
state does not recapture planning advance, town
stands to gain approx. $194,000 from land assembly
and disposition ($375,000 - $225,000 + $44,000);
however, in event redeveloper fails to complete
infrastructure improvements and successfully market
property, town may *not receive full $375,000 dis-
position price agreed to in lease/purchase agree-
ment; however, inasmuch as Authority has received
$139,232 from sale of 8.5 acres (approx. $16,500/
acre), eventual disposition of remaining 22 acres
will certainly return more than $85,768 ($225,000 -
438
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$139,232) required for Authority to cover all costs
and repay $44,000 state planning advance; moreover,
terms of lease/purchase agreement executed in 6/75
call for redeveloper to make annual payments of
$9,000 (only $7,092 paid to 9/76); since Town of
Wilmington donated 30 acres of municipally owned
land for 40 acre project, financial gain from
development of project can be viewed as a return
for municipal property.
Solely a land assembly project: all project land
was disposed of by Redevelopment Authority without
any infrastructure improvements; original estimate
of $650,000 for improvements was considered to be
too severe a burden.on town finances.
* Mostly municipally owned tax title property and
streets used for project; 18 of 40 acres in project
were owned by town as a result of tax foreclosure
and an additional 12 acres consisted of streets
owned by town.
* Project is in a generally prosperous, growing,
and largely residential community; population of
town has grown from 7,039 persons in '50 to 17,102
persons in '70 or by 143% over a period Boston
Metropolitan Area population increased by 14%; many
residents of town commute to jobs in surrounding
communities; however, Wilmington has attracted
significant numbers of jobs in high wage, state
growth industry groupings of non-electrical machinery,
instruments, and chemicals and overall average
annual wage of town employment is high; statistics
on resident incomes indicate relative prosperity;
private industrial land development activity has
been strong and is expected to continue due to
advantageous location of town.
* Board of Redevelopment Authority is composed
of members of local Chamber of Commerce who initiated
project.
* Development Strategy: land in park has been
disposed of on a lease/purchase basis to a redevel-
oper who markets parcels to individual firms.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers: powers of public land
assembly were employed to clear title; for a number
of years businessmen who had sought to develop
site for industrial purposes had been frustrated by
an inability to establish clear title to some of
property.
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* State planning advance; $44,837 in state funds
were advanced for planning; advance has not been
recovered by DCA despite prospect of substantial
net financial gains to town.
* No state execution subsidy.
* No state infrastructure investment has been
directly related to development of project; however,
DCA can advance project from its present standstill
by securing funding for construction of a necessary
interior access road; inability of redeveloper to
raise financing for construction of an access road
to open up interior of park and refusal of town to
supply needed funds have prevented development and
marketing of remaining 22 acres held by redeveloper
on a lease/purchase basis; if town and Authority
agree, Commonwealth might provide a loan for con-
struction of road which could be secured by land
disposition proceeds from sales made possible by
existence of road; funding for road loan might be
obtained from DPW, federal Urban Systems monies,
or other economic development funding sources; DCA
could use loan as leverage for: (a) revising dis-
position agreement to include performance provisions,
such as specifying types of firms that are able to
locate in park and number of jobs to be provided to
unemployed persons; and (b) obtaining cooperation
of redeveloper and Authority for establishing an
employment program for park.
* Active DCA management control and assistance
efforts are required in order for project to
achieve state economic development objectives;
failure of DCA to create an adequate information
system forreporting of data on status and impacts
of project has limited ability of DCA to monitor
and assist project and Commonwealth to assess merits
of and improve design and operation of program;
absence of a state "non-relocation" regulation
comparable to EDA prohibition allows firms to move
from high priority development areas to locations
in park and, thus, allows project to subvert state
economic development goals; inasmuch as Wilmington
does not exhibit fiscal and employment needs, a
need for diversifying local economy, or evidence of
agglomeration economies, a public industrial devel-
opment project is only warranted on basis of its
potential for achieving state growth and employment
-objectives; however, failure of DCA to require and
assist in formulating an employment program for
hiring of unemployed state residents has weakened
justification for project; absence of an information
system for reporting on project impacts has deprived
DCA of data on previous locations of two firms which
have moved to park and number and characteristics
of persons employed by these two firms at present
and in past; in addition, due to absence of a
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reporting system for providing information on status
and actual costs of project, DCA has not been aware
of problem with access road or extent of financial
gain to Wilmington (which may indicate that town
should return planning advance to DCA in this case,
lack of information has especially limited DCA's
ability to exercise management control responsibilities
because absence of state execution subsidy has
deprived DCA of its primary instrument for achieving
authority (i.e. cut-off of state payments); although
DCA adopted a "hands-off" attitude with respect to
projects not receiving execution aid (partly due to
difficulty of exerting control) and local personnel
welcomed that approach, state planning funds and
eminent domain powers have been used for project and
state government has an obligation to insure that
public purposes are served by such projects; moreover,
project may subvert state economic development
objectives by attracting firms out of high priority
development areas and DCA is required by Chapter
121B rules and regulations to exercise regulatory
control over project and serve as a check on
criminal actions; in order for project to achieve
its full potential for achieving publicly valued
economic development objectives, DCA should: (a)
attempt to revise disposition agreement with redeveloper
to include performance provisions specifying a
minimum of jobs to be provided to unemployed persons
and firm selection criteria based on quality and
intensity of labor use; (b) attempt to promulgate
and enforce a "non-relocation" regualtion in order
to prohibit relocation of firms from depressed
communities to parcels in park; (c) develop an
employment program for project, with assistance of
Department of Manpower Development and cooperation
of Redevelopment Authority, to provide under- and
unemploye'd residents of Lowell, Lawrence, and other
nearby communities with access to and skills for
jobs in park; (d) attempt to secure funding for a
loan for construction of an access road in order to
advance development and marketing of project and
gain leverage for initiating other actions; (e)
obtain cooperation of Department of Commerce and
Development in promoting project to in-state and out-
of-state firms and bringing public sources of business
capital to focus on project in order to enhance
marketing efforts and gain leverage for other
actions; and (f) create an information system for
reporting of status ,and impacts of projects.
municipal: * Municipal advance of development funds; town
advanced $175,000 to Redevelopment Authority
for project expenses during land assembly phase.
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* Donation of municipally owned property; Wilmington
contributed 30 of 40 project acres; financial gain
which is expected by town can be viewed as compen-
sation for donation of municipal property.
Actors: * Town of Wilmington: advanced development expenses
and donated municipally owned property.
* Chamber of Commerce: initiated project and formed
Redevelopment Authority.
Wilmington Redevelopment Authority: was formed in
6/66 in order to undertake industrial park project;
Authority has never hired an executive director; a
member of Chamber of Commerce has directed project
efforts on a part time basis without receiving
monetary compensation.
* DCA: has played a minor role in past; DCA has exhib-
ited a "hands-off" attitude toward project because
no state execution subsidy was required; however, when
an impass was reached in negotiations between
Authority and redeveloper, a lease/purchase agree-
ment was successfully adopted at suggestion of DCA;
see above section on DCA under program components
for comments on DCA's past and future roles.
* Department of Manpower Development: should assist
in formulating and implementing an employment program
for park: ex. establishing customized manpower
training programs through TAP or a CETA sponsor,
solving worker transportation problems, establishing
training and employment referral relationships
with vocational education schools and programs, etc.;
however, ability to "tie" an employment program to
park is largely dependent upon ability of DCA to
persuade or require redeveloper to accept employ-
ment performance objectives.
*Department of Commerce and Development: should
assist by promoting park to in-state (through business
contact program) and out-of-state firms and helping
to target public sources of business capital to park,
if these actions serve to persuade Authority and
redeveloper to adopt employment performance objectives.
Performance
Process
Measures: * Implementation Process: approval for survey and
planning phase was given in 11/66 but plan was not
completed until 6/70; absence of a full-time salaried
executive director cntributed to prolonging develop-
ment process; initial contact with DCA was made in
3/66 and lease/purchase agreement with redeveloper
was executed in 6/75; process of acquiring 10
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Effectiveness
Measures:
privately owned acres proved to be more time
consuming and costly than originally planned.
* Planning: original project plan included
development of park infrastructure by Authority
but estimated $650,000 expense was considered
too severe a- burden for town.
* Marketing: in 1974 Authority negotiated a
purchase and sale agreement for entire project
with a local businessman attempting his first
industrial park real estate venture; agreed upon
disposition price of $375,000 was $131,000
greater than amount previously estimated by
Authority; however, disagreements over terms of
disposition agreement and loss of financing by
developer as economy worsened delayed disposi-
tion settlement for over two years; in early
75, a lease/purchase agreement, which reduces
developer's-need for up-front cash, was sug-
gested by DCA and agreed to by both parties;
two of ten parcels in park, 8.5 acres, were
subsequently sold to firms; however, inability
of redeveloper to raise necessary capital for a
road into park interior presently precludes
additional land sales; thus, project is current-
ly at a standstill because town refuses-to as-
sume cost of road and redeveloper lacks required
funds; attractive features (railsidings, etc.)
and excellent location of park near 1-93 (1/2
mi.) and Rt. 12a (2 mi.) suggest that marketing
will not be a problem if interior access road
is built; expanding local firms are viewed as
primary market for park.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Wilmington, as
measured by tax rate on equalized value, is
significantly lower than for most Mass. cities
(approx. $35 in '75) and has remained stable
over a number of years; town is very much a
residential community with a large middle in-
come working population which commutes to nearby
communities;' however, private industrial land
development activity has been strong over past
decade and is expected to continue due to ad-
vantages of town location (ex. "Wilmington
Office and Industrial Park" with 200-plus
acres); manufacturing now contributes approx.
57% of jobs in town -(5,689 jobs in '74: DES)
and on average offers high annual wages ($10,300
in '74: DES); project was initially justified
in 1966 as an effort to increase local tax base;
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although a public industrial development pro-
ject may have been warranted in 1966 on basis
of fiscal need, it appears that private market
activities have been strong enough to eliminate
that need.
* Employment Need: as indicated above, although
Wilmington has been, and continues to be, home
of commuters, town has experienced considerable
manufacturing growth; in '58 town employment
and payrolls were almost tripled by advent of
Research and Advanced Development of Avco Corp.;
more recently, Wilmington has attracted signifi-
cant numbers of jobs in high wage, state growth
industry groups of non-electrical machinery
(33% of total manufacturing employment; $10,000
average annual wage in '74: DES), instruments
(11% of man. employ.; $11,335 annual wage in
'74); and chemicals and allied products (7% of
man. employed.; $13,000:annual wage in '74);
overall average annual wage for all employment
in town is very high ($10,400 in '74: DES);
jobs in selected services category represent
approx. 15% of total town employment and offer
unusually high wages ($14,000 average annual
wage in '74: DES) and normally low wage jobs
in retail sector are relatively well paying-
($6,597 average annual wage in '74: DES)
general prosperity of residents is suggested by
a comparison of percentages of town population
in lowest two income groupings. with Boston
Metro. Area and state figures from 1970 Census:
incomes under $3,000 = W 4.6%, B.M.A. 6.1%,
Mass. 6.4%; from $3,000-5,999 = W 5.5%, B.M.A.
10.8%, Mass. 11.8%; thus, Wilmington does not
warrant state assistance and a public industrial
park development on basis of local employment
need; nevertheless, proximity of Wilmington to
high unemployment areas of Lowell (4/76: 10:1%)
and Lawrence (4/76:12.1%) may allow for job
access for those most in need; thus, a public
project in Wilmington may be warranted on basis
on employment need only if explicit initiatives
to provide jobs to unemployed are included as
part of project.
* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: net fiscal bene-
fits to Wilmington from project are likely to
be substantial: project utilized mostly non-
revenue producing municipally owned property,
town advanced only a modest sum for project
development as a consequerceof not adding park
infrastructure prior to disposition, disposition
. . -~..
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agreement calls for a higher price than origin-
ally estimated, town has received $139,232 from
sale of 8.5 acres, and remaining acreage should
be highly marketable due to desirable features
and location of park; town expects to gain
financial benefits of approx. $194,000 ($150,000
if $44,000 is returned to state) from assembly
and disposition phase of project; at present
time, two firms which have located in park are
contributing approx. $17,000 annually in taxes
from land which previously provided almost no
tax revenues.
* Growth of the State Economy. clearing of title
through public assembly process has enabled
development of this highly marketable property
to proceed; if in-state firms expand, businesses
start up, or out-of-state firms locate in park
due in part to increased efficiency in highway
transportation at site, project will contribute
to state economic growth; however, unless public
efforts are initiated to insure that project
achieves its potential for employing under- and
unemployed persons, park will not serve to re-
duce state fiscal demands in that manner (i.e.
lower welfare costs, reduced local- aid, -etc.)
and, thereby, need for taxation which impairs
competitive position of Commonwealth for business
in general; due to absence of detailed inform-
ation on two firms which have moved to park, it
is not known whether these two firms have added
to employment in state or provided jobs to un-
employed persons.
* Employment Impacts: achievement of state em-
ployment objectives is apparently dependent upon
state's'ability to provide access to jobs for
unemployed residents of Lowell, Lawrence, and
other communities; in addition, absence of a
"non-relocation" regulation allows for firms to
move out of high priority development areas to
park locations and, thereby, result in negative
employment impacts; due to lack of an adequate
information system for reporting on project
impacts, detailed information is not available
on employment impacts of two firms currently
located in park; although project presents great
potential for achieving positive employment im-
pacts, public initiatives necessary to in-
sure achievement of public objectives have not
occurred; inasmuch as entire property has been
disposed of by Authority to a redeveloper, it
may be difficult to implement previously dis-
cussed corrective actions.
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Narrative:
Judgement:
* No Evidence of Agglomeration Economies.
* Induced Effects: no evidence of additional
development resulting from project.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy: al-
though project should increase manufacturing
base of community, private market activities
have been accomplishing this without public pro-
jects; however, when project was just conceived
in 1966, strength of private industrial develop-
ment activity was much less evident.
The Chamber of Commerce in Wilmington initiated
this project in 1966 because the land was almost
totally unutilized, industrially zoned, close
to good highway transportation, and adjacent to
a rail line, and private attempts to-develop the
site were stymied by an inability to establish
clear title to some of the property. The limited
industrial base of Wilmington at the time con-
tributed to high per capita real estate taxes.
Members of the Chamber pushed the town to form
a Redevelopment Authority in order to seek state
assistance for the planning and developing of
the park. As a result of the high cost of site
improvements necessary for the project, the
Authority decided to sell the entire assembled
property in unimproved condition to a single re-
developer. Citizen support for the project was
strong because of the immediate and long term
fiscal gains to the town.
Public intervention was warranted in this case
because title problems precluded private develop-
ment of an unused and highly attractive industi-
ally zoned property. Wilmington's limited in-
dustrial base and high per capita real estate
taxes at the time of project initiation suggest
that publicly assisted industrial development
was an appropriate course of action.
However, although the utilization of public land
assembly powers to clear title may contribute
to state economic growth by allowing development
to proceed on this highly attractive property,
the project may not achieve public economic
development objectives due to the changing
economy of Wilmington and DCA weaknesses at pro-
ject management. State assistance and a public
industrial project in Wilmington are not justi-
fied on the basis of local fiscal or employment
needs, a need to diversify the local economy,
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the presence of agglomeration economies, or a
potential for induced development. A project
in prosperous Wilmington can only be justified
on the basis of a potential for contributing to
aggregate state growth and a potential for
meeting state employment objectives. Hence, the
absence of a state regulation prohibiting the
relocation of firms to the park from other
"ineedy" Massachusetts communities allows for
firms to move without expanding and, therefore,
without adding to state economic growth, and for
firms to leave those areas suffering most from
unemployment and fiscal strains and, therefore,
worsen state employment problems. In order to
insure that public purposes are served and not
subverted by the project, DCA should attempt to
establish a variant of EDAts "non-relocation
requirement" which would prohibit firms from
relocating out of "needy" communities to a pro-
ject in another community assisted with state
funds, state eminent domain powers, or state
technical assistance. In addition, since DCA
has failed to require actions to insure that the
project will employ currently unemployed persons,
the Wilmington project will not meet state
employment objectives.
In summary, in order for the Wilmington project
to achieve its full potentail for achieving
publicly valued economic development objectives,
DCA should: (a) attempt to revise the dis-
position agreement with the redeveloper to in-
clude performance provisions specifying a mini-
mum number of jobs to be provided to unemployed
persons and firm selection criteria on quality
and intensity of labor use; (b) attempt to
promulgate and enforce a "non-relocation" regu-
lation; (c) develop an employment program for
the project with the assistance of the Dept. of
Manpower Development and the cooperation of the
Redevelopment Authority; (d) attempt to secure
funding for a loan for construction of an access
road in order to advance -the development and
marketing of the project and gain leverage for
initiating other actions; (e) obtain the co-
operation of the Dept. of Commerce and Development
in promoting the project to in-state and out-of-
state firms and bringing public sources of
business capital to focus on the project in
order to enhance marketing efforts and gain
leverage for other actions; and (f) create an
information system for the reporting of the
status and impacts of projects.
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Location:
Project Name:
Size:
Type:
Reuse:
Net Project Cost:
State Share:
City Share:
State Payments to
Date:
Status:
Model Aspects:
WOBURN
Woburn Industrial Park
230 acres
Industrial
$3,367,526 (original budget projection)
$1,683,763 (1/2 of originally estimated net pro-
ject cost; principal only)
$1,683,763 (1/2 of estimated net project cost not
including bond interest costs which are borne
entirely by city)
$ 673,495.20 ('69-'76: 7 payments; annual pay-
ment of $84,188.15 with $74,483.43 planning ad-
vance subtracted from first payment)
All of project property has been acquired and
all public improvements, except for a bridge
and a road, have been completed. Approximately
50% of disposable park land has been sold. 95
industrial firms with their 2,227 employees are
located in park. Although project has added a
large number of jobs to Woburn and has contri-
buted to state economic growth, local and state
project management weaknesses have limited
benefits of project. DCA should assist Authority
by persuading DPW of importance of construction
of a bridge on an access road to Rt. 128.
* Large project situated at one of most attractive
industrial locations in Commonwealth: 230 acre
industrial park is located at junction of Rt. 128
and 1-93, adjacent to a Boston and Maine Rail
line; site is only 10 miles from Boston along
direct 1-93 route.
* Project in a prosperous and growing community;
population has grown from 20,492 persons in '50
to 35,329 persons in '75, despite loss of 2,077
persons between 1970 and '74; approx. 8,800
jobs were added to local economy from '50 to '74,
including approx. 3,000 manufacturing and approx.
5,000 service jobs (approx. 2,800 total jobs were
added '70-'74); continued growth is projected
due to advantageous location of city.
* Park marketed to a great number of small and
medium sized firms: with approximately 50% of
project land sold, park contains 95 industrial
firms employing from 2 to 300 persons each for
a total of 2,227 park employees; only limited
effort has been directed at attracting out-of-
state or out-of-area firms; a reliance on a "word-
of-mouth" marketing approach has led to disposi-
tions to primarily regional firms; park may be
74,
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providing relatively cheap, modern and efficient
space to small marginal firms and, thus, serving
as an "incubation" facility for small firms that
otherwise might not survive.
* Some land parcels sold by Authority to specu-
lative developers for construction of multi-
tenant industrial buildings for lease to small
firms.
* Urban renewal bonds issued by city for terms
of four years: two bond issues totaling $3,760,000
were sold with four year terms at request of
mayor in order to minimize long term interest
expenses to city; burden of bonds on tax rate
over four years contributed to defeat of mayor;
practice conflicts with principle of paying for
capital projects with long run returns from
projects; nevertheless, at present, all bonds
have been retired and no longer represent any
burden on town tax revenues and temporary tax
increase from bond servicing did not slow economic
development of Woburn.
* Development Strategies: (a) land parcels are
sold by Authority to individual firms; and (b)
land parcels are sold by Authority to speculative
builders of multi-tenant industrial structures.
Program Components:
state: * Eminent domain powers: 50 acquisitions were
completed with land damage legal actions initiated
in five cases; owner of a pig farm on site
successfully challenged relocation plan which
had been approved by DCA resulting in delay and
higher acquisition costs.
* State planning advance: state advanced
$74,438.43 for planning.
* State execution subsidy.
* State construction of a bridge over a railroad
line on access road to interstate highway
essential to project development: bridge was
originally included as part of project expenses
but plan underestimated bridge cost by 90% so
Authority turned to state DPW for assistance;
due to slow DPW development process, bridge con-
struction has not begun and truck traffic now
flows through a residential area; bridge will be
funded by DPW and Federal Highway Administration;
absence of bridge has weakened marketability of
project. 4 ,
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* Active DCA management control and assistance
efforts are required for project to achieve state
economic development objectives; Past failure
of DCA to manage project with reference to
economic development objectives and provide
technical, marketing, and coordination assistance
has resulted in implementation delays and sub-
optimal development impacts; absence of a state
"non-relocation" regulation comparable to EDA
prohibition has allowed for movement of firms
out of high priority development areas to park
locations, thereby subverting state development
goals; failure of DCA to require and assist in
formulation of an employment program for hiring
of unemployed has lessened employment benefits
from project; DCA neglect of enforcement of
suitable design and construction standards for
project has weakened physical attractiveness of
project and, thereby, reduced good park potential
for attracting out-of-state firms; failure of
DCA to coordinate activities with DPW has de-
layed completion of essential bridge which is
needed for park marketability and to eliminate
truck traffic flows through a residential area;
lack of attention by DCA to developing an
information system for reporting of project
status and impact information has deprived state
of data for monitoring implementation activities
and assessing benefits and costs of projects;
failure of DCA to establish appropriate format
for detailing project financial structure and
monitoring changes in that structure has allowed
Authority to cut back on site improvements in
order to compensate for higher than anticpated
acquisition costs without DCA's awareness and,
thereby, diminish park attractiveness for out-
of-state firms; despite these past problems
which can be related to inadequate DCA program
management, Authority director believes that
DCA should divest itself of all activities not
part of a minimal oversight role; he claims that
DCA lacks staff to expeditiously and competently
review appraisals, plans, and marketability
studies; he claims that rules and regulations
are cumbersome and reflect a lack of confidence
in ability and honesty of Redevelopment Authority
boards and staffs; he questions whether state
employees are any more honest than local people;
nevertheless, experience suggests that in order
for project to achieve publicly valued economic
development objectives DCA must: (a) help to
formulate a marketing strategy with Authority
to attract out-of-state firms interested in a
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municipal:
federal:
Actors:
regional location in order to achieve state growth
objectives, and establish criteria for firm
selection based on quality and intensity of labor
use; (b) use leverage provided by desirable
location and low land costs of project to imple-
ment an employment program directed at hiring
unemployed from nearby communities; (c) obtain
cooperation of Dept. of Commerce and Development
in marketing project to major out-of-state firms;
(d) bring public sources of business capital and
manpower training funds to focus on project by
coordinating activities with units within Executive
Office of Economic Affairs; (e) coordinate
activities with DPW to insure timely completion
of bridge; (f) promulgate and enforce a "non-
relocation" regulation which prohibits movement
of firms from other communities to project;
and (g) work with Authority to update physical
plan for park considering assets and constraints
of remaining less attractive sites.
* unicipal expenditures: two bond issues totaling
$3,760,000 were sold in 1970 with four year terms;
city has retired all bonds and paid all interest
expenses on bonds; in addition, city advanced
$25,702.72 out of general revenues for local share
of survey and planning expenses and assumed an
approximately $829,000 cost for construction of
a street out of municipal DPW funds; total city
share of net project cost is projected to be
$1,683,763 (principal only); in addition, city
assumes entire cost of bond interest expense;
however, city will also bear project costs equal
to amount of estimated disposition proceeds
($3,032,000) until such time as land is sold
($1,101,801 received to 9/76 from disposition of
approximately 50% of land) and amount by which
proceeds fall short of estimate; this assumes
gross project costs will equal estimated $6,399,526
(gross project costs to 9/76 were only $4,386,016);
furthermore, by adopting short bond period, city
also assumes some cost from advancing $1,683,763
estimated state share of net project cost which
Commonwealth pays in $84,188.15 annual install-
-ments over 20 years.
* Federal Highway Administration is funding most
of costs for construction of necessary bridge.
* City of Woburn: advance of development expenses
and state share of net project cost and assumption
of municipal share of project execution subsidy
and bond interest expenses.
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* Woburn Redevelopment Authority: Chairman of
Authority has held position since formation of
Authority in 1962; Board predominantly composed
of prominent local businessmen - company presi-
dent, business executives, accountant, postman;
initial effort of Authority was preparation of
a city master plan entitled "Community Renewal
Program for the City of Woburn"; pursuant to plan,
Woburn City Council authorized Authority in 1966
to develop an industrial park at subject site;
staff consists of a full-time executive director
and a full time assistant; Authority has main-
tained a low profile in city with little contact
with Champer of Commerce or city government;
Authority proposed a federally subsidized down-
town project which was rejected by local citizens.
* DCA: in past, its limited role in providing
assistance and weaknesses of program management
have contributed to delays and limited achieve-
ment of state economic development objectives;
future marketing and effectiveness of project
are largely dependent on ability of DCA to assist
in formulating a marketing strategy based upon
state economic development objectives, coordinate
activities of other state agencies, establish a
"non-relocation" regulation, and assist Authority
in examining physical assets and constraints of
remaining parcels in park.
* Department of Commerce and Development: should
assist in marketing project to out-of-state firms.
* Department of Public Works: responsible for
construction of a highway access road bridge
essential for marketing project and drawing truck
traffic off of residential streets.
* Department of Manpower Affairs: should assist
in formulating an employment program for project
to provide job access for unemployed with park
firms: ex. manpower training (TAP), requiring
firms to hire a certain percentage of unemployed,
solving worker transportation needs, etc.
* Federal Highway Administration: providing
funding for bridge construction needed for project;
had to make a determination as to whether bridge
caused a major or a minor impact on environment.
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Performance:
Process Measures: * Implementation Process: project implement-
ation has been subject to delays and problems
during planning and execution stages; survey
and planning phase was approved in 8/66 and pro-
ject execution was approved in 6/69; whereas
original plan called for a five year execution
phase, completion of project development, except
for bridge and one.road, and disposition of
approximately one-half of land has taken nine
years and disposition of remaining project proper-
ty is expected to require -an additional three
years; project planning was delayed when a second
plan had to be prepared because original plan
had failed to account for property topography by
ignoring presence of a large hill in project area;
numerous problems have plagued project during
execution: (a) owner of a pig farm on site
successfully contested DCA approved relocation
plan in court, and, thus, forced Authority to
prepare a new relocation plan, order new ap-
praisals for pig farm, and continue negotiations
with owner, (b) over this extended period Authority
incurred unanticipated expenditures managing
property ($129,000 compared with $78,000 budget),
(c) presence of pig farm, with piles of garbage
from refuse collection business operated from
site, caused fires, stench, and a physical eye-
sore which seriously impaired ability of Authority
to market remainder of property (in addition,
pig farm owner would confront strangers with a
hostile manner and firearms), (d) as a result of
delays, total acquisition costs were approx. 65%
greater than originally estimated ($2,720,001
compared with a $1,848,000 budget; pig farm was
acquired for $426,000 compared with an initial
appraisal of $160,000), and (e) construction of
a key bridge over railroad for direct truck
access to Rt. 128 has been delayed by slow moving
DPW planning and development process despite
Authority funding of costs for preparation of
three alternative designs for bridge in an effort
to expedite process (cost of bridge. was origin-
ally included in project budget but underestima-
tion of expense by 90% led Authority to seek
DPW assistance; DCA has never attempted to coor-
dinate activities %4ith DPW or argue for priority
for bridge project); since Authority did not
want to seek City Council approval for an in-
crease in project costs, grading and site pre-
paration improvements were cut back to compensate
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for higher than budgeted acquisition expenses
(actual Site Clearance and Improvement expense
to 9/76 was $308,000 compared with a budget of
$1,792,586); without an adequate information
system to report this change, DCA was not able
to examine possible impact of these cutbacks;
reduction in improvements has lowered physical
attractiveness of project and, thereby, reduced
marketability of park to higher quality firms;
a positive factor which has enhanced implementa-
tion process has been timely design and develop-
ment work of city public works department in
completing project site improvements; as a re-
sult of four year term of urban renewal bonds
issued for project, city experienced a rise in
tax rate over period of debt service; at present
time, acquisitions and public improvements have
been completed and 60 to 70 acres remain avail-
able for disposition.
* Planning: Authority spent approx. $100,000
for a new site plan study because original plan
had failed to take account of a hill in middle
of park site and firm demand was primarily for
small parcel sizes rather than large and medium
sizes originally designed; Authority continues
to incur expenses as parcel boundaries are re-
drawn to meet firm demands; Authority staff lacks
necessary expertise to prepare plan changes.
* Marketing: original project plan was based
on a projected market of Research and Develop-
ment firms which were locating along Rt. 128
belt during late 1960s; with cutback of NASA
funded R&D and recessionary economy this demand
evaporated; Authority has not directed marketing
effort to out-of-state or out-of-area firms but
has relied on "word-of-mouth" advertising to
promote project to area firms; a few newspaper
adds directed at national market drew little
response; Authority does not rely on a prepared
information kit or a comittee of prominent citi-
zens to market project, but prefers a "soft sell"
approach which concentrates on direct negotiation
with individual firms; Authority asks for a formal
statement of interest from developer describing
nature of business and contemplated uses for
parcel which is reviewed by Board for approval;
Authority will reject, and has rejected, low
employment warehousing uses and outside storage
facilities, but will accept distribution uses;
if a firm is interested in a purchase, agreement
"W e ..... W.W,
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can be reached in a short period of time; execu-
tive director has recently complained that com-
pliance with bidding requirements specified in
rules and regulations would eliminate such rapid
dispositions; however, director apparently mis-
understands actual advertising requirement which
does not preclude negotiations with firms but
only requires public advertising before a deal
can be closed; director claims that one firm was
forced to locate in another park because Authority
could not complete disposition process in short
enough time period; past marketing success is
attributed to excellent location of park and need
for expansion space by local firms; nevertheless,
marketing has been slow considering superior
location of park and promotional practices of
Authority appear to be partly to blame; factors
which detract from project marketability include
limited rail access in park, uneven topography,
and physically unattractive buildings constructed
in project area by speculative developer prior to
designation of area for-a park; project competes
somewhat with two adjacent privately developed
parks (one by Cabot, Cabot & Forbes) which offer
higher disposition prices and more attractive
physical settings, and market mostly to major
high quality firms seeking large parcels; in con-
trast, most of firms locating in Authority park
have been small businesses from local area;
director expects to continue marketing predomin-
antly to local firms; nevertheless, project has
attracted some out-of-state and major firms:
(a) Globe Ticket Co. relocated from Cambridge
or Boston to park with its approx. 100 employees
by employing Carlson Corp. as a turn-key developer
to acquire property and construct a building, and
(b) major HVAC firm with home offices in Pitts-
burg, which had contract for Boston's Hancock
Tower, located in park; Cambridge Tire Co. was
interested in opening a major retail outlet in
park but pulled out rather than go through process
of obtaining a local zoning permit; continued
neglect of out-of-state and major firms by
Authority may prolong disposition period and re-
duce possible benefits from project; a marketing
report prepared by U. Mass. Center for Community
Renewal Studies, which identifies target industries
and a marketing strategy directed at out-of-state
firms, has not been utilized by director because
he believes local demand is increasing with
economic recovery; director claims that IDFA and
SBA financing are available to firms locating
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Effectiveness
Measures:
in park and at least one firm has used industrial
revenue bonding for financing of plant construction.
* Fiscal Need: tax burden in Woburn, as measured
by tax rate on equalized value, is somewhat lower
than median average for Mass. cities and has
generally decreased over last few years: $56 in
'70, $39.20 in '76 (but a rise to $45 in '77);
two large industrial parks, including one privately
developed park, a number of smaller parks, and
three new major hotels have considerably increased
city tax base; in addition, city center has ex-
perienced renewed commercial activity; Woburn
manifests a broad and growing tax base; conse-
quently, Woburn does not warrant state assistance
or aid or public industrial development efforts
on basis of fiscal need.
* Employment Need: although Woburn has declined
as a major leather and shoe city, advantageous
location of city with respect to highway and rail
transport and close proximity to Boston, has
provided for a beneficial transformation and
growth of manufacturing and local economy; manu-
facturing accounts for approx. 39% (DES: 1974)
of employment in Woburn with approx. 64% of
manufacturing employment consisting of generally
high quality jobs in electrical machinery, machin-
ery (ex. electrical), chemicals, and fabricated
metal products industry groups; many firms in
these groups. are high technology businesses which
offer superior employment opportunities; unemploy-
ment has not been a major problem in city although
rate reached 8.3% in 3/76; population of Woburn
has increased by 92.5% since 1930 (to 37,407 per-
sons in '70) compared with an increase of 26.8%
for Boston Metro. Area over same period; prosperity
of residents is evident from a comparison of
percentages of city population in lowest two in-
come groupings with Boston Metro. Area and State
figures from 1970 Census: incomes under $3,000
W 3.9%, B.M.A. 6.1%, Mass. 6.4%; from $3,000 -
$5,999 = W 7.8%, B.M.A. 10.8%, Mass. 11.8%; norm-
ally modest or low wage selected services sector,
which added 2,483 jobs between '70 and '74, mani-
fests a high average annual wage ($10,284 DES: 174)
and overall average annual wage in city in 1974
was a high $10,252 according to Dept. of Employ-
ment Security data; thus, Woburn does not warrant
state assistance and aid and public industrial
development efforts on basis of local employment
need.
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* Net Municipal Fiscal Flows: despite consider-
able expense of project to City of Woburn, large
size of project, tremendous market potential,
relatively small amount of foregone annual tax
revenues ($32,984 before project), and completion
of most of development work and successful dis-
position of approx. 50% of property up to pre-
sent time indicate that project will net consider-
able positive financial flows to city; park cur-
rently returns approx. $700,000 annually to city
which is sufficient to provide city with positive
fiscal benefits when annual costs and revenues are
discounted to year of initiation of project; due
to presence of a pig farm and garbage dump, sand
and gravel pits, and refuse land-fills, and diffi-
cult topography of unimproved area, it is doubt-
ful that, even with attractive location of property,
private redevelopment would have proceeded at
this scale without a public project (owner of
pig farm would probably not have sold land for
less than an exhorbitant price, if at any price);
nevertheless, it is highly probably that some
private development would have occurred on property
without public actions; one developer had con-
structed nine speculative industrial buildings
in area prior to park designation; therefore,
"1net" fiscal flows to city from project should
be reduced somewhat to account for private develop-
ment that would have taken place, although probably
not enough to eliminate significant positive net
fiscal flows from project.
* Employment Impacts: although project has
increased number of jobs in Woburn - approx.
2,227 jobs are currently in park, a number of
factors indicate that employment benefits from
project for Commonwealth have fallen far short
of park's potential; however, due to absence of
an adequate information system for reporting
project impacts to DCA, a precise assessment of
employment impacts from project cannot be made;
despite attractive features of park for serving
as location for major out-of-state firms, as
evidenced by clientele in adjacent Cabot, Cabot
and Forbes park, Woburn project has been marketed
primarily to small local firms, many of which do
not offer "primary labor market" hquality employ-
ment; moreover in order for project in city not
suffering from local employment problems to serve
state economic development objectives related to
employing under- and unemployed persons, explicit
public strategies and programs, which were not
initiated in this instance, were necessary to
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provide jobs, training and transportation to
needy persons from communities within commuting
distance; furthermore, absence of a state "non-
relocation" regulation has allowed firms to move
out of high priority development areas to park
and, thereby, subvert public development goals;
nevertheless, firms in park may have provided
jobs to some previously unemployed persons; in
addition, jobs have been added to Commonwealth
by location of some out-of-state firms and
expanding local firms in park, which presumably
find park space more efficient than alternative
locations; moreover, marketing of modern industrial
space to many small firms (2 to 20 employees)
on a lease basis in multi-tenant buildings appears
to be serving a previously unmet "incubation"
need for start-up firms which would otherwise
rely on older less efficient space; however, if
this contention is accurate, project has failed
to maximize its potential as an incubation park
by not planning for special service needs of such
firms (ex. capital); in summary, project has
probably resulted in positive employment benefits
for state but employment impacts have been much
less favorable than those potentially derivable
from project; in addition, due to DCA weaknesses
at project management, project has contributed
to decline of more needy communities by allowing
for movement of firms out of those communities
into park locations; inasmuch as private industrial
development would probably have occurred on some
of property without public action, a publicly
assisted project was only warranted if public
economic development goals were maximized; at-
tractiveness of site and low cost of land provide
leverage needed to foster valued public objectives,
such as jobs for unemployed; in order to better
fulfill that potential through future dispositions
of land, DCA should promulgate a "non-relocation"
regulation, require an employment program for
providing job access for unemployed, obtain
assistance of Dept. of Commerce and Development
in marketing park to out-of-state firms, and
assemble data to test incubator hypothesis and
formulate a strategy for strengthening this
function if evidence supports contention.
* Growth of State Economy: by providing more
efficient space, i.e. superior transportation
resources and a modern horizontal layout, which
allowed some firms to expand that otherwise would
not have, project has contributed to growth of
state economy; in addition, by providing
WOBURN
"incubation" space to small firms, project may
have enabled firms to start-up or continue in
business that otherwise could not have survived;
however, neglect of out-of-state market has re-
duced growth benefits from project below potential
presented by highly marketable park; nevertheless,
location of a few out-of-state firms has added
new firms and employment to state economy; al-
though one cannot know if such firms would have
located in Comonwealth in any case, availability
of low cost and strategically located land cer-
tainly adds to State's ability to attract and
retain such firms; failure of DCA to utilize rare
opportunity presented by highly attractive park
to promote employment objectives of state has
limited fiscal benefits of project to state
(through lower welfare costs, city aid, etc.)
and, therefore, impact of project on reducing
state taxing needs which partly determine com-
petitive position of Commonwealth for business
in general.
* Increased Diversity of the Local Economy: econ-
omy of Woburn is well balanced with manufacturing
(39%), wholesale and retail trade (30%), and ser-
vices (18%) each contributing substantial numbers
of jobs and manufacturing employment distributed
among a variety of industry groups.
* Induced Impacts: although Authority claims
that private development of adjacent industrial
parks and nearby commercial concerns was stimu-
lated by public project, it is more probable that
private actions were motivated solely by attractive
highway transportation features of location;
nevertheless, construction of bridge for highway
access may allow for some additional private
development to occur.
* No Evidence of Agglomeration Economies.
The Woburn Industrial Park was initiated pursuant
to the master plan for the city which the Woburn
Redevelopment Authority had commissioned soon
after its formation. Private interest in the
site for industrial uses had been evident and
the prime location at the junction of Rts. 128
and 93, adjacent to a major rail line, suggested
that an industrial park would be feasible. The
stated goals of the project were the creation
of jobs and the expansion of the local tax base.
The presence of a pig farm and garbage dump,
sand and gravel pits, and refuse land-fills on
the property were serious deterrents to private
Narrative:
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development of a large industrial park on the
site. Nevertheless, a local developer had
constructed 9 speculative buildings in the area
prior to the park designation and additional
private development would most likely have
occured without the public initiative, although
not on the scale of the public project. The
speculative multi-tenant industrial buildings
constructed by the private developer prior to
the park designation do not conform to the de-
sign standards for the park, and, thus, detract
from the physical attractiveness of the property.
In addition, the physical appearance of the
project has suffered because the Authority cut
back on site improvements in order to compensate
for higher than anticipated acquisition expenses
and established lax design and construction
standards because of the weak market demand
during the recent recessionary period. While
the Authority has generally received the support
of local citizens and the city government, the
present mayor was elected on an anti-renewal
platform as a result of opposition which arose
against the previous mayor after the tax rate
was increased in order to pay off the urban
renewal bonds -over a four year term. The previous
pro-renewal mayor had decided upon this unusual
four year bond term in order to minimize long
term interest costs to the city.
Although private development would probably have
occured on the site without a public project,
state~ assistance and a public initiative may have
been justified because the difficult physical
terrain and presence of noxious uses required
considerable site improvement work and the property
was costly to acquire and difficult to assemble
and, therefore, a project of the scope of the
public effort would most likely not have emerged.
Moreover, the attractiveness of the property
offered rare potential for promoting public eco-
nomic development objectives related to employ-
ment. In addition, inasmuch as public donstruc-
tion of a highway access bridge is necessary,
a public project designed to achieve public
economic development objectives may have been
warranted to maximize the social benefits from
the bridge expenditure. Nevertheless, a public
project in Woburn was not justified on the basis
of local fiscal or employment needs and the pro-
ject which has been developed cannot be justified
on the basis of employment impacts, increased
diversity of the local economy, growth of the
'
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state economy, agglomeration economies, or in-
duced impacts. In order for the project in
prosperous Woburn to serve state economic develop-
ment objectives, a strategy for firm marketing
and selection directed at attracting out-of-
state and "primary labor market" quality firms,
an employment program for providing the unem-
ployed with access to and skills for jobs, and
a "non-relocation" regulation prohibiting the
movement of firms out of high priority development
areas to the project were necessary. The failure
to undertake such actions has seriously reduced
the benefits from the project despite the increase
in jobs which has resulted from local firm ex-
pansions and some out-of-state firm moves to
the more efficient location. In addition, small
firms may have benefited from "incubation" space
efficiencies which have supported business start-
ups and small firm survival in modern, small
leased space.
The low cost of land in the site and superior
locational features should have provided the
needed leverage for managing the project with
reference to state economic development objectives.
The lax design and construction standards for
the park and allowance of speculative multi-unit
industrial buildings have limited the attractive-
ness of the park for major firms. In addition,
the absence of a supportive framework for small
firms has limited the ability of the park to
serve as an incubation facility.
The past failures of DCA to manage the project
with reference to state economic development
objectives and provide technical, marketing, and
coordination assistance have contributed to
the delays in implementation and sub-optimal
development. Active DCA assistance must be
provided at this point to achieve publicly
valued objectives: (a) helping to formulate
a marketing strategy and firm selection criteria,
(b) assisting in designing and implementing an
employment program with the cooperation of the
Dept. of Manpower Affairs, (c) obtaining market
ing assistance from the Dept. of Commerce and
Development, (d) bringing public sources of
business capital and manpower training funds
to focus on the project, (e) coordinating activi-
ties with DPW to accomplish the timely comple-
tion of the bridge, (f) promulgating a "non-re-
location"regulation, and (g) working with the
Authority to update the physical plan.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR PROJECT CASES
For All Cases-
(1) DCA Ledger:
approved net projects cost; approved state share of
net project cost; state planning advance; annual
state payments made; amendments to net project cost
and state payments.
(2) Fiscal Year 1977 Budget for Chapter 121 B:
annual state payments budgeted for all projects.
(3) Audit Reports On Redevelopment Authorities
Prepared by Office of the State Auditor:
project acreage; estimated gross project cost; city,
state, and federal share of project cost; litigation;
brief historical accounts; receipt of planning advance
and execution funds from state; funds provided by
municipality; miscellaneous statements on project
activities; days of critical actions; approval and
receipt of federal funds; costs of contracts entered
into by Redevelopment Authority; information on
status of project; financial statements; comparison
of planned with actual expenditures by budget cat-
egories; principal expenditures over period of audit;
terms of lease and/or sale agreements; use of
eminent domain powers.
(4) Chapter 121 B Industrial Park Survey Questionnaires
(received for eight projects; extent of information
provided varied):
reuse; acreage; development strategy; available
acreage; amounts and terms of bonding; completion
of activities; sources of project financing; other
public improvements associated with developemtn of
project; firms which purchased property; availability
of SBA 502 Local Development Corporation; Redevelopment
Authority assistance to firms in obtaining capital;
taxes received from property prior to project and
currently; disposition price of property; assistance
needs from DCA.
(5) Project Summaries Prepared from File Information
and Interviews by Students from MIT or Univ. of Mass.
project history; project status; miscellaneous information
on problems and impacts; circumstances of project
initiation; dates of project approvals; condition
of land prior to project; use of eminent domain powers;
highway construction; factors contributing to
success or failure.
(6) Municipal and SMSA Monographs or Profiles Prepared
by Department of Commerce and Development:
population change; income information; age of housing;
economic history; composition of economic base
(Department of Employment Security data on employment
by sector, composition of manufacturing employment,
average annual vrages in industries and sectors);
tax rate; information for figuring equalized value
tax rate; educational facilities in area; transportation
resources and services; available industrial land
in parks; composition of regional economic base.
(7) "Financial Plight of Bay State Cities," Boston Globe,
January 11, 1977, (for cities only):
tax rate on equalized value; tax rate trend; basic
changes in economy;major influences on economic base;
major recent developments; unemployment rate.
Individual Projects
Attleboro:
Brockton:
Fitchburg:
Gardner:-
Holyoke:
Lawrence:
personal file search; annual reports of
Redevelopment Authority; no questionnaire.
no questionnaire; Donald N. Stone, "Service
Sector.Growth: Its Implications for the
Massachusetts Economy and Federal Base
Redevelopment," Boston: Harbridge House,
1975, for information on service sector;
C. Bergstrom, "Strategies for Economic
Development of Massachusetts' Old
Industrial Centers," Task Force on Capital
Formation, unpublished,for information on
unemployment rates and changes in
equalized property tax rate.
received questionnaire.
received questionnaire.
received questionnaire.
received questionnaire; Bergstrom, "Strategies..."
for information on changes in unemployment
rate, changes in equalized tax rate, and
changes in composition of manufacturing employment.
no questionnaire.Methuen:
New Bedford:
Northampton:
Palmer:
Peabody:
Wilmington:
Woburn
no questionnaire; Bergstrom, "Strategies...
for information on changes in unemployment
rate, changes in equalized tax rate, and
changes in composition of manufacturing
employment; Craig Moore.,et al., "New
Bedford-Fairhaven Route 6 Bridge Corridor
Planning Study Report," III, Dec.20, 1976,
Southeastern Regional Planning and Economic
Development District,for analyses of
economic base, off-shore oil development
impact, fishing industry, coal development,
feasibility of containerization facility,
and constraint presented by current bridge
for development.
received questionnaire.
received questionnaire; Nicholas Brand
and David Heflich, "Palmer:Industrial
Development and the A-95 Process," in
The Land Use Controversy In Massachusetts:
Case Studies And Policy Options, ed. Lawrence
Susskind, Special Commission on the Effects
of Growth Patterns on the Quality of Life
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1975,
for detailed account of history of project.
received questionnaire.
received questionnaire.
no questionnaire; informational booklet
prepared by Woburn Redevelopment Authority
in 9/76 for information on actual expenditures
compared with budget, bond issues, and
firms in park; Bergstrom, "Strategies..." for
information on changes in unemployment rates,
changes in equalized property tax rate,
and changes in composition of manufacturing
employment.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
(A) SAMPLE PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND LAND USE PLAN
FROM ACTUAL PROJECT PLAN
(B) SAMPLE PROJECT DESCRIPTION FROM ACTUAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(C) SAMPLE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND
EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM ACTUAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT
(D) SAMPLE TIMETABLE OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES FROM
ACTUAL ENVIRONMIENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(E) COPY OF DCA CHAPTER 121B INDUSTRIAL PARK SURVEY
QUESTIONNAIRE W/ COVER LETTER
(F) COPY OF DCA CHAPTER 121B INDUSTRIAL PARK REAL
ESTATE TAX SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND LETTER TO
MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS W/ COVER LETTER
(G) COPY OF DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY OF FIRMS
IN STATE-ASSISTED INDUSTRIAL PARKS
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II. Description of Project
A. Boundaries of Urban Renewal Area
The boundaries of the urban renewal area are shown on the Project Boundary
and Property Map which accompanies this plan in a separate map folder, and
are described in Enclosure No.. 1, Boundary Description.
B. Urban Renewal Plan Obiectives
1. To eliminate a blighted open area
2. To remove impediments to land disposition and development
3. To broaden the city tax base
4. To increase employment opportunities
5. To provide adequate access to the area by constructing a new street
6. To install improvements and utilities to adequately service the area
7. To provide development parcels for relocating and new industries
8. To provide an attractively planned and controlled development which
will assist and encourage the orderly growth and expansion of the City
of Fitchburg.
C. Types of Proposed Renewal Actions
1. A number of actions are proposed to transform the present blighted open
area into an industrial park. All land within the project area is pro-
posed for acquisition and redevelopment.
2. There is only one (1) structure in the project area and that is an
occupied single-family residence. It is planned to relocate the family
and demolish the structure.
3. Wyman's Brook which meanders through the project area will be relocated-
along Route 2, lowlands will be filled and the area will be graded and
landscaped to accommodate parcels of land suitable for industrial develop-
ment.
4. Project improvements are proposed to provide necessary services to the
project area. An access road to the area from Princeton Road will pro-
vide frontage to all parcels. Water service will be provided from the
present 20" water line located in the Fifth Hass. Turnpike. The City
is planning to construct a sewer line to a point on Princeton Road
opposite the location of the proposed access road to the industrial
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park. A gravity sewer in the access road through the park will provide
sewage to all parcels and will connect with the sewer line in Princeton
Road. These sewer lines will carry sewage to a new treatment plan which
will be completed in the near future (current estimate is December 1974).
Storm drainage and surface water runoff will be accommodated by a closed
drainage system and an open channel drainage system which conform to the
topography and needs of the area.
5. The project area will be developed in two phases. The eastern portion
of the area, a total of approximately forty-nine (49) acres, will be
developed in Phase I. The major actions during this phase will be the
relocation of Wyman's Brook, excavation of the highlands as fill for
low lying areas, the construction of the retention pond, construction
of approximately 2800 linear feet of the industrial road with all
utilities, and the preparation of approximately 42.5 acres of land for
industrial development. The western portion of the area, a total of
approximately forty-five (45) acres will be developed in Phase II. This
area is dominated by a large hill which if rough graded to a level pla-
teau as a project cost would be very expensive. Current plans are to
leave the area generally in its natural state and to construct the
industrial road, with all utilities, through the area in a manner which
would require minimum excavation and embankment. Further major actions
during Phase II would be predicated upon the development of the Phase I
area and requirements of developers who wish to develop the Phase II
area.
III. Land Use Plan
A. Land Use Mao
Land use and street layout shall be as shown on the Preliminary Disposition.
Plan which accompanies this report in a separate map folder.
B. Land Use Provisions and Building Recuirements
-1. Statement of Permitted Land Uses ~ permitted land uses within the project
area.shall include the following:
a.- Research, experimental or testing laboratories.
b. Office buildings, including insurance buildings.
c. Manufacturing of precision instruments, tool and die, dental, medical
and optical equipment, electrical or electronic instruments.
d. Light non-nuisance manufacturing, and manufacturing which is inciden-
tal to research and experimental laboratories, subject to a license
by the City Council after a determination as to the effect upon the
neighborhood and the City at large.
e. Service buildings, built and maintained by one or more of the per-
mitted uses, containing either or all of the following uses: res-
taurant, drug store, bank or other similar services primarily for the
use of employees of the permitted uses.
9/67
CODE NO. 201-2
f. Any use similar to a permitted use which is not otherwise prohibited
by Zoning Ordinance.
g. Any accessory use approved by the FRA and completely hidden from the
abutting streets, tracts or lots, by appropriate screening or fencing.
h. Any permitted use approved by the City Council through amendment of
the Zoning Ordinance, with subsequent approval by the FRA as a com-
patible and appropriate use for the Industrial Park.
IC(IE: Land use for trucking terminals, wholesaling, warehousing or contractorts
yard are specifically prohibited except when such use is clearly accessory
and subordinate to a permitted use.
2. Additional Regulations, Controls or Restrictions
a. Building and Site Use Standards - all parcels and buildings within
the 231 Industrial Park shall conform to the following standards:
(1) -linimum Lot Area: Two (2) acres.
(2) Minimum Lot Frontage: Two hundred (200) feet.
.(3) Minimum Setback Requirements: Fifty (50) feet from any street or
property line, except that the setback from the Fifth Massachusetts
Turnpike may be reduced to twenty (20) feet if necessary to acccm-
modate a railsiding.
(4) Building Coverage: The minimum and maximum amount of land covered
by all buildings constructed on a lot shall be as follows:
(a) Minimum lot coverage - fifteen (15) percent
(b) Maximum lot coverage - forty (40) percent
(5) Maximum Floor Area: The maximum floor area for all buildings on
a lot shall not exceed fifty (50) percent of the lot area.
6) Building Height: No building or structure shall exceed two (2)
stories or thirty-five (35) feet in height.
(7) Cutside Storage: Any outside storage approved by the FRA shall be
enclosed by an opaque fence or site obscuring screening, either
of which shall be not less than six (6) feet, nor more than
ten (10) feet in height. Cutside storage shall be-located in an
area not visible from any public roadway, including Route 2.
Equipment or materials stored in a storage area shall not extend
above the top of the fence or screening.
b. Parking and Loading Standards
(1) Parking
(a) Off-street parking spaces shall be provided in an amount
sufficient to serve each use or reuse approved for the Park
- and so located to provide safe and convenient access. Parking
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III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT
A, TYPE OF PROJECT
The 231 Industrial Park is proposed for location of the following com-
mercial and industrial facilities:
.1. Research, experimental or testing laboratories.
2. Office buildings, including insurance buildings.
-3. Manufacturing of piecision instruments, tool and die, dental, medi-
cal and optical equipment, electrical or electronic instruments.
4. Light non-nuisance manufacturing, and manufacturing which is in-
cidental to research and experimental laboratories, subject to a
license by the City Council after a determination as to the effect
upon the neighborhood and the City at large.
5. Service buildings, built and maintained by one or more of the per-
mitted uses, containing either or all of the following uses: restau-
rant, drug store, bank or other similar services primarily for the
use.of employees of the permitted uses.
6. Any use similar to a permitted use which is not otherwise prohib-
ited by Zoning Ordinance.
7. Any accessory use approved by the Fitchburg Redevelopment
Authority and completely hidden from the abutting streets, tracts
or lots, by appropriate screening or fencing.
8. Any permitted use approved by the City Council through amend-
ment of the Zoning Ordinance, with subsequent approval by the
Fitchburg Redevelopment Authority as a compatible and appropri-
ate use for the Industrial Park.
Further restriction is placed on land use for trucking terminals,
wholesaling, warehousing or as a contractor's yard. These are
specifically prohibited, except when such use is clearly accessory
and subordinate to a permitted use.
'1t~
The building and site standards are:
1. Minimum Lot Area: Two (2) acres.
2. Minimum Lot Frontage: Two hundred (200) feet.
3. Minimum Setback Requirements: Fifty (50) feet from any street'or
property line, except that the setback from the Fifth Massachusetts
Turnpike may be reduced to twenty (20) feet if necessary to accom-
modate a railsiding.
4. Building Coverage: The minimum and maximum amount of land
covered by all buildings constructed on a lot shall be as follows:
(a) Minimum lot coverage - fifteen (15) percent
(b) Maximum lot coverage - forty (40) percent
5.. Maximum Floor Area: The maximum floor area for all buildings
on a lot shall not exceed fifty (50) percent of the lot area.
6. Building Height: No building or structure shall exceed-two (2)
stories or thirty-five (35) feet in height.
7. Outside Storage: Any outside storage approved by the Fitchburg
Redevelopment Authority shall be enclosed by an opaque fence or
site obscuring screening, either of which shall be not less than six
(6) feet, nor more than ten (10) feet in height. Outside storage
- shall be located in an area not visible from any public roadway, in-
cluding Route 2. Equipment-or materials stored in a storage area
shall not extend above the top of the fence or screening.
8. The arrangement of buildings, parking and loading areas, open
spaces and landscaping shall be designed to provide an attractive
. appearance.
9. A minimum of twenty (20) percent of any parcel area shall be re-
tained without building or pavement improvements.
10. All land not improved with buildings or pavement shall be appro-
priately landscaped or left in a natural state, if adequate.
11. Insofar as possible, parking areas shall contain landscaping to the
extent of five (5) percent or more of their areas.
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PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND. BENEFITS
Objectives of the Fitchburg Redevelopment Authority include elimination
of a blighted open area, removal of impediments to land disposition and
development, broadening the City's tax base, increasing employment
opportunities, providing development parcels for relocating industries
-and new industries, and providing planned and controlled development
which will assist and encourage orderly change or growth.
Aside from the large net income through taxes resulting from the project
during and after the term of the municipal bond, the project will-increase
employment with the spinoff of increased spending money.
14-7/
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D. TIMETABLE
Development plans for tlae project area are flexible. It will either be
developed in two phases or as an entity. Phase I roads and utilities is
expected to begin in Spring 1975 and be completed by Fall 1975. Phase
IIwill be developed as disposition of Phase I parcels occur. If developed
to an entity, construction of all roads and utilities is expected to begin
in Spring 1975 and be completed by Spring 1976.
According to the Land Use and Marketability Study - 231 Industrial Park,
prepared by Ralph S. Foster Company, Inc. a minimum of 40, 000 square
feet will be constructed annually in the industrial park. This estimate
was then applied to the minimum amount of floor space that can be con-
structed during Phase I (15c land coverage on 42. 8 acres of land) under
the project controls, and resulted in an estimate of seven years to de-
velop the Phase I area. The Fitchburg Redevelopment Authority considers
this estimate to be conservative and estimates that the entire industrial
park, which could accommodate a maximum of 1, 292, 000 square feet of
floor space (40% land coverage on 74. 2 acres of land) will be developed
in ten to twelve years.
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SECRETARY
Dear
Once again the Department of Community Affairs is seeking the cooperation
and assistance of local Redevelopment Authorities by requesting information
through a survey questionnaire of industrial park projects. As in the case of
the previous questionnaire, the information is being collected as part of our
study of state-aided urban renewal being conducted with the assistance of the
MIT Department of Urban Studies a'nd Planning and the University of Massachusetts
Center for Community Renewal Studies. However, in this instance, we hope that
Redevelopment Authorities will recognize that the desired information is directly
related to assisting you in more successfully marketing your projects.
The enclosed questionnaire has been designed to collect the minimum inform-
ation necessary to accomplish a number of separate objectives. First, informa-
tion provided by Redevelopment Authorities will be used to complete question-
naires of the Economic Development Administration in order for Redevelopment
Authorities to receive computer print-outs which will identify the specific
types of firms likely to be attracted to the features of individual industrial
parks. This industrial location service will enable Redevelopment Authorities
to target marketing efforts toward particular industries. Second, information
obtained through the questionnaire will be used to devise marketing strategies
for parks with the methodology being developed at the University of Massachusetts.
Third, some of the requested information will be placed in the state-wide data
bank on available industrial property being developed by consultants at the
Department of Commerce and Development. Fourth, the questionnaire will supply
information needed by DCA to assess the current status and economic impact of
projects and identify the kinds of assistance which would prove most helpful to
Redevelopment Authorities.
Next we have made every effort to keep the questionnaire-.as-short-as-possible.
In addition., we have completed parts of the questionnaire on the basis of inform-
ation.previously collected from the files and the prior interview and questionnaire.
Please correct any information which is incorrect.
We feel that the information being requested is essential for DCA to lend
aorthwhile assistance to Redevelopment Authorities in marketing and for formulating
improvements to the 121B program. The economic information obtained will enable
DCA to set the state-aided industrial park program within the larger setting of
state economic development efforts.
(fix, coquar orpo'114tnily conlpt) vl'
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A member of the study team will be contacting you in the near future in
order to determine whether you are having any difficulty interpreting the
questionnaire or obtaining the requested information. If you have any questions,
suggestions or comments regarding the study, please contact Jero Nesson or
myself at 727-7180.
Thank you for your efforts in this matter.
Sincerely,
JOHN P. SAWYER, JR.
Director
Bureau of Urban Renewal
____ 
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DCA CHAPTER 121B
INDUSTRIAL PARK SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
INSTRUCTIONS: The information collected through this questionnaire will
be used to assist Redevelopment Authorities in marketing efforts by obtaining
. the EDA locator service and employing the marketing methodology developed
by the U. Mass. Center for Community Renewal Studies; will be placed in the
state-wide industrial property data bank and will be analyzed to suggest
improvements to the 121B program.
The questionnaire is divided into a number of sections which are labeled by
headings which identify the type of information requested. Please expand
on answers which you feel are inadequately covered by the answer categories
presented in the questionnaire. More specific or explanatory information
is always welcomed. When you are unsure about an exact number answer do
your best to estimate the likely figure and indicate that you have made an
estimate. Please fill out a separate questionaire for each industrial park
sponsored by your Redevelopment Authority. Please provide an answer to every
question and correct all inaccurate information which appears in the question-
naire.
q7S
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. INTRODUCTION
Al. Name of your industrial park:
city/town
A2. Date questionnaire is being completed:
A3. Name of individual completing questionnaire:
Title of individual:
A4. Check the current or eventual primary use of your industrial park:
general (mixed use park without a predominate use)
--research
technology
-__office
exclusive industrial district
other, describe
Estimate what percentage of the park's use will be in the following
categories upon completion of the park:
% heavy industrial ___ assembly
% light industrial % service
% office commercial/retail
% warehousing % research
% distribution % other, explain
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How many total acres are in the development?
How many total acres will be sold or leased?
How many parcels will have been sold or leased
acres
acres
when the park is completed? parcels
5. Check the category or categories which most accurately describe (s)
the strategy used to develop your park:
individual land parcels sold by the Redevelopment Authority to firms
individual land parcels sold by the Redevelopment Authority to small
speculative builders
individual land parcels leased by the Redevelopment Authority to
firms and/or speculative builders
all land in park sold to a single redeveloper who markets parcels
to individual firms
all land in park leased to a single redeveloper who sub-leases
parcels to individual firms
describe any other arrangement
\7. At the present time, how many acres remain unsold and
unleased? acres
Please list the sizes of available individual parcels and indicate if
the parcels can be subdivided:
CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THE
FOLLOWING PARCEL SIZES
acres;.
acres;
acres ;
acres; ;-;- ;
acres ; ;
acres;,,, ;
acres;-,
acres; ;
acres ;
acres;.,-,-,
acres;.
acres; ;
acres;_
acres; ;
acres;-;-;
acres; ; q77
acres; ;
acres;-,-,
or ANY SIZES
(CHECK)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16'
17
18
PARCEL
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
parcel
garcel
parcel
# ACRES
PARK DEVELOPMENT
Bl. In what year did you first offer parcels for sale or lease? 19
If you have not yet started active marketing, when do you
expect to? month 19
82. For each year please indicate which of the following activities took
place or will take place:
Activities to Note: $ value of renewal bonds floated; # and $
value of property acquisitions; beginning of site preparation work;
completion of site preparation work; beginning of construction of
public works associated with park (examples: DPW bridge; water tower;
highway access road; etc.); completion of construction of public works;
$ value of relocation payments.
YEAR ACTIVITIES
2 19
3 19
4 19
5 19
6 19
7 19
8 19
9 19
10 19
11 19
12 19
13 19
14 19
15. 19_
*Year 0 is the year prior to any acquisition by the Redevelopment Authority.
B3. What were the terms of the urban renewal bond financing?
-1st issue:
2nd issue:
year issued 19 ; amount $
interest rate %; years to maturity
year issued 19 ; amount $
interest rate %; years to maturity_ _
/78
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B4. What other sources of financing were used to develop the park?
source 1: local municipal general expenditures
use:
source 2:
source 3:
use:
use:
amount: $
amount: $
amount: $
B5. Please fill in the following information for each year:
SIZES OF NAMES OF FIRMS MOVING
YEAR PARCELS SOLD IN + OR OUT
acres, __
acres,__, -;
-acres ; - ; ;
acres; ;;-;-
acres;
acres;
acres; 
- ; - *
acres; ; - ;
acres; - ; - ;
acres; - ; - ;
acres; ;; -
acres; ; - ;-
acres; ; - ;
acres; ;; -
acres ; ;- ;
*NOTE: If park land disposed of to single redeveloper or to
builders indicate initial disposition and subsequent
of redeveloper (s) to individual firms.
B6. Has a marketing study ever been prepared for your park
the specific types of industries most likely to prefer
features of your park?
Who prepared the study?
Is it available on request? yes no
When was the study prepared?
How was it used?
speculative
sales/leases
which identifies-
the locational
'l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
15 19.
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B7. Does the Redevelopment Authority have any criteria for favoring or
rejecting part cular types of industries? yes___ no
If yes, what are these criteria?
characteristics of favored firms:
characterstics of rejected firms:
L-8o
C. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PARK
Note: The information requested in this section is needed in the specified
form in order to obtain the EDA industrial location service.
C1. Please check the utilities available and indicate the relevant quantity
measure and cost of each:
UTILITY INDUSTRIAL RATEQUANTITY
max. diam. of supply inches cents/the rm
elec.
water
sewage
coal
oil fuel
name of utility Co.
highest primary voltage Mills/RWH
max. main diam. inches cents/gal.
excess capacity over peak demand gal/day
max. main diam. inches $/mo.
treatment capacity il.gai/day
excess capacity treatment plant mil.gal/dav
$/tonavailable: yes no
available: yes no cents/gal.
C2. Please check the facilities available for the transportation of materials:
CLARIFICATION
roads within park access size (width)
navigable waterways river access (miles)
port access (miles)
railsidings
rail terminal
material transport
pipelines
parking
airports
highways
# inpark
access (miles)
access (miles)
mtrls. transported
spaces/sq, ft. of bldg.
distance (miles) freioht
miles to interstate access
es to junction of interstates
C3. What is the maximum allowable building coverage on a parcel?
'8i
_ 
gas
FACILI TY
pass.
C4. Does (will) the Redevelopment Authority strictly enforce:
* unified facade treatment yes__ no
* landscaping standards yes_ no
* constr. material standards yes__ no
D. HUMAN RESOURCES (check)
D. Availability of vocational and technical ed'cation:
located within commuting distance yes__ no
available to high school students yes no
available to adults yes no
D2 Availability of state and federal manpower training programs:
any program conducted in area since '62 yes no
available in area last year yes_ no
D3. Educational institutions:
available within community
Jr. College yes_ no
4-Yr. College yes no
Grad. Institution -yes_ no
available within commuting distance (45 minutes one-way)
Jr. College yes no
4-Yr. College yes no
Grad. Institution yes no
E. COMMUNITY SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE
El. Size of police force of officers
E2. Community fire insurance rating
E3. Industrial building fire insurance rating
E4. Assistance available to new industry through the Redevelopment Aurhority:
industrial bonds: IDFA; EDIC; other
# of industrial bonds approved in last five years
industrial zoning: strict; lenient
Redevelopment Authority assistance in making contact with sources
of capital for financing plant and equipment:
SBIC (specity)
SBA 502 Local Develop. Corp.
introductions to local bankers_
introductions to Chamber of Comm.
other
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F. FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Fl. Please provide the following inforn-ation for each yez.r:
(estimate year if you are uncertain)
YEAR ASSESSED VALUE OF TAX RATE , DISPOSITION
ALL TAX PAYING PARK $1,000 AV PRICE OF
LAND LAND
*NOTE: Year 0 is the year prior to any property acquisition by the
Redevelopment Authority.
$19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
$ $/acr.
EST. #
SQ. FT.OF
BUILDING
CONSTRUCT
sq.ft
F2. Please note any private investment which has taken place outside of
the park boundaries as a result of the development of the park:
item: Est. $:
item: Est. S:
item: Est. $:
item: Est. $:
vou'a
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G. COMPETITION
G1. Estimate how many industrial parks and how much acreage is
available in the market which directly competes with your park:
-park 1: location acreage:
park 2: location acreage:
park 3: location' acreage:
G2. How much is land selling for in the market which directly competes
with your park:
range from: $/acre to $/acre
G3. How much would you have to charge for land in order to attract
clients? $/acre
G4. Please add any comments concerning the competitive position of your
park or the need for a state-aided park in the first place:
G5. What kinds of marketing assistance from DCA would you find helpful:
access to manpower training funds: yes no
. information on sources of capital for
plant and equipment: yes no
. access to capital for plant and
equipment: yes no
. info. on the Mass. economy: yes no
. other:
H. BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS
H1. Please provide the following information on firms
to locate in the park:
located or planning
(1) Firm Name_
Address:_
Contact:_
Title:
Phone i:_
Est. I sq. ft. space:_
Fi rm Name_
Address:_
Contact:
Title:
Phone #:_
Est. # sq. ft. space:_
Firm Name_
Address:_
Contact:_
Title:
Phone #:_
Est. # sq. ft. space:_
Firm Name_
Address:
(2)
(4)
(6)
(7)
Contact:*
Title:
Phone #:_
Firm Name
Address:
a
Contact:
Title:
Phone #:
Est. # sq. ft. space:
Firm Name
Address:
Contact:
Title:
Phone #:
Est. # sq. ft. space:
Firm Name
Address:
Contact:
Title:
Phone :
Est. # sq. ft. space:_
Firm Name
Address:
Contact:
Ti tie:
Phone #:
Est. f sq. ft. space: Est. # sq. ft. space:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT
L8T-
(3)
(5)
(6)
&(ac4C42'Ofi of amMi"^ie&v cuui 9P 4 2efopmni
100 & mitiA 9Z40. 1404
AEL S. DUKAKIS 727-7765
GOVERNOR
JAM G. FLYNN
SECRETARY
March 25, 1977
Dear
As part of the questionnaire on Chapter 121B Industrial
Park projects recently sent to you, we requested information
on the annual assessed value of tax paying project property
and the municipal real estate tax rate over the period of
project life (Question Fl.). Comments from Redevelopment
Authority Directors regarding this question have indicated
that there may be some confusion with respect to the inform-
ation requested and a need to rely on local assessors' and
treasurers' offices for the data.
Concerning the nature of the information, we are seeking
the actual real estate taxes paid to the community over the
relevant period. If the Redevelopment Authority arranged to
make in lieu of tax payments or to forego taxes on Authority
owned property the actual taxes received by the municipality
will not be equal to the tax rate multiplied by the total
assessed value of the property in the project. As parcels
were sold to private owners who paid full taxes on improved
property the total actual taxes for the project would change.
In addition, taxes on parcels sold would be prorated for the
tax year. Another reason for a discrepancy between expected
and actual taxes would be tax delinquency on the part of private
owners; especially likely with respect to private owners prior
to acquisition by the Redevelopment Authority.. In any case,
we are most interested in finding out the actual year by year
tax payments to the municipality.
With respect to the second concern voiced by Directors,
we have prepared the enclosed sample request form to be forwarded
by the Redevelopment Authority to the local assessor and/or
treasurer. Please add an appropriate description(s) of all
of the project property in the space alloted; whether street
addresses or plot numbers. You may want to attach a map of the
project area.
We hope that you can appreciate the essential nature of the
OppOd4uut~J ~n~pi~iJe~
Industrial Park RAs Re: Real Estate Taxes
requested information for estimating the fiscal impacts of
projects. For projects which haven't yet sold any land or
haven't completed sales we will be projecting future tax
returns to the municipality. If tax credits were included
as part of the net project cost we will note that the state
is paying 1/2 of those foregone taxes in its annual project
payments.
In a related matter, we would like to add a question to
the questionnaire. The additional question is numbered E5.
and it reads as follows:
Please indicate if the following types of financial assistance
have been used by firms in your park and, if so, by approximately
how many:
EDIC Industrial Revenue Bonds EDA loan
IDFA Industrial Revenue Bonds EDA guarantee
SBA loans SBIC
SBA guarantee -_Mass. Bus. Develop. Corp.
others
Thank you once again for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
Jero Nesson,
Urban Renewal Coordinator
p. 2
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HAEL S. DUKAKIS 727-7765
GOVERNOR
LLIAM G. FLYNN
SECRETARY
Dear
As part of a study of state-assisted Chapter 121B
industrial park projects we are assembling information on
local real estate tax payments from projects in order to
assess the fiscal impacts of projects. The local Redevelopment
Authority is supplying related information on project
costs and impacts.
The enclosed one page questionnaire outlines the
information needed from your office. We are seeking the
actual real estate taxes paid to the community from all of
the project property over the life of the project. For a
number of different reasons the taxes actually received by the
municipality may not equal the tax rate multiplied by the
total assessed value of the property in the project. First,
the Redevelopment Authority may have arranged to make in lieu
of tax payments or to forego taxes on Authority owned property.
-Second, taxes on property sold may have been prorated for the
tax year. Third, private owners may have been tax delinquent
before selling property to the Authority or after purchasing
property from the Authority. In any case, we are most interested
in finding out the actual year by year tax payments from the
property to the municipality.
Please note that year 0 is the year prior to any project
property acquisition by the Redevelopment Authority.
If you have any questions, suggestions or comments regarding
the study, please contact me at 727-7180.
Thank you for your prompt efforts in this matter.
Sincerely,
Jero Nesson,
Urlan Renewal Coordinator
amn &9"aC oppo-aiuyi~ &rf ACV
HAEL S. DUKAKIS
GOVERNOR
LLIAM G. FLYNN
SECRETARY
&ecutia' Ofice of Communite and q)e4efopment
400 Cawe c5Le4 - £Loom 1404
.Bastor, 9Ra9acfiuseS 02202
DCA CHAPTER 121B INDUSTRIAL PARK
REAL ESTATE TAX SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
727-7765
Project Property Description:
Please
*NOTE:
YEAR
19
1 19
2 19
3 19
4 19
5 19
6 19
7 19
8 19
9 19
10 19
provide the following information for each year:
Year 0 is the year prior to any acquisition of property
by the Redevelopment Authority for this project.
ASSESSED VALUE OF ALL TAX RATE/ ACTUAL TAXES PAID
TAX PAYING PARK LAND $1,000 AV FOR ALL PROJECT LAND
$__ _ _ _ $ - $__ _ _ _
11 19
12 19
13 19
14 .19
DRAFT QUEST IONNA IRE: Survey of Firms
COMMONEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPAFTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS
Bureau of Urban Renewal
Room 100 Cambridge Street, Boston 727-7180
CONFIDENT IAL
Survey Of Firms In
State-Aided Industrial Parks
A. INTRODUCTION/GENERAL
Al. Date of completion of questionnaire:
A2. Title of individual completing questionnaire:
A3. Name of firm: (optional)
A4. Please describe the products made and/or services offered
by your firm operating at this industrial park location:
A5. In what year was your firm founded?:
A6. (a) Is your firm incorporated? yes no
(b) Is stock sold to the general public? yes no
(c) Is this a privately, held corporation? yes no
(d) other, please specify _
A7. (a) Is this company partly or wholly owned by some other
company? yes, wholly yes, partly no
(b) Where is the head office of this firm located?
city, state
A8. From the attached list of Standard Industrial Classification
Codes find the two digit (example: 34 -Fabricated Metals)
and three digit (example: 344 - Fabricated Structural Metal
Products) numbers which most accurately describe your firm's
business activity at this industrial park location:
2 digit SIC Code:
3 digit SIC Code:
A9. Does your firm rent or own space in the park?(check):
rent own
If space is leased, what is your annual rent?(optional):
$/sq. ft.
A10. What is the floor area of your park facility?: sq. ft
How much of the above area is allocated to the followin:7 uses:
office % or number of sq. ft.
warehouse __, or number of sq. ft.
assembly __ or number of sq. ft.
manufacture or number of sq. ft.
other _ or number of sq. ft.
490
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE P. 2
All. Roughly what percentage of your firm's total expenditures
at this location are devoted to research and development
at the present time? %
A12. About what proportion (percent) of your firm's current sales
from this location is made up of products or services which
were not available on the market 10 years ago?:
, please specify
B. LOCATION DECISIONS
B1. In what year did your firm begin operations in the park?
B2. Did you personally make the decision to locate in the park
or were you: responsible for making the recommendation to
locate in the park?: (check) yes no
B3. Please check the descriptive item which best characterizes
your firm's park accupancy:
firm started at location in industrial park
space in park obtained solely for expansion activities
of firm (no move from other location involved)
firm moved to park from:
prior location in same city cr town
prior location in Mass. city or town of
prior location in same metropolitan area as park
prior location in New England state of_ _
prior location in other U.S. state of
other location, please specify
B4. If your firm moved or expanded from another location, please
indicate on the following chart what your reasons were
for leaving or not expanding at your prior sites (Beside
each reason CIRCLE the number best indicating the DEGREE OF
IMPORTANCE of each reason for your location decision.)
Very Important
1
Important
2
Of No Importance
3
required expansion space not available
at present location
required expansion space difficult
and/or costly to assemble at
present location
* required 1-story layout not available
at present location
* consolidation of space not possible
at present location
* cost of space too high at present
location
* desired more attractive space
* desired more attractive physical setting
* required more parking space for employees
* required more parking space for vehicles
1 2 3
12 3
12 3
12 3
12 3
SPACE
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE: Firm Survey
Very Important
1
Important
2
Of No Importance
3
* cost of unskilled labor too high at
present location
e cost of skilled labor too high at
present location
* poor performance of unkilled labor
at present location
* poor performance of skilled labor
at present location
BETTER PROXIMITY TO:
* competitors
* business services
* skilled labor
* unskilled labor
* customers and markets
* raw materials and intermediate goods
* transportation facilities such as:
railroad siding; water frontage;
highway distribution point; airport;
please specify
*utilities such as:
water; power; fuel; machine repair
services; etc.
please specify
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
etc.
1 2 3
TAIES
ENVIRONMENT
* real estate taxes too high at present
location
* other city or state taxes too high at
present location
Dlease specify
* quality of life conditions at park
location better than at present location:
desirable residential living areas;
acceptable commuting distance; superior
quality of public schools; housing in
affordable price ranges; etc.
please specify
* too much crime and vandalism at
present location
* other, please specify
12 3
12 3
12 3
12 3
1 2 3
B5. Would your firm have located
space costs were:
20% -higher
40% higher
60% higher
80% higher
100% higher
in this park if land
yes no
yes no
yes no
yes no
yes no
'19 2-
LABOR
PROXIMITY
or
P. 3
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE: Firm Survey p. 4
B6.- What other locations did your firm consider before
locating in this park?:
B7. Why was this park picked over other sites?:
B8. Which of the following marketing strategies did the
Redevelopment Authority employ and which of these did
(would) your firm find useful and/or persuasive?: (check)
Provided Useful Persuas.
(a) Detailed information on the
local labor force
(b) Deatiled infomration on
sources of financing for plant
and equipment
(c) Access to labor training
programs
(d) Information on the city or
town
(e) Introductions to other local
businessmen
(f) Introductions to local bankers
(g) Information on the quality of
life in the area
(h) Detailed information on the
availability and cost of
utilities and fuel
(i) Detailed information on
transportation
B9. How did your firm learn of the availability of space in
the industrial park?
B10. Did your firm locate in the park due to any of the following
university related benefits of the location: (check)
yes no
(a) Opportunity for consulting assistance
from faculty
(b) Graduate level programs or university
research related to your firm's activities
(c) Availability of university library or
computer services
(d) Continuing education programs which
could improve the skills of your employees
C. EMPLOYTENT
C1. Does the number of fulltime employees at your park facility
vary depending upon time or season of the. year? In other
words, is employment seasonal?: yes __ no
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE: Firm Survey p. 5
C2. On the average how many people work at your park facility
during a business week including all hourly and salaried
personnel and yourself?
fulltime persons
part-time persons
If seasonal: Jan.- full April- ___full
Mar. part June part
April- _full Oct.- ___full
June part Dec. -part
C3. Do you have a high quit rate among your employees at the
park location?: (check) yes no
How does your present quit rate compare with prior or
other locations?:
present quit rate: higher ___ lower same
C4. What is the basic composition of your work force in
the park?:
Percent or Number
male
female
white
minority
professional-managerial
professional-technical
skilled
unskilled
C5. Please estimate how many persons working in your facility
are in the following wage or salary categories:
Annual Weekly Percent Number
Below $4,999 Below $96
$5,000 - $6,999 $9? - $134
$7,000 - $8,999 $135 - $173
$9,000 - $10,999 $174 - $211
$11,000 - $13,999 $212 - $269
$14,000 and Above $270 and Above
C6. Are there any significant problems attracting employees
to your firm?:
skilled, specify
unskilled, specify
professional, specify
E. LINKAGES
El. Roughly what proportion (percent) of the deliveries to your
facility are from suppliers located in the following areas?:
_ same city or town
% within radius of 20 miles
% within radius of 60 miles
. other within Massachusetts
New England
Rest of U.S.
Foreign
DRAFT QUEST IONNAIRa: nrm Survey
E2. Roughly what proportion (percent) of your shipping and
receiving involve the following modes of transportation:
REA, UPS & Parcel Post 5 Railroad /_
Trailer Trucking _ Aircargo
Small or Van Trucks % Water Trans. _
other, 
_% other, %
E3. Roughly what proportion (percent) of the total sales of
products and/or services from this park facility are to
the following kinds of buyers:
Other manufacturers _ Consumers directly __
Wholesalers % State Government %
Retailers Federal Government %
specify
Roughly what proportion of sales
following geographical areas?:
same city or town
% within 20 mile radius
% within 60 mile radius
% other within Mass.
go to buyers from the
0 New England
% rest of U.S.
5 Foreign
F. INDUSTRIAL PARK SERVICES
F1. There are many services and physical offerings which may be
available to occupants of an Industrial Park. Beside
each of the listed attributes please indicate with check
marks whether or not the item is (was) available and
whether or not this is (was) (would be) important to your
firm:
(a) Preconstructed buildings
available for immediate
occupancy
(b) Maintenance programs for
park aesthetics
(c) Library facilities
(d) Computer facilities
(e) Park owned small conference
facilities
(f) Hotel-restaurant complex in
close proximity to the park
(g) Shopping mall complex in
close proximity to the park
(h) Available financing for
plant and equipment
Available:
yes no
yes no
yes no
yes no
yes no-
yes_ no
yes no
yes no
Important
To Firm
yesno
yes-no
yes no
yes-no
yes-_no
yes no
yes-no
yes _no
G. LOCATION PREFERENCES
G1. If your firm were to expand, would you consider an in-city
location?: yesno
If yes, which of the following conditions would have to be
present in order for you to locate in such a site?:
close to major highway access point
industrial park setting 99
p. 6
DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE: Firm Survey p.7
1-story structure
well-engineered rehabilitated multi-story structure
port area with access to water transport
rapid access to airport
space or land costs 50% less than suburban costs
other, please specify
G2. Would your firm be interested in locating in a well engineered
rehabilitated multi-story in-city structure if:
*space costs were the same as suburban space: yes no
*space costs were 25% less than suburban: yes no
*space costs were 50% less than suburban: yes no
*space costs were 100% less than suburban: yes no
Under no circumstances would be interested:
G3. What would you say are the major advantages and disadvantages
of an in-city location:
Advantages
Disadvantages
G4. What would you say are the major advantages and disadvantages
of locating your firm in Massachusetts?:
Advantages
Disadvantages
Thank you very much for your time and effort.
